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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
Date: Sun, 17 May 2020 16:09:39 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <042a0b0e-bbf0-53d7-91b2-ea113ca8cca5@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMe9rOq_pCUz4wTQUyGCjyLpSkj4i3YO0XpZecADEp5cF=FhsQ@mail.gmail.com>

On 5/15/20 7:51 PM, H.J. Lu wrote:
> On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 4:56 PM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
>> Let's say we have an app doing silly things like retpolines.  (Lots of
>> app do lots of silly things).  It gets compiled in a distro but never
>> runs on a system with CET.  The app gets run for the first time on a
>> system with CET.  App goes boom.  Not init, just some random app, say
>> /usr/bin/ldapsearch.
> 
> I designed and implemented CET toolchain and run-time in such a way
> for it very difficult to happen.   Basically, CET won't be enabled on such
> an app.

Would you care to share any specifics about how this is implemented?
That would be great information to include in the kernel documentation
because it informs us about the reasons why we don't need a kernel-based
"kill switch".

>> What's my recourse as an end user?  I want to run my app and turn off
>> CET for that app.  How can I do that?
> 
> The CET OS I designed turns CET off for you and you don't have to do
> anything.

OK, cool!  Could you share some of the specifics about how it does that?

>>         Is it possible with the patches in this series to run a single-
>>         threaded binary which was has GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK
>>         unset to run with shadow stack protection?
> 
> Yes, you can.  I added such capabilities for testing purpose.  But
> you application will crash as soon as there is a CET violation.  My
> CET software design is very flexible. 

Yu-cheng speficially referred to the:

	GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.tune.hwcaps=-SHSTK,-IBT

option.  Is that the option you're talking about?

>>> I have a quick test that checks shadow stack and ibt in both main program and in
>>> signals.  Currently it is public on Github.  If that is desired, I can submit it
>>> to the mailing list.
>>
>> Yes, that is desired.  It must accompany this submission.  It must also
>> exercise all of the new ABIs.
> 
> Our CET smoke test is for quick validation of CET OS, not just
> kernel. It requires the complete CET implementation.   It does
> nothing if your OS isn't CET enabled.
I think requiring the complete CET implementation to be present for this
test to work is a mistake.  We don't require anything other than an
enabled kernel and the selftests that ship with that kernel.

MPX required toolchain, library and compiler changes.  Yet, we had a
totally standalone kernel test that found real bugs.  It sounds like
this smoke test as it stands wouldn't be a great fit.  But, that
shouldn't discourage us from finding something that _is_ a good fit for
the kernel-shipped selftests.

  reply	other threads:[~2020-05-17 23:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-29 22:07 [PATCH v10 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:53   ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-29 23:02     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-12 23:20       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-15 18:39         ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-15 21:33           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-15 22:43             ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-15 23:29               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-15 23:56                 ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-16  2:51                   ` H.J. Lu
2020-05-17 23:09                     ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2020-05-16  2:53                   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-18 13:41                     ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-18 14:01                       ` H.J. Lu
2020-05-18 14:26                         ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-18 14:21                       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-18 23:47                     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-19  0:38                       ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-19  1:35                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-20  1:04                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-29  2:08                             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-16  0:13               ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-16  2:37                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-05-16 14:09                   ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-22 16:49                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-05-22 17:48                       ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-07-23 16:10   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-23 16:21     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 04/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-07 15:55   ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-07 16:59     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 06/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 09/26] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 12/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 15/26] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 16/26] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 17/26] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 19/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 21/26] ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 22/26] ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 23/26] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 26/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-21 22:42   ` Kees Cook
2020-05-22 17:17     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-22 17:29       ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2020-05-22 18:13         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-21 15:15 ` [PATCH v10 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Josh Poimboeuf
2020-05-21 15:57   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-21 18:50     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-05-21 19:08       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-07-23 16:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-23 16:41   ` Dave Hansen
2020-07-23 16:56     ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-23 18:41       ` Dave Hansen
2020-07-24  3:40         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-07-24  4:50           ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-24  4:59         ` Sean Christopherson

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