From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykaukab@suse.de>,
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 093/114] arm64: Add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v1
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 10:36:40 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191010083613.035890528@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191010083544.711104709@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykaukab@suse.de>
[ Upstream commit 3891ebccace188af075ce143d8b072b65e90f695 ]
spectre-v1 has been mitigated and the mitigation is always active.
Report this to userspace via sysfs
Signed-off-by: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykaukab@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Acked-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -729,3 +729,9 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
{
}
};
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
+}
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-10 8:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20191010083544.711104709@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 089/114] arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 090/114] KVM: arm64: Set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD is forcefully disabled and !vhe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 091/114] arm64: docs: Document SSBS HWCAP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 092/114] arm64: fix SSBS sanitization Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 094/114] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 095/114] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 096/114] arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 097/114] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 098/114] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 099/114] arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 100/114] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 101/114] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 102/114] arm64: ssbs: Dont treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 103/114] arm64: Force SSBS on context switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20191010083613.035890528@linuxfoundation.org \
--to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=andre.przywara@arm.com \
--cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=jeremy.linton@arm.com \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stefan.wahren@i2se.com \
--cc=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
--cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
--cc=ykaukab@suse.de \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).