* [patch V6 01/14] MDS basics 1
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 21:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-02 0:06 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 02/14] MDS basics 2 Thomas Gleixner
` (14 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
Subject: [patch V6 01/14] x86/msr-index: Cleanup bit defines
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Greg pointed out that speculation related bit defines are using (1 << N)
format instead of BIT(N). Aside of that (1 << N) is wrong as it should use
1UL at least.
Clean it up.
[ Josh Poimboeuf: Fix tools build ]
Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
V5 -> V6: Fix tools build (Josh)
---
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 34 ++++++++++++------------
tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile | 2 -
tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile | 2 -
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
#ifndef _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H
#define _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+
/*
* CPU model specific register (MSR) numbers.
*
@@ -40,14 +42,14 @@
/* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT 1 /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictor (STIBP) bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */
#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
-#define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
#define MSR_PPIN_CTL 0x0000004e
#define MSR_PPIN 0x0000004f
@@ -69,20 +71,20 @@
#define MSR_MTRRcap 0x000000fe
#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a
-#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
-#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */
-#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH (1 << 3) /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
-#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO (1 << 4) /*
- * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
- * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
- * control required.
- */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO BIT(0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
+#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL BIT(1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH BIT(3) /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
+#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO BIT(4) /*
+ * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
+ * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
+ * control required.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
-#define L1D_FLUSH (1 << 0) /*
- * Writeback and invalidate the
- * L1 data cache.
- */
+#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*
+ * Writeback and invalidate the
+ * L1 data cache.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e
--- a/tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile
+++ b/tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ ifeq ("$(origin O)", "command line")
endif
turbostat : turbostat.c
-override CFLAGS += -Wall
+override CFLAGS += -Wall -I../../../include
override CFLAGS += -DMSRHEADER='"../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h"'
override CFLAGS += -DINTEL_FAMILY_HEADER='"../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h"'
--- a/tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile
+++ b/tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ ifeq ("$(origin O)", "command line")
endif
x86_energy_perf_policy : x86_energy_perf_policy.c
-override CFLAGS += -Wall
+override CFLAGS += -Wall -I../../../include
override CFLAGS += -DMSRHEADER='"../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h"'
%: %.c
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 01/14] MDS basics 1
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 01/14] MDS basics 1 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-02 0:06 ` Frederic Weisbecker
0 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Frederic Weisbecker @ 2019-03-02 0:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:39PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 01/14] x86/msr-index: Cleanup bit defines
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> Greg pointed out that speculation related bit defines are using (1 << N)
> format instead of BIT(N). Aside of that (1 << N) is wrong as it should use
> 1UL at least.
>
> Clean it up.
>
> [ Josh Poimboeuf: Fix tools build ]
>
> Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> ---
> V5 -> V6: Fix tools build (Josh)
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [patch V6 02/14] MDS basics 2
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 01/14] MDS basics 1 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 21:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-02 0:34 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
` (2 more replies)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 03/14] MDS basics 3 Thomas Gleixner
` (13 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 3 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
Subject: [patch V6 02/14] x86/speculation: Consolidate CPU whitelists
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The CPU vulnerability whitelists have some overlap and there are more
whitelists coming along.
Use the driver_data field in the x86_cpu_id struct to denote the
whitelisted vulnerabilities and combine all whitelists into one.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
V5 --> V6: Use a helper macro to make it more readable
Fix the AMD family 0xf-0x12 vs. ANY ordering
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -948,61 +948,72 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s
#endif
}
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_speculation[] = {
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL_MID, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_MID, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
- { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5 },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5 },
- { X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5 },
- { X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4 },
+#define NO_SPECULATION BIT(0)
+#define NO_MELTDOWN BIT(1)
+#define NO_SSB BIT(2)
+#define NO_L1TF BIT(3)
+
+#define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \
+ { X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
+
+#define VULNWL_INTEL(model, whitelist) \
+ VULNWL(INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_##model, whitelist)
+
+#define VULNWL_AMD(family, whitelist) \
+ VULNWL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist)
+
+#define VULNWL_HYGON(family, whitelist) \
+ VULNWL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist)
+
+static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
+ VULNWL(ANY, 4, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
+ VULNWL(CENTAUR, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
+ VULNWL(INTEL, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
+ VULNWL(NSC, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
+
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL, NO_SPECULATION),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET, NO_SPECULATION),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL, NO_SPECULATION),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION),
+
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
+
+ VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB),
+
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_L1TF),
+
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
+
+ /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
+ VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF),
{}
};
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = {
- { X86_VENDOR_AMD },
- { X86_VENDOR_HYGON },
- {}
-};
-
-/* Only list CPUs which speculate but are non susceptible to SSB */
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_spec_store_bypass[] = {
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_X },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM },
- { X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x12, },
- { X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x11, },
- { X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x10, },
- { X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0xf, },
- {}
-};
+static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+{
+ const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_l1tf[] = {
- /* in addition to cpu_no_speculation */
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_X },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT_MID },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_X },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL },
- { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM },
- {}
-};
+ return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
+}
static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 ia32_cap = 0;
- if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
+ if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
@@ -1011,15 +1022,14 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
- if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
- !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+ if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
- if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
+ if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1028,7 +1038,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
- if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_l1tf))
+ if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 02/14] MDS basics 2
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 02/14] MDS basics 2 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-02 0:34 ` Frederic Weisbecker
2019-03-02 8:34 ` Greg KH
2019-03-05 17:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Frederic Weisbecker @ 2019-03-02 0:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:40PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> {
> u64 ia32_cap = 0;
>
> - if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
> + if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
> return;
>
> setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
> @@ -1011,15 +1022,14 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
> if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
> rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
>
> - if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
> - !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
> + if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
Much clearer and well unified.
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 02/14] MDS basics 2
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 02/14] MDS basics 2 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-02 0:34 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
@ 2019-03-02 8:34 ` Greg KH
2019-03-05 17:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2019-03-02 8:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:40PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 02/14] x86/speculation: Consolidate CPU whitelists
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> The CPU vulnerability whitelists have some overlap and there are more
> whitelists coming along.
>
> Use the driver_data field in the x86_cpu_id struct to denote the
> whitelisted vulnerabilities and combine all whitelists into one.
>
> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 02/14] MDS basics 2
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 02/14] MDS basics 2 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-02 0:34 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
2019-03-02 8:34 ` Greg KH
@ 2019-03-05 17:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2019-03-05 17:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:40PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 02/14] x86/speculation: Consolidate CPU whitelists
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> The CPU vulnerability whitelists have some overlap and there are more
> whitelists coming along.
>
> Use the driver_data field in the x86_cpu_id struct to denote the
> whitelisted vulnerabilities and combine all whitelists into one.
>
> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> ---
>
> V5 --> V6: Use a helper macro to make it more readable
> Fix the AMD family 0xf-0x12 vs. ANY ordering
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
> 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
Yap, nice and clean.
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [patch V6 03/14] MDS basics 3
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 01/14] MDS basics 1 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 02/14] MDS basics 2 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 21:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-02 1:12 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 04/14] MDS basics 4 Thomas Gleixner
` (12 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
Subject: [patch V6 03/14] x86/speculation/mds: Add basic bug infrastructure for MDS
From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS), is a class of side channel attacks
on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are:
- Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126)
- Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130)
- Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127)
MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a
dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward
can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different
memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store
buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is
not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store
buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other.
MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage
L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response
to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load
operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is
deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which
can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can
be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between
Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible.
MLDPS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations
from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register
file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can
contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to
faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be
exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross
thread leakage is possible.
All variants have the same mitigation for single CPU thread case (SMT off),
so the kernel can treat them as one MDS issue.
Add the basic infrastructure to detect if the current CPU is affected by
MDS.
[ tglx: Rewrote changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
V5: Adopt to the consolidated quirk table
V3: Addressed Borislav's review comments
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 +++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++----------
3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -344,6 +344,7 @@
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR (18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */
#define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG (18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
@@ -381,5 +382,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
#define X86_BUG_L1TF X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
+#define X86_BUG_MDS X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@
* attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
* control required.
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO BIT(5) /*
+ * Not susceptible to
+ * Microarchitectural Data
+ * Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -952,6 +952,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s
#define NO_MELTDOWN BIT(1)
#define NO_SSB BIT(2)
#define NO_L1TF BIT(3)
+#define NO_MDS BIT(4)
#define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \
{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
@@ -971,6 +972,7 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
VULNWL(INTEL, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
VULNWL(NSC, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
+ /* Intel Family 6 */
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL, NO_SPECULATION),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET, NO_SPECULATION),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION),
@@ -987,18 +989,20 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_L1TF),
-
- VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
+
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+
+ /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
- VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+ VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
{}
};
@@ -1029,6 +1033,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
+ if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
+
if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 03/14] MDS basics 3
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 03/14] MDS basics 3 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-02 1:12 ` Frederic Weisbecker
0 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Frederic Weisbecker @ 2019-03-02 1:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:41PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 03/14] x86/speculation/mds: Add basic bug infrastructure for MDS
> + /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
> + VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
> + VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
> + VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
> + VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
Lucky guys :-)
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [patch V6 04/14] MDS basics 4
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 03/14] MDS basics 3 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 21:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-02 1:28 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
` (2 more replies)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 05/14] MDS basics 5 Thomas Gleixner
` (11 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 3 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
Subject: [patch V6 04/14] x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
This bug bit is set on CPUs which are only affected by Microarchitectural
Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) and not by any other MDS variant.
This is important because the Store Buffers are partitioned between
Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is not possible. But if a thread
enters or exits a sleep state the store buffer is repartitioned which can
expose data from one thread to the other. This transition can be mitigated.
That means that for CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS SMT can be
enabled, if the CPU is not affected by other SMT sensitive vulnerabilities,
e.g. L1TF. The XEON PHI variants fall into that category.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 10 +++++++---
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -383,5 +383,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
#define X86_BUG_L1TF X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
#define X86_BUG_MDS X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
+#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -953,6 +953,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s
#define NO_SSB BIT(2)
#define NO_L1TF BIT(3)
#define NO_MDS BIT(4)
+#define MSBDS_ONLY BIT(5)
#define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \
{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
@@ -983,8 +984,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB),
@@ -1033,8 +1034,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO))
+ if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
+ if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
+ }
if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 04/14] MDS basics 4
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 04/14] MDS basics 4 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-02 1:28 ` Frederic Weisbecker
2019-03-05 14:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-06 20:00 ` [MODERATED] " Andrew Cooper
2019-03-07 23:56 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2 siblings, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Frederic Weisbecker @ 2019-03-02 1:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:42PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 04/14] x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> This bug bit is set on CPUs which are only affected by Microarchitectural
> Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) and not by any other MDS variant.
>
> This is important because the Store Buffers are partitioned between
> Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is not possible. But if a thread
> enters or exits a sleep state the store buffer is repartitioned which can
> expose data from one thread to the other. This transition can be mitigated.
>
> That means that for CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS SMT can be
> enabled, if the CPU is not affected by other SMT sensitive vulnerabilities,
> e.g. L1TF. The XEON PHI variants fall into that category.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 10 +++++++---
> 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -383,5 +383,6 @@
> #define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
> #define X86_BUG_L1TF X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
> #define X86_BUG_MDS X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
> +#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
>
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> @@ -953,6 +953,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s
> #define NO_SSB BIT(2)
> #define NO_L1TF BIT(3)
> #define NO_MDS BIT(4)
> +#define MSBDS_ONLY BIT(5)
>
> #define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \
> { X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
> @@ -983,8 +984,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
> VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> - VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> - VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> + VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
> + VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
>
> VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB),
>
> @@ -1033,8 +1034,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
> if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
>
> - if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO))
> + if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
> setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
> + if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
> + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
> + }
>
> if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
> return;
>
It looks weird to have it as a separate bug flag and not as a subset of full
MDS such as:
#define NO_IDLE_SHARED_MDS BIT(4)
#define NO_SHARED_MDS BIT(5)
#define NO_MDS (NO_IDLE_SHARED_MDS | NO_SHARED_MDS)
Now that would probably make sense only if the mitigation of full MDS required
to also imply a VERW before entering idle (that's the mitigation of MSBDS_ONLY, right?).
Turning off SMT removes the need to do that so the layout seem to make sense as is.
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* Re: [patch V6 04/14] MDS basics 4
2019-03-02 1:28 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
@ 2019-03-05 14:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
0 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-05 14:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Sat, 2 Mar 2019, speck for Frederic Weisbecker wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:42PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
> > return;
> >
>
> It looks weird to have it as a separate bug flag and not as a subset of full
> MDS such as:
>
> #define NO_IDLE_SHARED_MDS BIT(4)
> #define NO_SHARED_MDS BIT(5)
> #define NO_MDS (NO_IDLE_SHARED_MDS | NO_SHARED_MDS)
>
> Now that would probably make sense only if the mitigation of full MDS required
> to also imply a VERW before entering idle (that's the mitigation of MSBDS_ONLY, right?).
> Turning off SMT removes the need to do that so the layout seem to make sense as is.
Yeah, I had several variants of the theme, but all of them sucked in one
way or the other.
Thanks,
tglx
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 04/14] MDS basics 4
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 04/14] MDS basics 4 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-02 1:28 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
@ 2019-03-06 20:00 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-03-06 20:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-07 23:56 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2 siblings, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Cooper @ 2019-03-06 20:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2851 bytes --]
On 01/03/2019 21:47, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 04/14] x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> This bug bit is set on CPUs which are only affected by Microarchitectural
> Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) and not by any other MDS variant.
>
> This is important because the Store Buffers are partitioned between
> Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is not possible. But if a thread
> enters or exits a sleep state the store buffer is repartitioned which can
> expose data from one thread to the other. This transition can be mitigated.
