From: "Mickaël Salaün" <email@example.com> To: firstname.lastname@example.org Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <email@example.com>, "Andreas Gruenbacher" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Andy Lutomirski" <email@example.com>, "Andy Lutomirski" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Arnd Bergmann" <email@example.com>, "Casey Schaufler" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Daniel Borkmann" <email@example.com>, "David Drysdale" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Eric Paris" <email@example.com>, "James Morris" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Jeff Dike" <email@example.com>, "Julien Tinnes" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Kees Cook" <email@example.com>, "Michael Kerrisk" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Paul Moore" <email@example.com>, "Richard Weinberger" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <email@example.com>, "Stephen Smalley" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>, "Will Drewry" <email@example.com>, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com Subject: [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 00/17] seccomp-object: From attack surface reduction to sandboxing Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2016 02:46:31 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <firstname.lastname@example.org> (raw) Hi, This series is a proof of concept (not ready for production) to extend seccomp with the ability to check argument pointers of syscalls as kernel object (e.g. file path). This add a needed feature to create a full sandbox managed by userland like the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or the OpenBSD Pledge. It was initially inspired from a partial seccomp-LSM prototype  but has evolved a lot since :) The audience for this RFC is limited to security-related actors to discuss about this new feature before enlarging the scope to a wider audience. This aims to focus on the security goal, usability and architecture before entering into the gory details of each subsystem. I also wish to get constructive criticisms about the userland API and intrusiveness of the code (and what could be the other ways to do it better) before going further (and addressing the TODO and FIXME in the code). The approach taken is to add the minimum amount of code while still allowing the userland to create access rules via seccomp. The current limitation of seccomp is to get raw syscall arguments value but there is no way to dereference a pointer to check its content (e.g. the first argument of the open syscall). This seccomp evolution brings a generic way to check against argument pointer regardless from the syscall unlike current LSMs. Here is the use case scenario: * First, a process must load some groups of seccomp checkers. This checkers are dedicated structs describing a pointed data (e.g. path). They are semantically grouped to be efficiently managed and checked in batch. Each group have a static ID. This IDs are unique and they reference groups only accessible from the filters created by the same process. * The loaded checkers are inherited and accessible by the newly created filters. This groups can be referenced by filters with a new return value SECCOMP_RET_ARGEVAL. Value in SECCOMP_RET_DATA contains a group ID and an argument bitmask. This return value is only meaningful between stacked filters to ask a check and get the result in the extended struct seccomp_data. The new fields are "is_valid_syscall", "arg_group" containing a group ID and "matches" consisting of one 64-bits mask per argument. This bitmasks are useful to get the check result of each checker from a group on a syscall argument which is handy to create a custom access control engine from userland. * SECCOMP_RET_ARGEVAL is equivalent to SECCOMP_RET_ACCESS except that the following filters can take a decision regarding a match (e.g. return EACCESS or emulate the syscall). Each checker is autonomous and new ones can easily be added in the future. There is currently two checkers for path objects: * SECCOMP_CHECK_FS_LITERAL checks if a string match a defined path; * SECCOMP_CHECK_FS_BENEATH checks if the path representation of a string is equal or equivalent to a file belonging to a defined path. This design does not seems too intrusive but is flexible enough to allow a powerful sandbox mechanism accessible by any process on Linux. The use of seccomp, including this new feature, is more suitable with the help of a userland library (e.g. libseccomp) that could help to specify a high-level language to express a security policy instead of raw syscall rules. The main concern should be about time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) race conditions attacks. Because of the nature of seccomp (executed before the effective syscall and before a potential ptrace), it is not possible to block all races but to detect them. There is still some questions I couldn't answer for sure (grep for FIXME or XXX). Comments appreciated. Tested on the x86 and UM architectures in 32 and 64 bits (with audit enabled).  https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/log/?h=seccomp/lsm # Need for LSM Because the arguments can be checked before the syscall actually evaluate them, there is two race condition classes: * The data pointed by the user address is in control of the userland (e.g. a tracing process) and is so subject to TOCTOU race conditions between the seccomp filter evaluation and the effective resource grabbing (part of each syscall code). * The semantic of the pointed data is also subject to race condition because there is no lock on the resource (e.g. file) between the evaluation of the argument by the seccomp filter and the use of the pointed resource by each part of the syscall code. The solution to fix these race conditions is to copy the userspace data and to lock the pointed resource. Whereas it is easy to copy the userspace data, it is not realistic to lock any pointed resources because of obvious locking issues. However, it is possible to detect a TOCTOU race condition with the help of LSM hooks. This way, we can keep a flexible access control (e.g. by controlling syscall return values) while blocking unattended malicious or bogus userland behavior (e.g. exploit a race-condition). To be able to deny access to a malicious userland behavior we must replay the seccomp filters and verify the intermediate return values to find out if the filters policy is still respected. Thanks to a cache we can detect if a check replay is necessary. Otherwise, the LSM hooks are really quick for non-malicious userland. # Cache handling Each time a checker is called, for each argument to check, it get them from it's seccomp_argeval_checked cache if any, or create a new cache entry and put it otherwise. This cache entries will be used to evaluate arguments. When rechecking in the LSM hooks, first it find out which argument is mapped to the hook check and find if it differ from the corresponding cache entry. If it match, then return OK without replaying the checks, or if nothing match, replay all the checks from this check type. # How to use it The SECCOMP_ARGFLAG_* help to narrow the rules constraints: * SECCOMP_ARGFLAG_FS_DENTRY: Check and rely on the path name. * SECCOMP_ARGFLAG_FS_INODE: