From: "Gupta, Pankaj" <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
To: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>, Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
"Maciej S . Szmigiero" <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>,
Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>,
Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>,
luto@kernel.org, jun.nakajima@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, david@redhat.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
ddutile@redhat.com, dhildenb@redhat.com,
Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
mhocko@suse.com, Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>,
wei.w.wang@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/8] mm/memfd: Introduce userspace inaccessible memfd
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2022 18:39:06 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c63ad0cd-d517-0f1e-59e9-927d8ae15a1a@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221017161955.t4gditaztbwijgcn@box.shutemov.name>
On 10/17/2022 6:19 PM, Kirill A . Shutemov wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 17, 2022 at 03:00:21PM +0200, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
>> On 9/15/22 16:29, Chao Peng wrote:
>>> From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
>>>
>>> KVM can use memfd-provided memory for guest memory. For normal userspace
>>> accessible memory, KVM userspace (e.g. QEMU) mmaps the memfd into its
>>> virtual address space and then tells KVM to use the virtual address to
>>> setup the mapping in the secondary page table (e.g. EPT).
>>>
>>> With confidential computing technologies like Intel TDX, the
>>> memfd-provided memory may be encrypted with special key for special
>>> software domain (e.g. KVM guest) and is not expected to be directly
>>> accessed by userspace. Precisely, userspace access to such encrypted
>>> memory may lead to host crash so it should be prevented.
>>>
>>> This patch introduces userspace inaccessible memfd (created with
>>> MFD_INACCESSIBLE). Its memory is inaccessible from userspace through
>>> ordinary MMU access (e.g. read/write/mmap) but can be accessed via
>>> in-kernel interface so KVM can directly interact with core-mm without
>>> the need to map the memory into KVM userspace.
>>>
>>> It provides semantics required for KVM guest private(encrypted) memory
>>> support that a file descriptor with this flag set is going to be used as
>>> the source of guest memory in confidential computing environments such
>>> as Intel TDX/AMD SEV.
>>>
>>> KVM userspace is still in charge of the lifecycle of the memfd. It
>>> should pass the opened fd to KVM. KVM uses the kernel APIs newly added
>>> in this patch to obtain the physical memory address and then populate
>>> the secondary page table entries.
>>>
>>> The userspace inaccessible memfd can be fallocate-ed and hole-punched
>>> from userspace. When hole-punching happens, KVM can get notified through
>>> inaccessible_notifier it then gets chance to remove any mapped entries
>>> of the range in the secondary page tables.
>>>
>>> The userspace inaccessible memfd itself is implemented as a shim layer
>>> on top of real memory file systems like tmpfs/hugetlbfs but this patch
>>> only implemented tmpfs. The allocated memory is currently marked as
>>> unmovable and unevictable, this is required for current confidential
>>> usage. But in future this might be changed.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
>>> ---
>>
>> ...
>>
>>> +static long inaccessible_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode,
>>> + loff_t offset, loff_t len)
>>> +{
>>> + struct inaccessible_data *data = file->f_mapping->private_data;
>>> + struct file *memfd = data->memfd;
>>> + int ret;
>>> +
>>> + if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) {
>>> + if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(offset) || !PAGE_ALIGNED(len))
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + ret = memfd->f_op->fallocate(memfd, mode, offset, len);
>>> + inaccessible_notifier_invalidate(data, offset, offset + len);
>>
>> Wonder if invalidate should precede the actual hole punch, otherwise we open
>> a window where the page tables point to memory no longer valid?
>
> Yes, you are right. Thanks for catching this.
I also noticed this. But then thought the memory would be anyways zeroed
(hole punched) before this call?
>
>>> + return ret;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>
>> ...
>>
>>> +
>>> +static struct file_system_type inaccessible_fs = {
>>> + .owner = THIS_MODULE,
>>> + .name = "[inaccessible]",
>>
>> Dunno where exactly is this name visible, but shouldn't it better be
>> "[memfd:inaccessible]"?
>
> Maybe. And skip brackets.