>
> That means that for CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS SMT can be
> enabled, if the CPU is not affected by other SMT sensitive vulnerabilities,
> e.g. L1TF. The XEON PHI variants fall into that category.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 10 +++++++---
> 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -383,5 +383,6 @@
> #define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
> #define X86_BUG_L1TF X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
> #define X86_BUG_MDS X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
> +#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
>
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> @@ -953,6 +953,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s
> #define NO_SSB BIT(2)
> #define NO_L1TF BIT(3)
> #define NO_MDS BIT(4)
> +#define MSBDS_ONLY BIT(5)
>
> #define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \
> { X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
> @@ -983,8 +984,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
> VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> - VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> - VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> + VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
> + VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
Looking at the table in the magic PDF, Silvermont/Airmont are MDBDS_ONLY
as well.
The model numbers listed in the Silvermont/Airmont category are 37, 4a,
4c, 4d, 5a, 5d, 6e, 65, 75.
The first 5 of those models match up with Linux's Silvermont/Airmont
names, while the last 4 are unknown. I can't locate them anywhere and
have requested clarification.
~Andrew
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* Re: [patch V6 04/14] MDS basics 4
2019-03-06 20:00 ` [MODERATED] " Andrew Cooper
@ 2019-03-06 20:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
0 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-06 20:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1256 bytes --]
On Wed, 6 Mar 2019, speck for Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 01/03/2019 21:47, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > #define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \
> > { X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
> > @@ -983,8 +984,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
> > VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> > VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> > VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> > - VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> > - VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF),
> > + VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
> > + VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
>
> Looking at the table in the magic PDF, Silvermont/Airmont are MDBDS_ONLY
> as well.
>
> The model numbers listed in the Silvermont/Airmont category are 37, 4a,
> 4c, 4d, 5a, 5d, 6e, 65, 75.
>
> The first 5 of those models match up with Linux's Silvermont/Airmont
> names, while the last 4 are unknown. I can't locate them anywhere and
> have requested clarification.
Yeah, forgot about the Silvermonts. Though the SMT problem does not exist
there as these beasts do not have HT AFAICT.
Thanks,
tglx
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 04/14] MDS basics 4
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 04/14] MDS basics 4 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-02 1:28 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
2019-03-06 20:00 ` [MODERATED] " Andrew Cooper
@ 2019-03-07 23:56 ` Andi Kleen
2019-03-08 0:36 ` Linus Torvalds
2 siblings, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Andi Kleen @ 2019-03-07 23:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:42PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 04/14] x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> This bug bit is set on CPUs which are only affected by Microarchitectural
> Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) and not by any other MDS variant.
This patch is pointless. It won't have VERW support and we don't have mitigation
for Xeon Phi because Linus rejected software sequences.
Xeon Phi will simply not be mitigated. However Xeon PHIs are not widely
used, and those that are deployed can be handled in different ways.
-Andi
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 04/14] MDS basics 4
2019-03-07 23:56 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
@ 2019-03-08 0:36 ` Linus Torvalds
0 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Linus Torvalds @ 2019-03-08 0:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 3:56 PM speck for Andi Kleen <speck@linutronix.de> wrote:
>
> Xeon Phi will simply not be mitigated. However Xeon PHIs are not widely
> used,
Heh. Understatement of the year.
> and those that are deployed can be handled in different ways.
I don't think anybody uses them in situations that would care.
The main target was HPC, I think.
So I think the "handled in different ways" ends up being "ignored", I suspect.
Linus
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [patch V6 05/14] MDS basics 5
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 04/14] MDS basics 4 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 21:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-02 1:37 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
2019-03-07 23:59 ` Andi Kleen
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 06/14] MDS basics 6 Thomas Gleixner
` (10 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 2 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [patch V6 05/14] x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests
X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is a new CPUID bit which is set when microcode
provides the mechanism to invoke a flush of various exploitable CPU buffers
by invoking the VERW instruction.
Hand it through to guests so they can adjust their mitigations.
This also requires corresponding qemu changes, which are available
separately.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -410,7 +410,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct
/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) |
- F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) | F(INTEL_STIBP);
+ F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) | F(INTEL_STIBP) |
+ F(MD_CLEAR);
/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
get_cpu();
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 05/14] MDS basics 5
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 05/14] MDS basics 5 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-02 1:37 ` Frederic Weisbecker
2019-03-07 23:59 ` Andi Kleen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Frederic Weisbecker @ 2019-03-02 1:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:43PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> Subject: [patch V6 05/14] x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests
>
> X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is a new CPUID bit which is set when microcode
> provides the mechanism to invoke a flush of various exploitable CPU buffers
> by invoking the VERW instruction.
>
> Hand it through to guests so they can adjust their mitigations.
>
> This also requires corresponding qemu changes, which are available
> separately.
>
> [ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
>
> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 05/14] MDS basics 5
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 05/14] MDS basics 5 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-02 1:37 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
@ 2019-03-07 23:59 ` Andi Kleen
2019-03-08 6:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
1 sibling, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Andi Kleen @ 2019-03-07 23:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:43PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> Subject: [patch V6 05/14] x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests
>
> X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is a new CPUID bit which is set when microcode
> provides the mechanism to invoke a flush of various exploitable CPU buffers
> by invoking the VERW instruction.
>
> Hand it through to guests so they can adjust their mitigations.
>
> This also requires corresponding qemu changes, which are available
> separately.
This patch is not complete. You also need some variant of
x86/speculation/mds: Handle VMENTRY clear for CPUs without l1tf
in my patch kit.
-Andi
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* Re: [patch V6 05/14] MDS basics 5
2019-03-07 23:59 ` Andi Kleen
@ 2019-03-08 6:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
0 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-08 6:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Thu, 7 Mar 2019, speck for Andi Kleen wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:43PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> > Subject: [patch V6 05/14] x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests
> >
> > X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is a new CPUID bit which is set when microcode
> > provides the mechanism to invoke a flush of various exploitable CPU buffers
> > by invoking the VERW instruction.
> >
> > Hand it through to guests so they can adjust their mitigations.
> >
> > This also requires corresponding qemu changes, which are available
> > separately.
>
> This patch is not complete. You also need some variant of
>
> x86/speculation/mds: Handle VMENTRY clear for CPUs without l1tf
650b68a0622f ("x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active")
Thanks,
tglx
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [patch V6 06/14] MDS basics 6
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 05/14] MDS basics 5 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 21:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-04 6:28 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 07/14] MDS basics 7 Thomas Gleixner
` (9 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
Subject: [patch V6 06/14] x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) vulernabilities are mitigated by
clearing the affected CPU buffers. The mechanism for clearing the buffers
uses the unused and obsolete VERW instruction in combination with a
microcode update which triggers a CPU buffer clear when VERW is executed.
Provide a inline function with the assembly magic. The argument of the VERW
instruction must be a memory operand as documented:
"MD_CLEAR enumerates that the memory-operand variant of VERW (for
example, VERW m16) has been extended to also overwrite buffers affected
by MDS. This buffer overwriting functionality is not guaranteed for the
register operand variant of VERW."
Documentation also recommends to use a writable data segment selector:
"The buffer overwriting occurs regardless of the result of the VERW
permission check, as well as when the selector is null or causes a
descriptor load segment violation. However, for lowest latency we
recommend using a selector that indicates a valid writable data
segment."
Add x86 specific documentation about MDS and the internal workings of the
mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
---
v4 --> V5: Fix typos and remove the conditional mode reference.
V3 --> V4: Document the segment selecor choice as well.
V2 --> V3: Add VERW documentation and fix typos/grammar..., dropped 'i(0)'
Add more details fo the documentation file
V1 --> V2: Add "cc" clobber and documentation
---
Documentation/index.rst | 1
Documentation/x86/conf.py | 10 +++
Documentation/x86/index.rst | 8 ++
Documentation/x86/mds.rst | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 25 ++++++++
5 files changed, 143 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/index.rst
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ implementation.
:maxdepth: 2
sh/index
+ x86/index
Filesystem Documentation
------------------------
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/conf.py
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8; mode: python -*-
+
+project = "X86 architecture specific documentation"
+
+tags.add("subproject")
+
+latex_documents = [
+ ('index', 'x86.tex', project,
+ 'The kernel development community', 'manual'),
+]
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+==========================
+x86 architecture specifics
+==========================
+
+.. toctree::
+ :maxdepth: 1
+
+ mds
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) mitigation
+=================================================
+
+.. _mds:
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a family of side channel attacks
+on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are:
+
+ - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126)
+ - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130)
+ - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127)
+
+MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a
+dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward
+can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different
+memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store
+buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is
+not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store
+buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other.
+
+MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage
+L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response
+to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load
+operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is
+deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which
+can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can
+be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between
+Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible.
+
+MLPDS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations
+from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register
+file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can
+contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to
+faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be
+exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross
+thread leakage is possible.
+
+
+Exposure assumptions
+--------------------
+
+It is assumed that attack code resides in user space or in a guest with one
+exception. The rationale behind this assumption is that the code construct
+needed for exploiting MDS requires:
+
+ - to control the load to trigger a fault or assist
+
+ - to have a disclosure gadget which exposes the speculatively accessed
+ data for consumption through a side channel.
+
+ - to control the pointer through which the disclosure gadget exposes the
+ data
+
+The existence of such a construct in the kernel cannot be excluded with
+100% certainty, but the complexity involved makes it extremly unlikely.
+
+There is one exception, which is untrusted BPF. The functionality of
+untrusted BPF is limited, but it needs to be thoroughly investigated
+whether it can be used to create such a construct.
+
+
+Mitigation strategy
+-------------------
+
+All variants have the same mitigation strategy at least for the single CPU
+thread case (SMT off): Force the CPU to clear the affected buffers.
+
+This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW
+instruction in combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears
+the affected CPU buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
+
+For virtualization there are two ways to achieve CPU buffer
+clearing. Either the modified VERW instruction or via the L1D Flush
+command. The latter is issued when L1TF mitigation is enabled so the extra
+VERW can be avoided. If the CPU is not affected by L1TF then VERW needs to
+be issued.
+
+If the VERW instruction with the supplied segment selector argument is
+executed on a CPU without the microcode update there is no side effect
+other than a small number of pointlessly wasted CPU cycles.
+
+This does not protect against cross Hyper-Thread attacks except for MSBDS
+which is only exploitable cross Hyper-thread when one of the Hyper-Threads
+enters a C-state.
+
+The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
+
+ mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+
+The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state
+(idle) transitions.
+
+According to current knowledge additional mitigations inside the kernel
+itself are not required because the necessary gadgets to expose the leaked
+data cannot be controlled in a way which allows exploitation from malicious
+user space or VM guests.
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -318,6 +318,31 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+#include <asm/segment.h>
+
+/**
+ * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ *
+ * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
+ * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
+ * instruction is executed.
+ */
+static inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+{
+ static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;
+
+ /*
+ * Has to be the memory-operand variant because only that
+ * guarantees the CPU buffer flush functionality according to
+ * documentation. The register-operand variant does not.
+ * Works with any segment selector, but a valid writable
+ * data segment is the fastest variant.
+ *
+ * "cc" clobber is required because VERW modifies ZF.
+ */
+ asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
+}
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Encrypted Message
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 06/14] MDS basics 6 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-04 6:28 ` Jon Masters
2019-03-05 14:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
0 siblings, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Jon Masters @ 2019-03-04 6:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/rfc822-headers; protected-headers="v1", Size: 130 bytes --]
From: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
To: speck for Thomas Gleixner <speck@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [patch V6 06/14] MDS basics 6
[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/plain, Size: 1195 bytes --]
On 3/1/19 4:47 PM, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Provide a inline function with the assembly magic. The argument of the VERW
> instruction must be a memory operand as documented:
>
> "MD_CLEAR enumerates that the memory-operand variant of VERW (for
> example, VERW m16) has been extended to also overwrite buffers affected
> by MDS. This buffer overwriting functionality is not guaranteed for the
> register operand variant of VERW."
>
> Documentation also recommends to use a writable data segment selector:
>
> "The buffer overwriting occurs regardless of the result of the VERW
> permission check, as well as when the selector is null or causes a
> descriptor load segment violation. However, for lowest latency we
> recommend using a selector that indicates a valid writable data
> segment."
Note that we raised this again with Intel last week amid Andrew's
results and they are going to get back to us if this guidance changes as
a result of further measurements on their end. It's a few cycles
difference in the Coffeelake case, but it could always be higher.
Jon.
--
Computer Architect | Sent with my Fedora powered laptop
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* Re: Encrypted Message
2019-03-04 6:28 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
@ 2019-03-05 14:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
0 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-05 14:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Mon, 4 Mar 2019, speck for Jon Masters wrote:
> > Documentation also recommends to use a writable data segment selector:
> >
> > "The buffer overwriting occurs regardless of the result of the VERW
> > permission check, as well as when the selector is null or causes a
> > descriptor load segment violation. However, for lowest latency we
> > recommend using a selector that indicates a valid writable data
> > segment."
>
> Note that we raised this again with Intel last week amid Andrew's
> results and they are going to get back to us if this guidance changes as
> a result of further measurements on their end. It's a few cycles
> difference in the Coffeelake case, but it could always be higher.
Ok. We can fix that up on top once we have final answers.
Thanks,
tglx
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [patch V6 07/14] MDS basics 7
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 06/14] MDS basics 6 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 21:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-02 2:22 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
2019-03-06 5:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 08/14] MDS basics 8 Thomas Gleixner
` (8 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 2 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
Subject: [patch V6 07/14] x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear
mechanism on exit to user space and add the call into
prepare_exit_to_usermode() and do_nmi() right before actually returning.
Add documentation which kernel to user space transition this covers and
explain why some corner cases are not mitigated.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
V4 --> v5: Use an inline helper instead of open coding it.
Rework the documentation paragraph about exceptions.
V3 --> V4: Add #DS mitigation and document that the #MC corner case
is really not interesting.
V3: Add NMI conditional on user regs and update documentation accordingly.
Use the static branch scheme suggested by Peter. Fix typos ...
---
Documentation/x86/mds.rst | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/entry/common.c | 3 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 13 ++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++
arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 4 ++
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 7 ++++
6 files changed, 82 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
@@ -97,3 +97,55 @@ According to current knowledge additiona
itself are not required because the necessary gadgets to expose the leaked
data cannot be controlled in a way which allows exploitation from malicious
user space or VM guests.
