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* [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
@ 2019-11-14 18:02 Marco Elver
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure Marco Elver
                   ` (12 more replies)
  0 siblings, 13 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-14 18:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
experimental ARM64 and POWER support).

To gather early feedback, we announced KCSAN back in September, and have
integrated the feedback where possible:
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNPJ_bHjfLZCAPV23AXFfiPiyXXqqu72n6TgWzb2Gnu1eA@mail.gmail.com

The current list of known upstream fixes for data races found by KCSAN
can be found here:
https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN#upstream-fixes-of-data-races-found-by-kcsan

We want to point out and acknowledge the work surrounding the LKMM,
including several articles that motivate why data races are dangerous
[1, 2], justifying a data race detector such as KCSAN.

[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
[2] https://lwn.net/Articles/799218/

Race conditions vs. data races
------------------------------

Race conditions are logic bugs, where unexpected interleaving of racing
concurrent operations result in an erroneous state.

Data races on the other hand are defined at the *memory model/language
level*.  Many data races are also harmful race conditions, which a tool
like KCSAN reports!  However, not all data races are race conditions and
vice-versa.  KCSAN's intent is to report data races according to the
LKMM. A data race detector can only work at the memory model/language
level.

Deeper analysis, to find high-level race conditions only, requires
conveying the intended kernel logic to a tool. This requires (1) the
developer writing a specification or model of their code, and then (2)
the tool verifying that the implementation matches. This has been done
for small bits of code using model checkers and other formal methods,
but does not scale to the level of what can be covered with a dynamic
analysis based data race detector such as KCSAN.

For reasons outlined in [1, 2], data races can be much more subtle, but
can cause no less harm than high-level race conditions.

Changelog
---------
v4:
* Major changes:
 - Optimizations resulting in performance improvement of 33% (on
   microbenchmark).
 - Deal with nested interrupts for atomic_next.
 - Simplify report.c (removing double-locking as well), in preparation
   for KCSAN_REPORT_VALUE_CHANGE_ONLY.
 - Add patch to introduce "data_race(expr)" macro.
 - Introduce KCSAN_REPORT_VALUE_CHANGE_ONLY option for further filtering of data
   races: if a conflicting write was observed via a watchpoint, only report the
   data race if a value change was observed as well. The option will be enabled
   by default on syzbot. (rcu-functions will be excluded from this filter at
   request of Paul McKenney.) Context:
   http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNOepvb6+zJmDePxj21n2rctM4Sp4rJ66x_J-L1UmNK54A@mail.gmail.com

v3: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191104142745.14722-1-elver@google.com
* Major changes:
 - Add microbenchmark.
 - Add instruction watchpoint skip randomization.
 - Refactor API and core runtime fast-path and slow-path. Compared to
   the previous version, with a default config and benchmarked using the
   added microbenchmark, this version is 3.8x faster.
 - Make __tsan_unaligned __alias of generic accesses.
 - Rename kcsan_{begin,end}_atomic ->
   kcsan_{nestable,flat}_atomic_{begin,end}
 - For filter list in debugfs.c use kmalloc+krealloc instead of
   kvmalloc.
 - Split Documentation into separate patch.

v2: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191017141305.146193-1-elver@google.com
* Major changes:
 - Replace kcsan_check_access(.., {true, false}) with
   kcsan_check_{read,write}.
 - Change atomic-instrumented.h to use __atomic_check_{read,write}.
 - Use common struct kcsan_ctx in task_struct and for per-CPU interrupt
   contexts.

v1: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191016083959.186860-1-elver@google.com

Marco Elver (10):
  kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  include/linux/compiler.h: Introduce data_race(expr) macro
  kcsan: Add Documentation entry in dev-tools
  objtool, kcsan: Add KCSAN runtime functions to whitelist
  build, kcsan: Add KCSAN build exceptions
  seqlock, kcsan: Add annotations for KCSAN
  seqlock: Require WRITE_ONCE surrounding raw_seqcount_barrier
  asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation for bitops
  locking/atomics, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation
  x86, kcsan: Enable KCSAN for x86

 Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst         |   1 +
 Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst         | 256 +++++++++
 MAINTAINERS                               |  11 +
 Makefile                                  |   3 +-
 arch/x86/Kconfig                          |   1 +
 arch/x86/boot/Makefile                    |   2 +
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile         |   2 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile              |   3 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h             |   6 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile                  |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile              |   3 +
 arch/x86/lib/Makefile                     |   4 +
 arch/x86/mm/Makefile                      |   4 +
 arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile               |   2 +
 arch/x86/realmode/Makefile                |   3 +
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/Makefile             |   3 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile     |   2 +
 include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h | 393 +++++++-------
 include/asm-generic/bitops-instrumented.h |  18 +
 include/linux/compiler-clang.h            |   9 +
 include/linux/compiler-gcc.h              |   7 +
 include/linux/compiler.h                  |  57 +-
 include/linux/kcsan-checks.h              |  97 ++++
 include/linux/kcsan.h                     | 115 ++++
 include/linux/sched.h                     |   4 +
 include/linux/seqlock.h                   |  51 +-
 init/init_task.c                          |   8 +
 init/main.c                               |   2 +
 kernel/Makefile                           |   6 +
 kernel/kcsan/Makefile                     |  11 +
 kernel/kcsan/atomic.h                     |  27 +
 kernel/kcsan/core.c                       | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/kcsan/debugfs.c                    | 275 ++++++++++
 kernel/kcsan/encoding.h                   |  94 ++++
 kernel/kcsan/kcsan.h                      | 108 ++++
 kernel/kcsan/report.c                     | 320 +++++++++++
 kernel/kcsan/test.c                       | 121 +++++
 kernel/sched/Makefile                     |   6 +
 lib/Kconfig.debug                         |   2 +
 lib/Kconfig.kcsan                         | 118 ++++
 lib/Makefile                              |   3 +
 mm/Makefile                               |   8 +
 scripts/Makefile.kcsan                    |   6 +
 scripts/Makefile.lib                      |  10 +
 scripts/atomic/gen-atomic-instrumented.sh |  17 +-
 tools/objtool/check.c                     |  18 +
 46 files changed, 2641 insertions(+), 206 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst
 create mode 100644 include/linux/kcsan-checks.h
 create mode 100644 include/linux/kcsan.h
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/Makefile
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/atomic.h
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/core.c
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/debugfs.c
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/encoding.h
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/kcsan.h
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/report.c
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/test.c
 create mode 100644 lib/Kconfig.kcsan
 create mode 100644 scripts/Makefile.kcsan

-- 
2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-14 18:02 ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-19 19:27   ` Qian Cai
  2020-01-03  5:13   ` Qian Cai
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] include/linux/compiler.h: Introduce data_race(expr) macro Marco Elver
                   ` (11 subsequent siblings)
  12 siblings, 2 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-14 18:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) is a dynamic data-race detector for
kernel space. KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based data-race detector.
See the included Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst for more details.

This patch adds basic infrastructure, but does not yet enable KCSAN for
any architecture.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
---
v4:
* Performance optimizations:
 - Avoid modulo in SLOT_IDX in fast-path: introduce SLOT_IDX_FAST.
 - Further fast-path optimizations by moving more code into slow-path.
 => 33% faster compared to v3 (using microbenchmark).
* compiler.h: Fix __no_sanitize_thread for GCC 4.9 in regular build.
* Deal with nested interrupts for atomic_next.
* Sort headers that were not sorted in new files.
* Add more comments.
* Simplify report.c (removing double-locking as well), in preparation
  for KCSAN_REPORT_VALUE_CHANGE_ONLY.
* Introduce KCSAN_REPORT_VALUE_CHANGE_ONLY option for further filtering of data
  races: if a conflicting write was observed via a watchpoint, only
  report the data race if a value change was observed as well. The
  option will be enabled by default on syzbot. (rcu-functions will be
  excluded from this filter at request of Paul McKenney.) Context:
  http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNOepvb6+zJmDePxj21n2rctM4Sp4rJ66x_J-L1UmNK54A@mail.gmail.com

v3:
* Move Documentation to separate patch.
* Default init_task 'disable_count' to 0, since kcsan_enabled is sufficient.
* Fix CFLAGS for compilers that do not support all options.
* lib/Kconfig.kcsan:
 - Clarify preference of config option over boot param in comment.
 - Add ref to Documentation
 - Remove unnecessary "KCSAN:"
* include/linux/compiler.h: Remove (const void*) casts
* include/linux/kcsan.h:
 - Reword atomic nestable and flat region comment, and clarify that they
   are independent.
 - Rename atomic_region -> atomic_nest_count.
 - Rename atomic_region_flat -> in_flat_atomic.
 - Rename kcsan_{begin,end}_atomic -> kcsan_{nestable,flat}_atomic_{begin,end}
* kernel/kcsan/kcsan.h:
 - Capitalize enums.
 - Make KCSAN_NUM_WATCHPOINTS configurable -> lib/Kconfig.kcsan.
* Make kcsan_is_atomic inlinable by turning atomic.c into atomic.h.
* kernel/kcsan/core.c (merged with previous kcsan.c):
 - Make __tsan_unaligned __alias of generic accesses.
 - user_access_save/restore() usage comment.
 - Add instruction watchpoint skip randomization.
 - Refactor API and core runtime fast-path and slow-path; check_access is
   now the single entry point for checking an access. Compared to the
   previous version, with a default config and benchmarked using the
   microbenchmark, this version is 3.8x faster.
* kernel/kcsan/test.c: Add more comments where appropriate.
* kernel/kcsan/report.c:
 - get_thread_desc should just return "interrupt" for any interrupt.
 - increase NUM_STACK_ENTRIES to 64.
* kernel/kcsan/debugfs.c
 - More appropriate error codes.
 - Use kmalloc+krealloc instead of kvmalloc.
 - Handle kmalloc failures.
 - Add debugfs based microbenchmark.
* Use '{ }' on same line where appropriate.
* Prefer IS_ENABLED instead of #ifdef.
* Use common spelling: "data-race" -> "data race"
* Other typos.

v2:
* Elaborate comment about instrumentation calls emitted by compilers.
* Replace kcsan_check_access(.., {true, false}) with
  kcsan_check_{read,write} for improved readability.
* Change bug title of race of unknown origin to just say "data-race in".
* Refine "Key Properties" in kcsan.rst, and mention observed slow-down.
* Add comment about safety of find_watchpoint without user_access_save.
* Remove unnecessary preempt_disable/enable and elaborate on comment why
  we want to disable interrupts and preemptions.
* Use common struct kcsan_ctx in task_struct and for per-CPU interrupt
  contexts [Suggested by Mark Rutland].
---
 MAINTAINERS                    |  11 +
 Makefile                       |   3 +-
 include/linux/compiler-clang.h |   9 +
 include/linux/compiler-gcc.h   |   7 +
 include/linux/compiler.h       |  37 +-
 include/linux/kcsan-checks.h   |  97 +++++
 include/linux/kcsan.h          | 115 ++++++
 include/linux/sched.h          |   4 +
 init/init_task.c               |   8 +
 init/main.c                    |   2 +
 kernel/Makefile                |   1 +
 kernel/kcsan/Makefile          |  11 +
 kernel/kcsan/atomic.h          |  27 ++
 kernel/kcsan/core.c            | 626 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/kcsan/debugfs.c         | 275 +++++++++++++++
 kernel/kcsan/encoding.h        |  94 +++++
 kernel/kcsan/kcsan.h           | 108 ++++++
 kernel/kcsan/report.c          | 320 +++++++++++++++++
 kernel/kcsan/test.c            | 121 +++++++
 lib/Kconfig.debug              |   2 +
 lib/Kconfig.kcsan              | 118 +++++++
 lib/Makefile                   |   3 +
 scripts/Makefile.kcsan         |   6 +
 scripts/Makefile.lib           |  10 +
 24 files changed, 2006 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/kcsan-checks.h
 create mode 100644 include/linux/kcsan.h
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/Makefile
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/atomic.h
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/core.c
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/debugfs.c
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/encoding.h
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/kcsan.h
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/report.c
 create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/test.c
 create mode 100644 lib/Kconfig.kcsan
 create mode 100644 scripts/Makefile.kcsan

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index f77959ecf7e0..36e74531e969 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -8848,6 +8848,17 @@ F:	Documentation/kbuild/kconfig*
 F:	scripts/kconfig/
 F:	scripts/Kconfig.include
 
+KCSAN
+M:	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
+R:	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+L:	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
+S:	Maintained
+F:	Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst
+F:	include/linux/kcsan*.h
+F:	kernel/kcsan/
+F:	lib/Kconfig.kcsan
+F:	scripts/Makefile.kcsan
+
 KDUMP
 M:	Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
 M:	Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 42bfda209cb8..4cd27e0c8fc0 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ export KBUILD_HOSTCXXFLAGS KBUILD_HOSTLDFLAGS KBUILD_HOSTLDLIBS LDFLAGS_MODULE
 
 export KBUILD_CPPFLAGS NOSTDINC_FLAGS LINUXINCLUDE OBJCOPYFLAGS KBUILD_LDFLAGS
 export KBUILD_CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL CFLAGS_MODULE
-export CFLAGS_KASAN CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE CFLAGS_UBSAN
+export CFLAGS_KASAN CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE CFLAGS_UBSAN CFLAGS_KCSAN
 export KBUILD_AFLAGS AFLAGS_KERNEL AFLAGS_MODULE
 export KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE
 export KBUILD_AFLAGS_KERNEL KBUILD_CFLAGS_KERNEL
@@ -900,6 +900,7 @@ endif
 include scripts/Makefile.kasan
 include scripts/Makefile.extrawarn
 include scripts/Makefile.ubsan
+include scripts/Makefile.kcsan
 
 # Add user supplied CPPFLAGS, AFLAGS and CFLAGS as the last assignments
 KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += $(KCPPFLAGS)
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-clang.h b/include/linux/compiler-clang.h
index 333a6695a918..a213eb55e725 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler-clang.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler-clang.h
@@ -24,6 +24,15 @@
 #define __no_sanitize_address
 #endif
 
+#if __has_feature(thread_sanitizer)
+/* emulate gcc's __SANITIZE_THREAD__ flag */
+#define __SANITIZE_THREAD__
+#define __no_sanitize_thread \
+		__attribute__((no_sanitize("thread")))
+#else
+#define __no_sanitize_thread
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Not all versions of clang implement the the type-generic versions
  * of the builtin overflow checkers. Fortunately, clang implements
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
index d7ee4c6bad48..0eb2a1cc411d 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
@@ -145,6 +145,13 @@
 #define __no_sanitize_address
 #endif
 
+#if defined(__SANITIZE_THREAD__) && __has_attribute(__no_sanitize_thread__)
+#define __no_sanitize_thread                                                   \
+	__attribute__((__noinline__)) __attribute__((no_sanitize_thread))
+#else
+#define __no_sanitize_thread
+#endif
+
 #if GCC_VERSION >= 50100
 #define COMPILER_HAS_GENERIC_BUILTIN_OVERFLOW 1
 #endif
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
index 5e88e7e33abe..c42fa83f23fb 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ void ftrace_likely_update(struct ftrace_likely_data *f, int val,
 #endif
 
 #include <uapi/linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kcsan-checks.h>
 
 #define __READ_ONCE_SIZE						\
 ({									\
@@ -193,12 +194,6 @@ void ftrace_likely_update(struct ftrace_likely_data *f, int val,
 	}								\
 })
 
-static __always_inline
-void __read_once_size(const volatile void *p, void *res, int size)
-{
-	__READ_ONCE_SIZE;
-}
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
 /*
  * We can't declare function 'inline' because __no_sanitize_address confilcts
@@ -207,18 +202,44 @@ void __read_once_size(const volatile void *p, void *res, int size)
  * '__maybe_unused' allows us to avoid defined-but-not-used warnings.
  */
 # define __no_kasan_or_inline __no_sanitize_address notrace __maybe_unused
+# define __no_sanitize_or_inline __no_kasan_or_inline
 #else
 # define __no_kasan_or_inline __always_inline
 #endif
 
-static __no_kasan_or_inline
+#ifdef __SANITIZE_THREAD__
+/*
+ * Rely on __SANITIZE_THREAD__ instead of CONFIG_KCSAN, to avoid not inlining in
+ * compilation units where instrumentation is disabled.
+ */
+# define __no_kcsan_or_inline __no_sanitize_thread notrace __maybe_unused
+# define __no_sanitize_or_inline __no_kcsan_or_inline
+#else
+# define __no_kcsan_or_inline __always_inline
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __no_sanitize_or_inline
+#define __no_sanitize_or_inline __always_inline
+#endif
+
+static __no_kcsan_or_inline
+void __read_once_size(const volatile void *p, void *res, int size)
+{
+	kcsan_check_atomic_read(p, size);
+	__READ_ONCE_SIZE;
+}
+
+static __no_sanitize_or_inline
 void __read_once_size_nocheck(const volatile void *p, void *res, int size)
 {
 	__READ_ONCE_SIZE;
 }
 
-static __always_inline void __write_once_size(volatile void *p, void *res, int size)
+static __no_kcsan_or_inline
+void __write_once_size(volatile void *p, void *res, int size)
 {
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(p, size);
+
 	switch (size) {
 	case 1: *(volatile __u8 *)p = *(__u8 *)res; break;
 	case 2: *(volatile __u16 *)p = *(__u16 *)res; break;
diff --git a/include/linux/kcsan-checks.h b/include/linux/kcsan-checks.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e78220661086
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/kcsan-checks.h
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_KCSAN_CHECKS_H
+#define _LINUX_KCSAN_CHECKS_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/*
+ * Access type modifiers.
+ */
+#define KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE 0x1
+#define KCSAN_ACCESS_ATOMIC 0x2
+
+/*
+ * __kcsan_*: Always calls into runtime when KCSAN is enabled. This may be used
+ * even in compilation units that selectively disable KCSAN, but must use KCSAN
+ * to validate access to an address.   Never use these in header files!
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN
+/**
+ * __kcsan_check_access - check generic access for data race
+ *
+ * @ptr address of access
+ * @size size of access
+ * @type access type modifier
+ */
+void __kcsan_check_access(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type);
+
+#else
+static inline void __kcsan_check_access(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size,
+					int type) { }
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * kcsan_*: Only calls into runtime when the particular compilation unit has
+ * KCSAN instrumentation enabled. May be used in header files.
+ */
+#ifdef __SANITIZE_THREAD__
+#define kcsan_check_access __kcsan_check_access
+#else
+static inline void kcsan_check_access(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size,
+				      int type) { }
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * __kcsan_check_read - check regular read access for data races
+ *
+ * @ptr address of access
+ * @size size of access
+ */
+#define __kcsan_check_read(ptr, size) __kcsan_check_access(ptr, size, 0)
+
+/**
+ * __kcsan_check_write - check regular write access for data races
+ *
+ * @ptr address of access
+ * @size size of access
+ */
+#define __kcsan_check_write(ptr, size)                                         \
+	__kcsan_check_access(ptr, size, KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE)
+
+/**
+ * kcsan_check_read - check regular read access for data races
+ *
+ * @ptr address of access
+ * @size size of access
+ */
+#define kcsan_check_read(ptr, size) kcsan_check_access(ptr, size, 0)
+
+/**
+ * kcsan_check_write - check regular write access for data races
+ *
+ * @ptr address of access
+ * @size size of access
+ */
+#define kcsan_check_write(ptr, size)                                           \
+	kcsan_check_access(ptr, size, KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE)
+
+/*
+ * Check for atomic accesses: if atomic access are not ignored, this simply
+ * aliases to kcsan_check_access, otherwise becomes a no-op.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN_IGNORE_ATOMICS
+#define kcsan_check_atomic_read(...)                                           \
+	do {                                                                   \
+	} while (0)
+#define kcsan_check_atomic_write(...)                                          \
+	do {                                                                   \
+	} while (0)
+#else
+#define kcsan_check_atomic_read(ptr, size)                                     \
+	kcsan_check_access(ptr, size, KCSAN_ACCESS_ATOMIC)
+#define kcsan_check_atomic_write(ptr, size)                                    \
+	kcsan_check_access(ptr, size, KCSAN_ACCESS_ATOMIC | KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE)
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_KCSAN_CHECKS_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/kcsan.h b/include/linux/kcsan.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9047048fee84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/kcsan.h
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_KCSAN_H
+#define _LINUX_KCSAN_H
+
+#include <linux/kcsan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN
+
+/*
+ * Context for each thread of execution: for tasks, this is stored in
+ * task_struct, and interrupts access internal per-CPU storage.
+ */
+struct kcsan_ctx {
+	int disable_count; /* disable counter */
+	int atomic_next; /* number of following atomic ops */
+
+	/*
+	 * We distinguish between: (a) nestable atomic regions that may contain
+	 * other nestable regions; and (b) flat atomic regions that do not keep
+	 * track of nesting. Both (a) and (b) are entirely independent of each
+	 * other, and a flat region may be started in a nestable region or
+	 * vice-versa.
+	 *
+	 * This is required because, for example, in the annotations for
+	 * seqlocks, we declare seqlock writer critical sections as (a) nestable
+	 * atomic regions, but reader critical sections as (b) flat atomic
+	 * regions, but have encountered cases where seqlock reader critical
+	 * sections are contained within writer critical sections (the opposite
+	 * may be possible, too).
+	 *
+	 * To support these cases, we independently track the depth of nesting
+	 * for (a), and whether the leaf level is flat for (b).
+	 */
+	int atomic_nest_count;
+	bool in_flat_atomic;
+};
+
+/**
+ * kcsan_init - initialize KCSAN runtime
+ */
+void kcsan_init(void);
+
+/**
+ * kcsan_disable_current - disable KCSAN for the current context
+ *
+ * Supports nesting.
+ */
+void kcsan_disable_current(void);
+
+/**
+ * kcsan_enable_current - re-enable KCSAN for the current context
+ *
+ * Supports nesting.
+ */
+void kcsan_enable_current(void);
+
+/**
+ * kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin - begin nestable atomic region
+ *
+ * Accesses within the atomic region may appear to race with other accesses but
+ * should be considered atomic.
+ */
+void kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin(void);
+
+/**
+ * kcsan_nestable_atomic_end - end nestable atomic region
+ */
+void kcsan_nestable_atomic_end(void);
+
+/**
+ * kcsan_flat_atomic_begin - begin flat atomic region
+ *
+ * Accesses within the atomic region may appear to race with other accesses but
+ * should be considered atomic.
+ */
+void kcsan_flat_atomic_begin(void);
+
+/**
+ * kcsan_flat_atomic_end - end flat atomic region
+ */
+void kcsan_flat_atomic_end(void);
+
+/**
+ * kcsan_atomic_next - consider following accesses as atomic
+ *
+ * Force treating the next n memory accesses for the current context as atomic
+ * operations.
+ *
+ * @n number of following memory accesses to treat as atomic.
+ */
+void kcsan_atomic_next(int n);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KCSAN */
+
+static inline void kcsan_init(void) { }
+
+static inline void kcsan_disable_current(void) { }
+
+static inline void kcsan_enable_current(void) { }
+
+static inline void kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin(void) { }
+
+static inline void kcsan_nestable_atomic_end(void) { }
+
+static inline void kcsan_flat_atomic_begin(void) { }
+
+static inline void kcsan_flat_atomic_end(void) { }
+
+static inline void kcsan_atomic_next(int n) { }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KCSAN */
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_KCSAN_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 67a1d86981a9..ae4f341c1db4 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/task_io_accounting.h>
 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
 #include <linux/rseq.h>
+#include <linux/kcsan.h>
 
