From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>Peter Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2018 08:03:28 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180921150351.20898-5-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180921150351.20898-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Intel Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) introduces the following MSRs into the XSAVES system states. IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings), IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode shadow stack), IA32_PL0_SSP (kernel-mode shadow stack), IA32_PL1_SSP (ring-1 shadow stack), IA32_PL2_SSP (ring-2 shadow stack). Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 4 +++- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 10 ++++++++++ 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h index 202c53918ecf..e55d51d172f1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h @@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ enum xfeature { XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM, XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR, XFEATURE_PKRU, + XFEATURE_RESERVED, + XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER, + XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL, XFEATURE_MAX, }; @@ -128,6 +131,8 @@ enum xfeature { #define XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM (1 << XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM) #define XFEATURE_MASK_PT (1 << XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR) #define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU (1 << XFEATURE_PKRU) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER (1 << XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL (1 << XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL) #define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE) #define XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512 (XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK \ @@ -229,6 +234,23 @@ struct pkru_state { u32 pad; } __packed; +/* + * State component 11 is Control flow Enforcement user states + */ +struct cet_user_state { + u64 u_cet; /* user control flow settings */ + u64 user_ssp; /* user shadow stack pointer */ +} __packed; + +/* + * State component 12 is Control flow Enforcement kernel states + */ +struct cet_kernel_state { + u64 kernel_ssp; /* kernel shadow stack */ + u64 pl1_ssp; /* ring-1 shadow stack */ + u64 pl2_ssp; /* ring-2 shadow stack */ +} __packed; + struct xstate_header { u64 xfeatures; u64 xcomp_bv; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h index a32dc5f8c963..662562cbafe9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h @@ -31,7 +31,9 @@ XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM | \ XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU | \ XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | \ - XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR) + XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR | \ + XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER | \ + XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #define REX_PREFIX "0x48, " diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h index bcba3c643e63..25311ec4b731 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h @@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ #define X86_CR4_SMAP _BITUL(X86_CR4_SMAP_BIT) #define X86_CR4_PKE_BIT 22 /* enable Protection Keys support */ #define X86_CR4_PKE _BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT) +#define X86_CR4_CET_BIT 23 /* enable Control flow Enforcement */ +#define X86_CR4_CET _BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT) /* * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c index dd2c561c4544..91c0f665567b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c @@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] = "Processor Trace (unused)" , "Protection Keys User registers", "unknown xstate feature" , + "Control flow User registers" , + "Control flow Kernel registers" , + "unknown xstate feature" , }; static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = { @@ -48,6 +51,9 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = { X86_FEATURE_AVX512F, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT, X86_FEATURE_PKU, + 0, /* Unused */ + X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, /* XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER */ + X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, /* XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL */ }; /* @@ -316,6 +322,8 @@ static void __init print_xstate_features(void) print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_ZMM_Hi256); print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM); print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU); + print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER); + print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL); } /* @@ -562,6 +570,8 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr) XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_ZMM_Hi256, struct avx_512_zmm_uppers_state); XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM, struct avx_512_hi16_state); XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PKRU, struct pkru_state); + XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER, struct cet_user_state); + XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL, struct cet_kernel_state); /* * Make *SURE* to add any feature numbers in below if -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>, "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>, Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com> Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2018 08:03:28 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180921150351.20898-5-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw) Message-ID: <20180921150328.oTtKW1RNSu6LI8xdYn0I3DiQ10PRY7gCRTMkUc0Z-SE@z> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180921150351.20898-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Intel Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) introduces the following MSRs into the XSAVES system states. IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings), IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode shadow stack), IA32_PL0_SSP (kernel-mode shadow stack), IA32_PL1_SSP (ring-1 shadow stack), IA32_PL2_SSP (ring-2 shadow stack). Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 4 +++- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 10 ++++++++++ 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h index 202c53918ecf..e55d51d172f1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h @@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ enum xfeature { XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM, XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR, XFEATURE_PKRU, + XFEATURE_RESERVED, + XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER, + XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL, XFEATURE_MAX, }; @@ -128,6 +131,8 @@ enum xfeature { #define XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM (1 << XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM) #define XFEATURE_MASK_PT (1 << XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR) #define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU (1 << XFEATURE_PKRU) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER (1 << XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL (1 << XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL) #define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE) #define XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512 (XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK \ @@ -229,6 +234,23 @@ struct pkru_state { u32 pad; } __packed; +/* + * State component 11 is Control flow Enforcement user states + */ +struct cet_user_state { + u64 u_cet; /* user control flow settings */ + u64 user_ssp; /* user shadow stack pointer */ +} __packed; + +/* + * State component 12 is Control flow Enforcement kernel states + */ +struct cet_kernel_state { + u64 kernel_ssp; /* kernel shadow stack */ + u64 pl1_ssp; /* ring-1 shadow stack */ + u64 pl2_ssp; /* ring-2 shadow stack */ +} __packed; + struct xstate_header { u64 xfeatures; u64 xcomp_bv; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h index a32dc5f8c963..662562cbafe9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h @@ -31,7 +31,9 @@ XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM | \ XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU | \ XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | \ - XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR) + XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR | \ + XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER | \ + XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #define REX_PREFIX "0x48, " diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h index bcba3c643e63..25311ec4b731 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h @@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ #define X86_CR4_SMAP _BITUL(X86_CR4_SMAP_BIT) #define X86_CR4_PKE_BIT 22 /* enable Protection Keys support */ #define X86_CR4_PKE _BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT) +#define X86_CR4_CET_BIT 23 /* enable Control flow Enforcement */ +#define X86_CR4_CET _BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT) /* * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c index dd2c561c4544..91c0f665567b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c @@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] = "Processor Trace (unused)" , "Protection Keys User registers", "unknown xstate feature" , + "Control flow User registers" , + "Control flow Kernel registers" , + "unknown xstate feature" , }; static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = { @@ -48,6 +51,9 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = { X86_FEATURE_AVX512F, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT, X86_FEATURE_PKU, + 0, /* Unused */ + X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, /* XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER */ + X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, /* XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL */ }; /* @@ -316,6 +322,8 @@ static void __init print_xstate_features(void) print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_ZMM_Hi256); print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM); print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU); + print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER); + print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL); } /* @@ -562,6 +570,8 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr) XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_ZMM_Hi256, struct avx_512_zmm_uppers_state); XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM, struct avx_512_hi16_state); XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PKRU, struct pkru_state); + XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_SHSTK_USER, struct cet_user_state); + XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_SHSTK_KERNEL, struct cet_kernel_state); /* * Make *SURE* to add any feature numbers in below if -- 2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-21 15:03 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 142+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-09-21 15:03 [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-25 16:27 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-09-25 16:27 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-09-25 16:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-25 16:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-28 16:51 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-09-28 16:51 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-09-28 16:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-28 16:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-25 16:37 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-09-25 16:37 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-10-02 15:29 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-02 15:29 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-02 16:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-02 16:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-02 16:30 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-02 16:30 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-02 16:37 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-02 16:37 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-02 16:39 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-02 16:39 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-02 16:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-02 16:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-25 17:03 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-09-25 17:03 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-09-25 17:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-25 17:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-02 17:15 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-02 17:15 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-04 15:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-04 15:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message] 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 10:39 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 10:39 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 16:11 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 16:11 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 13:38 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-10-03 13:38 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-10-03 14:05 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-03 14:05 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-03 16:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 16:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 13:19 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 13:19 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 17/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 15:08 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 15:08 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 15:12 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 15:12 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 4:15 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 4:15 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 14:36 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 14:36 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 16:46 ` Jann Horn 2018-10-03 16:46 ` Jann Horn 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 23:27 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 23:27 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-09 21:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-09 21:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-15 23:40 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-15 23:40 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-16 17:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-16 17:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 23/27] mm/map: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 16:55 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-09-21 16:55 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-09-21 17:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 17:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 24/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 4:56 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 4:56 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 5:36 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-10-03 5:36 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-10-03 16:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 16:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 16:18 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-10-03 16:18 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-10-03 16:32 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 16:32 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 16:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 16:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 16:52 ` Jann Horn 2018-10-03 16:52 ` Jann Horn 2018-10-03 21:21 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 21:21 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 25/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-03 17:57 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-10-03 17:57 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov 2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-21 22:53 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen 2018-09-21 22:53 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-24 15:25 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-24 15:25 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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