+
+Mitigation points
+-----------------
+
+1. Return to user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ When transitioning from kernel to user space the CPU buffers are flushed
+ on affected CPUs when the mitigation is not disabled on the kernel
+ command line. The migitation is enabled through the static key
+ mds_user_clear.
+
+ The mitigation is invoked in prepare_exit_to_usermode() which covers
+ most of the kernel to user space transitions. There are a few exceptions
+ which are not invoking prepare_exit_to_usermode() on return to user
+ space. These exceptions use the paranoid exit code.
+
+ - Non Maskable Interrupt (NMI):
+
+ Access to sensible data like keys, credentials in the NMI context is
+ mostly theoretical: The CPU can do prefetching or execute a
+ misspeculated code path and thereby fetching data which might end up
+ leaking through a buffer.
+
+ But for mounting other attacks the kernel stack address of the task is
+ already valuable information. So in full mitigation mode, the NMI is
+ mitigated on the return from do_nmi() to provide almost complete
+ coverage.
+
+ - Double fault (#DF):
+
+ A double fault is usually fatal, but the ESPFIX workaround, which can
+ be triggered from user space through modify_ldt(2) is a recoverable
+ double fault. #DF uses the paranoid exit path, so explicit mitigation
+ in the double fault handler is required.
+
+ - Machine Check Exception (#MC):
+
+ Another corner case is a #MC which hits between the CPU buffer clear
+ invocation and the actual return to user. As this still is in kernel
+ space it takes the paranoid exit path which does not clear the CPU
+ buffers. So the #MC handler repopulates the buffers to some
+ extent. Machine checks are not reliably controllable and the window is
+ extremly small so mitigation would just tick a checkbox that this
+ theoretical corner case is covered. To keep the amount of special
+ cases small, ignore #MC.
+
+ - Debug Exception (#DB):
+
+ This takes the paranoid exit path only when the INT1 breakpoint is in
+ kernel space. #DB on a user space address takes the regular exit path,
+ so no extra mitigation required.
--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <asm/vdso.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <trace/events/syscalls.h>
@@ -212,6 +213,8 @@ static void exit_to_usermode_loop(struct
#endif
user_enter_irqoff();
+
+ mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
}
#define SYSCALL_EXIT_WORK_FLAGS \
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -318,6 +318,8 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+
#include <asm/segment.h>
/**
@@ -343,6 +345,17 @@ static inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers
asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
}
+/**
+ * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ *
+ * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
+ */
+static inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+{
+ if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear))
+ mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+}
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
/*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_i
/* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
identify_boot_cpu();
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
#include <asm/reboot.h>
#include <asm/cache.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <trace/events/nmi.h>
@@ -533,6 +534,9 @@ do_nmi(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_
write_cr2(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2));
if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
goto nmi_restart;
+
+ if (user_mode(regs))
+ mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_nmi);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -366,6 +366,13 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struc
regs->ip = (unsigned long)general_protection;
regs->sp = (unsigned long)&gpregs->orig_ax;
+ /*
+ * This situation can be triggered by userspace via
+ * modify_ldt(2) and the return does not take the regular
+ * user space exit, so a CPU buffer clear is required when
+ * MDS mitigation is enabled.
+ */
+ mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
return;
}
#endif
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 07/14] MDS basics 7
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 07/14] MDS basics 7 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-02 2:22 ` Frederic Weisbecker
2019-03-05 15:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-06 5:21 ` Borislav Petkov
1 sibling, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Frederic Weisbecker @ 2019-03-02 2:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:45PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> +
> + - Debug Exception (#DB):
> +
> + This takes the paranoid exit path only when the INT1 breakpoint is in
> + kernel space. #DB on a user space address takes the regular exit path,
> + so no extra mitigation required.
I can't find that part in this patch, maybe it's further in the series?
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
> #include <asm/x86_init.h>
> #include <asm/reboot.h>
> #include <asm/cache.h>
> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
>
> #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
> #include <trace/events/nmi.h>
> @@ -533,6 +534,9 @@ do_nmi(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_
> write_cr2(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2));
> if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
> goto nmi_restart;
> +
> + if (user_mode(regs))
> + mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
What if the NMI fires after a call to prepare_exit_to_usermode()
but before the actual return to usermode, would that be a problem?
Thanks.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* Re: [patch V6 07/14] MDS basics 7
2019-03-02 2:22 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
@ 2019-03-05 15:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-06 15:49 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
0 siblings, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-05 15:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Sat, 2 Mar 2019, speck for Frederic Weisbecker wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:45PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > +
> > + - Debug Exception (#DB):
> > +
> > + This takes the paranoid exit path only when the INT1 breakpoint is in
> > + kernel space. #DB on a user space address takes the regular exit path,
> > + so no extra mitigation required.
>
> I can't find that part in this patch, maybe it's further in the series?
There is no patch. #DB is not interesting as explained above.
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
> > @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
> > #include <asm/x86_init.h>
> > #include <asm/reboot.h>
> > #include <asm/cache.h>
> > +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
> >
> > #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
> > #include <trace/events/nmi.h>
> > @@ -533,6 +534,9 @@ do_nmi(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_
> > write_cr2(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2));
> > if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
> > goto nmi_restart;
> > +
> > + if (user_mode(regs))
> > + mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
>
> What if the NMI fires after a call to prepare_exit_to_usermode()
> but before the actual return to usermode, would that be a problem?
Yes, it's a hole in the protection, but you would need to be able to
orchestrate that as user which I doubt you can. So the thought was that we
rather avoid the penalty for perf when it hits kernel space, which requires
root ....
Thanks,
tglx
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 07/14] MDS basics 7
2019-03-05 15:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-06 15:49 ` Frederic Weisbecker
0 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Frederic Weisbecker @ 2019-03-06 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 04:30:38PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Sat, 2 Mar 2019, speck for Frederic Weisbecker wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:45PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > > +
> > > + - Debug Exception (#DB):
> > > +
> > > + This takes the paranoid exit path only when the INT1 breakpoint is in
> > > + kernel space. #DB on a user space address takes the regular exit path,
> > > + so no extra mitigation required.
> >
> > I can't find that part in this patch, maybe it's further in the series?
>
> There is no patch. #DB is not interesting as explained above.
Oh right, my brainfart...
>
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
> > > @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
> > > #include <asm/x86_init.h>
> > > #include <asm/reboot.h>
> > > #include <asm/cache.h>
> > > +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
> > >
> > > #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
> > > #include <trace/events/nmi.h>
> > > @@ -533,6 +534,9 @@ do_nmi(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_
> > > write_cr2(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2));
> > > if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
> > > goto nmi_restart;
> > > +
> > > + if (user_mode(regs))
> > > + mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
> >
> > What if the NMI fires after a call to prepare_exit_to_usermode()
> > but before the actual return to usermode, would that be a problem?
>
> Yes, it's a hole in the protection, but you would need to be able to
> orchestrate that as user which I doubt you can. So the thought was that we
> rather avoid the penalty for perf when it hits kernel space, which requires
> root ....
Fair enough.
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 07/14] MDS basics 7
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 07/14] MDS basics 7 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-02 2:22 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
@ 2019-03-06 5:21 ` Borislav Petkov
1 sibling, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2019-03-06 5:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:45PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 07/14] x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear
> mechanism on exit to user space and add the call into
> prepare_exit_to_usermode() and do_nmi() right before actually returning.
>
> Add documentation which kernel to user space transition this covers and
> explain why some corner cases are not mitigated.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>
> ---
> V4 --> v5: Use an inline helper instead of open coding it.
> Rework the documentation paragraph about exceptions.
>
> V3 --> V4: Add #DS mitigation and document that the #MC corner case
> is really not interesting.
>
> V3: Add NMI conditional on user regs and update documentation accordingly.
> Use the static branch scheme suggested by Peter. Fix typos ...
> ---
> Documentation/x86/mds.rst | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/entry/common.c | 3 ++
> arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 13 ++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 4 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 7 ++++
> 6 files changed, 82 insertions(+)
...
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> @@ -366,6 +366,13 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struc
> regs->ip = (unsigned long)general_protection;
> regs->sp = (unsigned long)&gpregs->orig_ax;
>
> + /*
> + * This situation can be triggered by userspace via
> + * modify_ldt(2) and the return does not take the regular
> + * user space exit, so a CPU buffer clear is required when
> + * MDS mitigation is enabled.
> + */
> + mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
> return;
> }
> #endif
Looks like the traps.c change is missing a hunk, see below. Otherwise:
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c: In function ‘do_double_fault’:
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:375:3: error: implicit declaration of function ‘mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers’ [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
make[2]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:276: arch/x86/kernel/traps.o] Error 1
make[2]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:492: arch/x86/kernel] Error 2
make: *** [Makefile:1043: arch/x86] Error 2
make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
---
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 5942060dba9a..ce33f7f672d6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
#include <asm/mpx.h>
#include <asm/vm86.h>
#include <asm/umip.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
---
with that
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [patch V6 08/14] MDS basics 8
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 07/14] MDS basics 7 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 21:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-03 2:54 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
` (2 more replies)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 09/14] MDS basics 9 Thomas Gleixner
` (7 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 3 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
CPUs which are affected by L1TF and MDS mitigate MDS with the L1D Flush on
VMENTER when updated microcode is installed.
If a CPU is not affected by L1TF or if the L1D Flush is not in use, then
MDS mitigation needs to be invoked explicit.
For these cases, follow the host mitigation state and invoke the MDS
mitigation before VMENTER.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
V4 --> V5: Fix changelog
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always
/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6371,6 +6371,8 @@ static void __vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vc
if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
+ else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
+ mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
asm(
/* Store host registers */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 08/14] MDS basics 8
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 08/14] MDS basics 8 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-03 2:54 ` Frederic Weisbecker
2019-03-04 6:57 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-06 14:11 ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 08/14] MDS basics 8 Borislav Petkov
2 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Frederic Weisbecker @ 2019-03-03 2:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:46PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> CPUs which are affected by L1TF and MDS mitigate MDS with the L1D Flush on
> VMENTER when updated microcode is installed.
>
> If a CPU is not affected by L1TF or if the L1D Flush is not in use, then
> MDS mitigation needs to be invoked explicit.
>
> For these cases, follow the host mitigation state and invoke the MDS
> mitigation before VMENTER.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> ---
> V4 --> V5: Fix changelog
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 ++
> 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always
>
> /* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
> DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
>
> void __init check_bugs(void)
> {
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -6371,6 +6371,8 @@ static void __vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vc
We may want to add a comment below to summarize what's explained
in the changelog. git blame tends to lose prime history after any
future most unsignificant variable rename. Something like:
+ /* l1tf mitigation, if present, spares us mds mitigation */
> if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
> vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
> + else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
> + mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Thanks.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Encrypted Message
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 08/14] MDS basics 8 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-03 2:54 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
@ 2019-03-04 6:57 ` Jon Masters
2019-03-04 7:06 ` Jon Masters
2019-03-05 15:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-06 14:11 ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 08/14] MDS basics 8 Borislav Petkov
2 siblings, 2 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Jon Masters @ 2019-03-04 6:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/rfc822-headers; protected-headers="v1", Size: 130 bytes --]
From: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
To: speck for Thomas Gleixner <speck@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [patch V6 08/14] MDS basics 8
[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/plain, Size: 491 bytes --]
On 3/1/19 4:47 PM, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
> vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
> + else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
> + mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
Does this cover the case where we have older ucode installed that does
L1D flush but NOT the MD_CLEAR? I'm about to go check to see if there's
logic handling this but wanted to call it out.
Jon.
--
Computer Architect | Sent with my Fedora powered laptop
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [MODERATED] Encrypted Message
2019-03-04 6:57 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
@ 2019-03-04 7:06 ` Jon Masters
2019-03-04 8:12 ` Jon Masters
2019-03-05 15:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
1 sibling, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Jon Masters @ 2019-03-04 7:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/rfc822-headers; protected-headers="v1", Size: 126 bytes --]
From: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
To: speck for Jon Masters <speck@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [patch V6 08/14] MDS basics 8
[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/plain, Size: 877 bytes --]
On 3/4/19 1:57 AM, speck for Jon Masters wrote:
> On 3/1/19 4:47 PM, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
>> vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
>> + else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
>> + mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
>
> Does this cover the case where we have older ucode installed that does
> L1D flush but NOT the MD_CLEAR? I'm about to go check to see if there's
> logic handling this but wanted to call it out.
Aside from the above question, I've reviewed all of the patches
extensively at this point. Feel free to add a Reviewed-by or Tested-by
according to your preference. I've a bunch of further tests running,
including on AMD platforms just so to check nothing broke with those
platforms that are not susceptible to MDS.
Jon.
--
Computer Architect | Sent with my Fedora powered laptop
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* Re: Encrypted Message
2019-03-04 6:57 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-04 7:06 ` Jon Masters
@ 2019-03-05 15:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-06 16:21 ` [MODERATED] " Jon Masters
1 sibling, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-05 15:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Mon, 4 Mar 2019, speck for Jon Masters wrote:
> On 3/1/19 4:47 PM, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
> > vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
> > + else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
> > + mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
>
> Does this cover the case where we have older ucode installed that does
> L1D flush but NOT the MD_CLEAR? I'm about to go check to see if there's
> logic handling this but wanted to call it out.
If no updated microcode is available then it's pretty irrelevant which code
path you take. None of them will mitigate MDS.
Thanks,
tglx
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 08/14] MDS basics 8
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 08/14] MDS basics 8 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-03 2:54 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
2019-03-04 6:57 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
@ 2019-03-06 14:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2019-03-06 14:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:46PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> CPUs which are affected by L1TF and MDS mitigate MDS with the L1D Flush on
> VMENTER when updated microcode is installed.
>
> If a CPU is not affected by L1TF or if the L1D Flush is not in use, then
> MDS mitigation needs to be invoked explicit.
explicitly.
