From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v11 20/25] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 17:25:35 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200825002540.3351-21-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200825002540.3351-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
This patch adds basic shadow stack enabling/disabling routines. A task's
shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK flag and has a fixed
size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
v11:
- Modify alloc_shstk() to take flags and pass to do_mmap().
This is to be used by an arch_prctl() introduced later.
v10:
- Change no_cet_shstk to no_user_shstk.
- Limit shadow stack size to 4 GB, and round_up to PAGE_SIZE.
- Replace checking shstk_enabled with shstk_size being zero.
- WARN_ON_ONCE() when vm_munmap() fails.
v9:
- Change cpu_feature_enabled() to static_cpu_has().
- Merge cet_disable_shstk to cet_disable_free_shstk.
- Remove the empty slot at the top of the shadow stack, as it is not
needed.
- Move do_mmap_locked() to alloc_shstk(), which is a static function.
v6:
- Create a function do_mmap_locked() for shadow stack allocation.
v2:
- Change noshstk to no_cet_shstk.
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 26 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 +
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 138 ++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 28 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 1 +
.../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
8 files changed, 214 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..caac0687c8e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
+#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct task_struct;
+/*
+ * Per-thread CET status
+ */
+struct cet_status {
+ unsigned long shstk_base;
+ unsigned long shstk_size;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
+int cet_setup_shstk(void);
+void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
+#else
+static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 4ea8584682f9..a0e1b24cfa02 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@
# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0
+#else
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
+#endif
+
/*
* Make sure to add features to the correct mask
*/
@@ -75,7 +81,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK13 0
#define DISABLED_MASK14 0
#define DISABLED_MASK15 0
-#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)
+#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK)
#define DISABLED_MASK17 0
#define DISABLED_MASK18 0
#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 01acbd63cad8..8c874d6ce871 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ struct vm86;
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
#include <asm/vmxfeatures.h>
#include <asm/vdso/processor.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
@@ -542,6 +543,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
+ struct cet_status cet;
+#endif
+
/* Floating point and extended processor state */
struct fpu fpu;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index e77261db2391..76f27f518266 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += unwind_orc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o
+
###
# 64 bit specific files
ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a1be8ccee1cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * cet.c - Control-flow Enforcement (CET)
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation.
+ * Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/user.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
+
+static void start_update_msrs(void)
+{
+ fpregs_lock();
+ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+ __fpregs_load_activate();
+}
+
+static void end_update_msrs(void)
+{
+ fpregs_unlock();
+}
+
+static unsigned long cet_get_shstk_addr(void)
+{
+ struct fpu *fpu = ¤t->thread.fpu;
+ unsigned long ssp = 0;
+
+ fpregs_lock();
+
+ if (fpregs_state_valid(fpu, smp_processor_id())) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+ } else {
+ struct cet_user_state *p;
+
+ p = get_xsave_addr(&fpu->state.xsave, XFEATURE_CET_USER);
+ if (p)
+ ssp = p->user_ssp;
+ }
+
+ fpregs_unlock();
+ return ssp;
+}
+
+static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size, int flags)
+{
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ unsigned long addr, populate;
+
+ /* VM_SHSTK requires MAP_ANONYMOUS, MAP_PRIVATE */
+ flags |= MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
+
+ mmap_write_lock(mm);
+ addr = do_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ, flags, VM_SHSTK, 0,
+ &populate, NULL);
+ mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+
+ if (populate)
+ mm_populate(addr, populate);
+
+ return addr;
+}
+
+int cet_setup_shstk(void)
+{
+ unsigned long addr, size;
+ struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ size = round_up(min(rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), 1UL << 32), PAGE_SIZE);
+ addr = alloc_shstk(size, 0);
+
+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+ return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
+
+ cet->shstk_base = addr;
+ cet->shstk_size = size;
+
+ start_update_msrs();
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN);
+ end_update_msrs();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+ !cet->shstk_size || !cet->shstk_base)
+ return;
+
+ if (!tsk->mm || (tsk->mm != current->mm))
+ return;
+
+ if (tsk == current) {
+ u64 msr_val;
+
+ start_update_msrs();
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val & ~CET_SHSTK_EN);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
+ end_update_msrs();
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ int r;
+
+ r = vm_munmap(cet->shstk_base, cet->shstk_size);
+
+ /*
+ * Retry if mmap_lock is not available.