 /* task_struct member predeclarations (sorted alphabetically): */
 struct audit_context;
@@ -1172,6 +1173,9 @@ struct task_struct {
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
 	unsigned int			kasan_depth;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN
+	struct kcsan_ctx		kcsan_ctx;
+#endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
 	/* Index of current stored address in ret_stack: */
diff --git a/init/init_task.c b/init/init_task.c
index 9e5cbe5eab7b..2b4fe98b0f09 100644
--- a/init/init_task.c
+++ b/init/init_task.c
@@ -161,6 +161,14 @@ struct task_struct init_task
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
 	.kasan_depth	= 1,
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN
+	.kcsan_ctx = {
+		.disable_count		= 0,
+		.atomic_next		= 0,
+		.atomic_nest_count	= 0,
+		.in_flat_atomic		= false,
+	},
+#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
 	.softirqs_enabled = 1,
 #endif
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 91f6ebb30ef0..4d814de017ee 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
 #include <linux/rodata_test.h>
 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/kcsan.h>
 
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/bugs.h>
@@ -779,6 +780,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
 	acpi_subsystem_init();
 	arch_post_acpi_subsys_init();
 	sfi_init_late();
+	kcsan_init();
 
 	/* Do the rest non-__init'ed, we're now alive */
 	arch_call_rest_init();
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index daad787fb795..74ab46e2ebd1 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS) += trace/
 obj-$(CONFIG_IRQ_WORK) += irq_work.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_PM) += cpu_pm.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BPF) += bpf/
+obj-$(CONFIG_KCSAN) += kcsan/
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += events/
 