>
> For these cases, follow the host mitigation state and invoke the MDS
> mitigation before VMENTER.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> ---
> V4 --> V5: Fix changelog
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 ++
> 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
With that:
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [patch V6 09/14] MDS basics 9
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 08/14] MDS basics 8 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 21:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-06 16:14 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10 Thomas Gleixner
` (6 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
Subject: [patch V6 09/14] x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear
mechanism on idle entry. This is independent of other MDS mitigations
because the idle entry invocation to mitigate the potential leakage due to
store buffer repartitioning is only necessary on SMT systems.
Add the actual invocations to the different halt/mwait variants which
covers all usage sites. mwaitx is not patched as it's not available on
Intel CPUs.
The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
that stale data from the idling CPU is spilled to the Hyper-Thread sibling
after the Store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are available to
the non idle sibling.
When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
sibling has half of it available. Now CPU which returned from idle could be
speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling, but the buffers are
flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER.
When later on conditional buffer clearing is implemented on top of this,
then there is no action required either because before returning to user
space the context switch will set the condition flag which causes a flush
on the return to user path.
Note, that the buffer clearing on idle is only sensible on CPUs which are
solely affected by MSBDS and not any other variant of MDS because the other
MDS variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so the buffer
clearing on idle would be a window dressing exercise.
This intentionally does not handle the case in the acpi/processor_idle
driver which uses the legacy IO port interface for C-State transitions for
two reasons:
- The acpi/processor_idle driver was replaced by the intel_idle driver
almost a decade ago. Anything Nehalem upwards supports it and defaults
to that new driver.
- The legacy IO port interface is likely to be used on older and therefore
unaffected CPUs or on systems which do not receive microcode updates
anymore, so there is no point in adding that.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
V4: Export mds_idle_clear
V3: Adjust document wording
---
Documentation/x86/mds.rst | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h | 4 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h | 7 +++++
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 12 ++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++
5 files changed, 68 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
@@ -149,3 +149,45 @@ Mitigation points
This takes the paranoid exit path only when the INT1 breakpoint is in
kernel space. #DB on a user space address takes the regular exit path,
so no extra mitigation required.
+
+
+2. C-State transition
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ When a CPU goes idle and enters a C-State the CPU buffers need to be
+ cleared on affected CPUs when SMT is active. This addresses the
+ repartitioning of the store buffer when one of the Hyper-Threads enters
+ a C-State.
+
+ When SMT is inactive, i.e. either the CPU does not support it or all
+ sibling threads are offline CPU buffer clearing is not required.
+
+ The idle clearing is enabled on CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS
+ and not by any other MDS variant. The other MDS variants cannot be
+ protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks because the Fill Buffer and
+ the Load Ports are shared. So on CPUs affected by other variants, the
+ idle clearing would be a window dressing exercise and is therefore not
+ activated.
+
+ The invocation is controlled by the static key mds_idle_clear which is
+ switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of
+ the system.
+
+ The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
+ that stale data from the idling CPU from spilling to the Hyper-Thread
+ sibling after the store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are
+ available to the non idle sibling.
+
+ When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
+ sibling has half of it available. The back from idle CPU could be then
+ speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling. The buffers are
+ flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER so malicious code
+ in user space or the guest cannot speculatively access them.
+
+ The mitigation is hooked into all variants of halt()/mwait(), but does
+ not cover the legacy ACPI IO-Port mechanism because the ACPI idle driver
+ has been superseded by the intel_idle driver around 2010 and is
+ preferred on all affected CPUs which are expected to gain the MD_CLEAR
+ functionality in microcode. Aside of that the IO-Port mechanism is a
+ legacy interface which is only used on older systems which are either
+ not affected or do not receive microcode updates anymore.
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
/* Provide __cpuidle; we can't safely include <linux/cpu.h> */
#define __cpuidle __attribute__((__section__(".cpuidle.text")))
@@ -54,11 +56,13 @@ static inline void native_irq_enable(voi
static inline __cpuidle void native_safe_halt(void)
{
+ mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
asm volatile("sti; hlt": : :"memory");
}
static inline __cpuidle void native_halt(void)
{
+ mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
asm volatile("hlt": : :"memory");
}
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/idle.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#define MWAIT_SUBSTATE_MASK 0xf
#define MWAIT_CSTATE_MASK 0xf
@@ -40,6 +41,8 @@ static inline void __monitorx(const void
static inline void __mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
{
+ mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
/* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */
asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;"
:: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx));
@@ -74,6 +77,8 @@ static inline void __mwait(unsigned long
static inline void __mwaitx(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ebx,
unsigned long ecx)
{
+ /* No MDS buffer clear as this is AMD/HYGON only */
+
/* "mwaitx %eax, %ebx, %ecx;" */
asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfb;"
:: "a" (eax), "b" (ebx), "c" (ecx));
@@ -81,6 +86,8 @@ static inline void __mwaitx(unsigned lon
static inline void __sti_mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
{
+ mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
trace_hardirqs_on();
/* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */
asm volatile("sti; .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;"
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -319,6 +319,7 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
#include <asm/segment.h>
@@ -356,6 +357,17 @@ static inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_bu
mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
}
+/**
+ * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ *
+ * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
+ */
+static inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+{
+ if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear))
+ mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+}
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
/*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always
/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 09/14] MDS basics 9
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 09/14] MDS basics 9 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-06 16:14 ` Frederic Weisbecker
0 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Frederic Weisbecker @ 2019-03-06 16:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:47PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 09/14] x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear
> mechanism on idle entry. This is independent of other MDS mitigations
> because the idle entry invocation to mitigate the potential leakage due to
> store buffer repartitioning is only necessary on SMT systems.
>
> Add the actual invocations to the different halt/mwait variants which
> covers all usage sites. mwaitx is not patched as it's not available on
> Intel CPUs.
>
> The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
> that stale data from the idling CPU is spilled to the Hyper-Thread sibling
> after the Store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are available to
> the non idle sibling.
>
> When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
> sibling has half of it available. Now CPU which returned from idle could be
> speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling, but the buffers are
> flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER.
>
> When later on conditional buffer clearing is implemented on top of this,
> then there is no action required either because before returning to user
> space the context switch will set the condition flag which causes a flush
> on the return to user path.
>
> Note, that the buffer clearing on idle is only sensible on CPUs which are
> solely affected by MSBDS and not any other variant of MDS because the other
> MDS variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so the buffer
> clearing on idle would be a window dressing exercise.
>
> This intentionally does not handle the case in the acpi/processor_idle
> driver which uses the legacy IO port interface for C-State transitions for
> two reasons:
>
> - The acpi/processor_idle driver was replaced by the intel_idle driver
> almost a decade ago. Anything Nehalem upwards supports it and defaults
> to that new driver.
>
> - The legacy IO port interface is likely to be used on older and therefore
> unaffected CPUs or on systems which do not receive microcode updates
> anymore, so there is no point in adding that.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 09/14] MDS basics 9 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 21:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-04 6:45 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
` (2 more replies)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 11/14] MDS basics 11 Thomas Gleixner
` (5 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 3 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
Subject: [patch V6 10/14] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Now that the mitigations are in place, add a command line parameter to
control the mitigation, a mitigation selector function and a SMT update
mechanism.
This is the minimal straight forward initial implementation which just
provides an always on/off mode. The command line parameter is:
mds=[full|off]
This is consistent with the existing mitigations for other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.
The idle invocation is dynamically updated according to the SMT state of
the system similar to the dynamic update of the STIBP mitigation. The idle
mitigation is limited to CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS and not any
other variant, because the other variants cannot be mitigated on SMT
enabled systems.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
V5 --> V6: Make idle clearing depend on BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
V4 --> V5: Remove 'auto'
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 22 +++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 95 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2356,6 +2356,28 @@
Format: <first>,<last>
Specifies range of consoles to be captured by the MDA.
+ mds= [X86,INTEL]
+ Control mitigation for the Micro-architectural Data
+ Sampling (MDS) vulnerability.
+
+ Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU
+ internal buffers which can forward information to a
+ disclosure gadget under certain conditions.
+
+ In vulnerable processors, the speculatively
+ forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel
+ attack, to access data to which the attacker does
+ not have direct access.
+
+ This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The
+ options are:
+
+ full - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+ off - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+ mds=full.
+
mem=nn[KMG] [KNL,BOOT] Force usage of a specific amount of memory
Amount of memory to be used when the kernel is not able
to see the whole system memory or for test.
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -992,4 +992,9 @@ enum l1tf_mitigations {
extern enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation;
+enum mds_mitigations {
+ MDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ MDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+};
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -108,6 +109,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
l1tf_select_mitigation();
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -214,6 +217,50 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
}
#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MDS: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
+static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
+ [MDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [MDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers"
+};
+
+static void mds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+ else
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ }
+ pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
@@ -617,6 +664,24 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(voi
static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
}
+/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
+static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Enable the idle clearing on CPUs which are affected only by
+ * MDBDS and not any other MDS variant. The other variants cannot
+ * be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so clearing the buffers on
+ * idle would be a window dressing exercise.
+ */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+ return;
+
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+ else
+ static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+}
+
void arch_smt_update(void)
{
/* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
@@ -638,6 +703,9 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
break;
}
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL)
+ update_mds_branch_idle();
+
mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Encrypted Message
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-04 6:45 ` Jon Masters
2019-03-05 18:42 ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10 Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-06 14:31 ` [MODERATED] " Borislav Petkov
2 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Jon Masters @ 2019-03-04 6:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/rfc822-headers; protected-headers="v1", Size: 131 bytes --]
From: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
To: speck for Thomas Gleixner <speck@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10
[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/plain, Size: 306 bytes --]
On 3/1/19 4:47 PM, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> + /*
> + * Enable the idle clearing on CPUs which are affected only by
> + * MDBDS and not any other MDS variant. The other variants cannot
^^^^^
MSBDS
--
Computer Architect | Sent with my Fedora powered laptop
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-04 6:45 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
@ 2019-03-05 18:42 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-06 19:15 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-06 14:31 ` [MODERATED] " Borislav Petkov
2 siblings, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Andrea Arcangeli @ 2019-03-05 18:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
Hi Thomas,
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:48PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> +/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
> +static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Enable the idle clearing on CPUs which are affected only by
> + * MDBDS and not any other MDS variant. The other variants cannot
> + * be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so clearing the buffers on
> + * idle would be a window dressing exercise.
> + */
> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
> + return;
> +
> + if (sched_smt_active())
> + static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
Do you think it's worth also clearing
MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_RING3MWAIT_BIT by setting
ring3mwait_disabled when sched_smt_active() is true above?
I don't expect anybody will pass manually ring3mwait=disable to the
kernel on XEON_PHI_KNL/XEON_PHI_KNM. I'm not aware of any app using
the user mwait, which also makes this not a big deal.. but it goes
both ways, it's also not a big deal for userland to turn it off when
we report SMT is enabled and safe in sysfs.
Thanks,
Andrea
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* Re: [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10
2019-03-05 18:42 ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10 Andrea Arcangeli
@ 2019-03-06 19:15 ` Thomas Gleixner
0 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-06 19:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
Andrea,
On Tue, 5 Mar 2019, speck for Andrea Arcangeli wrote:
> Hi Thomas,
>
> On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:48PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > +/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
> > +static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
> > +{
> > + /*
> > + * Enable the idle clearing on CPUs which are affected only by
> > + * MDBDS and not any other MDS variant. The other variants cannot
> > + * be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so clearing the buffers on
> > + * idle would be a window dressing exercise.
> > + */
> > + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + if (sched_smt_active())
> > + static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
>
> Do you think it's worth also clearing
> MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_RING3MWAIT_BIT by setting
> ring3mwait_disabled when sched_smt_active() is true above?
Not sure.
> I don't expect anybody will pass manually ring3mwait=disable to the
> kernel on XEON_PHI_KNL/XEON_PHI_KNM. I'm not aware of any app using
> the user mwait, which also makes this not a big deal.. but it goes
> both ways, it's also not a big deal for userland to turn it off when
> we report SMT is enabled and safe in sysfs.
True and as usual we don't really know what people are doing and wreckaging
existing applications which rely on that would be not nice.
Thanks,
tglx
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-04 6:45 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-05 18:42 ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10 Andrea Arcangeli
@ 2019-03-06 14:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-03-06 15:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2 siblings, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2019-03-06 14:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:48PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 10/14] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> Now that the mitigations are in place, add a command line parameter to
> control the mitigation, a mitigation selector function and a SMT update
> mechanism.
>
> This is the minimal straight forward initial implementation which just
> provides an always on/off mode. The command line parameter is:
>
> mds=[full|off]
>
> This is consistent with the existing mitigations for other speculative
> hardware vulnerabilities.
>
> The idle invocation is dynamically updated according to the SMT state of
> the system similar to the dynamic update of the STIBP mitigation. The idle
> mitigation is limited to CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS and not any
> other variant, because the other variants cannot be mitigated on SMT
> enabled systems.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> ---
> V5 --> V6: Make idle clearing depend on BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
> V4 --> V5: Remove 'auto'
> ---
...
> @@ -617,6 +664,24 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(voi
> static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
> }
>
> +/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
> +static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Enable the idle clearing on CPUs which are affected only by
> + * MDBDS and not any other MDS variant. The other variants cannot
> + * be mitigated when SMT is enabled,
... but we're not enabling the key when SMT on those is disabled,
AFAICT. Or is that coming later?
> so clearing the buffers on
> + * idle would be a window dressing exercise.
> + */
> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug
> + return;
> +
> + if (sched_smt_active())
> + static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
> + else
> + static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
> +}
> +
> void arch_smt_update(void)
> {
> /* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
> @@ -638,6 +703,9 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
> break;
> }
>
> + if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL)
> + update_mds_branch_idle();
> +
> mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
> }
>
>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* Re: [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10
2019-03-06 14:31 ` [MODERATED] " Borislav Petkov
@ 2019-03-06 15:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-06 18:35 ` Thomas Gleixner
0 siblings, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-06 15:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Wed, 6 Mar 2019, speck for Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:48PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > +/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
> > +static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
> > +{
> > + /*
> > + * Enable the idle clearing on CPUs which are affected only by
> > + * MDBDS and not any other MDS variant. The other variants cannot
> > + * be mitigated when SMT is enabled,
>
> ... but we're not enabling the key when SMT on those is disabled,
> AFAICT. Or is that coming later?