>
>>
>>> + .init_fs_context = inaccessible_init_fs_context,
>>> + .kill_sb = kill_anon_super,
>>> +};
>>> +
>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-17 16:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 97+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-09-15 14:29 [PATCH v8 0/8] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM Chao Peng
2022-09-15 14:29 ` [PATCH v8 1/8] mm/memfd: Introduce userspace inaccessible memfd Chao Peng
2022-09-19 9:12 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-09-19 19:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-09-21 21:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-09-22 13:23 ` Wang, Wei W
2022-09-23 15:20 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-09-23 15:19 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-09-26 14:23 ` Chao Peng
2022-09-26 15:51 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-09-27 22:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-09-30 16:19 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-10-13 13:34 ` Chao Peng
2022-10-17 10:31 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-10-17 14:58 ` Chao Peng
2022-10-17 19:05 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-10-19 13:30 ` Chao Peng
2022-10-18 0:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-10-19 15:04 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-09-23 0:58 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-09-26 10:35 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-09-26 14:48 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-26 14:53 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-09-27 23:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-09-28 13:36 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-22 13:26 ` Wang, Wei W
2022-09-22 19:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-09-23 0:53 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-09-23 15:20 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-09-30 16:14 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-09-30 16:23 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-03 7:33 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-10-03 11:01 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-04 15:39 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-10-06 8:50 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-10-06 13:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-17 13:00 ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-10-17 16:19 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-17 16:39 ` Gupta, Pankaj [this message]
2022-10-17 21:56 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-18 13:42 ` Vishal Annapurve
2022-10-19 15:32 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-20 10:50 ` Vishal Annapurve
2022-10-21 13:54 ` Chao Peng
2022-10-21 16:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-10-19 12:23 ` Vishal Annapurve
2022-10-21 13:47 ` Chao Peng
2022-10-21 16:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-10-24 14:59 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-24 15:26 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-11-03 16:27 ` Vishal Annapurve
2022-09-15 14:29 ` [PATCH v8 2/8] KVM: Extend the memslot to support fd-based private memory Chao Peng
2022-09-16 9:14 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-09-16 9:53 ` Chao Peng
2022-09-26 10:26 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-09-26 14:04 ` Chao Peng
2022-09-29 22:45 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-09-29 23:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-10-05 13:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-10-05 22:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-10-06 9:00 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-10-06 14:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-10-06 15:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-10-06 15:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-10-07 11:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-10-07 14:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-10-07 21:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-10-08 16:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-10-08 17:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-10-10 8:25 ` Chao Peng
2022-10-12 8:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-15 14:29 ` [PATCH v8 3/8] KVM: Add KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT exit Chao Peng
2022-09-16 9:17 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-09-16 9:54 ` Chao Peng
2022-09-15 14:29 ` [PATCH v8 4/8] KVM: Use gfn instead of hva for mmu_notifier_retry Chao Peng
2022-09-15 14:29 ` [PATCH v8 5/8] KVM: Register/unregister the guest private memory regions Chao Peng
2022-09-26 10:36 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-09-26 14:07 ` Chao Peng
2022-10-11 9:48 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-10-12 2:35 ` Chao Peng
2022-10-17 10:15 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-10-17 22:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-10-19 13:23 ` Chao Peng
2022-10-19 15:02 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-10-19 16:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-10-19 18:32 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-09-15 14:29 ` [PATCH v8 6/8] KVM: Update lpage info when private/shared memory are mixed Chao Peng
2022-09-29 16:52 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-09-30 8:59 ` Chao Peng
2022-09-15 14:29 ` [PATCH v8 7/8] KVM: Handle page fault for private memory Chao Peng
2022-10-14 18:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-10-17 14:48 ` Chao Peng
2022-09-15 14:29 ` [PATCH v8 8/8] KVM: Enable and expose KVM_MEM_PRIVATE Chao Peng
2022-10-04 14:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-10-10 8:31 ` Chao Peng
2022-10-06 8:55 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-10-10 8:33 ` Chao Peng
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