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/Makefile b/kernel/kcsan/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..dd15b62ec0b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+KCSAN_SANITIZE := n
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
+
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_core.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+
+CFLAGS_core.o := $(call cc-option,-fno-conserve-stack,) \
+	$(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector,)
+
+obj-y := core.o debugfs.o report.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KCSAN_SELFTEST) += test.o
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/atomic.h b/kernel/kcsan/atomic.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c9c3fe628011
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/atomic.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef _KERNEL_KCSAN_ATOMIC_H
+#define _KERNEL_KCSAN_ATOMIC_H
+
+#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+
+/*
+ * Helper that returns true if access to ptr should be considered as an atomic
+ * access, even though it is not explicitly atomic.
+ *
+ * List all volatile globals that have been observed in races, to suppress
+ * data race reports between accesses to these variables.
+ *
+ * For now, we assume that volatile accesses of globals are as strong as atomic
+ * accesses (READ_ONCE, WRITE_ONCE cast to volatile). The situation is still not
+ * entirely clear, as on some architectures (Alpha) READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE do more
+ * than cast to volatile. Eventually, we hope to be able to remove this
+ * function.
+ */
+static inline bool kcsan_is_atomic(const volatile void *ptr)
+{
+	/* only jiffies for now */
+	return ptr == &jiffies;
+}
+
+#endif /* _KERNEL_KCSAN_ATOMIC_H */
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/core.c b/kernel/kcsan/core.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d9410d58c93e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,626 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/preempt.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+#include "atomic.h"
+#include "encoding.h"
+#include "kcsan.h"
+
+bool kcsan_enabled;
+
+/* Per-CPU kcsan_ctx for interrupts */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kcsan_ctx, kcsan_cpu_ctx) = {
+	.disable_count = 0,
+	.atomic_next = 0,
+	.atomic_nest_count = 0,
+	.in_flat_atomic = false,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Helper macros to index into adjacent slots slots, starting from address slot
+ * itself, followed by the right and left slots.
+ *
+ * The purpose is 2-fold:
+ *
+ *	1. if during insertion the address slot is already occupied, check if
+ *	   any adjacent slots are free;
+ *	2. accesses that straddle a slot boundary due to size that exceeds a
+ *	   slot's range may check adjacent slots if any watchpoint matches.
+ *
+ * Note that accesses with very large size may still miss a watchpoint; however,
+ * given this should be rare, this is a reasonable trade-off to make, since this
+ * will avoid:
+ *
+ *	1. excessive contention between watchpoint checks and setup;
+ *	2. larger number of simultaneous watchpoints without sacrificing
+ *	   performance.
+ *
+ * Example: SLOT_IDX values for KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT=1, where i is [0, 1, 2]:
+ *
+ *   slot=0:  [ 1,  2,  0]
+ *   slot=9:  [10, 11,  9]
+ *   slot=63: [64, 65, 63]
+ */
+#define NUM_SLOTS (1 + 2 * KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT)
+#define SLOT_IDX(slot, i) (slot + ((i + KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT) % NUM_SLOTS))
+
+/*
+ * SLOT_IDX_FAST is used in fast-path. Not first checking the address's primary
+ * slot (middle) is fine if we assume that data races occur rarely. The set of
+ * indices {SLOT_IDX(slot, i) | i in [0, NUM_SLOTS)} is equivalent to
+ * {SLOT_IDX_FAST(slot, i) | i in [0, NUM_SLOTS)}.
+ */
+#define SLOT_IDX_FAST(slot, i) (slot + i)
+
+/*
+ * Watchpoints, with each entry encoded as defined in encoding.h: in order to be
+ * able to safely update and access a watchpoint without introducing locking
+ * overhead, we encode each watchpoint as a single atomic long. The initial
+ * zero-initialized state matches INVALID_WATCHPOINT.
+ *
+ * Add NUM_SLOTS-1 entries to account for overflow; this helps avoid having to
+ * use more complicated SLOT_IDX_FAST calculation with modulo in fast-path.
+ */
+static atomic_long_t watchpoints[CONFIG_KCSAN_NUM_WATCHPOINTS + NUM_SLOTS - 1];
+
+/*
+ * Instructions to skip watching counter, used in should_watch(). We use a
+ * per-CPU counter to avoid excessive contention.
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(long, kcsan_skip);
+
+static inline atomic_long_t *find_watchpoint(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
+					     bool expect_write,
+					     long *encoded_watchpoint)
+{
+	const int slot = watchpoint_slot(addr);
+	const unsigned long addr_masked = addr & WATCHPOINT_ADDR_MASK;
+	atomic_long_t *watchpoint;
+	unsigned long wp_addr_masked;
+	size_t wp_size;
+	bool is_write;
+	int i;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_KCSAN_NUM_WATCHPOINTS < NUM_SLOTS);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_SLOTS; ++i) {
+		watchpoint = &watchpoints[SLOT_IDX_FAST(slot, i)];
+		*encoded_watchpoint = atomic_long_read(watchpoint);
+		if (!decode_watchpoint(*encoded_watchpoint, &wp_addr_masked,
+				       &wp_size, &is_write))
+			continue;
+
+		if (expect_write && !is_write)
+			continue;
+
+		/* Check if the watchpoint matches the access. */
+		if (matching_access(wp_addr_masked, wp_size, addr_masked, size))
+			return watchpoint;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline atomic_long_t *insert_watchpoint(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
+					       bool is_write)
+{
+	const int slot = watchpoint_slot(addr);
+	const long encoded_watchpoint = encode_watchpoint(addr, size, is_write);
+	atomic_long_t *watchpoint;
+	int i;
+
+	/* Check slot index logic, ensuring we stay within array bounds. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(SLOT_IDX(0, 0) != KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(SLOT_IDX(0, KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT + 1) != 0);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(SLOT_IDX(CONFIG_KCSAN_NUM_WATCHPOINTS - 1,
+			      KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT) !=
+		     ARRAY_SIZE(watchpoints) - 1);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(SLOT_IDX(CONFIG_KCSAN_NUM_WATCHPOINTS - 1,
+			      KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT + 1) !=
+		     ARRAY_SIZE(watchpoints) - NUM_SLOTS);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_SLOTS; ++i) {
+		long expect_val = INVALID_WATCHPOINT;
+
+		/* Try to acquire this slot. */
+		watchpoint = &watchpoints[SLOT_IDX(slot, i)];
+		if (atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(watchpoint, &expect_val,
+						    encoded_watchpoint))
+			return watchpoint;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return true if watchpoint was successfully consumed, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * This may return false if:
+ *
+ *	1. another thread already consumed the watchpoint;
+ *	2. the thread that set up the watchpoint already removed it;
+ *	3. the watchpoint was removed and then re-used.
+ */
+static inline bool try_consume_watchpoint(atomic_long_t *watchpoint,
+					  long encoded_watchpoint)
+{
+	return atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(watchpoint, &encoded_watchpoint,
+					       CONSUMED_WATCHPOINT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return true if watchpoint was not touched, false if consumed.
+ */
+static inline bool remove_watchpoint(atomic_long_t *watchpoint)
+{
+	return atomic_long_xchg_relaxed(watchpoint, INVALID_WATCHPOINT) !=
+	       CONSUMED_WATCHPOINT;
+}
+
+static inline struct kcsan_ctx *get_ctx(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * In interrupt, use raw_cpu_ptr to avoid unnecessary checks, that would
+	 * also result in calls that generate warnings in uaccess regions.
+	 */
+	return in_task() ? &current->kcsan_ctx : raw_cpu_ptr(&kcsan_cpu_ctx);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_atomic(const volatile void *ptr)
+{
+	struct kcsan_ctx *ctx = get_ctx();
+
+	if (unlikely(ctx->atomic_next > 0)) {
+		/*
+		 * Because we do not have separate contexts for nested
+		 * interrupts, in case atomic_next is set, we simply assume that
+		 * the outer interrupt set atomic_next. In the worst case, we
+		 * will conservatively consider operations as atomic. This is a
+		 * reasonable trade-off to make, since this case should be
+		 * extremely rare; however, even if extremely rare, it could
+		 * lead to false positives otherwise.
+		 */
+		if ((hardirq_count() >> HARDIRQ_SHIFT) < 2)
+			--ctx->atomic_next; /* in task, or outer interrupt */
+		return true;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(ctx->atomic_nest_count > 0 || ctx->in_flat_atomic))
+		return true;
+
+	return kcsan_is_atomic(ptr);
+}
+
+static inline bool should_watch(const volatile void *ptr, int type)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Never set up watchpoints when memory operations are atomic.
+	 *
+	 * Need to check this first, before kcsan_skip check below: (1) atomics
+	 * should not count towards skipped instructions, and (2) to actually
+	 * decrement kcsan_atomic_next for consecutive instruction stream.
+	 */
+	if ((type & KCSAN_ACCESS_ATOMIC) != 0 || is_atomic(ptr))
+		return false;
+
+	if (this_cpu_dec_return(kcsan_skip) >= 0)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * NOTE: If we get here, kcsan_skip must always be reset in slow path
+	 * via reset_kcsan_skip() to avoid underflow.
+	 */
+
+	/* this operation should be watched */
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline void reset_kcsan_skip(void)
+{
+	long skip_count = CONFIG_KCSAN_SKIP_WATCH -
+			  (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_SKIP_WATCH_RANDOMIZE) ?
+				   prandom_u32_max(CONFIG_KCSAN_SKIP_WATCH) :
+				   0);
+	this_cpu_write(kcsan_skip, skip_count);
+}
+
+static inline bool kcsan_is_enabled(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(kcsan_enabled) && get_ctx()->disable_count == 0;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int get_delay(void)
+{
+	unsigned int delay = in_task() ? CONFIG_KCSAN_UDELAY_TASK :
+					 CONFIG_KCSAN_UDELAY_INTERRUPT;
+	return delay - (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_DELAY_RANDOMIZE) ?
+				prandom_u32_max(delay) :
+				0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pull everything together: check_access() below contains the performance
+ * critical operations; the fast-path (including check_access) functions should
+ * all be inlinable by the instrumentation functions.
+ *
+ * The slow-path (kcsan_found_watchpoint, kcsan_setup_watchpoint) are
+ * non-inlinable -- note that, we prefix these with "kcsan_" to ensure they can
+ * be filtered from the stacktrace, as well as give them unique names for the
+ * UACCESS whitelist of objtool. Each function uses user_access_save/restore(),
+ * since they do not access any user memory, but instrumentation is still
+ * emitted in UACCESS regions.
+ */
+
+static noinline void kcsan_found_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr,
+					    size_t size, bool is_write,
+					    atomic_long_t *watchpoint,
+					    long encoded_watchpoint)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	bool consumed;
+
+	if (!kcsan_is_enabled())
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * Consume the watchpoint as soon as possible, to minimize the chances
+	 * of !consumed. Consuming the watchpoint must always be guarded by
+	 * kcsan_is_enabled() check, as otherwise we might erroneously
+	 * triggering reports when disabled.
+	 */
+	consumed = try_consume_watchpoint(watchpoint, encoded_watchpoint);
+
+	/* keep this after try_consume_watchpoint */
+	flags = user_access_save();
+
+	if (consumed) {
+		kcsan_report(ptr, size, is_write, true, raw_smp_processor_id(),
+			     KCSAN_REPORT_CONSUMED_WATCHPOINT);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * The other thread may not print any diagnostics, as it has
+		 * already removed the watchpoint, or another thread consumed
+		 * the watchpoint before this thread.
+		 */
+		kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_REPORT_RACES);
+	}
+	kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_DATA_RACES);
+
+	user_access_restore(flags);
+}
+
+static noinline void kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr,
+					    size_t size, bool is_write)
+{
+	atomic_long_t *watchpoint;
+	union {
+		u8 _1;
+		u16 _2;
+		u32 _4;
+		u64 _8;
+	} expect_value;
+	bool value_change = false;
+	unsigned long ua_flags = user_access_save();
+	unsigned long irq_flags;
+
+	/*
+	 * Always reset kcsan_skip counter in slow-path to avoid underflow; see
+	 * should_watch().
+	 */
+	reset_kcsan_skip();
+
+	if (!kcsan_is_enabled())
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!check_encodable((unsigned long)ptr, size)) {
+		kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_UNENCODABLE_ACCESSES);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable interrupts & preemptions to avoid another thread on the same
+	 * CPU accessing memory locations for the set up watchpoint; this is to
+	 * avoid reporting races to e.g. CPU-local data.
+	 *
+	 * An alternative would be adding the source CPU to the watchpoint
+	 * encoding, and checking that watchpoint-CPU != this-CPU. There are
+	 * several problems with this:
+	 *   1. we should avoid stealing more bits from the watchpoint encoding
+	 *      as it would affect accuracy, as well as increase performance
+	 *      overhead in the fast-path;
+	 *   2. if we are preempted, but there *is* a genuine data race, we
+	 *      would *not* report it -- since this is the common case (vs.
+	 *      CPU-local data accesses), it makes more sense (from a data race
+	 *      detection point of view) to simply disable preemptions to ensure
+	 *      as many tasks as possible run on other CPUs.
+	 */
+	local_irq_save(irq_flags);
+
+	watchpoint = insert_watchpoint((unsigned long)ptr, size, is_write);
+	if (watchpoint == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * Out of capacity: the size of `watchpoints`, and the frequency
+		 * with which `should_watch()` returns true should be tweaked so
+		 * that this case happens very rarely.
+		 */
+		kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_NO_CAPACITY);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_SETUP_WATCHPOINTS);
+	kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_USED_WATCHPOINTS);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read the current value, to later check and infer a race if the data
+	 * was modified via a non-instrumented access, e.g. from a device.
+	 */
+	switch (size) {
+	case 1:
+		expect_value._1 = READ_ONCE(*(const u8 *)ptr);
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		expect_value._2 = READ_ONCE(*(const u16 *)ptr);
+		break;
+	case 4:
+		expect_value._4 = READ_ONCE(*(const u32 *)ptr);
+		break;
+	case 8:
+		expect_value._8 = READ_ONCE(*(const u64 *)ptr);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break; /* ignore; we do not diff the values */
+	}
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_DEBUG)) {
+		kcsan_disable_current();
+		pr_err("KCSAN: watching %s, size: %zu, addr: %px [slot: %d, encoded: %lx]\n",
+		       is_write ? "write" : "read", size, ptr,
+		       watchpoint_slot((unsigned long)ptr),
+		       encode_watchpoint((unsigned long)ptr, size, is_write));
+		kcsan_enable_current();
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Delay this thread, to increase probability of observing a racy
+	 * conflicting access.
+	 */
+	udelay(get_delay());
+
+	/*
+	 * Re-read value, and check if it is as expected; if not, we infer a
+	 * racy access.
+	 */
+	switch (size) {
+	case 1:
+		value_change = expect_value._1 != READ_ONCE(*(const u8 *)ptr);
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		value_change = expect_value._2 != READ_ONCE(*(const u16 *)ptr);
+		break;
+	case 4:
+		value_change = expect_value._4 != READ_ONCE(*(const u32 *)ptr);
+		break;
+	case 8:
+		value_change = expect_value._8 != READ_ONCE(*(const u64 *)ptr);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break; /* ignore; we do not diff the values */
+	}
+
+	/* Check if this access raced with another. */
+	if (!remove_watchpoint(watchpoint)) {
+		/*
+		 * No need to increment 'data_races' counter, as the racing
+		 * thread already did.
+		 */
+		kcsan_report(ptr, size, is_write, size > 8 || value_change,
+			     smp_processor_id(), KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_SIGNAL);
+	} else if (value_change) {
+		/* Inferring a race, since the value should not have changed. */
+		kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_RACES_UNKNOWN_ORIGIN);
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_UNKNOWN_ORIGIN))
+			kcsan_report(ptr, size, is_write, true,
+				     smp_processor_id(),
+				     KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_UNKNOWN_ORIGIN);
+	}
+
+	kcsan_counter_dec(KCSAN_COUNTER_USED_WATCHPOINTS);
+out_unlock:
+	local_irq_restore(irq_flags);
+out:
+	user_access_restore(ua_flags);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void check_access(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size,
+					 int type)
+{
+	const bool is_write = (type & KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE) != 0;
+	atomic_long_t *watchpoint;
+	long encoded_watchpoint;
+
+	/*
+	 * Avoid user_access_save in fast-path: find_watchpoint is safe without
+	 * user_access_save, as the address that ptr points to is only used to
+	 * check if a watchpoint exists; ptr is never dereferenced.
+	 */
+	watchpoint = find_watchpoint((unsigned long)ptr, size, !is_write,
+				     &encoded_watchpoint);
+	/*
+	 * It is safe to check kcsan_is_enabled() after find_watchpoint in the
+	 * slow-path, as long as no state changes that cause a data race to be
+	 * detected and reported have occurred until kcsan_is_enabled() is
+	 * checked.
+	 */
+
+	if (unlikely(watchpoint != NULL))
+		kcsan_found_watchpoint(ptr, size, is_write, watchpoint,
+				       encoded_watchpoint);
+	else if (unlikely(should_watch(ptr, type)))
+		kcsan_setup_watchpoint(ptr, size, is_write);
+}
+
+/* === Public interface ===================================================== */
+
+void __init kcsan_init(void)
+{
+	BUG_ON(!in_task());
+
+	kcsan_debugfs_init();
+
+	/*
+	 * We are in the init task, and no other tasks should be running;
+	 * WRITE_ONCE without memory barrier is sufficient.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_EARLY_ENABLE))
+		WRITE_ONCE(kcsan_enabled, true);
+}
+
+/* === Exported interface =================================================== */
+
+void kcsan_disable_current(void)
+{
+	++get_ctx()->disable_count;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_disable_current);
+
+void kcsan_enable_current(void)
+{
+	if (get_ctx()->disable_count-- == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Warn if kcsan_enable_current() calls are unbalanced with
+		 * kcsan_disable_current() calls, which causes disable_count to
+		 * become negative and should not happen.
+		 */
+		kcsan_disable_current(); /* restore to 0, KCSAN still enabled */
+		kcsan_disable_current(); /* disable to generate warning */
+		WARN(1, "Unbalanced %s()", __func__);
+		kcsan_enable_current();
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_enable_current);
+
+void kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Do *not* check and warn if we are in a flat atomic region: nestable
+	 * and flat atomic regions are independent from each other.
+	 * See include/linux/kcsan.h: struct kcsan_ctx comments for more
+	 * comments.
+	 */
+
+	++get_ctx()->atomic_nest_count;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin);
+
+void kcsan_nestable_atomic_end(void)
+{
+	if (get_ctx()->atomic_nest_count-- == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Warn if kcsan_nestable_atomic_end() calls are unbalanced with
+		 * kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin() calls, which causes
+		 * atomic_nest_count to become negative and should not happen.
+		 */
+		kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin(); /* restore to 0 */
+		kcsan_disable_current(); /* disable to generate warning */
+		WARN(1, "Unbalanced %s()", __func__);
+		kcsan_enable_current();
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_nestable_atomic_end);
+
+void kcsan_flat_atomic_begin(void)
+{
+	get_ctx()->in_flat_atomic = true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_flat_atomic_begin);
+
+void kcsan_flat_atomic_end(void)
+{
+	get_ctx()->in_flat_atomic = false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_flat_atomic_end);
+
+void kcsan_atomic_next(int n)
+{
+	get_ctx()->atomic_next = n;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_atomic_next);
+
+void __kcsan_check_access(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type)
+{
+	check_access(ptr, size, type);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kcsan_check_access);
+
+/*
+ * KCSAN uses the same instrumentation that is emitted by supported compilers
+ * for ThreadSanitizer (TSAN).
+ *
+ * When enabled, the compiler emits instrumentation calls (the functions
+ * prefixed with "__tsan" below) for all loads and stores that it generated;
+ * inline asm is not instrumented.
+ *
+ * Note that, not all supported compiler versions distinguish aligned/unaligned
+ * accesses, but e.g. recent versions of Clang do. We simply alias the unaligned
+ * version to the generic version, which can handle both.
+ */
+
+#define DEFINE_TSAN_READ_WRITE(size)                                           \
+	void __tsan_read##size(void *ptr)                                      \
+	{                                                                      \
+		check_access(ptr, size, 0);                                    \
+	}                                                                      \
+	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_read##size);                                      \
+	void __tsan_unaligned_read##size(void *ptr)                            \
+		__alias(__tsan_read##size);                                    \
+	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_unaligned_read##size);                            \
+	void __tsan_write##size(void *ptr)                                     \
+	{                                                                      \
+		check_access(ptr, size, KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE);                   \
+	}                                                                      \
+	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_write##size);                                     \
+	void __tsan_unaligned_write##size(void *ptr)                           \
+		__alias(__tsan_write##size);                                   \
+	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_unaligned_write##size)
+
+DEFINE_TSAN_READ_WRITE(1);
+DEFINE_TSAN_READ_WRITE(2);
+DEFINE_TSAN_READ_WRITE(4);
+DEFINE_TSAN_READ_WRITE(8);
+DEFINE_TSAN_READ_WRITE(16);
+
+void __tsan_read_range(void *ptr, size_t size)
+{
+	check_access(ptr, size, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_read_range);
+
+void __tsan_write_range(void *ptr, size_t size)
+{
+	check_access(ptr, size, KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_write_range);
+
+/*
+ * The below are not required by KCSAN, but can still be emitted by the
+ * compiler.
+ */
+void __tsan_func_entry(void *call_pc)
+{
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_func_entry);
+void __tsan_func_exit(void)
+{
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_func_exit);
+void __tsan_init(void)
+{
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_init);
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/debugfs.c b/kernel/kcsan/debugfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..041d520a0183
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/debugfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/bsearch.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sort.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+#include "kcsan.h"
+
+/*
+ * Statistics counters.
+ */
+static atomic_long_t counters[KCSAN_COUNTER_COUNT];
+
+/*
+ * Addresses for filtering functions from reporting. This list can be used as a
+ * whitelist or blacklist.
+ */
+static struct {
+	unsigned long *addrs; /* array of addresses */
+	size_t size; /* current size */
+	int used; /* number of elements used */
+	bool sorted; /* if elements are sorted */
+	bool whitelist; /* if list is a blacklist or whitelist */
+} report_filterlist = {
+	.addrs = NULL,
+	.size = 8, /* small initial size */
+	.used = 0,
+	.sorted = false,
+	.whitelist = false, /* default is blacklist */
+};
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(report_filterlist_lock);
+
+static const char *counter_to_name(enum kcsan_counter_id id)
+{
+	switch (id) {
+	case KCSAN_COUNTER_USED_WATCHPOINTS:
+		return "used_watchpoints";
+	case KCSAN_COUNTER_SETUP_WATCHPOINTS:
+		return "setup_watchpoints";
+	case KCSAN_COUNTER_DATA_RACES:
+		return "data_races";
+	case KCSAN_COUNTER_NO_CAPACITY:
+		return "no_capacity";
+	case KCSAN_COUNTER_REPORT_RACES:
+		return "report_races";
+	case KCSAN_COUNTER_RACES_UNKNOWN_ORIGIN:
+		return "races_unknown_origin";
+	case KCSAN_COUNTER_UNENCODABLE_ACCESSES:
+		return "unencodable_accesses";
+	case KCSAN_COUNTER_ENCODING_FALSE_POSITIVES:
+		return "encoding_false_positives";
+	case KCSAN_COUNTER_COUNT:
+		BUG();
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void kcsan_counter_inc(enum kcsan_counter_id id)
+{
+	atomic_long_inc(&counters[id]);
+}
+
+void kcsan_counter_dec(enum kcsan_counter_id id)
+{
+	atomic_long_dec(&counters[id]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The microbenchmark allows benchmarking KCSAN core runtime only. To run
+ * multiple threads, pipe 'microbench=<iters>' from multiple tasks into the
+ * debugfs file.
+ */
+static void microbenchmark(unsigned long iters)
+{
+	cycles_t cycles;
+
+	pr_info("KCSAN: %s begin | iters: %lu\n", __func__, iters);
+
+	cycles = get_cycles();
+	while (iters--) {
+		/*
+		 * We can run this benchmark from multiple tasks; this address
+		 * calculation increases likelyhood of some accesses overlapping
+		 * (they still won't conflict because all are reads).
+		 */
+		unsigned long addr =
+			iters % (CONFIG_KCSAN_NUM_WATCHPOINTS * PAGE_SIZE);
+		__kcsan_check_read((void *)addr, sizeof(long));
+	}
+	cycles = get_cycles() - cycles;
+
+	pr_info("KCSAN: %s end   | cycles: %llu\n", __func__, cycles);
+}
+
+static int cmp_filterlist_addrs(const void *rhs, const void *lhs)
+{
+	const unsigned long a = *(const unsigned long *)rhs;
+	const unsigned long b = *(const unsigned long *)lhs;
+
+	return a < b ? -1 : a == b ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+bool kcsan_skip_report_debugfs(unsigned long func_addr)
+{
+	unsigned long symbolsize, offset;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	if (!kallsyms_lookup_size_offset(func_addr, &symbolsize, &offset))
+		return false;
+	func_addr -= offset; /* get function start */
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&report_filterlist_lock, flags);
+	if (report_filterlist.used == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Sort array if it is unsorted, and then do a binary search. */
+	if (!report_filterlist.sorted) {
+		sort(report_filterlist.addrs, report_filterlist.used,
+		     sizeof(unsigned long), cmp_filterlist_addrs, NULL);
+		report_filterlist.sorted = true;
+	}
+	ret = !!bsearch(&func_addr, report_filterlist.addrs,
+			report_filterlist.used, sizeof(unsigned long),
+			cmp_filterlist_addrs);
+	if (report_filterlist.whitelist)
+		ret = !ret;
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_filterlist_lock, flags);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void set_report_filterlist_whitelist(bool whitelist)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&report_filterlist_lock, flags);
+	report_filterlist.whitelist = whitelist;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_filterlist_lock, flags);
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 on success, error-code otherwise. */
+static ssize_t insert_report_filterlist(const char *func)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	unsigned long addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func);
+	ssize_t ret = 0;
+
+	if (!addr) {
+		pr_err("KCSAN: could not find function: '%s'\n", func);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&report_filterlist_lock, flags);
+
+	if (report_filterlist.addrs == NULL) {
+		/* initial allocation */
+		report_filterlist.addrs =
+			kmalloc_array(report_filterlist.size,
+				      sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (report_filterlist.addrs == NULL) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	} else if (report_filterlist.used == report_filterlist.size) {
+		/* resize filterlist */
+		size_t new_size = report_filterlist.size * 2;
+		unsigned long *new_addrs =
+			krealloc(report_filterlist.addrs,
+				 new_size * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+		if (new_addrs == NULL) {
+			/* leave filterlist itself untouched */
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		report_filterlist.size = new_size;
+		report_filterlist.addrs = new_addrs;
+	}
+
+	/* Note: deduplicating should be done in userspace. */
+	report_filterlist.addrs[report_filterlist.used++] =
+		kallsyms_lookup_name(func);
+	report_filterlist.sorted = false;
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_filterlist_lock, flags);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int show_info(struct seq_file *file, void *v)
+{
+	int i;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	/* show stats */
+	seq_printf(file, "enabled: %i\n", READ_ONCE(kcsan_enabled));
+	for (i = 0; i < KCSAN_COUNTER_COUNT; ++i)
+		seq_printf(file, "%s: %ld\n", counter_to_name(i),
+			   atomic_long_read(&counters[i]));
+
+	/* show filter functions, and filter type */
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&report_filterlist_lock, flags);
+	seq_printf(file, "\n%s functions: %s\n",
+		   report_filterlist.whitelist ? "whitelisted" : "blacklisted",
+		   report_filterlist.used == 0 ? "none" : "");
+	for (i = 0; i < report_filterlist.used; ++i)
+		seq_printf(file, " %ps\n", (void *)report_filterlist.addrs[i]);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_filterlist_lock, flags);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int debugfs_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return single_open(file, show_info, NULL);
+}
+
+static ssize_t debugfs_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			     size_t count, loff_t *off)
+{
+	char kbuf[KSYM_NAME_LEN];
+	char *arg;
+	int read_len = count < (sizeof(kbuf) - 1) ? count : (sizeof(kbuf) - 1);
+
+	if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, read_len))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	kbuf[read_len] = '\0';
+	arg = strstrip(kbuf);
+
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "on")) {
+		WRITE_ONCE(kcsan_enabled, true);
+	} else if (!strcmp(arg, "off")) {
+		WRITE_ONCE(kcsan_enabled, false);
+	} else if (!strncmp(arg, "microbench=", sizeof("microbench=") - 1)) {
+		unsigned long iters;
+
+		if (kstrtoul(&arg[sizeof("microbench=") - 1], 0, &iters))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		microbenchmark(iters);
+	} else if (!strcmp(arg, "whitelist")) {
+		set_report_filterlist_whitelist(true);
+	} else if (!strcmp(arg, "blacklist")) {
+		set_report_filterlist_whitelist(false);
+	} else if (arg[0] == '!') {
+		ssize_t ret = insert_report_filterlist(&arg[1]);
+
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+	} else {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations debugfs_ops = { .read = seq_read,
+						    .open = debugfs_open,
+						    .write = debugfs_write,
+						    .release = single_release };
+
+void __init kcsan_debugfs_init(void)
+{
+	debugfs_create_file("kcsan", 0644, NULL, NULL, &debugfs_ops);
+}
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/encoding.h b/kernel/kcsan/encoding.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e17bdac0e54b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/encoding.h
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef _KERNEL_KCSAN_ENCODING_H
+#define _KERNEL_KCSAN_ENCODING_H
+
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+#include <linux/log2.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+
+#include "kcsan.h"
+
+#define SLOT_RANGE PAGE_SIZE
+#define INVALID_WATCHPOINT 0
+#define CONSUMED_WATCHPOINT 1
+
+/*
+ * The maximum useful size of accesses for which we set up watchpoints is the
+ * max range of slots we check on an access.
+ */
+#define MAX_ENCODABLE_SIZE (SLOT_RANGE * (1 + KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT))
+
+/*
+ * Number of bits we use to store size info.
+ */
+#define WATCHPOINT_SIZE_BITS bits_per(MAX_ENCODABLE_SIZE)
+/*
+ * This encoding for addresses discards the upper (1 for is-write + SIZE_BITS);
+ * however, most 64-bit architectures do not use the full 64-bit address space.
+ * Also, in order for a false positive to be observable 2 things need to happen:
+ *
+ *	1. different addresses but with the same encoded address race;
+ *	2. and both map onto the same watchpoint slots;
+ *
+ * Both these are assumed to be very unlikely. However, in case it still happens
+ * happens, the report logic will filter out the false positive (see report.c).
+ */
+#define WATCHPOINT_ADDR_BITS (BITS_PER_LONG - 1 - WATCHPOINT_SIZE_BITS)
+
+/*
+ * Masks to set/retrieve the encoded data.
+ */
+#define WATCHPOINT_WRITE_MASK BIT(BITS_PER_LONG - 1)
+#define WATCHPOINT_SIZE_MASK                                                   \
+	GENMASK(BITS_PER_LONG - 2, BITS_PER_LONG - 2 - WATCHPOINT_SIZE_BITS)
+#define WATCHPOINT_ADDR_MASK                                                   \
+	GENMASK(BITS_PER_LONG - 3 - WATCHPOINT_SIZE_BITS, 0)
+
+static inline bool check_encodable(unsigned long addr, size_t size)
+{
+	return size <= MAX_ENCODABLE_SIZE;
+}
+
+static inline long encode_watchpoint(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
+				     bool is_write)
+{
+	return (long)((is_write ? WATCHPOINT_WRITE_MASK : 0) |
+		      (size << WATCHPOINT_ADDR_BITS) |
+		      (addr & WATCHPOINT_ADDR_MASK));
+}
+
+static inline bool decode_watchpoint(long watchpoint,
+				     unsigned long *addr_masked, size_t *size,
+				     bool *is_write)
+{
+	if (watchpoint == INVALID_WATCHPOINT ||
+	    watchpoint == CONSUMED_WATCHPOINT)
+		return false;
+
+	*addr_masked = (unsigned long)watchpoint & WATCHPOINT_ADDR_MASK;
+	*size = ((unsigned long)watchpoint & WATCHPOINT_SIZE_MASK) >>
+		WATCHPOINT_ADDR_BITS;
+	*is_write = !!((unsigned long)watchpoint & WATCHPOINT_WRITE_MASK);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return watchpoint slot for an address.
+ */
+static inline int watchpoint_slot(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	return (addr / PAGE_SIZE) % CONFIG_KCSAN_NUM_WATCHPOINTS;
+}
+
+static inline bool matching_access(unsigned long addr1, size_t size1,
+				   unsigned long addr2, size_t size2)
+{
+	unsigned long end_range1 = addr1 + size1 - 1;
+	unsigned long end_range2 = addr2 + size2 - 1;
+
+	return addr1 <= end_range2 && addr2 <= end_range1;
+}
+
+#endif /* _KERNEL_KCSAN_ENCODING_H */
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/kcsan.h b/kernel/kcsan/kcsan.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1bb2f1c0d61e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/kcsan.h
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+/*
+ * The Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) infrastructure. For more info please
+ * see Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KERNEL_KCSAN_KCSAN_H
+#define _KERNEL_KCSAN_KCSAN_H
+
+#include <linux/kcsan.h>
+
+/* The number of adjacent watchpoints to check. */
+#define KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT 1
+
+/*
+ * Globally enable and disable KCSAN.
+ */
+extern bool kcsan_enabled;
+
+/*
+ * Initialize debugfs file.
+ */
+void kcsan_debugfs_init(void);
+
+enum kcsan_counter_id {
+	/*
+	 * Number of watchpoints currently in use.
+	 */
+	KCSAN_COUNTER_USED_WATCHPOINTS,
+
+	/*
+	 * Total number of watchpoints set up.
+	 */
+	KCSAN_COUNTER_SETUP_WATCHPOINTS,
+
+	/*
+	 * Total number of data races.
+	 */
+	KCSAN_COUNTER_DATA_RACES,
+
+	/*
+	 * Number of times no watchpoints were available.
+	 */
+	KCSAN_COUNTER_NO_CAPACITY,
+
+	/*
+	 * A thread checking a watchpoint raced with another checking thread;
+	 * only one will be reported.
+	 */
+	KCSAN_COUNTER_REPORT_RACES,
+
+	/*
+	 * Observed data value change, but writer thread unknown.
+	 */
+	KCSAN_COUNTER_RACES_UNKNOWN_ORIGIN,
+
+	/*
+	 * The access cannot be encoded to a valid watchpoint.
+	 */
+	KCSAN_COUNTER_UNENCODABLE_ACCESSES,
+
+	/*
+	 * Watchpoint encoding caused a watchpoint to fire on mismatching
+	 * accesses.
+	 */
+	KCSAN_COUNTER_ENCODING_FALSE_POSITIVES,
+
+	KCSAN_COUNTER_COUNT, /* number of counters */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Increment/decrement counter with given id; avoid calling these in fast-path.
+ */
+void kcsan_counter_inc(enum kcsan_counter_id id);
+void kcsan_counter_dec(enum kcsan_counter_id id);
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if data races in the function symbol that maps to func_addr
+ * (offsets are ignored) should *not* be reported.
+ */
+bool kcsan_skip_report_debugfs(unsigned long func_addr);
+
+enum kcsan_report_type {
+	/*
+	 * The thread that set up the watchpoint and briefly stalled was
+	 * signalled that another thread triggered the watchpoint.
+	 */
+	KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_SIGNAL,
+
+	/*
+	 * A thread found and consumed a matching watchpoint.
+	 */
+	KCSAN_REPORT_CONSUMED_WATCHPOINT,
+
+	/*
+	 * No other thread was observed to race with the access, but the data
+	 * value before and after the stall differs.
+	 */
+	KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_UNKNOWN_ORIGIN,
+};
+/*
+ * Print a race report from thread that encountered the race.
+ */
+void kcsan_report(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, bool is_write,
+		  bool value_change, int cpu_id, enum kcsan_report_type type);
+
+#endif /* _KERNEL_KCSAN_KCSAN_H */
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/report.c b/kernel/kcsan/report.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ead5610bafa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/report.c
@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/preempt.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
+
+#include "kcsan.h"
+#include "encoding.h"
+
+/*
+ * Max. number of stack entries to show in the report.
+ */
+#define NUM_STACK_ENTRIES 64
+
+/*
+ * Other thread info: communicated from other racing thread to thread that set
+ * up the watchpoint, which then prints the complete report atomically. Only
+ * need one struct, as all threads should to be serialized regardless to print
+ * the reports, with reporting being in the slow-path.
+ */
+static struct {
+	const volatile void *ptr;
+	size_t size;
+	bool is_write;
+	int task_pid;
+	int cpu_id;
+	unsigned long stack_entries[NUM_STACK_ENTRIES];
+	int num_stack_entries;
+} other_info = { .ptr = NULL };
+
+/*
+ * This spinlock protects reporting and other_info, since other_info is usually
+ * required when reporting.
+ */
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(report_lock);
+
+/*
+ * Special rules to skip reporting.
+ */
+static bool skip_report(bool is_write, bool value_change,
+			unsigned long top_frame)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_REPORT_VALUE_CHANGE_ONLY) && is_write &&
+	    !value_change) {
+		/*
+		 * The access is a write, but the data value did not change.
+		 *
+		 * We opt-out of this filter for certain functions at request of
+		 * maintainers.
+		 */
+		char buf[64];
+
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%ps", (void *)top_frame);
+		if (!strnstr(buf, "rcu_", sizeof(buf)) &&
+		    !strnstr(buf, "_rcu", sizeof(buf)) &&
+		    !strnstr(buf, "_srcu", sizeof(buf)))
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return kcsan_skip_report_debugfs(top_frame);
+}
+
+static inline const char *get_access_type(bool is_write)
+{
+	return is_write ? "write" : "read";
+}
+
+/* Return thread description: in task or interrupt. */
+static const char *get_thread_desc(int task_id)
+{
+	if (task_id != -1) {
+		static char buf[32]; /* safe: protected by report_lock */
+
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "task %i", task_id);
+		return buf;
+	}
+	return "interrupt";
+}
+
+/* Helper to skip KCSAN-related functions in stack-trace. */
+static int get_stack_skipnr(unsigned long stack_entries[], int num_entries)
+{
+	char buf[64];
+	int skip = 0;
+
+	for (; skip < num_entries; ++skip) {
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%ps", (void *)stack_entries[skip]);
+		if (!strnstr(buf, "csan_", sizeof(buf)) &&
+		    !strnstr(buf, "tsan_", sizeof(buf)) &&
+		    !strnstr(buf, "_once_size", sizeof(buf))) {
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return skip;
+}
+
+/* Compares symbolized strings of addr1 and addr2. */
+static int sym_strcmp(void *addr1, void *addr2)
+{
+	char buf1[64];
+	char buf2[64];
+
+	snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "%pS", addr1);
+	snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%pS", addr2);
+	return strncmp(buf1, buf2, sizeof(buf1));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if a report was generated, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool print_report(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, bool is_write,
+			 bool value_change, int cpu_id,
+			 enum kcsan_report_type type)
+{
+	unsigned long stack_entries[NUM_STACK_ENTRIES] = { 0 };
+	int num_stack_entries =
+		stack_trace_save(stack_entries, NUM_STACK_ENTRIES, 1);
+	int skipnr = get_stack_skipnr(stack_entries, num_stack_entries);
+	int other_skipnr;
+
+	/*
+	 * Must check report filter rules before starting to print.
+	 */
+	if (skip_report(is_write, true, stack_entries[skipnr]))
+		return false;
+
+	if (type == KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_SIGNAL) {
+		other_skipnr = get_stack_skipnr(other_info.stack_entries,
+						other_info.num_stack_entries);
+
+		/* value_change is only known for the other thread */
+		if (skip_report(other_info.is_write, value_change,
+				other_info.stack_entries[other_skipnr]))
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Print report header. */
+	pr_err("==================================================================\n");
+	switch (type) {
+	case KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_SIGNAL: {
+		void *this_fn = (void *)stack_entries[skipnr];
+		void *other_fn = (void *)other_info.stack_entries[other_skipnr];
+		int cmp;
+
+		/*
+		 * Order functions lexographically for consistent bug titles.
+		 * Do not print offset of functions to keep title short.
+		 */
+		cmp = sym_strcmp(other_fn, this_fn);
+		pr_err("BUG: KCSAN: data-race in %ps / %ps\n",
+		       cmp < 0 ? other_fn : this_fn,
+		       cmp < 0 ? this_fn : other_fn);
+	} break;
+
+	case KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_UNKNOWN_ORIGIN:
+		pr_err("BUG: KCSAN: data-race in %pS\n",
+		       (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+
+	pr_err("\n");
+
+	/* Print information about the racing accesses. */
+	switch (type) {
+	case KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_SIGNAL:
+		pr_err("%s to 0x%px of %zu bytes by %s on cpu %i:\n",
+		       get_access_type(other_info.is_write), other_info.ptr,
+		       other_info.size, get_thread_desc(other_info.task_pid),
+		       other_info.cpu_id);
+
+		/* Print the other thread's stack trace. */
+		stack_trace_print(other_info.stack_entries + other_skipnr,
+				  other_info.num_stack_entries - other_skipnr,
+				  0);
+
+		pr_err("\n");
+		pr_err("%s to 0x%px of %zu bytes by %s on cpu %i:\n",
+		       get_access_type(is_write), ptr, size,
+		       get_thread_desc(in_task() ? task_pid_nr(current) : -1),
+		       cpu_id);
+		break;
+
+	case KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_UNKNOWN_ORIGIN:
+		pr_err("race at unknown origin, with %s to 0x%px of %zu bytes by %s on cpu %i:\n",
+		       get_access_type(is_write), ptr, size,
+		       get_thread_desc(in_task() ? task_pid_nr(current) : -1),
+		       cpu_id);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+	/* Print stack trace of this thread. */
+	stack_trace_print(stack_entries + skipnr, num_stack_entries - skipnr,
+			  0);
+
+	/* Print report footer. */
+	pr_err("\n");
+	pr_err("Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:\n");
+	dump_stack_print_info(KERN_DEFAULT);
+	pr_err("==================================================================\n");
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void release_report(unsigned long *flags, enum kcsan_report_type type)
+{
+	if (type == KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_SIGNAL)
+		other_info.ptr = NULL; /* mark for reuse */
+
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Depending on the report type either sets other_info and returns false, or
+ * acquires the matching other_info and returns true. If other_info is not
+ * required for the report type, simply acquires report_lock and returns true.
+ */
+static bool prepare_report(unsigned long *flags, const volatile void *ptr,
+			   size_t size, bool is_write, int cpu_id,
+			   enum kcsan_report_type type)
+{
+	if (type != KCSAN_REPORT_CONSUMED_WATCHPOINT &&
+	    type != KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_SIGNAL) {
+		/* other_info not required; just acquire report_lock */
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&report_lock, *flags);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+retry:
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&report_lock, *flags);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case KCSAN_REPORT_CONSUMED_WATCHPOINT:
+		if (other_info.ptr != NULL)
+			break; /* still in use, retry */
+
+		other_info.ptr = ptr;
+		other_info.size = size;
+		other_info.is_write = is_write;
+		other_info.task_pid = in_task() ? task_pid_nr(current) : -1;
+		other_info.cpu_id = cpu_id;
+		other_info.num_stack_entries = stack_trace_save(
+			other_info.stack_entries, NUM_STACK_ENTRIES, 1);
+
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
+
+		/*
+		 * The other thread will print the summary; other_info may now
+		 * be consumed.
+		 */
+		return false;
+
+	case KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_SIGNAL:
+		if (other_info.ptr == NULL)
+			break; /* no data available yet, retry */
+
+		/*
+		 * First check if this is the other_info we are expecting, i.e.
+		 * matches based on how watchpoint was encoded.
+		 */
+		if (!matching_access((unsigned long)other_info.ptr &
+					     WATCHPOINT_ADDR_MASK,
+				     other_info.size,
+				     (unsigned long)ptr & WATCHPOINT_ADDR_MASK,
+				     size))
+			break; /* mismatching watchpoint, retry */
+
+		if (!matching_access((unsigned long)other_info.ptr,
+				     other_info.size, (unsigned long)ptr,
+				     size)) {
+			/*
+			 * If the actual accesses to not match, this was a false
+			 * positive due to watchpoint encoding.
+			 */
+			kcsan_counter_inc(
+				KCSAN_COUNTER_ENCODING_FALSE_POSITIVES);
+
+			/* discard this other_info */
+			release_report(flags, KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_SIGNAL);
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Matching & usable access in other_info: keep other_info_lock
+		 * locked, as this thread consumes it to print the full report;
+		 * unlocked in release_report.
+		 */
+		return true;
+
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
+	goto retry;
+}
+
+void kcsan_report(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, bool is_write,
+		  bool value_change, int cpu_id, enum kcsan_report_type type)
+{
+	unsigned long flags = 0;
+
+	kcsan_disable_current();
+	if (prepare_report(&flags, ptr, size, is_write, cpu_id, type)) {
+		if (print_report(ptr, size, is_write, value_change, cpu_id,
+				 type) &&
+		    panic_on_warn)
+			panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+
+		release_report(&flags, type);
+	}
+	kcsan_enable_current();
+}
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/test.c b/kernel/kcsan/test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0bae63c5ca65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include "encoding.h"
+
+#define ITERS_PER_TEST 2000
+
+/* Test requirements. */
+static bool test_requires(void)
+{
+	/* random should be initialized for the below tests */
+	return prandom_u32() + prandom_u32() != 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test watchpoint encode and decode: check that encoding some access's info,
+ * and then subsequent decode preserves the access's info.
+ */
+static bool test_encode_decode(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ITERS_PER_TEST; ++i) {
+		size_t size = prandom_u32_max(MAX_ENCODABLE_SIZE) + 1;
+		bool is_write = !!prandom_u32_max(2);
+		unsigned long addr;
+
+		prandom_bytes(&addr, sizeof(addr));
+		if (WARN_ON(!check_encodable(addr, size)))
+			return false;
+
+		/* encode and decode */
+		{
+			const long encoded_watchpoint =
+				encode_watchpoint(addr, size, is_write);
+			unsigned long verif_masked_addr;
+			size_t verif_size;
+			bool verif_is_write;
+
+			/* check special watchpoints */
+			if (WARN_ON(decode_watchpoint(
+				    INVALID_WATCHPOINT, &verif_masked_addr,
+				    &verif_size, &verif_is_write)))
+				return false;
+			if (WARN_ON(decode_watchpoint(
+				    CONSUMED_WATCHPOINT, &verif_masked_addr,
+				    &verif_size, &verif_is_write)))
+				return false;
+
+			/* check decoding watchpoint returns same data */
+			if (WARN_ON(!decode_watchpoint(
+				    encoded_watchpoint, &verif_masked_addr,
+				    &verif_size, &verif_is_write)))
+				return false;
+			if (WARN_ON(verif_masked_addr !=
+				    (addr & WATCHPOINT_ADDR_MASK)))
+				goto fail;
+			if (WARN_ON(verif_size != size))
+				goto fail;
+			if (WARN_ON(is_write != verif_is_write))
+				goto fail;
+
+			continue;
+fail:
+			pr_err("%s fail: %s %zu bytes @ %lx -> encoded: %lx -> %s %zu bytes @ %lx\n",
+			       __func__, is_write ? "write" : "read", size,
+			       addr, encoded_watchpoint,
+			       verif_is_write ? "write" : "read", verif_size,
+			       verif_masked_addr);
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/* Test access matching function. */
+static bool test_matching_access(void)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON(!matching_access(10, 1, 10, 1)))
+		return false;
+	if (WARN_ON(!matching_access(10, 2, 11, 1)))
+		return false;
+	if (WARN_ON(!matching_access(10, 1, 9, 2)))
+		return false;
+	if (WARN_ON(matching_access(10, 1, 11, 1)))
+		return false;
+	if (WARN_ON(matching_access(9, 1, 10, 1)))
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int __init kcsan_selftest(void)
+{
+	int passed = 0;
+	int total = 0;
+
+#define RUN_TEST(do_test)                                                      \
+	do {                                                                   \
+		++total;                                                       \
+		if (do_test())                                                 \
+			++passed;                                              \
+		else                                                           \
+			pr_err("KCSAN selftest: " #do_test " failed");         \
+	} while (0)
+
+	RUN_TEST(test_requires);
+	RUN_TEST(test_encode_decode);
+	RUN_TEST(test_matching_access);
+
+	pr_info("KCSAN selftest: %d/%d tests passed\n", passed, total);
+	if (passed != total)
+		panic("KCSAN selftests failed");
+	return 0;
+}
+postcore_initcall(kcsan_selftest);
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index 93d97f9b0157..35accd1d93de 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -2086,6 +2086,8 @@ source "lib/Kconfig.kgdb"
 
 source "lib/Kconfig.ubsan"
 
