From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, jroedel@suse.de,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, mingo@redhat.com,
dave.hansen@intel.com, rientjes@google.com, seanjc@google.com,
peterz@infradead.org, hpa@zytor.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 23/37] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2021 07:38:08 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210430123822.13825-24-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210430123822.13825-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
The KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command can be used to insert data into the
guest's memory. The data is encrypted with the cryptographic context
created with the KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START.
In addition to the inserting data, it can insert a two special pages
into the guests memory: the secrets page and the CPUID page.
For more information see the SEV-SNP specification.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 18 +++++
2 files changed, 157 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 90d70038b607..d97f37df1f3b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/misc_cgroup.h>
#include <linux/processor.h>
#include <linux/trace_events.h>
+#include <linux/sev.h>
#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
#include <asm/trapnr.h>
@@ -1607,6 +1608,141 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
return rc;
}
+static struct kvm_memory_slot *hva_to_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long hva)
+{
+ struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
+
+ kvm_for_each_memslot(memslot, slots) {
+ if (hva >= memslot->userspace_addr &&
+ hva < memslot->userspace_addr + (memslot->npages << PAGE_SHIFT))
+ return memslot;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static bool hva_to_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long hva, gpa_t *gpa)
+{
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
+ gpa_t gpa_offset;
+
+ memslot = hva_to_memslot(kvm, hva);
+ if (!memslot)
+ return false;
+
+ gpa_offset = hva - memslot->userspace_addr;
+ *gpa = ((memslot->base_gfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + gpa_offset);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int snp_page_reclaim(struct page *page, int rmppage_size)
+{
+ struct sev_data_snp_page_reclaim data = {};
+ struct rmpupdate e = {};
+ int rc, err;
+
+ data.paddr = __sme_page_pa(page) | rmppage_size;
+ rc = snp_guest_page_reclaim(&data, &err);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return rmpupdate(page, &e);
+}
+
+static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ unsigned long npages, vaddr, vaddr_end, i, next_vaddr;
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ struct sev_data_snp_launch_update data = {};
+ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update params;
+ int *error = &argp->error;
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+ struct page **inpages;
+ struct rmpupdate e;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ if (!sev->snp_context)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
+
+ /* Lock the user memory. */
+ inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.uaddr, params.len, &npages, 1);
+ if (!inpages)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, 0);
+ vaddr = params.uaddr;
+ vaddr_end = vaddr + params.len;
+
+ for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i++) {
+ unsigned long psize, pmask;
+ int level = PG_LEVEL_4K;
+ gpa_t gpa;
+
+ if (!hva_to_gpa(kvm, vaddr, &gpa)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto e_unpin;
+ }
+
+ psize = page_level_size(level);
+ pmask = page_level_mask(level);
+ gpa = gpa & pmask;
+
+ /* Transition the page state to pre-guest */
+ memset(&e, 0, sizeof(e));
+ e.assigned = 1;
+ e.gpa = gpa;
+ e.asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
+ e.immutable = true;
+ e.pagesize = X86_TO_RMP_PG_LEVEL(level);
+ ret = rmpupdate(inpages[i], &e);
+ if (ret) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto e_unpin;
+ }
+
+ data.address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]);
+ data.page_size = e.pagesize;
+ data.page_type = params.page_type;
+ ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, &data, error);
+ if (ret) {
+ snp_page_reclaim(inpages[i], e.pagesize);
+ goto e_unpin;
+ }
+
+ next_vaddr = (vaddr & pmask) + psize;
+ }
+
+e_unpin:
+ /* Content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
+ memset(&e, 0, sizeof(e));
+ for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
+ set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
+ mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
+
+ /*
+ * If its an error, then update RMP entry to change page ownership
+ * to the hypervisor.
+ */
+ if (ret)
+ rmpupdate(inpages[i], &e);
+ }
+
+ /* Unlock the user pages */
+ sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -1699,6 +1835,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
case KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START:
r = snp_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
break;
+ case KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE:
+ r = snp_launch_update(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
default:
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 00427707d053..dfc4975820d6 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1681,6 +1681,7 @@ enum sev_cmd_id {
/* SNP specific commands */
KVM_SEV_SNP_INIT,
KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START,
+ KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE,
KVM_SEV_NR_MAX,
};
@@ -1786,6 +1787,23 @@ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start {
__u8 gosvw[16];
};
+#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL 0x1
+#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA 0x2
+#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO 0x3
+#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED 0x4
+#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS 0x5
+#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID 0x6
+
+struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update {
+ __u64 uaddr;
+ __u32 len;
+ __u8 imi_page;
+ __u8 page_type;
+ __u8 vmpl3_perms;
+ __u8 vmpl2_perms;
+ __u8 vmpl1_perms;
+};
+
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0)
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1)
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-30 12:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-30 12:37 [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 00/37] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:37 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 01/37] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:37 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 02/37] KVM: SVM: Provide the Hypervisor Feature support VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:37 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 03/37] KVM: SVM: Increase the GHCB protocol version Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:37 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 04/37] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:37 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 05/37] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:37 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 06/37] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:37 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 07/37] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:37 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 08/37] x86/sev: Split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 15:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-05-03 15:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-03 15:41 ` Dave Hansen
2021-05-07 11:28 ` Vlastimil Babka
2021-04-30 12:37 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 09/37] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:37 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 10/37] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for kernel address Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 14:44 ` Dave Hansen
2021-05-03 15:03 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-03 15:49 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 15:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 16:15 ` Dave Hansen
2021-05-03 17:19 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 17:31 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 17:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-03 19:41 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 19:43 ` Dave Hansen
2021-05-04 12:31 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-04 14:33 ` Dave Hansen
2021-05-04 15:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:37 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 11/37] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:37 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 12/37] crypto:ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:37 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 13/37] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:37 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 14/37] crypto: ccp: Shutdown SNP firmware on kexec Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 15/37] crypto:ccp: Provide APIs to issue SEV-SNP commands Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 16/37] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-05-10 18:23 ` Peter Gonda
2021-05-10 20:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 17/37] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 18/37] KVM: SVM: make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 19/37] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 20/37] KVM: SVM: define new SEV_FEATURES field in the VMCB Save State Area Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 21/37] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 20:25 ` Peter Gonda
2021-05-06 22:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 22/37] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 24/37] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 25/37] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 26/37] KVM: X86: Add kvm_x86_ops to get the max page level for the TDP Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 27/37] KVM: X86: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by SEV Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 28/37] KVM: X86: Introduce kvm_mmu_get_tdp_walk() for SEV-SNP use Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 29/37] KVM: X86: Define new RMP check related #NPF error bits Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 30/37] KVM: X86: update page-fault trace to log the 64-bit error code Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 31/37] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 32/37] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-05-10 17:30 ` Peter Gonda
2021-05-10 17:51 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-10 19:59 ` Peter Gonda
2021-05-10 20:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 33/37] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle " Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 34/37] KVM: X86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 35/37] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP nested page fault Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 36/37] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Brijesh Singh
2021-05-10 18:57 ` Peter Gonda
2021-05-10 20:14 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-10 21:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-05-11 18:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 12:38 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v2 37/37] KVM: SVM: Advertise the SEV-SNP feature support Brijesh Singh
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