Five lines down ....
> > so clearing the buffers on
> > + * idle would be a window dressing exercise.
> > + */
> > + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
>
> if (!boot_cpu_has_bug
Fixed.
> > + return;
> > +
> > + if (sched_smt_active())
... here is the decision whether to enable or disable.
> > + static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
> > + else
> > + static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
> > +}
Thanks,
tglx
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* Re: [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10
2019-03-06 15:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-06 18:35 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-06 19:34 ` [MODERATED] Re: " Borislav Petkov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-06 18:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Wed, 6 Mar 2019, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Wed, 6 Mar 2019, speck for Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:48PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > > +/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
> > > +static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
> > > +{
> > > + /*
> > > + * Enable the idle clearing on CPUs which are affected only by
> > > + * MDBDS and not any other MDS variant. The other variants cannot
> > > + * be mitigated when SMT is enabled,
> >
> > ... but we're not enabling the key when SMT on those is disabled,
> > AFAICT. Or is that coming later?
>
> Five lines down ....
Following up on our conversation on IRC, I've reworded the comment:
/*
* Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
* affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
*
* The other variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so
* clearing the buffers on idle just to prevent the Store Buffer
* repartitioning leak would be a window dressing exercise.
*/
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
return;
Thanks,
tglx
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Re: Re: [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10
2019-03-06 18:35 ` Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-06 19:34 ` Borislav Petkov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2019-03-06 19:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 07:35:26PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Following up on our conversation on IRC, I've reworded the comment:
>
> /*
> * Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
> * affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
> *
> * The other variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so
> * clearing the buffers on idle just to prevent the Store Buffer
> * repartitioning leak would be a window dressing exercise.
> */
> if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
> return;
Yap, looks good.
With that addressed:
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [patch V6 11/14] MDS basics 11
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 21:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 12/14] MDS basics 12 Thomas Gleixner
` (4 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
Subject: [patch V6 11/14] x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Add the sysfs reporting file for MDS. It exposes the vulnerability and
mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
V3: Copy & Paste done right :(
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++++++
include/linux/cpu.h | 2 +
4 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabi
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1170,6 +1170,22 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf
}
#endif
+static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (!hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_NATIVE)) {
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+ mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+ }
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY)) {
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "mitigated" : "disabled");
+ }
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
@@ -1236,6 +1252,10 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV))
return l1tf_show_state(buf);
break;
+
+ case X86_BUG_MDS:
+ return mds_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -1267,4 +1287,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_L1TF);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MDS);
+}
#endif
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -546,11 +546,18 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_l1tf(struct devi
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 0444, cpu_show_spec_store_bypass, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -558,6 +565,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner
&dev_attr_spectre_v2.attr,
&dev_attr_spec_store_bypass.attr,
&dev_attr_l1tf.attr,
+ &dev_attr_mds.attr,
NULL
};
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypas
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern __printf(4, 5)
struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [patch V6 12/14] MDS basics 12
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 11/14] MDS basics 11 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 21:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-04 5:47 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
` (2 more replies)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 13/14] MDS basics 13 Thomas Gleixner
` (3 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 3 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
Subject: [patch V6 12/14] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
In virtualized environments it can happen that the host has the microcode
update which utilizes the VERW instruction to clear CPU buffers, but the
hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR CPUID bit
to guests.
Introduce an internal mitigation mode VWWERV which enables the invocation
of the CPU buffer clearing even if X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is not set. If the
system has no updated microcode this results in a pointless execution of
the VERW instruction wasting a few CPU cycles. If the microcode is updated,
but not exposed to a guest then the CPU buffers will be cleared.
That said: Virtual Machines Will Eventually Receive Vaccine
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
V2 -> V3: Rename mode.
---
Documentation/x86/mds.rst | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
@@ -93,11 +93,38 @@ enters a C-state.
The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state
(idle) transitions.
+As a special quirk to address virtualization scenarios where the host has
+the microcode updated, but the hypervisor does not (yet) expose the
+MD_CLEAR CPUID bit to guests, the kernel issues the VERW instruction in the
+hope that it might actually clear the buffers. The state is reflected
+accordingly.
+
According to current knowledge additional mitigations inside the kernel
itself are not required because the necessary gadgets to expose the leaked
data cannot be controlled in a way which allows exploitation from malicious
user space or VM guests.
+Kernel internal mitigation modes
+--------------------------------
+
+ ======= ============================================================
+ off Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
+ mds=off is supplied on the kernel command line
+
+ full Mitigation is eanbled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
+ advertised in CPUID.
+
+ vmwerv Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
+ advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
+ scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
+ hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
+ effort approach without guarantee.
+ ======= ============================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and mds=off is not supplied on the kernel command
+line then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation mode depending on
+the availability of the MD_CLEAR CPUID bit.
+
Mitigation points
-----------------
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -995,6 +995,7 @@ extern enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitiga
enum mds_mitigations {
MDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
MDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+ MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,
};
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -224,7 +224,8 @@ static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigati
static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
[MDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
- [MDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers"
+ [MDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+ [MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
};
static void mds_select_mitigation(void)
@@ -235,10 +236,9 @@ static void mds_select_mitigation(void)
}
if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
- static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
- else
- mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
}
pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
}
@@ -703,8 +703,14 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
break;
}
- if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL)
+ switch(mds_mitigation) {
+ case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+ case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
update_mds_branch_idle();
+ break;
+ case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ break;
+ }
mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Encrypted Message
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 12/14] MDS basics 12 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-04 5:47 ` Jon Masters
2019-03-05 16:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-05 16:40 ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 12/14] MDS basics 12 mark gross
2019-03-06 14:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2 siblings, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Jon Masters @ 2019-03-04 5:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/rfc822-headers; protected-headers="v1", Size: 131 bytes --]
From: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
To: speck for Thomas Gleixner <speck@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [patch V6 12/14] MDS basics 12
[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/plain, Size: 1553 bytes --]
On 3/1/19 4:47 PM, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 12/14] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> In virtualized environments it can happen that the host has the microcode
> update which utilizes the VERW instruction to clear CPU buffers, but the
> hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR CPUID bit
> to guests.
>
> Introduce an internal mitigation mode VWWERV which enables the invocation
> of the CPU buffer clearing even if X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is not set. If the
> system has no updated microcode this results in a pointless execution of
> the VERW instruction wasting a few CPU cycles. If the microcode is updated,
> but not exposed to a guest then the CPU buffers will be cleared.
>
> That said: Virtual Machines Will Eventually Receive Vaccine
The effect of this patch, currently, is that a (bare metal) machine
without updated ucode will print the following:
[ 1.576602] MDS: Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode
The intention of the patch is to say "hey, you might be on a VM, so
we'll try anyway in case we didn't get told you had MD_CLEAR". But the
effect on bare metal might be ambiguous. It's reasonable (for someone
else) to assume we might be using a software sequence to try flushing.
Perhaps the wording should convey something like:
"MDS: Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers may not work, no microcode"
Jon.
--
Computer Architect | Sent with my Fedora powered laptop
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* Re: Encrypted Message
2019-03-04 5:47 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
@ 2019-03-05 16:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
0 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-05 16:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Mon, 4 Mar 2019, speck for Jon Masters wrote:
> > That said: Virtual Machines Will Eventually Receive Vaccine
>
> The effect of this patch, currently, is that a (bare metal) machine
> without updated ucode will print the following:
>
> [ 1.576602] MDS: Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode
>
> The intention of the patch is to say "hey, you might be on a VM, so
> we'll try anyway in case we didn't get told you had MD_CLEAR". But the
> effect on bare metal might be ambiguous. It's reasonable (for someone
> else) to assume we might be using a software sequence to try flushing.
>
> Perhaps the wording should convey something like:
>
> "MDS: Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers may not work, no microcode"
Yeah, we also could do something like the delta patch below:
Thanks,
tglx
8<------------------
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -228,18 +228,28 @@ static const char * const mds_strings[]
[MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
};
-static void mds_select_mitigation(void)
+static void __init mds_check_md_clear(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)) {
+ if (hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_NATIVE)) {
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+ }
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+}
+
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
return;
}
- if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
- mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
- static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
- }
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL)
+ mds_check_md_clear();
+
pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 12/14] MDS basics 12
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 12/14] MDS basics 12 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-04 5:47 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
@ 2019-03-05 16:40 ` mark gross
2019-03-06 14:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: mark gross @ 2019-03-05 16:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:50PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 12/14] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> In virtualized environments it can happen that the host has the microcode
> update which utilizes the VERW instruction to clear CPU buffers, but the
> hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR CPUID bit
> to guests.
>
> Introduce an internal mitigation mode VWWERV which enables the invocation
minor type-oh. s/VWWERV/VMWERV/
--mark
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 12/14] MDS basics 12
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 12/14] MDS basics 12 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-04 5:47 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-05 16:40 ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 12/14] MDS basics 12 mark gross
@ 2019-03-06 14:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2019-03-06 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:50PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 12/14] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> In virtualized environments it can happen that the host has the microcode
> update which utilizes the VERW instruction to clear CPU buffers, but the
> hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR CPUID bit
> to guests.
>
> Introduce an internal mitigation mode VWWERV which enables the invocation
> of the CPU buffer clearing even if X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is not set. If the
> system has no updated microcode this results in a pointless execution of
> the VERW instruction wasting a few CPU cycles. If the microcode is updated,
> but not exposed to a guest then the CPU buffers will be cleared.
>
> That said: Virtual Machines Will Eventually Receive Vaccine
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> ---
> V2 -> V3: Rename mode.
> ---
> Documentation/x86/mds.rst | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
> 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
...
> @@ -235,10 +236,9 @@ static void mds_select_mitigation(void)
> }
>
> if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
> - static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
> - else
> - mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
> + mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
> + static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
> }
> pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
> }
> @@ -703,8 +703,14 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
> break;
> }
>
> - if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL)
> + switch(mds_mitigation) {
ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '('
#119: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:706:
+ switch(mds_mitigation) {
with that addressed:
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [patch V6 13/14] MDS basics 13
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 12/14] MDS basics 12 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 21:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-03 4:01 ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-05 16:43 ` [MODERATED] " mark gross
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 14/14] MDS basics 14 Thomas Gleixner
` (2 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 2 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
Subject: [patch V6 13/14] Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Move L!TF to a separate directory so the MDS stuff can be added at the
side. Otherwise the all hardware vulnerabilites have their own top level
entry. Should have done that right away.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 12
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst | 614 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst | 6
Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst | 614 ----------------------------
4 files changed, 628 insertions(+), 618 deletions(-)
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+========================
+Hardware vulnerabilities
+========================
+
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
+possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
+are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+
+.. toctree::
+ :maxdepth: 1
+
+ l1tf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,614 @@
+L1TF - L1 Terminal Fault
+========================
+
+L1 Terminal Fault is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
+speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache
+when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used
+for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+ - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+ - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+ - A range of Intel ATOM processors (Cedarview, Cloverview, Lincroft,
+ Penwell, Pineview, Silvermont, Airmont, Merrifield)
+
+ - The Intel XEON PHI family
+
+ - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO bit set in the
+ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. If the bit is set the CPU is not affected
+ by the Meltdown vulnerability either. These CPUs should become
+ available by end of 2018.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the L1TF
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`l1tf_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the L1TF vulnerability:
+
+ ============= ================= ==============================
+ CVE-2018-3615 L1 Terminal Fault SGX related aspects
+ CVE-2018-3620 L1 Terminal Fault OS, SMM related aspects
+ CVE-2018-3646 L1 Terminal Fault Virtualization related aspects
+ ============= ================= ==============================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant page
+table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set,
+then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads the referenced
+data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if the page referenced
+by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible.
+
+While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will raise
+a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of loading the
+data and making it available to other speculative instructions opens up the
+opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code,
+similar to the Meltdown attack.
+
+While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
+allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
+works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
+works from inside virtual machines because the speculation bypasses the
+extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+1. Malicious user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ Operating Systems store arbitrary information in the address bits of a
+ PTE which is marked non present. This allows a malicious user space
+ application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
+ In some cases user-space can maliciously influence the information
+ encoded in the address bits of the PTE, thus making attacks more
+ deterministic and more practical.
+
+ The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
+ inversion, which is permanently enabled and has no performance
+ impact. The kernel ensures that the address bits of PTEs, which are not
+ marked present, never point to cacheable physical memory space.
+
+ A system with an up to date kernel is protected against attacks from
+ malicious user space applications.
+
+2. Malicious guest in a virtual machine
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The fact that L1TF breaks all domain protections allows malicious guest
+ OSes, which can control the PTEs directly, and malicious guest user
+ space applications, which run on an unprotected guest kernel lacking the
+ PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
+
+ A special aspect of L1TF in the context of virtualization is symmetric
+ multi threading (SMT). The Intel implementation of SMT is called
+ HyperThreading. The fact that Hyperthreads on the affected processors
+ share the L1 Data Cache (L1D) is important for this. As the flaw allows
+ only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
+ on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
+ the context which runs on the sibling Hyperthread of the same physical
+ core. This context can be host OS, host user space or a different guest.
+
+ If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
+ only possible, when the hypervisor does not sanitize the content of the
+ effective (shadow) page tables.
+
+ While solutions exist to mitigate these attack vectors fully, these
+ mitigations are not enabled by default in the Linux kernel because they
+ can affect performance significantly. The kernel provides several
+ mechanisms which can be utilized to address the problem depending on the
+ deployment scenario. The mitigations, their protection scope and impact
+ are described in the next sections.
+
+ The default mitigations and the rationale for choosing them are explained
+ at the end of this document. See :ref:`default_mitigations`.