+source "lib/Kconfig.kcsan"
+
 config ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
 	bool
 
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kcsan b/lib/Kconfig.kcsan
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5dd464e52ab4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.kcsan
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_KCSAN
+	bool
+
+menuconfig KCSAN
+	bool "KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector"
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_KCSAN && !KASAN && STACKTRACE
+	default n
+	help
+	  Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer is a dynamic data race detector, which
+	  uses a watchpoint-based sampling approach to detect races. See
+	  <file:Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst> for more details.
+
+if KCSAN
+
+config KCSAN_DEBUG
+	bool "Debugging of KCSAN internals"
+	default n
+
+config KCSAN_SELFTEST
+	bool "Perform short selftests on boot"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Run KCSAN selftests on boot. On test failure, causes kernel to panic.
+
+config KCSAN_EARLY_ENABLE
+	bool "Early enable during boot"
+	default y
+	help
+	  If KCSAN should be enabled globally as soon as possible. KCSAN can
+	  later be enabled/disabled via debugfs.
+
+config KCSAN_NUM_WATCHPOINTS
+	int "Number of available watchpoints"
+	default 64
+	help
+	  Total number of available watchpoints. An address range maps into a
+	  specific watchpoint slot as specified in kernel/kcsan/encoding.h.
+	  Although larger number of watchpoints may not be usable due to
+	  limited number of CPUs, a larger value helps to improve performance
+	  due to reducing cache-line contention. The chosen default is a
+	  conservative value; we should almost never observe "no_capacity"
+	  events (see /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan).
+
+config KCSAN_UDELAY_TASK
+	int "Delay in microseconds (for tasks)"
+	default 80
+	help
+	  For tasks, the microsecond delay after setting up a watchpoint.
+
+config KCSAN_UDELAY_INTERRUPT
+	int "Delay in microseconds (for interrupts)"
+	default 20
+	help
+	  For interrupts, the microsecond delay after setting up a watchpoint.
+	  Interrupts have tighter latency requirements, and their delay should
+	  be lower than for tasks.
+
+config KCSAN_DELAY_RANDOMIZE
+	bool "Randomize above delays"
+	default y
+	help
+	  If delays should be randomized, where the maximum is KCSAN_UDELAY_*.
+	  If false, the chosen delays are always KCSAN_UDELAY_* defined above.
+
+config KCSAN_SKIP_WATCH
+	int "Skip instructions before setting up watchpoint"
+	default 4000
+	help
+	  The number of per-CPU memory operations to skip, before another
+	  watchpoint is set up, i.e. one in KCSAN_WATCH_SKIP per-CPU
+	  memory operations are used to set up a watchpoint. A smaller value
+	  results in more aggressive race detection, whereas a larger value
+	  improves system performance at the cost of missing some races.
+
+config KCSAN_SKIP_WATCH_RANDOMIZE
+	bool "Randomize watchpoint instruction skip count"
+	default y
+	help
+	  If instruction skip count should be randomized, where the maximum is
+	  KCSAN_WATCH_SKIP. If false, the chosen value is always
+	  KCSAN_WATCH_SKIP.
+
+# Note that, while some of the below options could be turned into boot
+# parameters, to optimize for the common use-case, we avoid this because: (a)
+# it would impact performance (and we want to avoid static branch for all
+# {READ,WRITE}_ONCE, atomic_*, bitops, etc.), and (b) complicate the design
+# without real benefit. The main purpose of the below options are for use in
+# fuzzer configs to control reported data races, and are not expected to be
+# switched frequently by a user.
+
+config KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_UNKNOWN_ORIGIN
+	bool "Report races of unknown origin"
+	default y
+	help
+	  If KCSAN should report races where only one access is known, and the
+	  conflicting access is of unknown origin. This type of race is
+	  reported if it was only possible to infer a race due to a data value
+	  change while an access is being delayed on a watchpoint.
+
+config KCSAN_REPORT_VALUE_CHANGE_ONLY
+	bool "Only report races where watcher observed a data value change"
+	default y
+	help
+	  If enabled and a conflicting write is observed via watchpoint, but
+	  the data value of the memory location was observed to remain
+	  unchanged, do not report the data race.
+
+config KCSAN_IGNORE_ATOMICS
+	bool "Do not instrument marked atomic accesses"
+	default n
+	help
+	  If enabled, never instruments marked atomic accesses. This results in
+	  not reporting data races where one access is atomic and the other is
+	  a plain access.
+
+endif # KCSAN
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index c5892807e06f..778ab704e3ad 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_string.o := n
 CFLAGS_string.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
 endif
 
+# Used by KCSAN while enabled, avoid recursion.
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_random32.o := n
+
 lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
 	 rbtree.o radix-tree.o timerqueue.o xarray.o \
 	 idr.o extable.o \
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.kcsan b/scripts/Makefile.kcsan
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..caf1111a28ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.kcsan
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN
+
+CFLAGS_KCSAN := -fsanitize=thread
+
+endif # CONFIG_KCSAN
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index 179d55af5852..8952f909f7c9 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -152,6 +152,16 @@ _c_flags += $(if $(patsubst n%,, \
 	$(CFLAGS_KCOV))
 endif
 
+#
+# Enable KCSAN flags except some files or directories we don't want to check
+# (depends on variables KCSAN_SANITIZE_obj.o, KCSAN_SANITIZE)
+#
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_KCSAN),y)
+_c_flags += $(if $(patsubst n%,, \
+	$(KCSAN_SANITIZE_$(basetarget).o)$(KCSAN_SANITIZE)y), \
+	$(CFLAGS_KCSAN))
+endif
+
 # $(srctree)/$(src) for including checkin headers from generated source files
 # $(objtree)/$(obj) for including generated headers from checkin source files
 ifeq ($(KBUILD_EXTMOD),)
-- 
2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 02/10] include/linux/compiler.h: Introduce data_race(expr) macro
  2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-14 18:02 ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] kcsan: Add Documentation entry in dev-tools Marco Elver
                   ` (10 subsequent siblings)
  12 siblings, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-14 18:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86, Linus Torvalds

This introduces the data_race(expr) macro, which can be used to annotate
expressions for purposes of (1) documenting, and (2) giving tooling such
as KCSAN information about which data races are deemed "safe".

More context:
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wg5CkOEF8DTez1Qu0XTEFw_oHhxN98bDnFqbY7HL5AB2g@mail.gmail.com

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
---
v4:
* Introduce this patch to KCSAN series.
---
 include/linux/compiler.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
index c42fa83f23fb..7d3e77781578 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
@@ -310,6 +310,26 @@ unsigned long read_word_at_a_time(const void *addr)
 	__u.__val;					\
 })
 
+#include <linux/kcsan.h>
+
+/*
+ * data_race: macro to document that accesses in an expression may conflict with
+ * other concurrent accesses resulting in data races, but the resulting
+ * behaviour is deemed safe regardless.
+ *
+ * This macro *does not* affect normal code generation, but is a hint to tooling
+ * that data races here should be ignored.
+ */
+#define data_race(expr)                                                        \
+	({                                                                     \
+		typeof(({ expr; })) __val;                                     \
+		kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin();                                 \
+		__val = ({ expr; });                                           \
+		kcsan_nestable_atomic_end();                                   \
+		__val;                                                         \
+	})
+#else
+
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 
 /*
-- 
2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 03/10] kcsan: Add Documentation entry in dev-tools
  2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure Marco Elver
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] include/linux/compiler.h: Introduce data_race(expr) macro Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-14 18:02 ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] objtool, kcsan: Add KCSAN runtime functions to whitelist Marco Elver
                   ` (9 subsequent siblings)
  12 siblings, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-14 18:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
---
v4:
* Update to performance numbers after optimizations: no measurable
  change with default, and minor improvement when no watchpoints are set
  up.
* Add section on race conditions vs. data races.
* Add section on selective analysis.

v3:
* Split Documentation into separate patch.
* Fix typos.
* Accuracy: refer to unsoundness/completeness.
* Update with new slow-down after optimizations.
* Add Alternatives Considered section and move KTSAN mentions there.
---
 Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst |   1 +
 Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst | 256 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 257 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
index b0522a4dd107..1b756a7014e0 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ whole; patches welcome!
    kasan
    ubsan
    kmemleak
+   kcsan
    gdb-kernel-debugging
    kgdb
    kselftest
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a6f4f92df2fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+The Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
+========================================
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+*Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)* is a dynamic data race detector for
+kernel space. KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based data race detector. Key
+priorities in KCSAN's design are lack of false positives, scalability, and
+simplicity. More details can be found in `Implementation Details`_.
+
+KCSAN uses compile-time instrumentation to instrument memory accesses. KCSAN is
+supported in both GCC and Clang. With GCC it requires version 7.3.0 or later.
+With Clang it requires version 7.0.0 or later.
+
+Usage
+-----
+
+To enable KCSAN configure kernel with::
+
+    CONFIG_KCSAN = y
+
+KCSAN provides several other configuration options to customize behaviour (see
+their respective help text for more info).
+
+Error reports
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+A typical data race report looks like this::
+
+    ==================================================================
+    BUG: KCSAN: data-race in generic_permission / kernfs_refresh_inode
+
+    write to 0xffff8fee4c40700c of 4 bytes by task 175 on cpu 4:
+     kernfs_refresh_inode+0x70/0x170
+     kernfs_iop_permission+0x4f/0x90
+     inode_permission+0x190/0x200
+     link_path_walk.part.0+0x503/0x8e0
+     path_lookupat.isra.0+0x69/0x4d0
+     filename_lookup+0x136/0x280
+     user_path_at_empty+0x47/0x60
+     vfs_statx+0x9b/0x130
+     __do_sys_newlstat+0x50/0xb0
+     __x64_sys_newlstat+0x37/0x50
+     do_syscall_64+0x85/0x260
+     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
+
+    read to 0xffff8fee4c40700c of 4 bytes by task 166 on cpu 6:
+     generic_permission+0x5b/0x2a0
+     kernfs_iop_permission+0x66/0x90
+     inode_permission+0x190/0x200
+     link_path_walk.part.0+0x503/0x8e0
+     path_lookupat.isra.0+0x69/0x4d0
+     filename_lookup+0x136/0x280
+     user_path_at_empty+0x47/0x60
+     do_faccessat+0x11a/0x390
+     __x64_sys_access+0x3c/0x50
+     do_syscall_64+0x85/0x260
+     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
+
+    Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
+    CPU: 6 PID: 166 Comm: systemd-journal Not tainted 5.3.0-rc7+ #1
+    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
+    ==================================================================
+
+The header of the report provides a short summary of the functions involved in
+the race. It is followed by the access types and stack traces of the 2 threads
+involved in the data race.
+
+The other less common type of data race report looks like this::
+
+    ==================================================================
+    BUG: KCSAN: data-race in e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x551/0xb10
+
+    race at unknown origin, with read to 0xffff933db8a2ae6c of 1 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:
+     e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x551/0xb10
+     e1000_clean+0x533/0xda0
+     net_rx_action+0x329/0x900
+     __do_softirq+0xdb/0x2db
+     irq_exit+0x9b/0xa0
+     do_IRQ+0x9c/0xf0
+     ret_from_intr+0x0/0x18
+     default_idle+0x3f/0x220
+     arch_cpu_idle+0x21/0x30
+     do_idle+0x1df/0x230
+     cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20
+     rest_init+0xc5/0xcb
+     arch_call_rest_init+0x13/0x2b
+     start_kernel+0x6db/0x700
+
+    Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
+    CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc7+ #2
+    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
+    ==================================================================
+
+This report is generated where it was not possible to determine the other
+racing thread, but a race was inferred due to the data value of the watched
+memory location having changed. These can occur either due to missing
+instrumentation or e.g. DMA accesses.
+
+Selective analysis
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+To disable KCSAN data race detection for an entire subsystem, add to the
+respective ``Makefile``::
+
+    KCSAN_SANITIZE := n
+
+To disable KCSAN on a per-file basis, add to the ``Makefile``::
+
+    KCSAN_SANITIZE_file.o := n
+
+KCSAN also understands the ``data_race(expr)`` annotation, which tells KCSAN
+that any data races due to accesses in ``expr`` should be ignored and resulting
+behaviour when encountering a data race is deemed safe.
+
+debugfs
+~~~~~~~
+
+* The file ``/sys/kernel/debug/kcsan`` can be read to get stats.
+
+* KCSAN can be turned on or off by writing ``on`` or ``off`` to
+  ``/sys/kernel/debug/kcsan``.
+
+* Writing ``!some_func_name`` to ``/sys/kernel/debug/kcsan`` adds
+  ``some_func_name`` to the report filter list, which (by default) blacklists
+  reporting data races where either one of the top stackframes are a function
+  in the list.
+
+* Writing either ``blacklist`` or ``whitelist`` to ``/sys/kernel/debug/kcsan``
+  changes the report filtering behaviour. For example, the blacklist feature
+  can be used to silence frequently occurring data races; the whitelist feature
+  can help with reproduction and testing of fixes.
+
+Data Races
+----------
+
+Informally, two operations *conflict* if they access the same memory location,
+and at least one of them is a write operation. In an execution, two memory
+operations from different threads form a **data race** if they *conflict*, at
+least one of them is a *plain access* (non-atomic), and they are *unordered* in
+the "happens-before" order according to the `LKMM
+<../../tools/memory-model/Documentation/explanation.txt>`_.
+
+Relationship with the Linux Kernel Memory Model (LKMM)
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The LKMM defines the propagation and ordering rules of various memory
+operations, which gives developers the ability to reason about concurrent code.
+Ultimately this allows to determine the possible executions of concurrent code,
+and if that code is free from data races.
+
+KCSAN is aware of *atomic* accesses (``READ_ONCE``, ``WRITE_ONCE``,
+``atomic_*``, etc.), but is oblivious of any ordering guarantees. In other
+words, KCSAN assumes that as long as a plain access is not observed to race
+with another conflicting access, memory operations are correctly ordered.
+
+This means that KCSAN will not report *potential* data races due to missing
+memory ordering. If, however, missing memory ordering (that is observable with
+a particular compiler and architecture) leads to an observable data race (e.g.
+entering a critical section erroneously), KCSAN would report the resulting
+data race.
+
+Race conditions vs. data races
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Race conditions are logic bugs, where unexpected interleaving of racing
+concurrent operations result in an erroneous state.
+
+Data races on the other hand are defined at the *memory model/language level*.
+Many data races are also harmful race conditions, which a tool like KCSAN
+reports!  However, not all data races are race conditions and vice-versa.
+KCSAN's intent is to report data races according to the LKMM. A data race
+detector can only work at the memory model/language level.
+
+Deeper analysis, to find high-level race conditions only, requires conveying
+the intended kernel logic to a tool. This requires (1) the developer writing a
+specification or model of their code, and then (2) the tool verifying that the
+implementation matches. This has been done for small bits of code using model
+checkers and other formal methods, but does not scale to the level of what can
+be covered with a dynamic analysis based data race detector such as KCSAN.
+
+For reasons outlined in this `article <https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/>`_,
+data races can be much more subtle, but can cause no less harm than high-level
+race conditions.
+
+Implementation Details
+----------------------
+
+The general approach is inspired by `DataCollider
+<http://usenix.org/legacy/events/osdi10/tech/full_papers/Erickson.pdf>`_.
+Unlike DataCollider, KCSAN does not use hardware watchpoints, but instead
+relies on compiler instrumentation. Watchpoints are implemented using an
+efficient encoding that stores access type, size, and address in a long; the
+benefits of using "soft watchpoints" are portability and greater flexibility in
+limiting which accesses trigger a watchpoint.
+
+More specifically, KCSAN requires instrumenting plain (unmarked, non-atomic)
+memory operations; for each instrumented plain access:
+
+1. Check if a matching watchpoint exists; if yes, and at least one access is a
+   write, then we encountered a racing access.
+
+2. Periodically, if no matching watchpoint exists, set up a watchpoint and
+   stall for a small delay.
+
+3. Also check the data value before the delay, and re-check the data value
+   after delay; if the values mismatch, we infer a race of unknown origin.
+
+To detect data races between plain and atomic memory operations, KCSAN also
+annotates atomic accesses, but only to check if a watchpoint exists
+(``kcsan_check_atomic_*``); i.e.  KCSAN never sets up a watchpoint on atomic
+accesses.
+
+Key Properties
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+1. **Memory Overhead:**  The current implementation uses a small array of longs
+   to encode watchpoint information, which is negligible.
+
+2. **Performance Overhead:** KCSAN's runtime aims to be minimal, using an
+   efficient watchpoint encoding that does not require acquiring any shared
+   locks in the fast-path. For kernel boot on a system with 8 CPUs:
+
+   - 5.0x slow-down with the default KCSAN config;
+   - 2.8x slow-down from runtime fast-path overhead only (set very large
+     ``KCSAN_SKIP_WATCH`` and unset ``KCSAN_SKIP_WATCH_RANDOMIZE``).
+
+3. **Annotation Overheads:** Minimal annotations are required outside the KCSAN
+   runtime. As a result, maintenance overheads are minimal as the kernel
+   evolves.
+
+4. **Detects Racy Writes from Devices:** Due to checking data values upon
+   setting up watchpoints, racy writes from devices can also be detected.
+
+5. **Memory Ordering:** KCSAN is *not* explicitly aware of the LKMM's ordering
+   rules; this may result in missed data races (false negatives).
+
+6. **Analysis Accuracy:** For observed executions, due to using a sampling
+   strategy, the analysis is *unsound* (false negatives possible), but aims to
+   be complete (no false positives).
+
+Alternatives Considered
+-----------------------
+
+An alternative data race detection approach for the kernel can be found in
+`Kernel Thread Sanitizer (KTSAN) <https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki>`_.
+KTSAN is a happens-before data race detector, which explicitly establishes the
+happens-before order between memory operations, which can then be used to
+determine data races as defined in `Data Races`_. To build a correct
+happens-before relation, KTSAN must be aware of all ordering rules of the LKMM
+and synchronization primitives. Unfortunately, any omission leads to false
+positives, which is especially important in the context of the kernel which
+includes numerous custom synchronization mechanisms. Furthermore, KTSAN's
+implementation requires metadata for each memory location (shadow memory);
+currently, for each page, KTSAN requires 4 pages of shadow memory.
-- 
2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 04/10] objtool, kcsan: Add KCSAN runtime functions to whitelist
  2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] kcsan: Add Documentation entry in dev-tools Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-14 18:02 ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] build, kcsan: Add KCSAN build exceptions Marco Elver
                   ` (8 subsequent siblings)
  12 siblings, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-14 18:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

This patch adds KCSAN runtime functions to the objtool whitelist.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
---
v3:
* Add missing instrumentation functions.
* Use new function names of refactored core runtime.
---
 tools/objtool/check.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index 044c9a3cb247..e022a9a00ca1 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -466,6 +466,24 @@ static const char *uaccess_safe_builtin[] = {
 	"__asan_report_store4_noabort",
 	"__asan_report_store8_noabort",
 	"__asan_report_store16_noabort",
+	/* KCSAN */
+	"kcsan_found_watchpoint",
+	"kcsan_setup_watchpoint",
+	/* KCSAN/TSAN */
+	"__tsan_func_entry",
+	"__tsan_func_exit",
+	"__tsan_read_range",
+	"__tsan_write_range",
+	"__tsan_read1",
+	"__tsan_read2",
+	"__tsan_read4",
+	"__tsan_read8",
+	"__tsan_read16",
+	"__tsan_write1",
+	"__tsan_write2",
+	"__tsan_write4",
+	"__tsan_write8",
+	"__tsan_write16",
 	/* KCOV */
 	"write_comp_data",
 	"__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc",
-- 
2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 05/10] build, kcsan: Add KCSAN build exceptions
  2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] objtool, kcsan: Add KCSAN runtime functions to whitelist Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-14 18:02 ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] seqlock, kcsan: Add annotations for KCSAN Marco Elver
                   ` (7 subsequent siblings)
  12 siblings, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-14 18:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

This blacklists several compilation units from KCSAN. See the respective
inline comments for the reasoning.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
---
v3:
* Moved EFI stub build exception hunk from x86-specific patch, since
  it's not x86-specific.
* Spelling "data-race" -> "data race".
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 2 ++
 kernel/Makefile                       | 5 +++++
 kernel/sched/Makefile                 | 6 ++++++
 mm/Makefile                           | 8 ++++++++
 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index ee0661ddb25b..5d0a645c0de8 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -31,7 +31,9 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS			:= $(cflags-y) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \
 				   -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS
 
 GCOV_PROFILE			:= n
+# Sanitizer runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked here.
 KASAN_SANITIZE			:= n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE			:= n
 UBSAN_SANITIZE			:= n
 OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD	:= y
 
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 74ab46e2ebd1..cc53f7c25446 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ endif
 # Prevents flicker of uninteresting __do_softirq()/__local_bh_disable_ip()
 # in coverage traces.
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_softirq.o := n
+# Avoid KCSAN instrumentation in softirq ("No shared variables, all the data
+# are CPU local" => assume no data races), to reduce overhead in interrupts.
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_softirq.o = n
 # These are called from save_stack_trace() on slub debug path,
 # and produce insane amounts of uninteresting coverage.
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_module.o := n
@@ -30,6 +33,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_extable.o := n
 # Don't self-instrument.
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_kcov.o := n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
 CFLAGS_kcov.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-conserve-stack -fno-stack-protector)
 
 # cond_syscall is currently not LTO compatible
@@ -118,6 +122,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_RSEQ) += rseq.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += stackleak.o
 KASAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o := n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o := n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_stackleak.o := n
 
 $(obj)/configs.o: $(obj)/config_data.gz
diff --git a/kernel/sched/Makefile b/kernel/sched/Makefile
index 21fb5a5662b5..e9307a9c54e7 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/sched/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@ endif
 # that is not a function of syscall inputs. E.g. involuntary context switches.
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
 
+# There are numerous races here, however, most of them due to plain accesses.
+# This would make it even harder for syzbot to find reproducers, because these
+# bugs trigger without specific input. Disable by default, but should re-enable
+# eventually.
+KCSAN_SANITIZE := n
+
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_SCHED_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER),y)
 # According to Alan Modra <alan@linuxcare.com.au>, the -fno-omit-frame-pointer is
 # needed for x86 only.  Why this used to be enabled for all architectures is beyond
diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
index d996846697ef..56c1964bb3a1 100644
--- a/mm/Makefile
+++ b/mm/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,14 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_slab_common.o := n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_slab.o := n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_slub.o := n
 
+# These produce frequent data race reports: most of them are due to races on
+# the same word but accesses to different bits of that word. Re-enable KCSAN
+# for these when we have more consensus on what to do about them.
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_slab_common.o := n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_slab.o := n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_slub.o := n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_page_alloc.o := n
+
 # These files are disabled because they produce non-interesting and/or
 # flaky coverage that is not a function of syscall inputs. E.g. slab is out of
 # free pages, or a task is migrated between nodes.
-- 
2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 06/10] seqlock, kcsan: Add annotations for KCSAN
  2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
                   ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] build, kcsan: Add KCSAN build exceptions Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-14 18:02 ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] seqlock: Require WRITE_ONCE surrounding raw_seqcount_barrier Marco Elver
                   ` (6 subsequent siblings)
  12 siblings, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-14 18:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

Since seqlocks in the Linux kernel do not require the use of marked
atomic accesses in critical sections, we teach KCSAN to assume such
accesses are atomic. KCSAN currently also pretends that writes to
`sequence` are atomic, although currently plain writes are used (their
corresponding reads are READ_ONCE).