+ */
+ if (r == -EINTR) {
+ cond_resched();
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(r);
+ break;
+ }
+ cet->shstk_base = 0;
+ cet->shstk_size = 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index c5d6f17d9b9d..5f60ddaabc46 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#include <asm/microcode_intel.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
#include <asm/uv/uv.h>
#include "cpu.h"
@@ -509,6 +510,32 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
__setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+ return;
+
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+static __init int setup_disable_shstk(char *s)
+{
+ /* require an exact match without trailing characters */
+ if (s[0] != '\0')
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return 1;
+
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+ pr_info("x86: 'no_user_shstk' specified, disabling user Shadow Stack\n");
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("no_user_shstk", setup_disable_shstk);
+#endif
+
/*
* Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
* be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
@@ -1544,6 +1571,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
x86_init_rdrand(c);
setup_pku(c);
+ setup_cet(c);
/*
* Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 994d8393f2f7..e41f1a468ee3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include <asm/io_bitmap.h>
#include <asm/proto.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
#include "process.h"
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 4ea8584682f9..a0e1b24cfa02 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@
# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0
+#else
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
+#endif
+
/*
* Make sure to add features to the correct mask
*/
@@ -75,7 +81,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK13 0
#define DISABLED_MASK14 0
#define DISABLED_MASK15 0
-#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)
+#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK)
#define DISABLED_MASK17 0
#define DISABLED_MASK18 0
#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
--
2.21.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-25 0:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-25 0:25 [PATCH v11 00/25] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 02/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 03/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 04/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 05/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 06/25] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 09/25] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 10/25] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 13/25] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 14/25] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 15/25] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 16/25] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 17/25] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 19/25] mm: Re-introduce do_mmap_pgoff() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 22/25] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 23/25] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:25 ` [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-25 18:43 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-08-25 19:19 ` Dave Hansen
2020-08-25 21:04 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-08-25 23:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-08-25 23:34 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-08-26 16:46 ` Dave Martin
2020-08-26 16:51 ` Florian Weimer
2020-08-26 17:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-26 18:49 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-08-26 19:43 ` H.J. Lu
2020-08-26 19:57 ` Dave Hansen
2020-08-27 13:26 ` H.J. Lu
2020-09-01 10:28 ` Dave Martin
2020-09-01 17:23 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-01 17:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-01 18:11 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-02 13:58 ` Dave Martin
[not found] ` <46dffdfd-92f8-0f05-6164-945f217b0958@intel.com>
2020-09-08 17:57 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-08 18:25 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-09 22:08 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-09 22:59 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-09 23:07 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-09 23:11 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-09 23:25 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-09 23:29 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-09 23:45 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-11 22:59 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-14 14:50 ` [NEEDS-REVIEW] " Dave Hansen
2020-09-14 18:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-14 20:44 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-14 21:14 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-16 13:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-16 19:25 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-09-14 1:33 ` [NEEDS-REVIEW] " Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-09-14 9:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-20 16:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-09-23 23:32 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
[not found] ` <bf2ab309-f8c4-83da-1c0a-5684e5bc5c82@intel.com>
2020-09-15 19:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-15 19:24 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-15 20:16 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-08-26 17:08 ` Dave Martin
2020-08-27 13:18 ` Florian Weimer
2020-08-27 13:28 ` H.J. Lu
2020-08-27 13:36 ` Florian Weimer
2020-08-27 14:07 ` H.J. Lu
2020-08-27 14:08 ` H.J. Lu
2020-09-01 17:49 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-01 17:50 ` Florian Weimer
2020-09-01 17:58 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-01 18:17 ` Florian Weimer
2020-09-01 18:19 ` H.J. Lu
2020-09-01 18:24 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-08-27 18:13 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-08-27 18:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-27 19:33 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-08-27 19:37 ` H.J. Lu
2020-08-28 1:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-28 1:44 ` H.J. Lu
2020-08-28 6:23 ` Florian Weimer
2020-08-28 11:37 ` H.J. Lu
2020-08-28 17:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-28 17:45 ` H.J. Lu
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20200825002540.3351-21-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
--to=yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
--cc=Dave.Martin@arm.com \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=esyr@redhat.com \
--cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
--cc=gorcunov@gmail.com \
--cc=hjl.tools@gmail.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mike.kravetz@oracle.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
--cc=oleg@redhat.com \
--cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=ravi.v.shankar@intel.com \
--cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com \
--cc=weijiang.yang@intel.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).