Check the data "container" whatever it's path name. * SECCOMP_ARGFLAG_FS_DEVICE: Check the device (i.e. file system) on which the file is, e.g. it can be use to allow access to USB mass-storage or dm-verity content only * SECCOMP_ARGFLAG_FS_MOUNT: Check the file mount point, e.g. can enforce a read-only bind mount (but is less flexible than the other checks) * SECCOMP_ARGFLAG_FS_NOFOLLOW: Check the file without following it if it is a symlink. Useful for rename(2) or open(2) with O_NOFOLLOW to have consistent check. However, LSM hooks will deny all unattended accesses set by the rules ignoring this flag (i.e. it act as a fail-safe). # Limitations ## Ptrace If a process can ptrace another one, the tracer can execute whatever syscall it wants without being constrained by any seccomp filter from the tracee. This apply for this seccomp extension as well. Any seccomp filter should then deny the use of ptrace. The LSM hooks must ensure that the filters results are the same (with the same arguments) but must not deny any ptraced modifications (e.g. syscall argument change). ## Stateless access Unlike current LSMs, the policies are stateless. It's not possible to mark and track a kernel object (e.g. file descriptor). Capsicum seems more appropriate for this kind of feature. ## Resource usage We must limit the resources taken by a filter list, and so the number of rules, to not allow any process to exhaust the system. Regards, Mickaël Salaün (17): um: Export the sys_call_table seccomp: Fix typo selftest/seccomp: Fix the flag name SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC selftest/seccomp: Fix the seccomp(2) signature security/seccomp: Add LSM and create arrays of syscall metadata seccomp: Add the SECCOMP_ADD_CHECKER_GROUP command seccomp: Add seccomp object checker evaluation selftest/seccomp: Remove unknown_ret_is_kill_above_allow test selftest/seccomp: Extend seccomp_data until matches selftest/seccomp: Add field_is_valid_syscall test selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_open_whitelist test audit,seccomp: Extend audit with seccomp state selftest/seccomp: Rename TRACE_poke to TRACE_poke_sys_read selftest/seccomp: Make tracer_poke() more generic selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_toctou_argument test security/seccomp: Protect against filesystem TOCTOU selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_toctou_filesystem test arch/x86/um/asm/syscall.h | 2 + include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 22 + include/linux/audit.h | 25 ++ include/linux/compat.h | 10 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 + include/linux/seccomp.h | 136 +++++- include/linux/syscalls.h | 68 +++ include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 105 +++++ kernel/audit.h | 3 + kernel/auditsc.c | 36 +- kernel/fork.c | 13 +- kernel/seccomp.c | 594 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/Kconfig | 1 + security/Makefile | 2 + security/seccomp/Kconfig | 14 + security/seccomp/Makefile | 3 + security/seccomp/checker_fs.c | 524 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/seccomp/checker_fs.h | 18 + security/seccomp/lsm.c | 135 ++++++ security/seccomp/lsm.h | 19 + security/security.c | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 572 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 22 files changed, 2248 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/seccomp/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/seccomp/Makefile create mode 100644 security/seccomp/checker_fs.c create mode 100644 security/seccomp/checker_fs.h create mode 100644 security/seccomp/lsm.c create mode 100644 security/seccomp/lsm.h -- 2.8.0.rc3
next reply other threads:[~2016-03-24 1:46 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2016-03-24 1:46 Mickaël Salaün [this message] 2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 01/17] um: Export the sys_call_table Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 02/17] seccomp: Fix typo Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 03/17] selftest/seccomp: Fix the flag name SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 4:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-03-29 15:35 ` Shuah Khan 2016-03-29 18:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] " Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-29 19:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Shuah Khan 2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 04/17] selftest/seccomp: Fix the seccomp(2) signature Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 4:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-03-29 15:38 ` Shuah Khan 2016-03-29 18:51 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] " Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-29 19:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Shuah Khan 2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 05/17] security/seccomp: Add LSM and create arrays of syscall metadata Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 15:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler 2016-03-24 16:01 ` Casey Schaufler 2016-03-24 21:31 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 06/17] seccomp: Add the SECCOMP_ADD_CHECKER_GROUP command Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 07/17] seccomp: Add seccomp object checker evaluation Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 08/17] selftest/seccomp: Remove unknown_ret_is_kill_above_allow test Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 09/17] selftest/seccomp: Extend seccomp_data until matches Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 10/17] selftest/seccomp: Add field_is_valid_syscall test Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 11/17] selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_open_whitelist test Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 12/17] audit,seccomp: Extend audit with seccomp state Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 13/17] selftest/seccomp: Rename TRACE_poke to TRACE_poke_sys_read Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 14/17] selftest/seccomp: Make tracer_poke() more generic Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 2:54 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 15/17] selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_toctou_argument test Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 2:54 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 16/17] security/seccomp: Protect against filesystem TOCTOU Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 2:54 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 17/17] selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_toctou_filesystem test Mickaël Salaün 2016-03-24 16:24 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1 00/17] seccomp-object: From attack surface reduction to sandboxing Kees Cook 2016-03-27 5:03 ` Loganaden Velvindron 2016-04-20 18:21 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-04-26 22:46 ` Kees Cook 2016-04-28 2:36 ` Kees Cook 2016-04-28 23:45 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-05-21 12:58 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-05-02 22:19 ` James Morris 2016-05-21 15:19 ` Daniel Borkmann 2016-05-22 21:30 ` Mickaël Salaün
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