From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, mst@redhat.com, cohuck@redhat.com,
david@redhat.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com,
qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org,
Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests
Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2020 15:06:00 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200625050600.GC172395@umbus.fritz.box> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200622090930.GB736373@redhat.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4876 bytes --]
On Mon, Jun 22, 2020 at 10:09:30AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> On Sat, Jun 20, 2020 at 06:24:27PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 04:05:56PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> > > On Sat, Jun 20, 2020 at 12:45:41AM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 11:12:45AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 12:06:02PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> > > > > > The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the platforms normal
> > > > > > DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a hypervisor
> > > > > > to directly access guest memory. That doesn't work if the guest's memory
> > > > > > is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or POWER's PEF.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > So, if a host trust limitation mechanism is enabled, then apply the
> > > > > > iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA mechanisms.
> > > > > > Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared with the
> > > > > > hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > > hw/core/machine.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > > > > > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > index a71792bc16..8dfc1bb3f8 100644
> > > > > > --- a/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
> > > > > > #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h"
> > > > > > #include "migration/vmstate.h"
> > > > > > #include "exec/host-trust-limitation.h"
> > > > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
> > > > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
> > > > > >
> > > > > > GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_0[] = {
> > > > > > { "virtio-balloon-device", "page-poison", "false" },
> > > > > > @@ -1165,6 +1167,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
> > > > > > * areas.
> > > > > > */
> > > > > > machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + /*
> > > > > > + * Virtio devices can't count on directly accessing guest
> > > > > > + * memory, so they need iommu_platform=on to use normal DMA
> > > > > > + * mechanisms. That requires disabling legacy virtio support
> > > > > > + * for virtio pci devices
> > > > > > + */
> > > > > > + object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI, "disable-legacy", "on");
> > > > > > + object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, "iommu_platform", "on");
> > > > > > }
> > > > >
> > > > > Silently changing the user's request configuration like this
> > > >
> > > > It doesn't, though. register_sugar_prop() effectively registers a
> > > > default, so if the user has explicitly specified something, that will
> > > > take precedence.
> > >
> > > Don't assume that the user has set "disable-legacy=off". People who want to
> > > have a transtional device are almost certainly pasing "-device virtio-blk-pci",
> > > because historical behaviour is that this is sufficient to give you a
> > > transitional device. Changing the default of disable-legacy=on has not
> > > honoured the users' requested config.
> >
> > Umm.. by this argument we can never change any default, ever. But we
> > do that routinely with new machine versions. How is changing based on
> > a machine option different from that?
>
> It isn't really different. Most of the time we get away with it and no one
> sees a problem. Some of the changes made though, do indeed break things,
> and libvirt tries to override QEMU's changes in defaults where they are
> especially at risk of causing breakage. The virtio device model is one such
> change I'd consider especially risky as there are clear guest OS driver
> support compatibility issues there, with it being a completely different
> PCI device ID & impl.
If it were possible to drop an existing supported guest into secure VM
mode, that would make sense. But AFAICT, a guest always need to be
aware of the secure mode - it certainly does on POWER. Plus, support
for secure guest mode is way newer than support for modern virtio
devices.
Even then, I don't see that this is really anything new. Updating
machine type version can absolutely change system devices in a way
which could break guests (though it mostly won't). If you really want
stable support for a given guest, use a versioned machine type. Doing
that will work just as well for the secure VM stuff as for anything
else.
--
David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code
david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_
| _way_ _around_!
http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-25 5:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-19 2:05 [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2020-06-19 2:05 ` [PATCH v3 1/9] host trust limitation: Introduce new host trust limitation interface David Gibson
2020-06-26 11:01 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-14 19:26 ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-19 2:05 ` [PATCH v3 2/9] host trust limitation: Handle memory encryption via interface David Gibson
2020-06-19 2:05 ` [PATCH v3 3/9] host trust limitation: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-06-19 2:05 ` [PATCH v3 4/9] host trust limitation: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2020-07-14 19:36 ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-19 2:05 ` [PATCH v3 5/9] host trust limitation: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2020-06-19 2:05 ` [PATCH v3 6/9] host trust limitation: Add Error ** to HostTrustLimitation::kvm_init David Gibson
2020-06-19 2:06 ` [PATCH v3 7/9] spapr: Add PEF based host trust limitation David Gibson
2020-06-19 2:06 ` [PATCH v3 8/9] spapr: PEF: block migration David Gibson
2020-06-26 10:33 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-05 7:38 ` David Gibson
2020-06-19 2:06 ` [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2020-06-19 10:12 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 11:46 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-19 11:47 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-19 12:16 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 20:04 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-24 7:55 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-25 4:57 ` David Gibson
2020-06-25 5:02 ` David Gibson
2020-06-19 14:45 ` David Gibson
2020-06-19 15:05 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-20 8:24 ` David Gibson
2020-06-22 9:09 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-25 5:06 ` David Gibson [this message]
2020-06-19 2:42 ` [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models no-reply
2020-06-19 8:28 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-19 9:45 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-19 9:56 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-19 10:05 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-19 10:10 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-22 12:02 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-25 5:25 ` David Gibson
2020-06-25 7:06 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-26 4:42 ` David Gibson
2020-06-26 6:53 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-26 9:01 ` Janosch Frank
2020-06-26 9:32 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-26 9:49 ` Janosch Frank
2020-06-26 10:29 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-26 10:58 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-26 12:49 ` Janosch Frank
2020-07-01 11:59 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-19 9:48 ` David Gibson
2020-06-19 10:04 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-25 5:42 ` David Gibson
2020-06-25 6:59 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-25 9:49 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-22 14:27 ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-06-24 7:06 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-25 5:47 ` David Gibson
2020-06-25 5:48 ` David Gibson
2020-06-25 5:44 ` David Gibson
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