+
+.. _l1tf_sys_info:
+
+L1TF system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current L1TF
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+ =========================== ===============================
+ 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
+ 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' The host protection is active
+ =========================== ===============================
+
+If KVM/VMX is enabled and the processor is vulnerable then the following
+information is appended to the 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' part:
+
+ - SMT status:
+
+ ===================== ================
+ 'VMX: SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled
+ 'VMX: SMT disabled' SMT is disabled
+ ===================== ================
+
+ - L1D Flush mode:
+
+ ================================ ====================================
+ 'L1D vulnerable' L1D flushing is disabled
+
+ 'L1D conditional cache flushes' L1D flush is conditionally enabled
+
+ 'L1D cache flushes' L1D flush is unconditionally enabled
+ ================================ ====================================
+
+The resulting grade of protection is discussed in the following sections.
+
+
+Host mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel is unconditionally protected against L1TF attacks from malicious
+user space running on the host.
+
+
+Guest mitigation mechanisms
+---------------------------
+
+.. _l1d_flush:
+
+1. L1D flush on VMENTER
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ To make sure that a guest cannot attack data which is present in the L1D
+ the hypervisor flushes the L1D before entering the guest.
+
+ Flushing the L1D evicts not only the data which should not be accessed
+ by a potentially malicious guest, it also flushes the guest
+ data. Flushing the L1D has a performance impact as the processor has to
+ bring the flushed guest data back into the L1D. Depending on the
+ frequency of VMEXIT/VMENTER and the type of computations in the guest
+ performance degradation in the range of 1% to 50% has been observed. For
+ scenarios where guest VMEXIT/VMENTER are rare the performance impact is
+ minimal. Virtio and mechanisms like posted interrupts are designed to
+ confine the VMEXITs to a bare minimum, but specific configurations and
+ application scenarios might still suffer from a high VMEXIT rate.
+
+ The kernel provides two L1D flush modes:
+ - conditional ('cond')
+ - unconditional ('always')
+
+ The conditional mode avoids L1D flushing after VMEXITs which execute
+ only audited code paths before the corresponding VMENTER. These code
+ paths have been verified that they cannot expose secrets or other
+ interesting data to an attacker, but they can leak information about the
+ address space layout of the hypervisor.
+
+ Unconditional mode flushes L1D on all VMENTER invocations and provides
+ maximum protection. It has a higher overhead than the conditional
+ mode. The overhead cannot be quantified correctly as it depends on the
+ workload scenario and the resulting number of VMEXITs.
+
+ The general recommendation is to enable L1D flush on VMENTER. The kernel
+ defaults to conditional mode on affected processors.
+
+ **Note**, that L1D flush does not prevent the SMT problem because the
+ sibling thread will also bring back its data into the L1D which makes it
+ attackable again.
+
+ L1D flush can be controlled by the administrator via the kernel command
+ line and sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`
+ and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+.. _guest_confinement:
+
+2. Guest VCPU confinement to dedicated physical cores
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ To address the SMT problem, it is possible to make a guest or a group of
+ guests affine to one or more physical cores. The proper mechanism for
+ that is to utilize exclusive cpusets to ensure that no other guest or
+ host tasks can run on these cores.
+
+ If only a single guest or related guests run on sibling SMT threads on
+ the same physical core then they can only attack their own memory and
+ restricted parts of the host memory.
+
+ Host memory is attackable, when one of the sibling SMT threads runs in
+ host OS (hypervisor) context and the other in guest context. The amount
+ of valuable information from the host OS context depends on the context
+ which the host OS executes, i.e. interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel
+ threads. The amount of valuable data from these contexts cannot be
+ declared as non-interesting for an attacker without deep inspection of
+ the code.
+
+ **Note**, that assigning guests to a fixed set of physical cores affects
+ the ability of the scheduler to do load balancing and might have
+ negative effects on CPU utilization depending on the hosting
+ scenario. Disabling SMT might be a viable alternative for particular
+ scenarios.
+
+ For further information about confining guests to a single or to a group
+ of cores consult the cpusets documentation:
+
+ https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt
+
+.. _interrupt_isolation:
+
+3. Interrupt affinity
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ Interrupts can be made affine to logical CPUs. This is not universally
+ true because there are types of interrupts which are truly per CPU
+ interrupts, e.g. the local timer interrupt. Aside of that multi queue
+ devices affine their interrupts to single CPUs or groups of CPUs per
+ queue without allowing the administrator to control the affinities.
+
+ Moving the interrupts, which can be affinity controlled, away from CPUs
+ which run untrusted guests, reduces the attack vector space.
+
+ Whether the interrupts with are affine to CPUs, which run untrusted
+ guests, provide interesting data for an attacker depends on the system
+ configuration and the scenarios which run on the system. While for some
+ of the interrupts it can be assumed that they won't expose interesting
+ information beyond exposing hints about the host OS memory layout, there
+ is no way to make general assumptions.
+
+ Interrupt affinity can be controlled by the administrator via the
+ /proc/irq/$NR/smp_affinity[_list] files. Limited documentation is
+ available at:
+
+ https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/IRQ-affinity.txt
+
+.. _smt_control:
+
+4. SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ To prevent the SMT issues of L1TF it might be necessary to disable SMT
+ completely. Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but
+ the impact depends on the hosting scenario and the type of workloads.
+ The impact of disabling SMT needs also to be weighted against the impact
+ of other mitigation solutions like confining guests to dedicated cores.
+
+ The kernel provides a sysfs interface to retrieve the status of SMT and
+ to control it. It also provides a kernel command line interface to
+ control SMT.
+
+ The kernel command line interface consists of the following options:
+
+ =========== ==========================================================
+ nosmt Affects the bring up of the secondary CPUs during boot. The
+ kernel tries to bring all present CPUs online during the
+ boot process. "nosmt" makes sure that from each physical
+ core only one - the so called primary (hyper) thread is
+ activated. Due to a design flaw of Intel processors related
+ to Machine Check Exceptions the non primary siblings have
+ to be brought up at least partially and are then shut down
+ again. "nosmt" can be undone via the sysfs interface.
+
+ nosmt=force Has the same effect as "nosmt" but it does not allow to
+ undo the SMT disable via the sysfs interface.
+ =========== ==========================================================
+
+ The sysfs interface provides two files:
+
+ - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
+ - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
+
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control:
+
+ This file allows to read out the SMT control state and provides the
+ ability to disable or (re)enable SMT. The possible states are:
+
+ ============== ===================================================
+ on SMT is supported by the CPU and enabled. All
+ logical CPUs can be onlined and offlined without
+ restrictions.
+
+ off SMT is supported by the CPU and disabled. Only
+ the so called primary SMT threads can be onlined
+ and offlined without restrictions. An attempt to
+ online a non-primary sibling is rejected
+
+ forceoff Same as 'off' but the state cannot be controlled.
+ Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
+
+ notsupported The processor does not support SMT. It's therefore
+ not affected by the SMT implications of L1TF.
+ Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
+ ============== ===================================================
+
+ The possible states which can be written into this file to control SMT
+ state are:
+
+ - on
+ - off
+ - forceoff
+
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active:
+
+ This file reports whether SMT is enabled and active, i.e. if on any
+ physical core two or more sibling threads are online.
+
+ SMT control is also possible at boot time via the l1tf kernel command
+ line parameter in combination with L1D flush control. See
+ :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+5. Disabling EPT
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ Disabling EPT for virtual machines provides full mitigation for L1TF even
+ with SMT enabled, because the effective page tables for guests are
+ managed and sanitized by the hypervisor. Though disabling EPT has a
+ significant performance impact especially when the Meltdown mitigation
+ KPTI is enabled.
+
+ EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
+
+There is ongoing research and development for new mitigation mechanisms to
+address the performance impact of disabling SMT or EPT.
+
+.. _mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the L1TF mitigations at boot
+time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+ ============ =============================================================
+ full Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF
+ vulnerability. Disables SMT and enables all mitigations in
+ the hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flushing
+
+ SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+ is still possible after boot. Hypervisors will issue a
+ warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+ insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+ disabled.
+
+ full,force Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D flush runtime
+ control. Implies the 'nosmt=force' command line option.
+ (i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
+
+ flush Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default hypervisor
+ mitigation, i.e. conditional L1D flushing
+
+ SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+ is still possible after boot. Hypervisors will issue a
+ warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+ insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+ disabled.
+
+ flush,nosmt Disables SMT and enables the default hypervisor mitigation,
+ i.e. conditional L1D flushing.
+
+ SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+ is still possible after boot. Hypervisors will issue a
+ warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+ insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+ disabled.
+
+ flush,nowarn Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when a VM is
+ started in a potentially insecure configuration.
+
+ off Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
+ warnings.
+ It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions
+ on both hypervisor and bare metal.
+
+ ============ =============================================================
+
+The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
+
+
+.. _mitigation_control_kvm:
+
+Mitigation control for KVM - module parameter
+-------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism, flushing the L1D cache when
+entering a guest, can be controlled with a module parameter.
+
+The option/parameter is "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=". It takes the
+following arguments:
+
+ ============ ==============================================================
+ always L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
+
+ cond Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between VMEXIT and
+ VMENTER can leak host memory which is considered
+ interesting for an attacker. This still can leak host memory
+ which allows e.g. to determine the hosts address space layout.
+
+ never Disables the mitigation
+ ============ ==============================================================
+
+The parameter can be provided on the kernel command line, as a module
+parameter when loading the modules and at runtime modified via the sysfs
+file:
+
+/sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/vmentry_l1d_flush
+
+The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
+line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
+module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. No virtualization in use
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
+ action is required.
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ If the guest comes from a trusted source and the guest OS kernel is
+ guaranteed to have the L1TF mitigations in place the system is fully
+ protected against L1TF and no further action is required.
+
+ To avoid the overhead of the default L1D flushing on VMENTER the
+ administrator can disable the flushing via the kernel command line and
+ sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
+ :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+3.1. SMT not supported or disabled
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+ If SMT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the BIOS or by
+ the kernel, it's only required to enforce L1D flushing on VMENTER.
+
+ Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
+ :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+3.2. EPT not supported or disabled
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+ If EPT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the hypervisor,
+ the system is fully protected. SMT can stay enabled and L1D flushing on
+ VMENTER is not required.
+
+ EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
+
+3.3. SMT and EPT supported and active
+"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+ If SMT and EPT are supported and active then various degrees of
+ mitigations can be employed:
+
+ - L1D flushing on VMENTER:
+
+ L1D flushing on VMENTER is the minimal protection requirement, but it
+ is only potent in combination with other mitigation methods.
+
+ Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
+ :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+ - Guest confinement:
+
+ Confinement of guests to a single or a group of physical cores which
+ are not running any other processes, can reduce the attack surface
+ significantly, but interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel threads can
+ still expose valuable data to a potential attacker. See
+ :ref:`guest_confinement`.
+
+ - Interrupt isolation:
+
+ Isolating the guest CPUs from interrupts can reduce the attack surface
+ further, but still allows a malicious guest to explore a limited amount
+ of host physical memory. This can at least be used to gain knowledge
+ about the host address space layout. The interrupts which have a fixed
+ affinity to the CPUs which run the untrusted guests can depending on
+ the scenario still trigger soft interrupts and schedule kernel threads
+ which might expose valuable information. See
+ :ref:`interrupt_isolation`.
+
+The above three mitigation methods combined can provide protection to a
+certain degree, but the risk of the remaining attack surface has to be
+carefully analyzed. For full protection the following methods are
+available:
+
+ - Disabling SMT:
+
+ Disabling SMT and enforcing the L1D flushing provides the maximum
+ amount of protection. This mitigation is not depending on any of the
+ above mitigation methods.
+
+ SMT control and L1D flushing can be tuned by the command line
+ parameters 'nosmt', 'l1tf', 'kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush' and at run
+ time with the matching sysfs control files. See :ref:`smt_control`,
+ :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
+ :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+ - Disabling EPT:
+
+ Disabling EPT provides the maximum amount of protection as well. It is
+ not depending on any of the above mitigation methods. SMT can stay
+ enabled and L1D flushing is not required, but the performance impact is
+ significant.
+
+ EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept'
+ parameter.
+
+3.4. Nested virtual machines
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+When nested virtualization is in use, three operating systems are involved:
+the bare metal hypervisor, the nested hypervisor and the nested virtual
+machine. VMENTER operations from the nested hypervisor into the nested
+guest will always be processed by the bare metal hypervisor. If KVM is the
+bare metal hypervisor it will:
+
+ - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested hypervisor to the
+ nested virtual machine, so that the nested hypervisor's secrets are not
+ exposed to the nested virtual machine;
+
+ - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested virtual machine to
+ the nested hypervisor; this is a complex operation, and flushing the L1D
+ cache avoids that the bare metal hypervisor's secrets are exposed to the
+ nested virtual machine;
+
+ - Instruct the nested hypervisor to not perform any L1D cache flush. This
+ is an optimization to avoid double L1D flushing.
+
+
+.. _default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+ The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+ - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
+ unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited
+ to ~16TB.
+
+ - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
+ a guest.
+
+ The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+ SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted guests with EPT enabled.
+
+ The rationale for this choice is:
+
+ - Force disabling SMT can break existing setups, especially with
+ unattended updates.
+
+ - If regular users run untrusted guests on their machine, then L1TF is
+ just an add on to other malware which might be embedded in an untrusted
+ guest, e.g. spam-bots or attacks on the local network.
+
+ There is no technical way to prevent a user from running untrusted code
+ on their machines blindly.
+
+ - It's technically extremely unlikely and from today's knowledge even
+ impossible that L1TF can be exploited via the most popular attack
+ mechanisms like JavaScript because these mechanisms have no way to
+ control PTEs. If this would be possible and not other mitigation would
+ be possible, then the default might be different.
+
+ - The administrators of cloud and hosting setups have to carefully
+ analyze the risk for their scenarios and make the appropriate
+ mitigation choices, which might even vary across their deployed
+ machines and also result in other changes of their overall setup.
+ There is no way for the kernel to provide a sensible default for this
+ kind of scenarios.