Further, to avoid false positives in the absence of clear ending of a
seqlock reader critical section (only when using the raw interface),
KCSAN assumes a fixed number of accesses after start of a seqlock
critical section are atomic.

=== Commentary on design around absence of clear begin/end markings ===
Seqlock usage via seqlock_t follows a predictable usage pattern, where
clear critical section begin/end is enforced. With subtle special cases
for readers needing to be flat atomic regions, e.g. because usage such
as in:
  - fs/namespace.c:__legitimize_mnt - unbalanced read_seqretry
  - fs/dcache.c:d_walk - unbalanced need_seqretry

But, anything directly accessing seqcount_t seems to be unpredictable.
Filtering for usage of read_seqcount_retry not following 'do { .. }
while (read_seqcount_retry(..));':

  $ git grep 'read_seqcount_retry' | grep -Ev 'while \(|seqlock.h|Doc|\* '
  => about 1/3 of the total read_seqcount_retry usage.

Just looking at fs/namei.c, we conclude that it is non-trivial to
prescribe and migrate to an interface that would force clear begin/end
seqlock markings for critical sections.

As such, we concluded that the best design currently, is to simply
ensure that KCSAN works well with the existing code.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
---
v3:
* Remove comment from raw_seqcount_barrier that should have been in next
  patch.
* Renamed kcsan_{nestable,flat}_atomic_{begin,end}
* Elaborate why clear begin/end cannot be enforced easily.
---
 include/linux/seqlock.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/seqlock.h b/include/linux/seqlock.h
index bcf4cf26b8c8..61232bc223fd 100644
--- a/include/linux/seqlock.h
+++ b/include/linux/seqlock.h
@@ -37,8 +37,24 @@
 #include <linux/preempt.h>
 #include <linux/lockdep.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/kcsan.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 
+/*
+ * The seqlock interface does not prescribe a precise sequence of read
+ * begin/retry/end. For readers, typically there is a call to
+ * read_seqcount_begin() and read_seqcount_retry(), however, there are more
+ * esoteric cases which do not follow this pattern.
+ *
+ * As a consequence, we take the following best-effort approach for raw usage
+ * via seqcount_t under KCSAN: upon beginning a seq-reader critical section,
+ * pessimistically mark then next KCSAN_SEQLOCK_REGION_MAX memory accesses as
+ * atomics; if there is a matching read_seqcount_retry() call, no following
+ * memory operations are considered atomic. Usage of seqlocks via seqlock_t
+ * interface is not affected.
+ */
+#define KCSAN_SEQLOCK_REGION_MAX 1000
+
 /*
  * Version using sequence counter only.
  * This can be used when code has its own mutex protecting the
@@ -115,6 +131,7 @@ static inline unsigned __read_seqcount_begin(const seqcount_t *s)
 		cpu_relax();
 		goto repeat;
 	}
+	kcsan_atomic_next(KCSAN_SEQLOCK_REGION_MAX);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -131,6 +148,7 @@ static inline unsigned raw_read_seqcount(const seqcount_t *s)
 {
 	unsigned ret = READ_ONCE(s->sequence);
 	smp_rmb();
+	kcsan_atomic_next(KCSAN_SEQLOCK_REGION_MAX);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -183,6 +201,7 @@ static inline unsigned raw_seqcount_begin(const seqcount_t *s)
 {
 	unsigned ret = READ_ONCE(s->sequence);
 	smp_rmb();
+	kcsan_atomic_next(KCSAN_SEQLOCK_REGION_MAX);
 	return ret & ~1;
 }
 
@@ -202,7 +221,8 @@ static inline unsigned raw_seqcount_begin(const seqcount_t *s)
  */
 static inline int __read_seqcount_retry(const seqcount_t *s, unsigned start)
 {
-	return unlikely(s->sequence != start);
+	kcsan_atomic_next(0);
+	return unlikely(READ_ONCE(s->sequence) != start);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -225,6 +245,7 @@ static inline int read_seqcount_retry(const seqcount_t *s, unsigned start)
 
 static inline void raw_write_seqcount_begin(seqcount_t *s)
 {
+	kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin();
 	s->sequence++;
 	smp_wmb();
 }
@@ -233,6 +254,7 @@ static inline void raw_write_seqcount_end(seqcount_t *s)
 {
 	smp_wmb();
 	s->sequence++;
+	kcsan_nestable_atomic_end();
 }
 
 /**
@@ -271,9 +293,11 @@ static inline void raw_write_seqcount_end(seqcount_t *s)
  */
 static inline void raw_write_seqcount_barrier(seqcount_t *s)
 {
+	kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin();
 	s->sequence++;
 	smp_wmb();
 	s->sequence++;
+	kcsan_nestable_atomic_end();
 }
 
 static inline int raw_read_seqcount_latch(seqcount_t *s)
@@ -398,7 +422,9 @@ static inline void write_seqcount_end(seqcount_t *s)
 static inline void write_seqcount_invalidate(seqcount_t *s)
 {
 	smp_wmb();
+	kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin();
 	s->sequence+=2;
+	kcsan_nestable_atomic_end();
 }
 
 typedef struct {
@@ -430,11 +456,21 @@ typedef struct {
  */
 static inline unsigned read_seqbegin(const seqlock_t *sl)
 {
-	return read_seqcount_begin(&sl->seqcount);
+	unsigned ret = read_seqcount_begin(&sl->seqcount);
+
+	kcsan_atomic_next(0);  /* non-raw usage, assume closing read_seqretry */
+	kcsan_flat_atomic_begin();
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static inline unsigned read_seqretry(const seqlock_t *sl, unsigned start)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Assume not nested: read_seqretry may be called multiple times when
+	 * completing read critical section.
+	 */
+	kcsan_flat_atomic_end();
+
 	return read_seqcount_retry(&sl->seqcount, start);
 }
 
-- 
2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 07/10] seqlock: Require WRITE_ONCE surrounding raw_seqcount_barrier
  2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
                   ` (5 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] seqlock, kcsan: Add annotations for KCSAN Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-14 18:03 ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation for bitops Marco Elver
                   ` (5 subsequent siblings)
  12 siblings, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-14 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

This patch proposes to require marked atomic accesses surrounding
raw_write_seqcount_barrier. We reason that otherwise there is no way to
guarantee propagation nor atomicity of writes before/after the barrier
[1]. For example, consider the compiler tears stores either before or
after the barrier; in this case, readers may observe a partial value,
and because readers are unaware that writes are going on (writes are not
in a seq-writer critical section), will complete the seq-reader critical
section while having observed some partial state.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/

This came up when designing and implementing KCSAN, because KCSAN would
flag these accesses as data-races. After careful analysis, our reasoning
as above led us to conclude that the best thing to do is to propose an
amendment to the raw_seqcount_barrier usage.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
---
v3:
* Add missing comment that was in preceding seqlock patch.
---
 include/linux/seqlock.h | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/seqlock.h b/include/linux/seqlock.h
index 61232bc223fd..f52c91be8939 100644
--- a/include/linux/seqlock.h
+++ b/include/linux/seqlock.h
@@ -265,6 +265,13 @@ static inline void raw_write_seqcount_end(seqcount_t *s)
  * usual consistency guarantee. It is one wmb cheaper, because we can
  * collapse the two back-to-back wmb()s.
  *
+ * Note that, writes surrounding the barrier should be declared atomic (e.g.
+ * via WRITE_ONCE): a) to ensure the writes become visible to other threads
+ * atomically, avoiding compiler optimizations; b) to document which writes are
+ * meant to propagate to the reader critical section. This is necessary because
+ * neither writes before and after the barrier are enclosed in a seq-writer
+ * critical section that would ensure readers are aware of ongoing writes.
+ *
  *      seqcount_t seq;
  *      bool X = true, Y = false;
  *
@@ -284,11 +291,11 @@ static inline void raw_write_seqcount_end(seqcount_t *s)
  *
  *      void write(void)
  *      {
- *              Y = true;
+ *              WRITE_ONCE(Y, true);
  *
  *              raw_write_seqcount_barrier(seq);
  *
- *              X = false;
+ *              WRITE_ONCE(X, false);
  *      }
  */
 static inline void raw_write_seqcount_barrier(seqcount_t *s)
-- 
2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 08/10] asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation for bitops
  2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
                   ` (6 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] seqlock: Require WRITE_ONCE surrounding raw_seqcount_barrier Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-14 18:03 ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-15 11:55   ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] locking/atomics, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation Marco Elver
                   ` (4 subsequent siblings)
  12 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-14 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

Add explicit KCSAN checks for bitops.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
---
v2:
* Use kcsan_check{,_atomic}_{read,write} instead of
  kcsan_check_{access,atomic}.
---
 include/asm-generic/bitops-instrumented.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/asm-generic/bitops-instrumented.h b/include/asm-generic/bitops-instrumented.h
index ddd1c6d9d8db..864d707cdb87 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/bitops-instrumented.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/bitops-instrumented.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #define _ASM_GENERIC_BITOPS_INSTRUMENTED_H
 
 #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/kcsan-checks.h>
 
 /**
  * set_bit - Atomically set a bit in memory
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@
 static inline void set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch_set_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -41,6 +43,7 @@ static inline void set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline void __set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch___set_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -54,6 +57,7 @@ static inline void __set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline void clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch_clear_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -69,6 +73,7 @@ static inline void clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline void __clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch___clear_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -82,6 +87,7 @@ static inline void __clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline void clear_bit_unlock(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch_clear_bit_unlock(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -97,6 +103,7 @@ static inline void clear_bit_unlock(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline void __clear_bit_unlock(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch___clear_bit_unlock(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -113,6 +120,7 @@ static inline void __clear_bit_unlock(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline void change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch_change_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -128,6 +136,7 @@ static inline void change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline void __change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch___change_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -141,6 +150,7 @@ static inline void __change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool test_and_set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch_test_and_set_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -155,6 +165,7 @@ static inline bool test_and_set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool __test_and_set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch___test_and_set_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -170,6 +181,7 @@ static inline bool __test_and_set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool test_and_set_bit_lock(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch_test_and_set_bit_lock(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -183,6 +195,7 @@ static inline bool test_and_set_bit_lock(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool test_and_clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch_test_and_clear_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -197,6 +210,7 @@ static inline bool test_and_clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool __test_and_clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch___test_and_clear_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -210,6 +224,7 @@ static inline bool __test_and_clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool test_and_change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch_test_and_change_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -224,6 +239,7 @@ static inline bool test_and_change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool __test_and_change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch___test_and_change_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -235,6 +251,7 @@ static inline bool __test_and_change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool test_bit(long nr, const volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_read(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_read(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch_test_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -254,6 +271,7 @@ static inline bool
 clear_bit_unlock_is_negative_byte(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch_clear_bit_unlock_is_negative_byte(nr, addr);
 }
 /* Let everybody know we have it. */
-- 
2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 09/10] locking/atomics, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation
  2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
                   ` (7 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation for bitops Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-14 18:03 ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] x86, kcsan: Enable KCSAN for x86 Marco Elver
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  12 siblings, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-14 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

This adds KCSAN instrumentation to atomic-instrumented.h.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
---
v2:
* Use kcsan_check{,_atomic}_{read,write} instead of
  kcsan_check_{access,atomic}.
* Introduce __atomic_check_{read,write} [Suggested by Mark Rutland].
---
 include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h | 393 +++++++++++-----------
 scripts/atomic/gen-atomic-instrumented.sh |  17 +-
 2 files changed, 218 insertions(+), 192 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h b/include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h
index e8730c6b9fe2..3dc0f38544f6 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h
@@ -19,11 +19,24 @@
 
 #include <linux/build_bug.h>
 #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/kcsan-checks.h>
+
+static inline void __atomic_check_read(const volatile void *v, size_t size)
+{
+	kasan_check_read(v, size);
+	kcsan_check_atomic_read(v, size);
+}
+
+static inline void __atomic_check_write(const volatile void *v, size_t size)
+{
+	kasan_check_write(v, size);
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(v, size);
+}
 
