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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>, Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk@man7.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1 00/17] seccomp-object: From attack surface reduction to sandboxing
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2016 09:24:06 -0700
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLModth62F8PsFfNVCL=7PrAd+kT_NEsMP5WwOJvLS8EQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1458784008-16277-1-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net>

On Wed, Mar 23, 2016 at 6:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> This series is a proof of concept (not ready for production) to extend seccomp
> with the ability to check argument pointers of syscalls as kernel object (e.g.
> file path). This add a needed feature to create a full sandbox managed by
> userland like the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or the OpenBSD Pledge. It was initially
> inspired from a partial seccomp-LSM prototype [1] but has evolved a lot since :)

This is interesting! I'd really like to get argument inspection
working. I'm going to spend some time examining this series more
closely, but my initial reaction is that I'm suspicious of the ToCToU
checking -- I'd rather there be no race at all. As for the bug-fixes,
I'll get those pulled in now. Thanks!

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

  parent reply index

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-24  1:46 [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 01/17] um: Export the sys_call_table Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 02/17] seccomp: Fix typo Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 03/17] selftest/seccomp: Fix the flag name SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  4:35   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-03-29 15:35     ` Shuah Khan
2016-03-29 18:46       ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-29 19:06         ` [kernel-hardening] " Shuah Khan
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 04/17] selftest/seccomp: Fix the seccomp(2) signature Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  4:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-03-29 15:38     ` Shuah Khan
2016-03-29 18:51       ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-29 19:07         ` [kernel-hardening] " Shuah Khan
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 05/17] security/seccomp: Add LSM and create arrays of syscall metadata Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 15:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2016-03-24 16:01   ` Casey Schaufler
2016-03-24 21:31     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 06/17] seccomp: Add the SECCOMP_ADD_CHECKER_GROUP command Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 07/17] seccomp: Add seccomp object checker evaluation Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 08/17] selftest/seccomp: Remove unknown_ret_is_kill_above_allow test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 09/17] selftest/seccomp: Extend seccomp_data until matches[6] Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:53   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 10/17] selftest/seccomp: Add field_is_valid_syscall test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:53   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 11/17] selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_open_whitelist test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:53   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 12/17] audit,seccomp: Extend audit with seccomp state Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:53   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 13/17] selftest/seccomp: Rename TRACE_poke to TRACE_poke_sys_read Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:53   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 14/17] selftest/seccomp: Make tracer_poke() more generic Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:54   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 15/17] selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_toctou_argument test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:54   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 16/17] security/seccomp: Protect against filesystem TOCTOU Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:54   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 17/17] selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_toctou_filesystem test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 16:24 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-03-27  5:03   ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1 00/17] seccomp-object: From attack surface reduction to sandboxing Loganaden Velvindron
2016-04-20 18:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-04-26 22:46   ` Kees Cook
2016-04-28  2:36 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-28 23:45   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-05-21 12:58     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-05-02 22:19   ` James Morris
2016-05-21 15:19   ` Daniel Borkmann
2016-05-22 21:30     ` Mickaël Salaün

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