Re: [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return

From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Rik van Riel <riel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Petr Mladek <pmladek-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>,
	Miroslav Benes <mbenes-AlSwsSmVLrQ@public.gmane.org>,
	Al Viro <viro-RmSDqhL/yNMiFSDQTTA3OLVCufUGDwFn@public.gmane.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Russell King <linux-I+IVW8TIWO2tmTQ+vhA3Yw@public.gmane.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>,
	Will Drewry <wad-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>,
	Pratyush Anand <panand@redh>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 13:38:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJcbSZE6Og4gwhFwhy_-Jaq6GovwN3y1B6O89JmkpXHtVfDLBA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKrJv0y70e5JiafKGcGzWoJPZM_HruZ=Y0rM1m0J4tZAA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>

On Wed, Jun 28, 2017 at 10:52 AM, Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 6:12 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> >> Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
> >> user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and elevate
> >> privileges [1].
> >>
> >> The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on
> >> return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if
> >> needed.
> >>
> >> The addr_limit_user_check function is added as a cross-architecture
> >> function to check the address limit.
> >>
> >> [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
> >
> > Thanks for reworking this series!
> >
> > The bad state correctly BUGs under the LKDTM test:
> >
> > [   21.171586] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_USER_DS
> > [   21.172791] lkdtm: setting bad task size limit
> > [   21.173742] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> > [   21.174641] kernel BUG at ./include/linux/syscalls.h:220!
> > ...
> > [   21.193166] Call Trace:
> > [   21.193617]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
> > [   21.194443]  entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
> >
> >
> > Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
>
> Is everyone happy with this patch for x86? Does this need anything
> more/different?

Asking again. Additional feedback? Anyone wants to pick-it up?

>
> Thanks!
>
> -Kees
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Pixel Security

-- 
Thomas