 static inline int
 atomic_read(const atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_read(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_read(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_read(v);
 }
 #define atomic_read atomic_read
@@ -32,7 +45,7 @@ atomic_read(const atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_read_acquire(const atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_read(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_read(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_read_acquire(v);
 }
 #define atomic_read_acquire atomic_read_acquire
@@ -41,7 +54,7 @@ atomic_read_acquire(const atomic_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic_set(atomic_t *v, int i)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic_set(v, i);
 }
 #define atomic_set atomic_set
@@ -50,7 +63,7 @@ atomic_set(atomic_t *v, int i)
 static inline void
 atomic_set_release(atomic_t *v, int i)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic_set_release(v, i);
 }
 #define atomic_set_release atomic_set_release
@@ -59,7 +72,7 @@ atomic_set_release(atomic_t *v, int i)
 static inline void
 atomic_add(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic_add(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_add atomic_add
@@ -68,7 +81,7 @@ atomic_add(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_add_return(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_add_return(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_add_return atomic_add_return
@@ -78,7 +91,7 @@ atomic_add_return(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_add_return_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_add_return_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_add_return_acquire atomic_add_return_acquire
@@ -88,7 +101,7 @@ atomic_add_return_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_add_return_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_add_return_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_add_return_release atomic_add_return_release
@@ -98,7 +111,7 @@ atomic_add_return_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_add_return_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_add_return_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_add_return_relaxed atomic_add_return_relaxed
@@ -108,7 +121,7 @@ atomic_add_return_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_add(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_add(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_add atomic_fetch_add
@@ -118,7 +131,7 @@ atomic_fetch_add(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_add_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_add_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_add_acquire atomic_fetch_add_acquire
@@ -128,7 +141,7 @@ atomic_fetch_add_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_add_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_add_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_add_release atomic_fetch_add_release
@@ -138,7 +151,7 @@ atomic_fetch_add_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_add_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_add_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_add_relaxed atomic_fetch_add_relaxed
@@ -147,7 +160,7 @@ atomic_fetch_add_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic_sub(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic_sub(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_sub atomic_sub
@@ -156,7 +169,7 @@ atomic_sub(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_sub_return(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_sub_return(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_sub_return atomic_sub_return
@@ -166,7 +179,7 @@ atomic_sub_return(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_sub_return_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_sub_return_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_sub_return_acquire atomic_sub_return_acquire
@@ -176,7 +189,7 @@ atomic_sub_return_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_sub_return_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_sub_return_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_sub_return_release atomic_sub_return_release
@@ -186,7 +199,7 @@ atomic_sub_return_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_sub_return_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_sub_return_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_sub_return_relaxed atomic_sub_return_relaxed
@@ -196,7 +209,7 @@ atomic_sub_return_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_sub(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_sub(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_sub atomic_fetch_sub
@@ -206,7 +219,7 @@ atomic_fetch_sub(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_sub_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_sub_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_sub_acquire atomic_fetch_sub_acquire
@@ -216,7 +229,7 @@ atomic_fetch_sub_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_sub_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_sub_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_sub_release atomic_fetch_sub_release
@@ -226,7 +239,7 @@ atomic_fetch_sub_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_sub_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_sub_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_sub_relaxed atomic_fetch_sub_relaxed
@@ -236,7 +249,7 @@ atomic_fetch_sub_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic_inc(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic_inc(v);
 }
 #define atomic_inc atomic_inc
@@ -246,7 +259,7 @@ atomic_inc(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_inc_return(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_inc_return(v);
 }
 #define atomic_inc_return atomic_inc_return
@@ -256,7 +269,7 @@ atomic_inc_return(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_inc_return_acquire(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_inc_return_acquire(v);
 }
 #define atomic_inc_return_acquire atomic_inc_return_acquire
@@ -266,7 +279,7 @@ atomic_inc_return_acquire(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_inc_return_release(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_inc_return_release(v);
 }
 #define atomic_inc_return_release atomic_inc_return_release
@@ -276,7 +289,7 @@ atomic_inc_return_release(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_inc_return_relaxed(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_inc_return_relaxed(v);
 }
 #define atomic_inc_return_relaxed atomic_inc_return_relaxed
@@ -286,7 +299,7 @@ atomic_inc_return_relaxed(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_inc(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_inc(v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_inc atomic_fetch_inc
@@ -296,7 +309,7 @@ atomic_fetch_inc(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_inc_acquire(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_inc_acquire(v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_inc_acquire atomic_fetch_inc_acquire
@@ -306,7 +319,7 @@ atomic_fetch_inc_acquire(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_inc_release(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_inc_release(v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_inc_release atomic_fetch_inc_release
@@ -316,7 +329,7 @@ atomic_fetch_inc_release(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_inc_relaxed(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_inc_relaxed(v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_inc_relaxed atomic_fetch_inc_relaxed
@@ -326,7 +339,7 @@ atomic_fetch_inc_relaxed(atomic_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic_dec(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic_dec(v);
 }
 #define atomic_dec atomic_dec
@@ -336,7 +349,7 @@ atomic_dec(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_dec_return(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_dec_return(v);
 }
 #define atomic_dec_return atomic_dec_return
@@ -346,7 +359,7 @@ atomic_dec_return(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_dec_return_acquire(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_dec_return_acquire(v);
 }
 #define atomic_dec_return_acquire atomic_dec_return_acquire
@@ -356,7 +369,7 @@ atomic_dec_return_acquire(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_dec_return_release(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_dec_return_release(v);
 }
 #define atomic_dec_return_release atomic_dec_return_release
@@ -366,7 +379,7 @@ atomic_dec_return_release(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_dec_return_relaxed(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_dec_return_relaxed(v);
 }
 #define atomic_dec_return_relaxed atomic_dec_return_relaxed
@@ -376,7 +389,7 @@ atomic_dec_return_relaxed(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_dec(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_dec(v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_dec atomic_fetch_dec
@@ -386,7 +399,7 @@ atomic_fetch_dec(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_dec_acquire(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_dec_acquire(v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_dec_acquire atomic_fetch_dec_acquire
@@ -396,7 +409,7 @@ atomic_fetch_dec_acquire(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_dec_release(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_dec_release(v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_dec_release atomic_fetch_dec_release
@@ -406,7 +419,7 @@ atomic_fetch_dec_release(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_dec_relaxed(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_dec_relaxed(v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_dec_relaxed atomic_fetch_dec_relaxed
@@ -415,7 +428,7 @@ atomic_fetch_dec_relaxed(atomic_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic_and(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic_and(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_and atomic_and
@@ -424,7 +437,7 @@ atomic_and(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_and(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_and(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_and atomic_fetch_and
@@ -434,7 +447,7 @@ atomic_fetch_and(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_and_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_and_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_and_acquire atomic_fetch_and_acquire
@@ -444,7 +457,7 @@ atomic_fetch_and_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_and_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_and_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_and_release atomic_fetch_and_release
@@ -454,7 +467,7 @@ atomic_fetch_and_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_and_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_and_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_and_relaxed atomic_fetch_and_relaxed
@@ -464,7 +477,7 @@ atomic_fetch_and_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic_andnot(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic_andnot(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_andnot atomic_andnot
@@ -474,7 +487,7 @@ atomic_andnot(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_andnot(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_andnot(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_andnot atomic_fetch_andnot
@@ -484,7 +497,7 @@ atomic_fetch_andnot(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_andnot_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_andnot_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_andnot_acquire atomic_fetch_andnot_acquire
@@ -494,7 +507,7 @@ atomic_fetch_andnot_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_andnot_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_andnot_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_andnot_release atomic_fetch_andnot_release
@@ -504,7 +517,7 @@ atomic_fetch_andnot_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_andnot_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_andnot_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_andnot_relaxed atomic_fetch_andnot_relaxed
@@ -513,7 +526,7 @@ atomic_fetch_andnot_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic_or(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic_or(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_or atomic_or
@@ -522,7 +535,7 @@ atomic_or(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_or(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_or(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_or atomic_fetch_or
@@ -532,7 +545,7 @@ atomic_fetch_or(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_or_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_or_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_or_acquire atomic_fetch_or_acquire
@@ -542,7 +555,7 @@ atomic_fetch_or_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_or_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_or_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_or_release atomic_fetch_or_release
@@ -552,7 +565,7 @@ atomic_fetch_or_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_or_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_or_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_or_relaxed atomic_fetch_or_relaxed
@@ -561,7 +574,7 @@ atomic_fetch_or_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic_xor(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic_xor(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_xor atomic_xor
@@ -570,7 +583,7 @@ atomic_xor(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_xor(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_xor(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_xor atomic_fetch_xor
@@ -580,7 +593,7 @@ atomic_fetch_xor(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_xor_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_xor_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_xor_acquire atomic_fetch_xor_acquire
@@ -590,7 +603,7 @@ atomic_fetch_xor_acquire(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_xor_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_xor_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_xor_release atomic_fetch_xor_release
@@ -600,7 +613,7 @@ atomic_fetch_xor_release(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_xor_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_xor_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_xor_relaxed atomic_fetch_xor_relaxed
@@ -610,7 +623,7 @@ atomic_fetch_xor_relaxed(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_xchg(atomic_t *v, int i)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_xchg(v, i);
 }
 #define atomic_xchg atomic_xchg
@@ -620,7 +633,7 @@ atomic_xchg(atomic_t *v, int i)
 static inline int
 atomic_xchg_acquire(atomic_t *v, int i)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_xchg_acquire(v, i);
 }
 #define atomic_xchg_acquire atomic_xchg_acquire
@@ -630,7 +643,7 @@ atomic_xchg_acquire(atomic_t *v, int i)
 static inline int
 atomic_xchg_release(atomic_t *v, int i)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_xchg_release(v, i);
 }
 #define atomic_xchg_release atomic_xchg_release
@@ -640,7 +653,7 @@ atomic_xchg_release(atomic_t *v, int i)
 static inline int
 atomic_xchg_relaxed(atomic_t *v, int i)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_xchg_relaxed(v, i);
 }
 #define atomic_xchg_relaxed atomic_xchg_relaxed
@@ -650,7 +663,7 @@ atomic_xchg_relaxed(atomic_t *v, int i)
 static inline int
 atomic_cmpxchg(atomic_t *v, int old, int new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_cmpxchg(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic_cmpxchg atomic_cmpxchg
@@ -660,7 +673,7 @@ atomic_cmpxchg(atomic_t *v, int old, int new)
 static inline int
 atomic_cmpxchg_acquire(atomic_t *v, int old, int new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_cmpxchg_acquire(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic_cmpxchg_acquire atomic_cmpxchg_acquire
@@ -670,7 +683,7 @@ atomic_cmpxchg_acquire(atomic_t *v, int old, int new)
 static inline int
 atomic_cmpxchg_release(atomic_t *v, int old, int new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_cmpxchg_release(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic_cmpxchg_release atomic_cmpxchg_release
@@ -680,7 +693,7 @@ atomic_cmpxchg_release(atomic_t *v, int old, int new)
 static inline int
 atomic_cmpxchg_relaxed(atomic_t *v, int old, int new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_cmpxchg_relaxed(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic_cmpxchg_relaxed atomic_cmpxchg_relaxed
@@ -690,8 +703,8 @@ atomic_cmpxchg_relaxed(atomic_t *v, int old, int new)
 static inline bool
 atomic_try_cmpxchg(atomic_t *v, int *old, int new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
-	kasan_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
 	return arch_atomic_try_cmpxchg(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic_try_cmpxchg atomic_try_cmpxchg
@@ -701,8 +714,8 @@ atomic_try_cmpxchg(atomic_t *v, int *old, int new)
 static inline bool
 atomic_try_cmpxchg_acquire(atomic_t *v, int *old, int new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
-	kasan_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
 	return arch_atomic_try_cmpxchg_acquire(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic_try_cmpxchg_acquire atomic_try_cmpxchg_acquire
@@ -712,8 +725,8 @@ atomic_try_cmpxchg_acquire(atomic_t *v, int *old, int new)
 static inline bool
 atomic_try_cmpxchg_release(atomic_t *v, int *old, int new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
-	kasan_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
 	return arch_atomic_try_cmpxchg_release(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic_try_cmpxchg_release atomic_try_cmpxchg_release
@@ -723,8 +736,8 @@ atomic_try_cmpxchg_release(atomic_t *v, int *old, int new)
 static inline bool
 atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(atomic_t *v, int *old, int new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
-	kasan_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
 	return arch_atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed
@@ -734,7 +747,7 @@ atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(atomic_t *v, int *old, int new)
 static inline bool
 atomic_sub_and_test(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_sub_and_test(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_sub_and_test atomic_sub_and_test
@@ -744,7 +757,7 @@ atomic_sub_and_test(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline bool
 atomic_dec_and_test(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_dec_and_test(v);
 }
 #define atomic_dec_and_test atomic_dec_and_test
@@ -754,7 +767,7 @@ atomic_dec_and_test(atomic_t *v)
 static inline bool
 atomic_inc_and_test(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_inc_and_test(v);
 }
 #define atomic_inc_and_test atomic_inc_and_test
@@ -764,7 +777,7 @@ atomic_inc_and_test(atomic_t *v)
 static inline bool
 atomic_add_negative(int i, atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_add_negative(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic_add_negative atomic_add_negative
@@ -774,7 +787,7 @@ atomic_add_negative(int i, atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_fetch_add_unless(atomic_t *v, int a, int u)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_fetch_add_unless(v, a, u);
 }
 #define atomic_fetch_add_unless atomic_fetch_add_unless
@@ -784,7 +797,7 @@ atomic_fetch_add_unless(atomic_t *v, int a, int u)
 static inline bool
 atomic_add_unless(atomic_t *v, int a, int u)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_add_unless(v, a, u);
 }
 #define atomic_add_unless atomic_add_unless
@@ -794,7 +807,7 @@ atomic_add_unless(atomic_t *v, int a, int u)
 static inline bool
 atomic_inc_not_zero(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_inc_not_zero(v);
 }
 #define atomic_inc_not_zero atomic_inc_not_zero
@@ -804,7 +817,7 @@ atomic_inc_not_zero(atomic_t *v)
 static inline bool
 atomic_inc_unless_negative(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_inc_unless_negative(v);
 }
 #define atomic_inc_unless_negative atomic_inc_unless_negative
@@ -814,7 +827,7 @@ atomic_inc_unless_negative(atomic_t *v)
 static inline bool
 atomic_dec_unless_positive(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_dec_unless_positive(v);
 }
 #define atomic_dec_unless_positive atomic_dec_unless_positive
@@ -824,7 +837,7 @@ atomic_dec_unless_positive(atomic_t *v)
 static inline int
 atomic_dec_if_positive(atomic_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic_dec_if_positive(v);
 }
 #define atomic_dec_if_positive atomic_dec_if_positive
@@ -833,7 +846,7 @@ atomic_dec_if_positive(atomic_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_read(const atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_read(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_read(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_read(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_read atomic64_read
@@ -842,7 +855,7 @@ atomic64_read(const atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_read_acquire(const atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_read(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_read(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_read_acquire(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_read_acquire atomic64_read_acquire
@@ -851,7 +864,7 @@ atomic64_read_acquire(const atomic64_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic64_set(atomic64_t *v, s64 i)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic64_set(v, i);
 }
 #define atomic64_set atomic64_set
@@ -860,7 +873,7 @@ atomic64_set(atomic64_t *v, s64 i)
 static inline void
 atomic64_set_release(atomic64_t *v, s64 i)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic64_set_release(v, i);
 }
 #define atomic64_set_release atomic64_set_release
@@ -869,7 +882,7 @@ atomic64_set_release(atomic64_t *v, s64 i)
 static inline void
 atomic64_add(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic64_add(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_add atomic64_add
@@ -878,7 +891,7 @@ atomic64_add(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_add_return(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_add_return(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_add_return atomic64_add_return
@@ -888,7 +901,7 @@ atomic64_add_return(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_add_return_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_add_return_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_add_return_acquire atomic64_add_return_acquire
@@ -898,7 +911,7 @@ atomic64_add_return_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_add_return_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_add_return_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_add_return_release atomic64_add_return_release
@@ -908,7 +921,7 @@ atomic64_add_return_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_add_return_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_add_return_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_add_return_relaxed atomic64_add_return_relaxed
@@ -918,7 +931,7 @@ atomic64_add_return_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_add(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_add(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_add atomic64_fetch_add
@@ -928,7 +941,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_add(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_add_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_add_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_add_acquire atomic64_fetch_add_acquire
@@ -938,7 +951,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_add_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_add_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_add_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_add_release atomic64_fetch_add_release
@@ -948,7 +961,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_add_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_add_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_add_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_add_relaxed atomic64_fetch_add_relaxed
@@ -957,7 +970,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_add_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic64_sub(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic64_sub(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_sub atomic64_sub
@@ -966,7 +979,7 @@ atomic64_sub(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_sub_return(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_sub_return(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_sub_return atomic64_sub_return
@@ -976,7 +989,7 @@ atomic64_sub_return(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_sub_return_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_sub_return_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_sub_return_acquire atomic64_sub_return_acquire
@@ -986,7 +999,7 @@ atomic64_sub_return_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_sub_return_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_sub_return_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_sub_return_release atomic64_sub_return_release
@@ -996,7 +1009,7 @@ atomic64_sub_return_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_sub_return_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_sub_return_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_sub_return_relaxed atomic64_sub_return_relaxed
@@ -1006,7 +1019,7 @@ atomic64_sub_return_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_sub(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_sub(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_sub atomic64_fetch_sub
@@ -1016,7 +1029,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_sub(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_sub_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_sub_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_sub_acquire atomic64_fetch_sub_acquire
@@ -1026,7 +1039,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_sub_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_sub_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_sub_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_sub_release atomic64_fetch_sub_release
@@ -1036,7 +1049,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_sub_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_sub_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_sub_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_sub_relaxed atomic64_fetch_sub_relaxed
@@ -1046,7 +1059,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_sub_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic64_inc(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic64_inc(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_inc atomic64_inc
@@ -1056,7 +1069,7 @@ atomic64_inc(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_inc_return(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_inc_return(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_inc_return atomic64_inc_return
@@ -1066,7 +1079,7 @@ atomic64_inc_return(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_inc_return_acquire(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_inc_return_acquire(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_inc_return_acquire atomic64_inc_return_acquire
@@ -1076,7 +1089,7 @@ atomic64_inc_return_acquire(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_inc_return_release(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_inc_return_release(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_inc_return_release atomic64_inc_return_release
@@ -1086,7 +1099,7 @@ atomic64_inc_return_release(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_inc_return_relaxed(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_inc_return_relaxed(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_inc_return_relaxed atomic64_inc_return_relaxed
@@ -1096,7 +1109,7 @@ atomic64_inc_return_relaxed(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_inc(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_inc(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_inc atomic64_fetch_inc
@@ -1106,7 +1119,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_inc(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_inc_acquire(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_inc_acquire(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_inc_acquire atomic64_fetch_inc_acquire
@@ -1116,7 +1129,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_inc_acquire(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_inc_release(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_inc_release(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_inc_release atomic64_fetch_inc_release
@@ -1126,7 +1139,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_inc_release(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_inc_relaxed(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_inc_relaxed(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_inc_relaxed atomic64_fetch_inc_relaxed
@@ -1136,7 +1149,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_inc_relaxed(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic64_dec(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic64_dec(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_dec atomic64_dec
@@ -1146,7 +1159,7 @@ atomic64_dec(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_dec_return(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_dec_return(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_dec_return atomic64_dec_return
@@ -1156,7 +1169,7 @@ atomic64_dec_return(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_dec_return_acquire(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_dec_return_acquire(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_dec_return_acquire atomic64_dec_return_acquire
@@ -1166,7 +1179,7 @@ atomic64_dec_return_acquire(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_dec_return_release(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_dec_return_release(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_dec_return_release atomic64_dec_return_release
@@ -1176,7 +1189,7 @@ atomic64_dec_return_release(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_dec_return_relaxed(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_dec_return_relaxed(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_dec_return_relaxed atomic64_dec_return_relaxed
@@ -1186,7 +1199,7 @@ atomic64_dec_return_relaxed(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_dec(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_dec(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_dec atomic64_fetch_dec
@@ -1196,7 +1209,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_dec(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_dec_acquire(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_dec_acquire(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_dec_acquire atomic64_fetch_dec_acquire
@@ -1206,7 +1219,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_dec_acquire(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_dec_release(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_dec_release(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_dec_release atomic64_fetch_dec_release
@@ -1216,7 +1229,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_dec_release(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_dec_relaxed(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_dec_relaxed(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_dec_relaxed atomic64_fetch_dec_relaxed
@@ -1225,7 +1238,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_dec_relaxed(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic64_and(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic64_and(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_and atomic64_and
@@ -1234,7 +1247,7 @@ atomic64_and(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_and(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_and(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_and atomic64_fetch_and
@@ -1244,7 +1257,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_and(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_and_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_and_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_and_acquire atomic64_fetch_and_acquire
@@ -1254,7 +1267,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_and_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_and_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_and_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_and_release atomic64_fetch_and_release
@@ -1264,7 +1277,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_and_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_and_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_and_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_and_relaxed atomic64_fetch_and_relaxed
@@ -1274,7 +1287,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_and_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic64_andnot(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic64_andnot(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_andnot atomic64_andnot
@@ -1284,7 +1297,7 @@ atomic64_andnot(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_andnot(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_andnot(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_andnot atomic64_fetch_andnot
@@ -1294,7 +1307,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_andnot(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_andnot_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_andnot_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_andnot_acquire atomic64_fetch_andnot_acquire
@@ -1304,7 +1317,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_andnot_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_andnot_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_andnot_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_andnot_release atomic64_fetch_andnot_release
@@ -1314,7 +1327,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_andnot_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_andnot_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_andnot_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_andnot_relaxed atomic64_fetch_andnot_relaxed
@@ -1323,7 +1336,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_andnot_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic64_or(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic64_or(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_or atomic64_or
@@ -1332,7 +1345,7 @@ atomic64_or(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_or(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_or(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_or atomic64_fetch_or
@@ -1342,7 +1355,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_or(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_or_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_or_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_or_acquire atomic64_fetch_or_acquire
@@ -1352,7 +1365,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_or_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_or_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_or_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_or_release atomic64_fetch_or_release
@@ -1362,7 +1375,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_or_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_or_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_or_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_or_relaxed atomic64_fetch_or_relaxed
@@ -1371,7 +1384,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_or_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline void
 atomic64_xor(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	arch_atomic64_xor(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_xor atomic64_xor
@@ -1380,7 +1393,7 @@ atomic64_xor(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_xor(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_xor(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_xor atomic64_fetch_xor
@@ -1390,7 +1403,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_xor(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_xor_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_xor_acquire(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_xor_acquire atomic64_fetch_xor_acquire
@@ -1400,7 +1413,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_xor_acquire(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_xor_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_xor_release(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_xor_release atomic64_fetch_xor_release
@@ -1410,7 +1423,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_xor_release(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_xor_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_xor_relaxed(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_xor_relaxed atomic64_fetch_xor_relaxed
@@ -1420,7 +1433,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_xor_relaxed(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_xchg(atomic64_t *v, s64 i)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_xchg(v, i);
 }
 #define atomic64_xchg atomic64_xchg
@@ -1430,7 +1443,7 @@ atomic64_xchg(atomic64_t *v, s64 i)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_xchg_acquire(atomic64_t *v, s64 i)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_xchg_acquire(v, i);
 }
 #define atomic64_xchg_acquire atomic64_xchg_acquire
@@ -1440,7 +1453,7 @@ atomic64_xchg_acquire(atomic64_t *v, s64 i)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_xchg_release(atomic64_t *v, s64 i)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_xchg_release(v, i);
 }
 #define atomic64_xchg_release atomic64_xchg_release
@@ -1450,7 +1463,7 @@ atomic64_xchg_release(atomic64_t *v, s64 i)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_xchg_relaxed(atomic64_t *v, s64 i)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_xchg_relaxed(v, i);
 }
 #define atomic64_xchg_relaxed atomic64_xchg_relaxed
@@ -1460,7 +1473,7 @@ atomic64_xchg_relaxed(atomic64_t *v, s64 i)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_cmpxchg(atomic64_t *v, s64 old, s64 new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_cmpxchg(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic64_cmpxchg atomic64_cmpxchg
@@ -1470,7 +1483,7 @@ atomic64_cmpxchg(atomic64_t *v, s64 old, s64 new)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_cmpxchg_acquire(atomic64_t *v, s64 old, s64 new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_cmpxchg_acquire(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic64_cmpxchg_acquire atomic64_cmpxchg_acquire
@@ -1480,7 +1493,7 @@ atomic64_cmpxchg_acquire(atomic64_t *v, s64 old, s64 new)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_cmpxchg_release(atomic64_t *v, s64 old, s64 new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_cmpxchg_release(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic64_cmpxchg_release atomic64_cmpxchg_release
@@ -1490,7 +1503,7 @@ atomic64_cmpxchg_release(atomic64_t *v, s64 old, s64 new)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_cmpxchg_relaxed(atomic64_t *v, s64 old, s64 new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_cmpxchg_relaxed(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic64_cmpxchg_relaxed atomic64_cmpxchg_relaxed
@@ -1500,8 +1513,8 @@ atomic64_cmpxchg_relaxed(atomic64_t *v, s64 old, s64 new)
 static inline bool
 atomic64_try_cmpxchg(atomic64_t *v, s64 *old, s64 new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
-	kasan_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
 	return arch_atomic64_try_cmpxchg(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic64_try_cmpxchg atomic64_try_cmpxchg
@@ -1511,8 +1524,8 @@ atomic64_try_cmpxchg(atomic64_t *v, s64 *old, s64 new)
 static inline bool
 atomic64_try_cmpxchg_acquire(atomic64_t *v, s64 *old, s64 new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
-	kasan_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
 	return arch_atomic64_try_cmpxchg_acquire(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic64_try_cmpxchg_acquire atomic64_try_cmpxchg_acquire
@@ -1522,8 +1535,8 @@ atomic64_try_cmpxchg_acquire(atomic64_t *v, s64 *old, s64 new)
 static inline bool
 atomic64_try_cmpxchg_release(atomic64_t *v, s64 *old, s64 new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
-	kasan_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
 	return arch_atomic64_try_cmpxchg_release(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic64_try_cmpxchg_release atomic64_try_cmpxchg_release
@@ -1533,8 +1546,8 @@ atomic64_try_cmpxchg_release(atomic64_t *v, s64 *old, s64 new)
 static inline bool
 atomic64_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(atomic64_t *v, s64 *old, s64 new)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
-	kasan_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(old, sizeof(*old));
 	return arch_atomic64_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(v, old, new);
 }
 #define atomic64_try_cmpxchg_relaxed atomic64_try_cmpxchg_relaxed
@@ -1544,7 +1557,7 @@ atomic64_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(atomic64_t *v, s64 *old, s64 new)
 static inline bool
 atomic64_sub_and_test(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_sub_and_test(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_sub_and_test atomic64_sub_and_test
@@ -1554,7 +1567,7 @@ atomic64_sub_and_test(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline bool
 atomic64_dec_and_test(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_dec_and_test(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_dec_and_test atomic64_dec_and_test
@@ -1564,7 +1577,7 @@ atomic64_dec_and_test(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline bool
 atomic64_inc_and_test(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_inc_and_test(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_inc_and_test atomic64_inc_and_test
@@ -1574,7 +1587,7 @@ atomic64_inc_and_test(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline bool
 atomic64_add_negative(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_add_negative(i, v);
 }
 #define atomic64_add_negative atomic64_add_negative
@@ -1584,7 +1597,7 @@ atomic64_add_negative(s64 i, atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_fetch_add_unless(atomic64_t *v, s64 a, s64 u)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_fetch_add_unless(v, a, u);
 }
 #define atomic64_fetch_add_unless atomic64_fetch_add_unless
@@ -1594,7 +1607,7 @@ atomic64_fetch_add_unless(atomic64_t *v, s64 a, s64 u)
 static inline bool
 atomic64_add_unless(atomic64_t *v, s64 a, s64 u)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_add_unless(v, a, u);
 }
 #define atomic64_add_unless atomic64_add_unless
@@ -1604,7 +1617,7 @@ atomic64_add_unless(atomic64_t *v, s64 a, s64 u)
 static inline bool
 atomic64_inc_not_zero(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_inc_not_zero(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_inc_not_zero atomic64_inc_not_zero
@@ -1614,7 +1627,7 @@ atomic64_inc_not_zero(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline bool
 atomic64_inc_unless_negative(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_inc_unless_negative(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_inc_unless_negative atomic64_inc_unless_negative
@@ -1624,7 +1637,7 @@ atomic64_inc_unless_negative(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline bool
 atomic64_dec_unless_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_dec_unless_positive(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_dec_unless_positive atomic64_dec_unless_positive
@@ -1634,7 +1647,7 @@ atomic64_dec_unless_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 static inline s64
 atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
+	__atomic_check_write(v, sizeof(*v));
 	return arch_atomic64_dec_if_positive(v);
 }
 #define atomic64_dec_if_positive atomic64_dec_if_positive
@@ -1644,7 +1657,7 @@ atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 #define xchg(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_xchg(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 #endif
@@ -1653,7 +1666,7 @@ atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 #define xchg_acquire(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_xchg_acquire(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 #endif
@@ -1662,7 +1675,7 @@ atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 #define xchg_release(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_xchg_release(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 #endif
@@ -1671,7 +1684,7 @@ atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 #define xchg_relaxed(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_xchg_relaxed(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 #endif
@@ -1680,7 +1693,7 @@ atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 #define cmpxchg(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_cmpxchg(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 #endif
@@ -1689,7 +1702,7 @@ atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 #define cmpxchg_acquire(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_cmpxchg_acquire(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 #endif
@@ -1698,7 +1711,7 @@ atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 #define cmpxchg_release(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_cmpxchg_release(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 #endif
@@ -1707,7 +1720,7 @@ atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 #define cmpxchg_relaxed(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_cmpxchg_relaxed(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 #endif
@@ -1716,7 +1729,7 @@ atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 #define cmpxchg64(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_cmpxchg64(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 #endif
@@ -1725,7 +1738,7 @@ atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 #define cmpxchg64_acquire(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_cmpxchg64_acquire(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 #endif
@@ -1734,7 +1747,7 @@ atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 #define cmpxchg64_release(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_cmpxchg64_release(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 #endif
@@ -1743,7 +1756,7 @@ atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 #define cmpxchg64_relaxed(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_cmpxchg64_relaxed(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 #endif
@@ -1751,28 +1764,28 @@ atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 #define cmpxchg_local(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_cmpxchg_local(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 
 #define cmpxchg64_local(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_cmpxchg64_local(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 
 #define sync_cmpxchg(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_sync_cmpxchg(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 
 #define cmpxchg_double(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, 2 * sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, 2 * sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_cmpxchg_double(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 
@@ -1780,9 +1793,9 @@ atomic64_dec_if_positive(atomic64_t *v)
 #define cmpxchg_double_local(ptr, ...)						\
 ({									\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, 2 * sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, 2 * sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\
 	arch_cmpxchg_double_local(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\
 })
 
 #endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_ATOMIC_INSTRUMENTED_H */
-// b29b625d5de9280f680e42c7be859b55b15e5f6a
+// beea41c2a0f2c69e4958ed71bf26f59740fa4b12
diff --git a/scripts/atomic/gen-atomic-instrumented.sh b/scripts/atomic/gen-atomic-instrumented.sh
index e09812372b17..8b8b2a6f8d68 100755
--- a/scripts/atomic/gen-atomic-instrumented.sh
+++ b/scripts/atomic/gen-atomic-instrumented.sh
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ gen_param_check()
 	# We don't write to constant parameters
 	[ ${type#c} != ${type} ] && rw="read"
 
-	printf "\tkasan_check_${rw}(${name}, sizeof(*${name}));\n"
+	printf "\t__atomic_check_${rw}(${name}, sizeof(*${name}));\n"
 }
 
 #gen_param_check(arg...)
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ cat <<EOF
 #define ${xchg}(ptr, ...)						\\
 ({									\\
 	typeof(ptr) __ai_ptr = (ptr);					\\
-	kasan_check_write(__ai_ptr, ${mult}sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\\
+	__atomic_check_write(__ai_ptr, ${mult}sizeof(*__ai_ptr));		\\
 	arch_${xchg}(__ai_ptr, __VA_ARGS__);				\\
 })
 EOF
@@ -148,6 +148,19 @@ cat << EOF
 
 #include <linux/build_bug.h>
 #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/kcsan-checks.h>
+
+static inline void __atomic_check_read(const volatile void *v, size_t size)
+{
+	kasan_check_read(v, size);
+	kcsan_check_atomic_read(v, size);
+}
+
+static inline void __atomic_check_write(const volatile void *v, size_t size)
+{
+	kasan_check_write(v, size);
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(v, size);
+}
 
 EOF
 
-- 
2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 10/10] x86, kcsan: Enable KCSAN for x86
  2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
                   ` (8 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] locking/atomics, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-14 18:03 ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-14 19:50 ` [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Paul E. McKenney
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  12 siblings, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-14 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

This patch enables KCSAN for x86, with updates to build rules to not use
KCSAN for several incompatible compilation units.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
---
v4:
* Fix code generation with clang (KCSAN_SANITIZE := n for affected
  compilation units).

v3:
* Moved EFI stub build exception hunk to generic build exception patch,
  since it's not x86-specific.

v2:
* Document build exceptions where no previous above comment explained
  why we cannot instrument.
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                  | 1 +
 arch/x86/boot/Makefile            | 2 ++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 2 ++
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile      | 3 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h     | 6 +++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile          | 4 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile      | 3 +++
 arch/x86/lib/Makefile             | 4 ++++
 arch/x86/mm/Makefile              | 4 ++++
 arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile       | 2 ++
 arch/x86/realmode/Makefile        | 3 +++
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/Makefile     | 3 +++
 12 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 8ef85139553f..9933ca8ffe16 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ config X86
 	select VIRT_TO_BUS
 	select X86_FEATURE_NAMES		if PROC_FS
 	select PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS		if PROC_FS
+	select HAVE_ARCH_KCSAN if X86_64
 
 config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
 	def_bool y
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/Makefile
index e2839b5c246c..9c7942794164 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/Makefile
@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@
 # Changed by many, many contributors over the years.
 #
 
