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From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	pair@us.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, david@redhat.com, cohuck@redhat.com,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, "Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	dgilbert@redhat.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org,
	qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	"Richard Henderson" <rth@twiddle.net>,
	mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests
Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2020 14:57:38 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200625045738.GA172395@umbus.fritz.box> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200624034932-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>

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On Wed, Jun 24, 2020 at 03:55:59AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 01:16:38PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 07:47:20AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 07:46:14AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 11:12:45AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 12:06:02PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> > > > > > The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the platforms normal
> > > > > > DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a hypervisor
> > > > > > to directly access guest memory.  That doesn't work if the guest's memory
> > > > > > is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or POWER's PEF.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > So, if a host trust limitation mechanism is enabled, then apply the
> > > > > > iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA mechanisms.
> > > > > > Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared with the
> > > > > > hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > >  hw/core/machine.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > > > > >  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > index a71792bc16..8dfc1bb3f8 100644
> > > > > > --- a/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
> > > > > >  #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h"
> > > > > >  #include "migration/vmstate.h"
> > > > > >  #include "exec/host-trust-limitation.h"
> > > > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
> > > > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
> > > > > >  
> > > > > >  GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_0[] = {
> > > > > >      { "virtio-balloon-device", "page-poison", "false" },
> > > > > > @@ -1165,6 +1167,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
> > > > > >           * areas.
> > > > > >           */
> > > > > >          machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > +        /*
> > > > > > +         * Virtio devices can't count on directly accessing guest
> > > > > > +         * memory, so they need iommu_platform=on to use normal DMA
> > > > > > +         * mechanisms.  That requires disabling legacy virtio support
> > > > > > +         * for virtio pci devices
> > > > > > +         */
> > > > > > +        object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI, "disable-legacy", "on");
> > > > > > +        object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, "iommu_platform", "on");
> > > > > >      }
> > > > > 
> > > > > Silently changing the user's request configuration like this is a bad idea.
> > > > > The "disable-legacy" option in particular is undesirable as that switches
> > > > > the device to virtio-1.0 only mode, which exposes a different PCI ID to
> > > > > the guest.
> > > > > 
> > > > > If some options are incompatible with encryption, then we should raise a
> > > > > fatal error at startup, so applications/admins are aware that their requested
> > > > > config is broken.
> > > >
> > > > Agreed - my suggestion is an on/off/auto property, auto value
> > > > changes automatically, on/off is validated.
> > > 
> > > In fact should we extend all bit properties to allow an auto value?
> > 
> > If "auto" was made the default that creates a similar headache, as to
> > preserve existing configuration semantics we expose to apps, libvirt
> > would need to find all the properties changed to use "auto" and manually
> > set them back to on/off explicitly.
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Daniel
> 
> It's QEMU's job to try and have more or less consistent semantics across
> versions. QEMU does not guarantee not to change any option defaults
> though.
> 
> My point is to add ability to differentiate between property values
> set by user and ones set by machine type for compatibility.

At which point are you looking to differentiate these?  The use of
sugar_prop() in my draft code accomplishes this already for the
purposes of resolving a final property value within qemu (an explicit
user set one takes precedence).

-- 
David Gibson			| I'll have my music baroque, and my code
david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au	| minimalist, thank you.  NOT _the_ _other_
				| _way_ _around_!
http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson

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  reply	other threads:[~2020-06-25  5:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-19  2:05 [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 1/9] host trust limitation: Introduce new host trust limitation interface David Gibson
2020-06-26 11:01   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-14 19:26   ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 2/9] host trust limitation: Handle memory encryption via interface David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 3/9] host trust limitation: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 4/9] host trust limitation: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2020-07-14 19:36   ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 5/9] host trust limitation: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 6/9] host trust limitation: Add Error ** to HostTrustLimitation::kvm_init David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:06 ` [PATCH v3 7/9] spapr: Add PEF based host trust limitation David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:06 ` [PATCH v3 8/9] spapr: PEF: block migration David Gibson
2020-06-26 10:33   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-05  7:38     ` David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:06 ` [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2020-06-19 10:12   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 11:46     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-19 11:47       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-19 12:16         ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 20:04           ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-24  7:55           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-25  4:57             ` David Gibson [this message]
2020-06-25  5:02       ` David Gibson
2020-06-19 14:45     ` David Gibson
2020-06-19 15:05       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-20  8:24         ` David Gibson
2020-06-22  9:09           ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-25  5:06             ` David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:42 ` [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models no-reply
2020-06-19  8:28 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-19  9:45   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-19  9:56     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-19 10:05       ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-19 10:10         ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-22 12:02           ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-25  5:25             ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  7:06               ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-26  4:42                 ` David Gibson
2020-06-26  6:53                   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-26  9:01                     ` Janosch Frank
2020-06-26  9:32                       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-26  9:49                         ` Janosch Frank
2020-06-26 10:29                           ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-26 10:58                             ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-26 12:49                               ` Janosch Frank
2020-07-01 11:59                                 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-19  9:48   ` David Gibson
2020-06-19 10:04     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-25  5:42       ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  6:59         ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-25  9:49           ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-22 14:27 ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-06-24  7:06   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-25  5:47     ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:48       ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:44   ` David Gibson

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