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst
@@ -17,14 +17,12 @@ etc.
kernel-parameters
devices
-This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
-possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
-are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and their mitigations.
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1
- l1tf
+ hw-vuln/index
Here is a set of documents aimed at users who are trying to track down
problems and bugs in particular.
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,614 +0,0 @@
-L1TF - L1 Terminal Fault
-========================
-
-L1 Terminal Fault is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
-speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache
-when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used
-for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set.
-
-Affected processors
--------------------
-
-This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
-vulnerability is not present on:
-
- - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
-
- - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
-
- - A range of Intel ATOM processors (Cedarview, Cloverview, Lincroft,
- Penwell, Pineview, Silvermont, Airmont, Merrifield)
-
- - The Intel XEON PHI family
-
- - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO bit set in the
- IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. If the bit is set the CPU is not affected
- by the Meltdown vulnerability either. These CPUs should become
- available by end of 2018.
-
-Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the L1TF
-vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`l1tf_sys_info`.
-
-Related CVEs
-------------
-
-The following CVE entries are related to the L1TF vulnerability:
-
- ============= ================= ==============================
- CVE-2018-3615 L1 Terminal Fault SGX related aspects
- CVE-2018-3620 L1 Terminal Fault OS, SMM related aspects
- CVE-2018-3646 L1 Terminal Fault Virtualization related aspects
- ============= ================= ==============================
-
-Problem
--------
-
-If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant page
-table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set,
-then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads the referenced
-data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if the page referenced
-by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible.
-
-While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will raise
-a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of loading the
-data and making it available to other speculative instructions opens up the
-opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code,
-similar to the Meltdown attack.
-
-While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
-allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
-works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
-works from inside virtual machines because the speculation bypasses the
-extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.
-
-
-Attack scenarios
-----------------
-
-1. Malicious user space
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
- Operating Systems store arbitrary information in the address bits of a
- PTE which is marked non present. This allows a malicious user space
- application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
- In some cases user-space can maliciously influence the information
- encoded in the address bits of the PTE, thus making attacks more
- deterministic and more practical.
-
- The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
- inversion, which is permanently enabled and has no performance
- impact. The kernel ensures that the address bits of PTEs, which are not
- marked present, never point to cacheable physical memory space.
-
- A system with an up to date kernel is protected against attacks from
- malicious user space applications.
-
-2. Malicious guest in a virtual machine
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
- The fact that L1TF breaks all domain protections allows malicious guest
- OSes, which can control the PTEs directly, and malicious guest user
- space applications, which run on an unprotected guest kernel lacking the
- PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
-
- A special aspect of L1TF in the context of virtualization is symmetric
- multi threading (SMT). The Intel implementation of SMT is called
- HyperThreading. The fact that Hyperthreads on the affected processors
- share the L1 Data Cache (L1D) is important for this. As the flaw allows
- only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
- on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
- the context which runs on the sibling Hyperthread of the same physical
- core. This context can be host OS, host user space or a different guest.
-
- If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
- only possible, when the hypervisor does not sanitize the content of the
- effective (shadow) page tables.
-
- While solutions exist to mitigate these attack vectors fully, these
- mitigations are not enabled by default in the Linux kernel because they
- can affect performance significantly. The kernel provides several
- mechanisms which can be utilized to address the problem depending on the
- deployment scenario. The mitigations, their protection scope and impact
- are described in the next sections.
-
- The default mitigations and the rationale for choosing them are explained
- at the end of this document. See :ref:`default_mitigations`.
-
-.. _l1tf_sys_info:
-
-L1TF system information
------------------------
-
-The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current L1TF
-status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
-mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
-
-/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
-
-The possible values in this file are:
-
- =========================== ===============================
- 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
- 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' The host protection is active
- =========================== ===============================
-
-If KVM/VMX is enabled and the processor is vulnerable then the following
-information is appended to the 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' part:
-
- - SMT status:
-
- ===================== ================
- 'VMX: SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled
- 'VMX: SMT disabled' SMT is disabled
- ===================== ================
-
- - L1D Flush mode:
-
- ================================ ====================================
- 'L1D vulnerable' L1D flushing is disabled
-
- 'L1D conditional cache flushes' L1D flush is conditionally enabled
-
- 'L1D cache flushes' L1D flush is unconditionally enabled
- ================================ ====================================
-
-The resulting grade of protection is discussed in the following sections.
-
-
-Host mitigation mechanism
--------------------------
-
-The kernel is unconditionally protected against L1TF attacks from malicious
-user space running on the host.
-
-
-Guest mitigation mechanisms
----------------------------
-
-.. _l1d_flush:
-
-1. L1D flush on VMENTER
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
- To make sure that a guest cannot attack data which is present in the L1D
- the hypervisor flushes the L1D before entering the guest.
-
- Flushing the L1D evicts not only the data which should not be accessed
- by a potentially malicious guest, it also flushes the guest
- data. Flushing the L1D has a performance impact as the processor has to
- bring the flushed guest data back into the L1D. Depending on the
- frequency of VMEXIT/VMENTER and the type of computations in the guest
- performance degradation in the range of 1% to 50% has been observed. For
- scenarios where guest VMEXIT/VMENTER are rare the performance impact is
- minimal. Virtio and mechanisms like posted interrupts are designed to
- confine the VMEXITs to a bare minimum, but specific configurations and
- application scenarios might still suffer from a high VMEXIT rate.
-
- The kernel provides two L1D flush modes:
- - conditional ('cond')
- - unconditional ('always')
-
- The conditional mode avoids L1D flushing after VMEXITs which execute
- only audited code paths before the corresponding VMENTER. These code
- paths have been verified that they cannot expose secrets or other
- interesting data to an attacker, but they can leak information about the
- address space layout of the hypervisor.
-
- Unconditional mode flushes L1D on all VMENTER invocations and provides
- maximum protection. It has a higher overhead than the conditional
- mode. The overhead cannot be quantified correctly as it depends on the
- workload scenario and the resulting number of VMEXITs.
-
- The general recommendation is to enable L1D flush on VMENTER. The kernel
- defaults to conditional mode on affected processors.
-
- **Note**, that L1D flush does not prevent the SMT problem because the
- sibling thread will also bring back its data into the L1D which makes it
- attackable again.
-
- L1D flush can be controlled by the administrator via the kernel command
- line and sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`
- and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
-.. _guest_confinement:
-
-2. Guest VCPU confinement to dedicated physical cores
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
- To address the SMT problem, it is possible to make a guest or a group of
- guests affine to one or more physical cores. The proper mechanism for
- that is to utilize exclusive cpusets to ensure that no other guest or
- host tasks can run on these cores.
-
- If only a single guest or related guests run on sibling SMT threads on
- the same physical core then they can only attack their own memory and
- restricted parts of the host memory.
-
- Host memory is attackable, when one of the sibling SMT threads runs in
- host OS (hypervisor) context and the other in guest context. The amount
- of valuable information from the host OS context depends on the context
- which the host OS executes, i.e. interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel
- threads. The amount of valuable data from these contexts cannot be
- declared as non-interesting for an attacker without deep inspection of
- the code.
-
- **Note**, that assigning guests to a fixed set of physical cores affects
- the ability of the scheduler to do load balancing and might have
- negative effects on CPU utilization depending on the hosting
- scenario. Disabling SMT might be a viable alternative for particular
- scenarios.
-
- For further information about confining guests to a single or to a group
- of cores consult the cpusets documentation:
-
- https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt
-
-.. _interrupt_isolation:
-
-3. Interrupt affinity
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
- Interrupts can be made affine to logical CPUs. This is not universally
- true because there are types of interrupts which are truly per CPU
- interrupts, e.g. the local timer interrupt. Aside of that multi queue
- devices affine their interrupts to single CPUs or groups of CPUs per
- queue without allowing the administrator to control the affinities.
-
- Moving the interrupts, which can be affinity controlled, away from CPUs
- which run untrusted guests, reduces the attack vector space.
-
- Whether the interrupts with are affine to CPUs, which run untrusted
- guests, provide interesting data for an attacker depends on the system
- configuration and the scenarios which run on the system. While for some
- of the interrupts it can be assumed that they won't expose interesting
- information beyond exposing hints about the host OS memory layout, there
- is no way to make general assumptions.
-
- Interrupt affinity can be controlled by the administrator via the
- /proc/irq/$NR/smp_affinity[_list] files. Limited documentation is
- available at:
-
- https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/IRQ-affinity.txt
-
-.. _smt_control:
-
-4. SMT control
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
- To prevent the SMT issues of L1TF it might be necessary to disable SMT
- completely. Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but
- the impact depends on the hosting scenario and the type of workloads.
- The impact of disabling SMT needs also to be weighted against the impact
- of other mitigation solutions like confining guests to dedicated cores.
-
- The kernel provides a sysfs interface to retrieve the status of SMT and
- to control it. It also provides a kernel command line interface to
- control SMT.
-
- The kernel command line interface consists of the following options:
-
- =========== ==========================================================
- nosmt Affects the bring up of the secondary CPUs during boot. The
- kernel tries to bring all present CPUs online during the
- boot process. "nosmt" makes sure that from each physical
- core only one - the so called primary (hyper) thread is
- activated. Due to a design flaw of Intel processors related
- to Machine Check Exceptions the non primary siblings have
- to be brought up at least partially and are then shut down
- again. "nosmt" can be undone via the sysfs interface.
-
- nosmt=force Has the same effect as "nosmt" but it does not allow to
- undo the SMT disable via the sysfs interface.
- =========== ==========================================================
-
- The sysfs interface provides two files:
-
- - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
- - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
-
- /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control:
-
- This file allows to read out the SMT control state and provides the
- ability to disable or (re)enable SMT. The possible states are:
-
- ============== ===================================================
- on SMT is supported by the CPU and enabled. All
- logical CPUs can be onlined and offlined without
- restrictions.
-
- off SMT is supported by the CPU and disabled. Only
- the so called primary SMT threads can be onlined
- and offlined without restrictions. An attempt to
- online a non-primary sibling is rejected
-
- forceoff Same as 'off' but the state cannot be controlled.
- Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
-
- notsupported The processor does not support SMT. It's therefore
- not affected by the SMT implications of L1TF.
- Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
- ============== ===================================================
-
- The possible states which can be written into this file to control SMT
- state are:
-
- - on
- - off
- - forceoff
-
- /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active:
-
- This file reports whether SMT is enabled and active, i.e. if on any
- physical core two or more sibling threads are online.
-
- SMT control is also possible at boot time via the l1tf kernel command
- line parameter in combination with L1D flush control. See
- :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`.
-
-5. Disabling EPT
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
- Disabling EPT for virtual machines provides full mitigation for L1TF even
- with SMT enabled, because the effective page tables for guests are
- managed and sanitized by the hypervisor. Though disabling EPT has a
- significant performance impact especially when the Meltdown mitigation
- KPTI is enabled.
-
- EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
-
-There is ongoing research and development for new mitigation mechanisms to
-address the performance impact of disabling SMT or EPT.
-
-.. _mitigation_control_command_line:
-
-Mitigation control on the kernel command line
----------------------------------------------
-
-The kernel command line allows to control the L1TF mitigations at boot
-time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
-
- ============ =============================================================
- full Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF
- vulnerability. Disables SMT and enables all mitigations in
- the hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flushing
-
- SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
- is still possible after boot. Hypervisors will issue a
- warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
- insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
- disabled.
-
- full,force Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D flush runtime
- control. Implies the 'nosmt=force' command line option.
- (i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
-
- flush Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default hypervisor
- mitigation, i.e. conditional L1D flushing
-
- SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
- is still possible after boot. Hypervisors will issue a
- warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
- insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
- disabled.
-
- flush,nosmt Disables SMT and enables the default hypervisor mitigation,
- i.e. conditional L1D flushing.
-
- SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
- is still possible after boot. Hypervisors will issue a
- warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
- insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
- disabled.
-
- flush,nowarn Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when a VM is
- started in a potentially insecure configuration.
-
- off Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
- warnings.
- It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions
- on both hypervisor and bare metal.
-
- ============ =============================================================
-
-The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
-
-
-.. _mitigation_control_kvm:
-
-Mitigation control for KVM - module parameter
--------------------------------------------------------------
-
-The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism, flushing the L1D cache when
-entering a guest, can be controlled with a module parameter.
-
-The option/parameter is "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=". It takes the
-following arguments:
-
- ============ ==============================================================
- always L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
-
- cond Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between VMEXIT and
- VMENTER can leak host memory which is considered
- interesting for an attacker. This still can leak host memory
- which allows e.g. to determine the hosts address space layout.
-
- never Disables the mitigation
- ============ ==============================================================
-
-The parameter can be provided on the kernel command line, as a module
-parameter when loading the modules and at runtime modified via the sysfs
-file:
-
-/sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/vmentry_l1d_flush
-
-The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
-line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
-module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
-
-
-Mitigation selection guide
---------------------------
-
-1. No virtualization in use
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
- The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
- action is required.
-
-2. Virtualization with trusted guests
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
- If the guest comes from a trusted source and the guest OS kernel is
- guaranteed to have the L1TF mitigations in place the system is fully
- protected against L1TF and no further action is required.
-
- To avoid the overhead of the default L1D flushing on VMENTER the
- administrator can disable the flushing via the kernel command line and
- sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
- :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
-
-3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-3.1. SMT not supported or disabled
-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
-
- If SMT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the BIOS or by
- the kernel, it's only required to enforce L1D flushing on VMENTER.
-
- Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
- :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
-3.2. EPT not supported or disabled
-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
-
- If EPT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the hypervisor,
- the system is fully protected. SMT can stay enabled and L1D flushing on
- VMENTER is not required.
-
- EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
-
-3.3. SMT and EPT supported and active
-"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
-
- If SMT and EPT are supported and active then various degrees of
- mitigations can be employed:
-
- - L1D flushing on VMENTER:
-
- L1D flushing on VMENTER is the minimal protection requirement, but it
- is only potent in combination with other mitigation methods.