+# Sanitizer runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked for early boot code.
 KASAN_SANITIZE			:= n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE			:= n
 OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD	:= y
 
 # Kernel does not boot with kcov instrumentation here.
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index 6b84afdd7538..a1c248b8439f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@
 #	(see scripts/Makefile.lib size_append)
 #	compressed vmlinux.bin.all + u32 size of vmlinux.bin.all
 
+# Sanitizer runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked for early boot code.
 KASAN_SANITIZE			:= n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE			:= n
 OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD	:= y
 
 # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
index 0f2154106d01..a23debaad5b9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
@@ -10,8 +10,11 @@ ARCH_REL_TYPE_ABS += R_386_GLOB_DAT|R_386_JMP_SLOT|R_386_RELATIVE
 include $(srctree)/lib/vdso/Makefile
 
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_LTO)
+
+# Sanitizer runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked here.
 KASAN_SANITIZE			:= n
 UBSAN_SANITIZE			:= n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE			:= n
 OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD	:= y
 
 # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h
index 7d1f6a49bfae..542b63ddc8aa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h
@@ -201,8 +201,12 @@ arch_test_and_change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 	return GEN_BINARY_RMWcc(LOCK_PREFIX __ASM_SIZE(btc), *addr, c, "Ir", nr);
 }
 
-static __always_inline bool constant_test_bit(long nr, const volatile unsigned long *addr)
+static __no_kcsan_or_inline bool constant_test_bit(long nr, const volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Because this is a plain access, we need to disable KCSAN here to
+	 * avoid double instrumentation via instrumented bitops.
+	 */
 	return ((1UL << (nr & (BITS_PER_LONG-1))) &
 		(addr[nr >> _BITOPS_LONG_SHIFT])) != 0;
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 3578ad248bc9..a9a1cab437bc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_dumpstack_$(BITS).o			:= n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_stacktrace.o				:= n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_paravirt.o				:= n
 
+# With some compiler versions the generated code results in boot hangs, caused
+# by several compilation units. To be safe, disable all instrumentation.
+KCSAN_SANITIZE := n
+
 OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_relocate_kernel_$(BITS).o	:= y
 OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_test_nx.o			:= y
 OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_paravirt_patch.o		:= y
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
index 890f60083eca..a704fb9ee98e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ endif
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_common.o := n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_perf_event.o := n
 
+# As above, instrumenting secondary CPU boot code causes boot hangs.
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_common.o := n
+
 # Make sure load_percpu_segment has no stackprotector
 nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
 CFLAGS_common.o		:= $(nostackp)
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
index 5246db42de45..432a07705677 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
@@ -6,10 +6,14 @@
 # Produces uninteresting flaky coverage.
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_delay.o	:= n
 
+# KCSAN uses udelay for introducing watchpoint delay; avoid recursion.
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_delay.o := n
+
 # Early boot use of cmdline; don't instrument it
 ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_cmdline.o := n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_cmdline.o  := n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_cmdline.o  := n
 
 ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_cmdline.o = -pg
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
index 84373dc9b341..3559f4297ee1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_identity.o	:= n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt.o		:= n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_identity.o	:= n
 
+# Disable KCSAN entirely, because otherwise we get warnings that some functions
+# reference __initdata sections.
+KCSAN_SANITIZE := n
+
 ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt.o		= -pg
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt_identity.o	= -pg
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
index fb4ee5444379..69379bce9574 100644
--- a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ CFLAGS_sha256.o := -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS
 LDFLAGS_purgatory.ro := -e purgatory_start -r --no-undefined -nostdlib -z nodefaultlib
 targets += purgatory.ro
 
+# Sanitizer runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked here.
 KASAN_SANITIZE	:= n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE	:= n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
 
 # These are adjustments to the compiler flags used for objects that
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/Makefile b/arch/x86/realmode/Makefile
index 682c895753d9..6b1f3a4eeb44 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/Makefile
@@ -6,7 +6,10 @@
 # for more details.
 #
 #
+
+# Sanitizer runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked here.
 KASAN_SANITIZE			:= n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE			:= n
 OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD	:= y
 
 subdir- := rm
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/Makefile b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/Makefile
index f60501a384f9..fdbbb945c216 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/Makefile
@@ -6,7 +6,10 @@
 # for more details.
 #
 #
+
+# Sanitizer runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked here.
 KASAN_SANITIZE			:= n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE			:= n
 OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD	:= y
 
 # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
-- 
2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
                   ` (9 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] x86, kcsan: Enable KCSAN for x86 Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-14 19:50 ` Paul E. McKenney
  2019-11-14 21:33   ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-19 19:50 ` Qian Cai
  2019-11-19 20:12 ` Qian Cai
  12 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Paul E. McKenney @ 2019-11-14 19:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Marco Elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 07:02:53PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> experimental ARM64 and POWER support).
> 
> To gather early feedback, we announced KCSAN back in September, and have
> integrated the feedback where possible:
> http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNPJ_bHjfLZCAPV23AXFfiPiyXXqqu72n6TgWzb2Gnu1eA@mail.gmail.com
> 
> The current list of known upstream fixes for data races found by KCSAN
> can be found here:
> https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN#upstream-fixes-of-data-races-found-by-kcsan
> 
> We want to point out and acknowledge the work surrounding the LKMM,
> including several articles that motivate why data races are dangerous
> [1, 2], justifying a data race detector such as KCSAN.
> 
> [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
> [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/799218/

I queued this and ran a quick rcutorture on it, which completed
successfully with quite a few reports.

							Thanx, Paul

> Race conditions vs. data races
> ------------------------------
> 
> Race conditions are logic bugs, where unexpected interleaving of racing
> concurrent operations result in an erroneous state.
> 
> Data races on the other hand are defined at the *memory model/language
> level*.  Many data races are also harmful race conditions, which a tool
> like KCSAN reports!  However, not all data races are race conditions and
> vice-versa.  KCSAN's intent is to report data races according to the
> LKMM. A data race detector can only work at the memory model/language
> level.
> 
> Deeper analysis, to find high-level race conditions only, requires
> conveying the intended kernel logic to a tool. This requires (1) the
> developer writing a specification or model of their code, and then (2)
> the tool verifying that the implementation matches. This has been done
> for small bits of code using model checkers and other formal methods,
> but does not scale to the level of what can be covered with a dynamic
> analysis based data race detector such as KCSAN.
> 
> For reasons outlined in [1, 2], data races can be much more subtle, but
> can cause no less harm than high-level race conditions.
> 
> Changelog
> ---------
> v4:
> * Major changes:
>  - Optimizations resulting in performance improvement of 33% (on
>    microbenchmark).
>  - Deal with nested interrupts for atomic_next.
>  - Simplify report.c (removing double-locking as well), in preparation
>    for KCSAN_REPORT_VALUE_CHANGE_ONLY.
>  - Add patch to introduce "data_race(expr)" macro.
>  - Introduce KCSAN_REPORT_VALUE_CHANGE_ONLY option for further filtering of data
>    races: if a conflicting write was observed via a watchpoint, only report the
>    data race if a value change was observed as well. The option will be enabled
>    by default on syzbot. (rcu-functions will be excluded from this filter at
>    request of Paul McKenney.) Context:
>    http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNOepvb6+zJmDePxj21n2rctM4Sp4rJ66x_J-L1UmNK54A@mail.gmail.com
> 
> v3: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191104142745.14722-1-elver@google.com
> * Major changes:
>  - Add microbenchmark.
>  - Add instruction watchpoint skip randomization.
>  - Refactor API and core runtime fast-path and slow-path. Compared to
>    the previous version, with a default config and benchmarked using the
>    added microbenchmark, this version is 3.8x faster.
>  - Make __tsan_unaligned __alias of generic accesses.
>  - Rename kcsan_{begin,end}_atomic ->
>    kcsan_{nestable,flat}_atomic_{begin,end}
>  - For filter list in debugfs.c use kmalloc+krealloc instead of
>    kvmalloc.
>  - Split Documentation into separate patch.
> 
> v2: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191017141305.146193-1-elver@google.com
> * Major changes:
>  - Replace kcsan_check_access(.., {true, false}) with
>    kcsan_check_{read,write}.
>  - Change atomic-instrumented.h to use __atomic_check_{read,write}.
>  - Use common struct kcsan_ctx in task_struct and for per-CPU interrupt
>    contexts.
> 
> v1: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191016083959.186860-1-elver@google.com
> 
> Marco Elver (10):
>   kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
>   include/linux/compiler.h: Introduce data_race(expr) macro
>   kcsan: Add Documentation entry in dev-tools
>   objtool, kcsan: Add KCSAN runtime functions to whitelist
>   build, kcsan: Add KCSAN build exceptions
>   seqlock, kcsan: Add annotations for KCSAN
>   seqlock: Require WRITE_ONCE surrounding raw_seqcount_barrier
>   asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation for bitops
>   locking/atomics, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation
>   x86, kcsan: Enable KCSAN for x86
> 
>  Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst         |   1 +
>  Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst         | 256 +++++++++
>  MAINTAINERS                               |  11 +
>  Makefile                                  |   3 +-
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                          |   1 +
>  arch/x86/boot/Makefile                    |   2 +
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile         |   2 +
>  arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile              |   3 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h             |   6 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/Makefile                  |   4 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile              |   3 +
>  arch/x86/lib/Makefile                     |   4 +
>  arch/x86/mm/Makefile                      |   4 +
>  arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile               |   2 +
>  arch/x86/realmode/Makefile                |   3 +
>  arch/x86/realmode/rm/Makefile             |   3 +
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile     |   2 +
>  include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h | 393 +++++++-------
>  include/asm-generic/bitops-instrumented.h |  18 +
>  include/linux/compiler-clang.h            |   9 +
>  include/linux/compiler-gcc.h              |   7 +
>  include/linux/compiler.h                  |  57 +-
>  include/linux/kcsan-checks.h              |  97 ++++
>  include/linux/kcsan.h                     | 115 ++++
>  include/linux/sched.h                     |   4 +
>  include/linux/seqlock.h                   |  51 +-
>  init/init_task.c                          |   8 +
>  init/main.c                               |   2 +
>  kernel/Makefile                           |   6 +
>  kernel/kcsan/Makefile                     |  11 +
>  kernel/kcsan/atomic.h                     |  27 +
>  kernel/kcsan/core.c                       | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  kernel/kcsan/debugfs.c                    | 275 ++++++++++
>  kernel/kcsan/encoding.h                   |  94 ++++
>  kernel/kcsan/kcsan.h                      | 108 ++++
>  kernel/kcsan/report.c                     | 320 +++++++++++
>  kernel/kcsan/test.c                       | 121 +++++
>  kernel/sched/Makefile                     |   6 +
>  lib/Kconfig.debug                         |   2 +
>  lib/Kconfig.kcsan                         | 118 ++++
>  lib/Makefile                              |   3 +
>  mm/Makefile                               |   8 +
>  scripts/Makefile.kcsan                    |   6 +
>  scripts/Makefile.lib                      |  10 +
>  scripts/atomic/gen-atomic-instrumented.sh |  17 +-
>  tools/objtool/check.c                     |  18 +
>  46 files changed, 2641 insertions(+), 206 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst
>  create mode 100644 include/linux/kcsan-checks.h
>  create mode 100644 include/linux/kcsan.h
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/Makefile
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/atomic.h
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/core.c
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/debugfs.c
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/encoding.h
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/kcsan.h
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/report.c
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/test.c
>  create mode 100644 lib/Kconfig.kcsan
>  create mode 100644 scripts/Makefile.kcsan
> 
> -- 
> 2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-14 19:50 ` [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Paul E. McKenney
@ 2019-11-14 21:33   ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-14 22:15     ` Paul E. McKenney
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-14 21:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Paul E. McKenney
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

On Thu, 14 Nov 2019, Paul E. McKenney wrote:

> On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 07:02:53PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> > KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> > are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> > only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> > architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> > experimental ARM64 and POWER support).
> > 
> > To gather early feedback, we announced KCSAN back in September, and have
> > integrated the feedback where possible:
> > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNPJ_bHjfLZCAPV23AXFfiPiyXXqqu72n6TgWzb2Gnu1eA@mail.gmail.com
> > 
> > The current list of known upstream fixes for data races found by KCSAN
> > can be found here:
> > https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN#upstream-fixes-of-data-races-found-by-kcsan
> > 
> > We want to point out and acknowledge the work surrounding the LKMM,
> > including several articles that motivate why data races are dangerous
> > [1, 2], justifying a data race detector such as KCSAN.
> > 
> > [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
> > [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/799218/
> 
> I queued this and ran a quick rcutorture on it, which completed
> successfully with quite a few reports.

Great. Many thanks for queuing this in -rcu. And regarding merge window
you mentioned, we're fine with your assumption to targeting the next
(v5.6) merge window.

I've just had a look at linux-next to check what a future rebase
requires:

- There is a change in lib/Kconfig.debug and moving KCSAN to the
  "Generic Kernel Debugging Instruments" section seems appropriate.
- bitops-instrumented.h was removed and split into 3 files, and needs
  re-inserting the instrumentation into the right places.

Otherwise there are no issues. Let me know what you recommend.

Thanks,
-- Marco

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-14 21:33   ` Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-14 22:15     ` Paul E. McKenney
  2019-11-15 12:02       ` Marco Elver
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Paul E. McKenney @ 2019-11-14 22:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Marco Elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:33:03PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Thu, 14 Nov 2019, Paul E. McKenney wrote:
> 
> > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 07:02:53PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> > > KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> > > are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> > > only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> > > architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> > > experimental ARM64 and POWER support).
> > > 
> > > To gather early feedback, we announced KCSAN back in September, and have
> > > integrated the feedback where possible:
> > > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNPJ_bHjfLZCAPV23AXFfiPiyXXqqu72n6TgWzb2Gnu1eA@mail.gmail.com
> > > 
> > > The current list of known upstream fixes for data races found by KCSAN
> > > can be found here:
> > > https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN#upstream-fixes-of-data-races-found-by-kcsan
> > > 
> > > We want to point out and acknowledge the work surrounding the LKMM,
> > > including several articles that motivate why data races are dangerous
> > > [1, 2], justifying a data race detector such as KCSAN.
> > > 
> > > [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
> > > [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/799218/
> > 
> > I queued this and ran a quick rcutorture on it, which completed
> > successfully with quite a few reports.
> 
> Great. Many thanks for queuing this in -rcu. And regarding merge window
> you mentioned, we're fine with your assumption to targeting the next
> (v5.6) merge window.
> 
> I've just had a look at linux-next to check what a future rebase
> requires:
> 
> - There is a change in lib/Kconfig.debug and moving KCSAN to the
>   "Generic Kernel Debugging Instruments" section seems appropriate.
> - bitops-instrumented.h was removed and split into 3 files, and needs
>   re-inserting the instrumentation into the right places.
> 
> Otherwise there are no issues. Let me know what you recommend.

Sounds good!

I will be rebasing onto v5.5-rc1 shortly after it comes out.  My usual
approach is to fix any conflicts during that rebasing operation.
Does that make sense, or would you prefer to send me a rebased stack at
that point?  Either way is fine for me.

							Thanx, Paul

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 08/10] asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation for bitops
  2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation for bitops Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-15 11:55   ` Marco Elver
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-15 11:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
Tentative version of the bitops patch that applies with the new
instrumented bitops infrastructure currently in linux-next. (Note that
that test_bit() is an atomic bitop, but is currently in the wrong
header.)

Otherwise there is no functional change compared to v4 that applies to
mainline.

---
 include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h     | 7 +++++++
 include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-lock.h       | 5 +++++
 include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h | 8 ++++++++
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h b/include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h
index 18ce3c9e8eec..eb3abf7e5c08 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #define _ASM_GENERIC_BITOPS_INSTRUMENTED_ATOMIC_H
 
 #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/kcsan-checks.h>
 
 /**
  * set_bit - Atomically set a bit in memory
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@
 static inline void set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch_set_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -39,6 +41,7 @@ static inline void set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline void clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch_clear_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -55,6 +58,7 @@ static inline void clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline void change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch_change_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -68,6 +72,7 @@ static inline void change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool test_and_set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch_test_and_set_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -81,6 +86,7 @@ static inline bool test_and_set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool test_and_clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch_test_and_clear_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -94,6 +100,7 @@ static inline bool test_and_clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool test_and_change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch_test_and_change_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-lock.h b/include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-lock.h
index ec53fdeea9ec..2c80dca31e27 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-lock.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-lock.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #define _ASM_GENERIC_BITOPS_INSTRUMENTED_LOCK_H
 
 #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/kcsan-checks.h>
 
 /**
  * clear_bit_unlock - Clear a bit in memory, for unlock
@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@
 static inline void clear_bit_unlock(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch_clear_bit_unlock(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -38,6 +40,7 @@ static inline void clear_bit_unlock(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline void __clear_bit_unlock(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch___clear_bit_unlock(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -53,6 +56,7 @@ static inline void __clear_bit_unlock(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool test_and_set_bit_lock(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch_test_and_set_bit_lock(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -72,6 +76,7 @@ static inline bool
 clear_bit_unlock_is_negative_byte(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch_clear_bit_unlock_is_negative_byte(nr, addr);
 }
 /* Let everybody know we have it. */
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h b/include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h
index 95ff28d128a1..8479af8b3309 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #define _ASM_GENERIC_BITOPS_INSTRUMENTED_NON_ATOMIC_H
 
 #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/kcsan-checks.h>
 
 /**
  * __set_bit - Set a bit in memory
@@ -25,6 +26,7 @@
 static inline void __set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch___set_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -40,6 +42,7 @@ static inline void __set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline void __clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch___clear_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -55,6 +58,7 @@ static inline void __clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline void __change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	arch___change_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -69,6 +73,7 @@ static inline void __change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool __test_and_set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch___test_and_set_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -83,6 +88,7 @@ static inline bool __test_and_set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool __test_and_clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch___test_and_clear_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -97,6 +103,7 @@ static inline bool __test_and_clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool __test_and_change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_write(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch___test_and_change_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
@@ -108,6 +115,7 @@ static inline bool __test_and_change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
 static inline bool test_bit(long nr, const volatile unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	kasan_check_read(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
+	kcsan_check_atomic_read(addr + BIT_WORD(nr), sizeof(long));
 	return arch_test_bit(nr, addr);
 }
 
-- 
2.24.0.432.g9d3f5f5b63-goog


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-14 22:15     ` Paul E. McKenney
@ 2019-11-15 12:02       ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-15 16:41         ` Paul E. McKenney
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-15 12:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Paul E. McKenney
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Peter Zijlstra,
	Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet, kasan-dev,
	linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Thu, 14 Nov 2019 at 23:16, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:33:03PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > On Thu, 14 Nov 2019, Paul E. McKenney wrote:
> >
> > > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 07:02:53PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> > > > KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> > > > are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> > > > only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> > > > architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> > > > experimental ARM64 and POWER support).
> > > >
> > > > To gather early feedback, we announced KCSAN back in September, and have
> > > > integrated the feedback where possible:
> > > > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNPJ_bHjfLZCAPV23AXFfiPiyXXqqu72n6TgWzb2Gnu1eA@mail.gmail.com
> > > >
> > > > The current list of known upstream fixes for data races found by KCSAN
> > > > can be found here:
> > > > https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN#upstream-fixes-of-data-races-found-by-kcsan
> > > >
> > > > We want to point out and acknowledge the work surrounding the LKMM,
> > > > including several articles that motivate why data races are dangerous
> > > > [1, 2], justifying a data race detector such as KCSAN.
> > > >
> > > > [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
> > > > [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/799218/
> > >
> > > I queued this and ran a quick rcutorture on it, which completed
> > > successfully with quite a few reports.
> >
> > Great. Many thanks for queuing this in -rcu. And regarding merge window
> > you mentioned, we're fine with your assumption to targeting the next
> > (v5.6) merge window.
> >
> > I've just had a look at linux-next to check what a future rebase
> > requires:
> >
> > - There is a change in lib/Kconfig.debug and moving KCSAN to the
> >   "Generic Kernel Debugging Instruments" section seems appropriate.
> > - bitops-instrumented.h was removed and split into 3 files, and needs
> >   re-inserting the instrumentation into the right places.
> >
> > Otherwise there are no issues. Let me know what you recommend.
>
> Sounds good!
>
> I will be rebasing onto v5.5-rc1 shortly after it comes out.  My usual
> approach is to fix any conflicts during that rebasing operation.
> Does that make sense, or would you prefer to send me a rebased stack at
> that point?  Either way is fine for me.

That's fine with me, thanks!  To avoid too much additional churn on
your end, I just replied to the bitops patch with a version that will
apply with the change to bitops-instrumented infrastructure.

Also considering the merge window, we had a discussion and there are
some arguments for targeting the v5.5 merge window:
- we'd unblock ARM and POWER ports;
- we'd unblock people wanting to use the data_race macro;
- we'd unblock syzbot just tracking upstream;
Unless there are strong reasons to not target v5.5, I leave it to you
if you think it's appropriate.

Thanks,
-- Marco

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-15 12:02       ` Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-15 16:41         ` Paul E. McKenney
  2019-11-15 17:14           ` Marco Elver
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Paul E. McKenney @ 2019-11-15 16:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Marco Elver
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Peter Zijlstra,
	Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet, kasan-dev,
	linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 01:02:08PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Thu, 14 Nov 2019 at 23:16, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:33:03PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > On Thu, 14 Nov 2019, Paul E. McKenney wrote:
> > >
> > > > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 07:02:53PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> > > > > KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> > > > > are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> > > > > only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> > > > > architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> > > > > experimental ARM64 and POWER support).
> > > > >
> > > > > To gather early feedback, we announced KCSAN back in September, and have
> > > > > integrated the feedback where possible:
> > > > > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNPJ_bHjfLZCAPV23AXFfiPiyXXqqu72n6TgWzb2Gnu1eA@mail.gmail.com
> > > > >
> > > > > The current list of known upstream fixes for data races found by KCSAN
> > > > > can be found here:
> > > > > https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN#upstream-fixes-of-data-races-found-by-kcsan
> > > > >
> > > > > We want to point out and acknowledge the work surrounding the LKMM,
> > > > > including several articles that motivate why data races are dangerous
> > > > > [1, 2], justifying a data race detector such as KCSAN.
> > > > >
> > > > > [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
> > > > > [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/799218/
> > > >
> > > > I queued this and ran a quick rcutorture on it, which completed
> > > > successfully with quite a few reports.
> > >
> > > Great. Many thanks for queuing this in -rcu. And regarding merge window
> > > you mentioned, we're fine with your assumption to targeting the next
> > > (v5.6) merge window.
> > >
> > > I've just had a look at linux-next to check what a future rebase
> > > requires:
> > >
> > > - There is a change in lib/Kconfig.debug and moving KCSAN to the
> > >   "Generic Kernel Debugging Instruments" section seems appropriate.
> > > - bitops-instrumented.h was removed and split into 3 files, and needs
> > >   re-inserting the instrumentation into the right places.
> > >
> > > Otherwise there are no issues. Let me know what you recommend.
> >
> > Sounds good!
> >
> > I will be rebasing onto v5.5-rc1 shortly after it comes out.  My usual
> > approach is to fix any conflicts during that rebasing operation.
> > Does that make sense, or would you prefer to send me a rebased stack at
> > that point?  Either way is fine for me.
> 
> That's fine with me, thanks!  To avoid too much additional churn on
> your end, I just replied to the bitops patch with a version that will
> apply with the change to bitops-instrumented infrastructure.

My first thought was to replace 8/10 of the previous version of your
patch in -rcu (047ca266cfab "asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation
for bitops"), but this does not apply.  So I am guessing that I instead
do this substitution when a rebase onto -rc1..

Except...