-
- Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
- :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
- - Guest confinement:
-
- Confinement of guests to a single or a group of physical cores which
- are not running any other processes, can reduce the attack surface
- significantly, but interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel threads can
- still expose valuable data to a potential attacker. See
- :ref:`guest_confinement`.
-
- - Interrupt isolation:
-
- Isolating the guest CPUs from interrupts can reduce the attack surface
- further, but still allows a malicious guest to explore a limited amount
- of host physical memory. This can at least be used to gain knowledge
- about the host address space layout. The interrupts which have a fixed
- affinity to the CPUs which run the untrusted guests can depending on
- the scenario still trigger soft interrupts and schedule kernel threads
- which might expose valuable information. See
- :ref:`interrupt_isolation`.
-
-The above three mitigation methods combined can provide protection to a
-certain degree, but the risk of the remaining attack surface has to be
-carefully analyzed. For full protection the following methods are
-available:
-
- - Disabling SMT:
-
- Disabling SMT and enforcing the L1D flushing provides the maximum
- amount of protection. This mitigation is not depending on any of the
- above mitigation methods.
-
- SMT control and L1D flushing can be tuned by the command line
- parameters 'nosmt', 'l1tf', 'kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush' and at run
- time with the matching sysfs control files. See :ref:`smt_control`,
- :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
- :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
- - Disabling EPT:
-
- Disabling EPT provides the maximum amount of protection as well. It is
- not depending on any of the above mitigation methods. SMT can stay
- enabled and L1D flushing is not required, but the performance impact is
- significant.
-
- EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept'
- parameter.
-
-3.4. Nested virtual machines
-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
-
-When nested virtualization is in use, three operating systems are involved:
-the bare metal hypervisor, the nested hypervisor and the nested virtual
-machine. VMENTER operations from the nested hypervisor into the nested
-guest will always be processed by the bare metal hypervisor. If KVM is the
-bare metal hypervisor it will:
-
- - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested hypervisor to the
- nested virtual machine, so that the nested hypervisor's secrets are not
- exposed to the nested virtual machine;
-
- - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested virtual machine to
- the nested hypervisor; this is a complex operation, and flushing the L1D
- cache avoids that the bare metal hypervisor's secrets are exposed to the
- nested virtual machine;
-
- - Instruct the nested hypervisor to not perform any L1D cache flush. This
- is an optimization to avoid double L1D flushing.
-
-
-.. _default_mitigations:
-
-Default mitigations
--------------------
-
- The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
-
- - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
- unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited
- to ~16TB.
-
- - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
- a guest.
-
- The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
- SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted guests with EPT enabled.
-
- The rationale for this choice is:
-
- - Force disabling SMT can break existing setups, especially with
- unattended updates.
-
- - If regular users run untrusted guests on their machine, then L1TF is
- just an add on to other malware which might be embedded in an untrusted
- guest, e.g. spam-bots or attacks on the local network.
-
- There is no technical way to prevent a user from running untrusted code
- on their machines blindly.
-
- - It's technically extremely unlikely and from today's knowledge even
- impossible that L1TF can be exploited via the most popular attack
- mechanisms like JavaScript because these mechanisms have no way to
- control PTEs. If this would be possible and not other mitigation would
- be possible, then the default might be different.
-
- - The administrators of cloud and hosting setups have to carefully
- analyze the risk for their scenarios and make the appropriate
- mitigation choices, which might even vary across their deployed
- machines and also result in other changes of their overall setup.
- There is no way for the kernel to provide a sensible default for this
- kind of scenarios.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 13/14] MDS basics 13
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 13/14] MDS basics 13 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-03 4:01 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-05 16:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-05 16:43 ` [MODERATED] " mark gross
1 sibling, 1 reply; 61+ messages in thread
From: Josh Poimboeuf @ 2019-03-03 4:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:51PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 13/14] Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> Move L!TF to a separate directory so the MDS stuff can be added at the
> side. Otherwise the all hardware vulnerabilites have their own top level
> entry. Should have done that right away.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
$ git grep admin-guide |grep l1tf |grep -v hw-vuln
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt: For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html for details.\n"
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html for details.\n"
--
Josh
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* Re: [patch V6 13/14] MDS basics 13
2019-03-03 4:01 ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
@ 2019-03-05 16:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
0 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-05 16:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Sat, 2 Mar 2019, speck for Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:51PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > Subject: [patch V6 13/14] Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory
> > From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> >
> > Move L!TF to a separate directory so the MDS stuff can be added at the
> > side. Otherwise the all hardware vulnerabilites have their own top level
> > entry. Should have done that right away.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> > Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>
> $ git grep admin-guide |grep l1tf |grep -v hw-vuln
> Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
> Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt: For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html for details.\n"
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html for details.\n"
>
Ah. Indeed....
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [MODERATED] Re: [patch V6 13/14] MDS basics 13
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 13/14] MDS basics 13 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-03 4:01 ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
@ 2019-03-05 16:43 ` mark gross
1 sibling, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: mark gross @ 2019-03-05 16:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:51PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Subject: [patch V6 13/14] Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> Move L!TF to a separate directory so the MDS stuff can be added at the
s/L!TF/L1TF
--mark
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread
* [patch V6 14/14] MDS basics 14
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 13/14] MDS basics 13 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 21:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-01 23:48 ` [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-04 5:30 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
15 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
Subject: [patch V6 14/14] Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Add the initial MDS vulnerability documentation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
V5 --> V6: Fix the protection matrix, minor tweaks vs. idle mitigation
and MSBDS only systems.
V4 --> V5: Remove 'auto' option. Adjust virt mitigation info.
V1 --> V4: Added the missing pieces
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst | 1
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst | 307 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 309 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run
:maxdepth: 1
l1tf
+ mds
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,for
line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
+.. _mitigation_selection:
Mitigation selection guide
--------------------------
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+MDS - Microarchitectural Data Sampling
+======================================
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows
+unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in various CPU
+internal buffers.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+ - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+ - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+ - Some Atoms (Bonnell, Saltwell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus)
+
+ - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO bit set in the
+ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the MDS
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`mds_sys_info`.
+
+Not all processors are affected by all variants of MDS, but the mitigation
+is identical for all of them so the kernel treats them as a single
+vulnerability.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the MDS vulnerability:
+
+ ============== ===== ==============================================
+ CVE-2018-12126 MSBDS Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
+ CVE-2018-12130 MFBDS Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
+ CVE-2018-12127 MLPDS Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
+ ============== ===== ==============================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load, L1 refill operations, processors write data
+into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in the
+buffer can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Under certain conditions, usually a fault/assist caused by a load
+operation, data unrelated to the load memory address can be speculatively
+forwarded from the buffers. Because the load operation causes a fault or
+assist and its result will be discarded, the forwarded data will not cause
+incorrect program execution or state changes. But a malicious operation
+may be able to forward this speculative data to a disclosure gadget which
+allows in turn to infer the value via a cache side channel attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+Deeper technical information is available in the MDS specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the MDS vulnerabilities can be mounted from malicious non
+priviledged user space applications running on hosts or guest. Malicious
+guest OSes can obviously mount attacks as well.
+
+Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS vulnerability
+does not allow the attacker to control the memory target address. As a
+consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but as demonstrated with
+the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully.
+
+Web-Browsers
+^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ It's unclear whether attacks through Web-Browsers are possible at
+ all. The exploitation through Java-Script is considered very unlikely,
+ but other widely used web technologies like Webassembly could possibly be
+ abused.
+
+
+.. _mds_sys_info:
+
+MDS system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current MDS
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+ ========================================= =================================
+ 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
+
+ 'Vulnerable' The processor is vulnerable,
+ but no mitigation enabled
+
+ 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted' The processor is vulnerable but
+ microcode is not updated.
+ The mitigation is enabled on a
+ best effort basis.
+ See :ref:`vmwerv`
+
+ 'Mitigation: CPU buffer clear' The processor is vulnerable and the
+ CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+ enabled.
+ ========================================= =================================
+
+If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended
+to the above information:
+
+ ======================== ============================================
+ 'SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled
+ 'SMT mitigated' SMT is enabled and mitigated
+ 'SMT disabled' SMT is disabled
+ 'SMT Host state unknown' Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
+ ======================== ============================================
+
+.. _vmwerv:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode based
+ mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+ effort mitigation mode. This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+ without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+ This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+ microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose
+ the CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection
+ takes effect otherwise a few cpu cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+ The state in the mds sysfs file reflects this situation accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode
+which is required.
+
+If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default. The mitigation can be controlled at boot
+time via a kernel command line option. See
+:ref:`mds_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _cpu_buffer_clear:
+
+CPU buffer clearing
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The mitigation for MDS clears the affected CPU buffers on return to user
+ space and when entering a guest.
+
+ If SMT is enabled it also clears the buffers on idle entry when the CPU
+ is only affected by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant, because the
+ other variants cannot be protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks.
+
+ For CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS the user space, guest and idle
+ transition mitigations are sufficient and SMT is not affected.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The protection for host to guest transition depends on the L1TF
+ vulnerability of the CPU:
+
+ - CPU is affected by L1TF:
+
+ If the L1D flush mitigation is enabled and up to date microcode is
+ available, the L1D flush mitigation is automatically protecting the
+ guest transition.
+
+ If the L1D flush mitigation is disabled then the MDS mitigation is
+ invoked explicit when the host MDS mitigation is enabled.
+
+ For details on L1TF and virtualization see:
+ :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <mitigation_control_kvm>`.
+
+ - CPU is not affected by L1TF:
+
+ CPU buffers are flushed before entering the guest when the host MDS
+ mitigation is enabled.
+
+ The resulting MDS protection matrix for the host to guest transition:
+
+ ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+ L1TF MDS VMX-L1FLUSH Host MDS MDS-State
+
+ Don't care No Don't care N/A Not affected
+
+ Yes Yes Disabled Off Vulnerable
+
+ Yes Yes Disabled Full Mitigated
+
+ Yes Yes Enabled Don't care Mitigated
+
+ No Yes N/A Off Vulnerable
+
+ No Yes N/A Full Mitigated
+ ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+
+ This only covers the host to guest transition, i.e. prevents leakage from
+ host to guest, but does not protect the guest internally. Guests need to
+ have their own protections.
+
+.. _xeon_phi:
+
+XEON PHI specific considerations
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The XEON PHI processor family is affected by MSBDS which can be exploited
+ cross Hyper-Threads when entering idle states. Some XEON PHI variants allow
+ to use MWAIT in user space (Ring 3) which opens an potential attack vector
+ for malicious user space. The exposure can be disabled on the kernel
+ command line with the 'ring3mwait=disable' command line option.
+
+ XEON PHI is not affected by the other MDS variants and MSBDS is mitigated
+ before the CPU enters a idle state. As XEON PHI is not affected by L1TF
+ either disabling SMT is not required for full protection.
+
+.. _mds_smt_control:
+
+SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ All MDS variants except MSBDS can be attacked cross Hyper-Threads. That
+ means on CPUs which are affected by MFBDS or MLPDS it is necessary to
+ disable SMT for full protection. These are most of the affected CPUs; the
+ exception is XEON PHI, see :ref:`xeon_phi`.
+
+ Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but the impact
+ depends on the type of workloads.
+
+ See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation documentation for details:
+ :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst <smt_control>`.
+
+
+.. _mds_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the MDS mitigations at boot
+time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+ ============ =============================================================
+ full If the CPU is vulnerable, enable all available mitigations
+ for the MDS vulnerability, CPU buffer clearing on exit to
+ userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are
+ protected as well if SMT is enabled.
+
+ It does not automatically disable SMT.
+
+ off Disables MDS mitigations completely.
+
+ ============ =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full".
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ If all userspace applications are from a trusted source and do not
+ execute untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation
+ can be disabled.
+
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The same considerations as above versus trusted user space apply.
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The protection depends on the state of the L1TF mitigations.
+ See :ref:`virt_mechanism`.
+
+ If the MDS mitigation is enabled and SMT is disabled, guest to host and
+ guest to guest attacks are prevented.
+
+.. _mds_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+ The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+ - Enable CPU buffer clearing
+
+ The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+ SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted code. The same rationale as
+ for L1TF applies.
+ See :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <default_mitigations>`.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* Re: [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 14/14] MDS basics 14 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-01 23:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-04 5:30 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
15 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-01 23:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
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On Fri, 1 Mar 2019, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>
> I'll send git bundles of the pile as well.
Attached.
Thanks,
tglx
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread* [MODERATED] Encrypted Message
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2019-03-01 23:48 ` [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-04 5:30 ` Jon Masters
15 siblings, 0 replies; 61+ messages in thread
From: Jon Masters @ 2019-03-04 5:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: speck
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From: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
To: speck for Thomas Gleixner <speck@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0
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On 3/1/19 4:47 PM, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Changes vs. V5:
>
> - Fix tools/ build (Josh)
>
> - Dropped the AIRMONT_MID change as it needs confirmation from Intel
>
> - Made the consolidated whitelist more readable and correct
>
> - Added the MSBDS only quirk for XEON PHI, made the idle flush
> depend on it and updated the sysfs output accordingly.
>
> - Fixed the protection matrix in the admin documentation and clarified
> the SMT situation vs. MSBDS only.
>
> - Updated the KVM/VMX changelog.
>
> Delta patch against V5 below.
>
> Available from git:
>
> cvs.ou.linutronix.de:linux/speck/linux WIP.mds
>
> The linux-4.20.y, linux-4.19.y and linux-4.14.y branches are updated as
> well and contain the untested backports of the pile for reference.
>
> I'll send git bundles of the pile as well.
Tested on Coffeelake with updated ucode successfully:
processor : 0
vendor_id : GenuineIntel
cpu family : 6
model : 158
model name : Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8086K CPU @ 4.00GHz
stepping : 10
microcode : 0xae
[jcm@stephen ~]$ dmesg|grep MDS
[ 1.633165] MDS: Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers
[jcm@stephen ~]$ cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable
Jon.
--
Computer Architect | Sent with my Fedora powered laptop
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 61+ messages in thread