> Also considering the merge window, we had a discussion and there are
> some arguments for targeting the v5.5 merge window:
> - we'd unblock ARM and POWER ports;
> - we'd unblock people wanting to use the data_race macro;
> - we'd unblock syzbot just tracking upstream;
> Unless there are strong reasons to not target v5.5, I leave it to you
> if you think it's appropriate.

My normal process is to send the pull request shortly after -rc5 comes
out, but you do call out some benefits of getting it in sooner, so...

What I will do is to rebase your series onto (say) -rc7, test it, and
see about an RFC pull request.

One possible complication is the new 8/10 patch.  But maybe it will
apply against -rc7?

Another possible complication is this:

scripts/kconfig/conf  --syncconfig Kconfig
*
* Restart config...
*
*
* KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector
*
KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector (KCSAN) [N/y/?] (NEW)

Might be OK in this case because it is quite obvious what it is doing.
(Avoiding pain from this is the reason that CONFIG_RCU_EXPERT exists.)

But I will just mention this in the pull request.

If there is a -rc8, there is of course a higher probability of making it
into the next merge window.

Fair enough?

							Thanx, Paul

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-15 16:41         ` Paul E. McKenney
@ 2019-11-15 17:14           ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-15 20:43             ` Paul E. McKenney
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-15 17:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Paul E. McKenney
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Peter Zijlstra,
	Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet, kasan-dev,
	linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Fri, 15 Nov 2019 at 17:42, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 01:02:08PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > On Thu, 14 Nov 2019 at 23:16, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:33:03PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > On Thu, 14 Nov 2019, Paul E. McKenney wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 07:02:53PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > > This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> > > > > > KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> > > > > > are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> > > > > > only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> > > > > > architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> > > > > > experimental ARM64 and POWER support).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > To gather early feedback, we announced KCSAN back in September, and have
> > > > > > integrated the feedback where possible:
> > > > > > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNPJ_bHjfLZCAPV23AXFfiPiyXXqqu72n6TgWzb2Gnu1eA@mail.gmail.com
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The current list of known upstream fixes for data races found by KCSAN
> > > > > > can be found here:
> > > > > > https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN#upstream-fixes-of-data-races-found-by-kcsan
> > > > > >
> > > > > > We want to point out and acknowledge the work surrounding the LKMM,
> > > > > > including several articles that motivate why data races are dangerous
> > > > > > [1, 2], justifying a data race detector such as KCSAN.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
> > > > > > [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/799218/
> > > > >
> > > > > I queued this and ran a quick rcutorture on it, which completed
> > > > > successfully with quite a few reports.
> > > >
> > > > Great. Many thanks for queuing this in -rcu. And regarding merge window
> > > > you mentioned, we're fine with your assumption to targeting the next
> > > > (v5.6) merge window.
> > > >
> > > > I've just had a look at linux-next to check what a future rebase
> > > > requires:
> > > >
> > > > - There is a change in lib/Kconfig.debug and moving KCSAN to the
> > > >   "Generic Kernel Debugging Instruments" section seems appropriate.
> > > > - bitops-instrumented.h was removed and split into 3 files, and needs
> > > >   re-inserting the instrumentation into the right places.
> > > >
> > > > Otherwise there are no issues. Let me know what you recommend.
> > >
> > > Sounds good!
> > >
> > > I will be rebasing onto v5.5-rc1 shortly after it comes out.  My usual
> > > approach is to fix any conflicts during that rebasing operation.
> > > Does that make sense, or would you prefer to send me a rebased stack at
> > > that point?  Either way is fine for me.
> >
> > That's fine with me, thanks!  To avoid too much additional churn on
> > your end, I just replied to the bitops patch with a version that will
> > apply with the change to bitops-instrumented infrastructure.
>
> My first thought was to replace 8/10 of the previous version of your
> patch in -rcu (047ca266cfab "asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation
> for bitops"), but this does not apply.  So I am guessing that I instead
> do this substitution when a rebase onto -rc1..
>
> Except...
>
> > Also considering the merge window, we had a discussion and there are
> > some arguments for targeting the v5.5 merge window:
> > - we'd unblock ARM and POWER ports;
> > - we'd unblock people wanting to use the data_race macro;
> > - we'd unblock syzbot just tracking upstream;
> > Unless there are strong reasons to not target v5.5, I leave it to you
> > if you think it's appropriate.
>
> My normal process is to send the pull request shortly after -rc5 comes
> out, but you do call out some benefits of getting it in sooner, so...
>
> What I will do is to rebase your series onto (say) -rc7, test it, and
> see about an RFC pull request.
>
> One possible complication is the new 8/10 patch.  But maybe it will
> apply against -rc7?
>
> Another possible complication is this:
>
> scripts/kconfig/conf  --syncconfig Kconfig
> *
> * Restart config...
> *
> *
> * KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector
> *
> KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector (KCSAN) [N/y/?] (NEW)
>
> Might be OK in this case because it is quite obvious what it is doing.
> (Avoiding pain from this is the reason that CONFIG_RCU_EXPERT exists.)
>
> But I will just mention this in the pull request.
>
> If there is a -rc8, there is of course a higher probability of making it
> into the next merge window.
>
> Fair enough?

Totally fine with that, sounds like a good plan, thanks!

If it helps, in theory we can also drop and delay the bitops
instrumentation patch until the new bitops instrumentation
infrastructure is in 5.5-rc1. There won't be any false positives if
this is missing, we might just miss a few data races until we have it.

Thanks,
-- Marco

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-15 17:14           ` Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-15 20:43             ` Paul E. McKenney
  2019-11-16  8:20               ` Marco Elver
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Paul E. McKenney @ 2019-11-15 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Marco Elver
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Peter Zijlstra,
	Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet, kasan-dev,
	linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 06:14:46PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Fri, 15 Nov 2019 at 17:42, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 01:02:08PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > On Thu, 14 Nov 2019 at 23:16, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:33:03PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, 14 Nov 2019, Paul E. McKenney wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 07:02:53PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > > > This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> > > > > > > KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> > > > > > > are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> > > > > > > only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> > > > > > > architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> > > > > > > experimental ARM64 and POWER support).
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > To gather early feedback, we announced KCSAN back in September, and have
> > > > > > > integrated the feedback where possible:
> > > > > > > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNPJ_bHjfLZCAPV23AXFfiPiyXXqqu72n6TgWzb2Gnu1eA@mail.gmail.com
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The current list of known upstream fixes for data races found by KCSAN
> > > > > > > can be found here:
> > > > > > > https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN#upstream-fixes-of-data-races-found-by-kcsan
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > We want to point out and acknowledge the work surrounding the LKMM,
> > > > > > > including several articles that motivate why data races are dangerous
> > > > > > > [1, 2], justifying a data race detector such as KCSAN.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
> > > > > > > [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/799218/
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I queued this and ran a quick rcutorture on it, which completed
> > > > > > successfully with quite a few reports.
> > > > >
> > > > > Great. Many thanks for queuing this in -rcu. And regarding merge window
> > > > > you mentioned, we're fine with your assumption to targeting the next
> > > > > (v5.6) merge window.
> > > > >
> > > > > I've just had a look at linux-next to check what a future rebase
> > > > > requires:
> > > > >
> > > > > - There is a change in lib/Kconfig.debug and moving KCSAN to the
> > > > >   "Generic Kernel Debugging Instruments" section seems appropriate.
> > > > > - bitops-instrumented.h was removed and split into 3 files, and needs
> > > > >   re-inserting the instrumentation into the right places.
> > > > >
> > > > > Otherwise there are no issues. Let me know what you recommend.
> > > >
> > > > Sounds good!
> > > >
> > > > I will be rebasing onto v5.5-rc1 shortly after it comes out.  My usual
> > > > approach is to fix any conflicts during that rebasing operation.
> > > > Does that make sense, or would you prefer to send me a rebased stack at
> > > > that point?  Either way is fine for me.
> > >
> > > That's fine with me, thanks!  To avoid too much additional churn on
> > > your end, I just replied to the bitops patch with a version that will
> > > apply with the change to bitops-instrumented infrastructure.
> >
> > My first thought was to replace 8/10 of the previous version of your
> > patch in -rcu (047ca266cfab "asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation
> > for bitops"), but this does not apply.  So I am guessing that I instead
> > do this substitution when a rebase onto -rc1..
> >
> > Except...
> >
> > > Also considering the merge window, we had a discussion and there are
> > > some arguments for targeting the v5.5 merge window:
> > > - we'd unblock ARM and POWER ports;
> > > - we'd unblock people wanting to use the data_race macro;
> > > - we'd unblock syzbot just tracking upstream;
> > > Unless there are strong reasons to not target v5.5, I leave it to you
> > > if you think it's appropriate.
> >
> > My normal process is to send the pull request shortly after -rc5 comes
> > out, but you do call out some benefits of getting it in sooner, so...
> >
> > What I will do is to rebase your series onto (say) -rc7, test it, and
> > see about an RFC pull request.
> >
> > One possible complication is the new 8/10 patch.  But maybe it will
> > apply against -rc7?
> >
> > Another possible complication is this:
> >
> > scripts/kconfig/conf  --syncconfig Kconfig
> > *
> > * Restart config...
> > *
> > *
> > * KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector
> > *
> > KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector (KCSAN) [N/y/?] (NEW)
> >
> > Might be OK in this case because it is quite obvious what it is doing.
> > (Avoiding pain from this is the reason that CONFIG_RCU_EXPERT exists.)
> >
> > But I will just mention this in the pull request.
> >
> > If there is a -rc8, there is of course a higher probability of making it
> > into the next merge window.
> >
> > Fair enough?
> 
> Totally fine with that, sounds like a good plan, thanks!
> 
> If it helps, in theory we can also drop and delay the bitops
> instrumentation patch until the new bitops instrumentation
> infrastructure is in 5.5-rc1. There won't be any false positives if
> this is missing, we might just miss a few data races until we have it.

That sounds advisable for an attempt to hit this coming merge window.

So just to make sure I understand, I drop 8/10 and keep the rest during
a rebase to 5.4-rc7, correct?

							Thanx, Paul

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-15 20:43             ` Paul E. McKenney
@ 2019-11-16  8:20               ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-16 15:34                 ` Paul E. McKenney
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-16  8:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Paul E. McKenney
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Peter Zijlstra,
	Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet, kasan-dev,
	linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Fri, 15 Nov 2019 at 21:43, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 06:14:46PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > On Fri, 15 Nov 2019 at 17:42, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 01:02:08PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > On Thu, 14 Nov 2019 at 23:16, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:33:03PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > > On Thu, 14 Nov 2019, Paul E. McKenney wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 07:02:53PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > > > > This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> > > > > > > > KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> > > > > > > > are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> > > > > > > > only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> > > > > > > > architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> > > > > > > > experimental ARM64 and POWER support).
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > To gather early feedback, we announced KCSAN back in September, and have
> > > > > > > > integrated the feedback where possible:
> > > > > > > > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNPJ_bHjfLZCAPV23AXFfiPiyXXqqu72n6TgWzb2Gnu1eA@mail.gmail.com
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > The current list of known upstream fixes for data races found by KCSAN
> > > > > > > > can be found here:
> > > > > > > > https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN#upstream-fixes-of-data-races-found-by-kcsan
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > We want to point out and acknowledge the work surrounding the LKMM,
> > > > > > > > including several articles that motivate why data races are dangerous
> > > > > > > > [1, 2], justifying a data race detector such as KCSAN.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
> > > > > > > > [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/799218/
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I queued this and ran a quick rcutorture on it, which completed
> > > > > > > successfully with quite a few reports.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Great. Many thanks for queuing this in -rcu. And regarding merge window
> > > > > > you mentioned, we're fine with your assumption to targeting the next
> > > > > > (v5.6) merge window.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I've just had a look at linux-next to check what a future rebase
> > > > > > requires:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > - There is a change in lib/Kconfig.debug and moving KCSAN to the
> > > > > >   "Generic Kernel Debugging Instruments" section seems appropriate.
> > > > > > - bitops-instrumented.h was removed and split into 3 files, and needs
> > > > > >   re-inserting the instrumentation into the right places.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Otherwise there are no issues. Let me know what you recommend.
> > > > >
> > > > > Sounds good!
> > > > >
> > > > > I will be rebasing onto v5.5-rc1 shortly after it comes out.  My usual
> > > > > approach is to fix any conflicts during that rebasing operation.
> > > > > Does that make sense, or would you prefer to send me a rebased stack at
> > > > > that point?  Either way is fine for me.
> > > >
> > > > That's fine with me, thanks!  To avoid too much additional churn on
> > > > your end, I just replied to the bitops patch with a version that will
> > > > apply with the change to bitops-instrumented infrastructure.
> > >
> > > My first thought was to replace 8/10 of the previous version of your
> > > patch in -rcu (047ca266cfab "asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation
> > > for bitops"), but this does not apply.  So I am guessing that I instead
> > > do this substitution when a rebase onto -rc1..
> > >
> > > Except...
> > >
> > > > Also considering the merge window, we had a discussion and there are
> > > > some arguments for targeting the v5.5 merge window:
> > > > - we'd unblock ARM and POWER ports;
> > > > - we'd unblock people wanting to use the data_race macro;
> > > > - we'd unblock syzbot just tracking upstream;
> > > > Unless there are strong reasons to not target v5.5, I leave it to you
> > > > if you think it's appropriate.
> > >
> > > My normal process is to send the pull request shortly after -rc5 comes
> > > out, but you do call out some benefits of getting it in sooner, so...
> > >
> > > What I will do is to rebase your series onto (say) -rc7, test it, and
> > > see about an RFC pull request.
> > >
> > > One possible complication is the new 8/10 patch.  But maybe it will
> > > apply against -rc7?
> > >
> > > Another possible complication is this:
> > >
> > > scripts/kconfig/conf  --syncconfig Kconfig
> > > *
> > > * Restart config...
> > > *
> > > *
> > > * KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector
> > > *
> > > KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector (KCSAN) [N/y/?] (NEW)
> > >
> > > Might be OK in this case because it is quite obvious what it is doing.
> > > (Avoiding pain from this is the reason that CONFIG_RCU_EXPERT exists.)
> > >
> > > But I will just mention this in the pull request.
> > >
> > > If there is a -rc8, there is of course a higher probability of making it
> > > into the next merge window.
> > >
> > > Fair enough?
> >
> > Totally fine with that, sounds like a good plan, thanks!
> >
> > If it helps, in theory we can also drop and delay the bitops
> > instrumentation patch until the new bitops instrumentation
> > infrastructure is in 5.5-rc1. There won't be any false positives if
> > this is missing, we might just miss a few data races until we have it.
>
> That sounds advisable for an attempt to hit this coming merge window.
>
> So just to make sure I understand, I drop 8/10 and keep the rest during
> a rebase to 5.4-rc7, correct?

Yes, that's right.

Many thanks,
-- Marco

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-16  8:20               ` Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-16 15:34                 ` Paul E. McKenney
  2019-11-16 18:09                   ` Marco Elver
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Paul E. McKenney @ 2019-11-16 15:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Marco Elver
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Peter Zijlstra,
	Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet, kasan-dev,
	linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Sat, Nov 16, 2019 at 09:20:54AM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Fri, 15 Nov 2019 at 21:43, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 06:14:46PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > On Fri, 15 Nov 2019 at 17:42, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 01:02:08PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, 14 Nov 2019 at 23:16, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:33:03PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > > > On Thu, 14 Nov 2019, Paul E. McKenney wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 07:02:53PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > > > > > This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> > > > > > > > > KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> > > > > > > > > are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> > > > > > > > > only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> > > > > > > > > architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> > > > > > > > > experimental ARM64 and POWER support).
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > To gather early feedback, we announced KCSAN back in September, and have
> > > > > > > > > integrated the feedback where possible:
> > > > > > > > > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNPJ_bHjfLZCAPV23AXFfiPiyXXqqu72n6TgWzb2Gnu1eA@mail.gmail.com
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > The current list of known upstream fixes for data races found by KCSAN
> > > > > > > > > can be found here:
> > > > > > > > > https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN#upstream-fixes-of-data-races-found-by-kcsan
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > We want to point out and acknowledge the work surrounding the LKMM,
> > > > > > > > > including several articles that motivate why data races are dangerous
> > > > > > > > > [1, 2], justifying a data race detector such as KCSAN.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
> > > > > > > > > [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/799218/
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I queued this and ran a quick rcutorture on it, which completed
> > > > > > > > successfully with quite a few reports.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Great. Many thanks for queuing this in -rcu. And regarding merge window
> > > > > > > you mentioned, we're fine with your assumption to targeting the next
> > > > > > > (v5.6) merge window.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I've just had a look at linux-next to check what a future rebase
> > > > > > > requires:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > - There is a change in lib/Kconfig.debug and moving KCSAN to the
> > > > > > >   "Generic Kernel Debugging Instruments" section seems appropriate.
> > > > > > > - bitops-instrumented.h was removed and split into 3 files, and needs
> > > > > > >   re-inserting the instrumentation into the right places.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Otherwise there are no issues. Let me know what you recommend.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Sounds good!
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I will be rebasing onto v5.5-rc1 shortly after it comes out.  My usual
> > > > > > approach is to fix any conflicts during that rebasing operation.
> > > > > > Does that make sense, or would you prefer to send me a rebased stack at
> > > > > > that point?  Either way is fine for me.
> > > > >
> > > > > That's fine with me, thanks!  To avoid too much additional churn on
> > > > > your end, I just replied to the bitops patch with a version that will
> > > > > apply with the change to bitops-instrumented infrastructure.
> > > >
> > > > My first thought was to replace 8/10 of the previous version of your
> > > > patch in -rcu (047ca266cfab "asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation
> > > > for bitops"), but this does not apply.  So I am guessing that I instead
> > > > do this substitution when a rebase onto -rc1..
> > > >
> > > > Except...
> > > >
> > > > > Also considering the merge window, we had a discussion and there are
> > > > > some arguments for targeting the v5.5 merge window:
> > > > > - we'd unblock ARM and POWER ports;
> > > > > - we'd unblock people wanting to use the data_race macro;
> > > > > - we'd unblock syzbot just tracking upstream;
> > > > > Unless there are strong reasons to not target v5.5, I leave it to you
> > > > > if you think it's appropriate.
> > > >
> > > > My normal process is to send the pull request shortly after -rc5 comes
> > > > out, but you do call out some benefits of getting it in sooner, so...
> > > >
> > > > What I will do is to rebase your series onto (say) -rc7, test it, and
> > > > see about an RFC pull request.
> > > >
> > > > One possible complication is the new 8/10 patch.  But maybe it will
> > > > apply against -rc7?
> > > >
> > > > Another possible complication is this:
> > > >
> > > > scripts/kconfig/conf  --syncconfig Kconfig
> > > > *
> > > > * Restart config...
> > > > *
> > > > *
> > > > * KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector
> > > > *
> > > > KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector (KCSAN) [N/y/?] (NEW)
> > > >
> > > > Might be OK in this case because it is quite obvious what it is doing.
> > > > (Avoiding pain from this is the reason that CONFIG_RCU_EXPERT exists.)
> > > >
> > > > But I will just mention this in the pull request.
> > > >
> > > > If there is a -rc8, there is of course a higher probability of making it
> > > > into the next merge window.
> > > >
> > > > Fair enough?
> > >
> > > Totally fine with that, sounds like a good plan, thanks!
> > >
> > > If it helps, in theory we can also drop and delay the bitops
> > > instrumentation patch until the new bitops instrumentation
> > > infrastructure is in 5.5-rc1. There won't be any false positives if
> > > this is missing, we might just miss a few data races until we have it.
> >
> > That sounds advisable for an attempt to hit this coming merge window.
> >
> > So just to make sure I understand, I drop 8/10 and keep the rest during
> > a rebase to 5.4-rc7, correct?
> 
> Yes, that's right.

Very good, I just now pushed a "kcsan" branch on -rcu, and am running
rcutorture, first without KCSAN enabled and then with it turned on.
If all that works out, I set my -next branch to that point and see what
-next testing and kbuild test robot think about it.  If all goes well,
an RFC pull request.

Look OK?

							Thanx, Paul

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-16 15:34                 ` Paul E. McKenney
@ 2019-11-16 18:09                   ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-16 18:28                     ` Paul E. McKenney
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-16 18:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Paul E. McKenney
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Peter Zijlstra,
	Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet, kasan-dev,
	linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Sat, 16 Nov 2019 at 16:34, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Nov 16, 2019 at 09:20:54AM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > On Fri, 15 Nov 2019 at 21:43, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 06:14:46PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > On Fri, 15 Nov 2019 at 17:42, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 01:02:08PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > > On Thu, 14 Nov 2019 at 23:16, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:33:03PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > > > > On Thu, 14 Nov 2019, Paul E. McKenney wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 07:02:53PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> > > > > > > > > > KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> > > > > > > > > > are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> > > > > > > > > > only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> > > > > > > > > > architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> > > > > > > > > > experimental ARM64 and POWER support).
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > To gather early feedback, we announced KCSAN back in September, and have
> > > > > > > > > > integrated the feedback where possible:
> > > > > > > > > > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNPJ_bHjfLZCAPV23AXFfiPiyXXqqu72n6TgWzb2Gnu1eA@mail.gmail.com
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > The current list of known upstream fixes for data races found by KCSAN
> > > > > > > > > > can be found here:
> > > > > > > > > > https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN#upstream-fixes-of-data-races-found-by-kcsan
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > We want to point out and acknowledge the work surrounding the LKMM,
> > > > > > > > > > including several articles that motivate why data races are dangerous
> > > > > > > > > > [1, 2], justifying a data race detector such as KCSAN.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
> > > > > > > > > > [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/799218/
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > I queued this and ran a quick rcutorture on it, which completed
> > > > > > > > > successfully with quite a few reports.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Great. Many thanks for queuing this in -rcu. And regarding merge window
> > > > > > > > you mentioned, we're fine with your assumption to targeting the next
> > > > > > > > (v5.6) merge window.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I've just had a look at linux-next to check what a future rebase
> > > > > > > > requires:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > - There is a change in lib/Kconfig.debug and moving KCSAN to the
> > > > > > > >   "Generic Kernel Debugging Instruments" section seems appropriate.
> > > > > > > > - bitops-instrumented.h was removed and split into 3 files, and needs
> > > > > > > >   re-inserting the instrumentation into the right places.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Otherwise there are no issues. Let me know what you recommend.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Sounds good!
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I will be rebasing onto v5.5-rc1 shortly after it comes out.  My usual
> > > > > > > approach is to fix any conflicts during that rebasing operation.
> > > > > > > Does that make sense, or would you prefer to send me a rebased stack at
> > > > > > > that point?  Either way is fine for me.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > That's fine with me, thanks!  To avoid too much additional churn on
> > > > > > your end, I just replied to the bitops patch with a version that will
> > > > > > apply with the change to bitops-instrumented infrastructure.
> > > > >
> > > > > My first thought was to replace 8/10 of the previous version of your
> > > > > patch in -rcu (047ca266cfab "asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation
> > > > > for bitops"), but this does not apply.  So I am guessing that I instead
> > > > > do this substitution when a rebase onto -rc1..
> > > > >
> > > > > Except...
> > > > >
> > > > > > Also considering the merge window, we had a discussion and there are
> > > > > > some arguments for targeting the v5.5 merge window:
> > > > > > - we'd unblock ARM and POWER ports;
> > > > > > - we'd unblock people wanting to use the data_race macro;
> > > > > > - we'd unblock syzbot just tracking upstream;
> > > > > > Unless there are strong reasons to not target v5.5, I leave it to you
> > > > > > if you think it's appropriate.
> > > > >
> > > > > My normal process is to send the pull request shortly after -rc5 comes
> > > > > out, but you do call out some benefits of getting it in sooner, so...
> > > > >
> > > > > What I will do is to rebase your series onto (say) -rc7, test it, and
> > > > > see about an RFC pull request.
> > > > >
> > > > > One possible complication is the new 8/10 patch.  But maybe it will
> > > > > apply against -rc7?
> > > > >
> > > > > Another possible complication is this:
> > > > >
> > > > > scripts/kconfig/conf  --syncconfig Kconfig
> > > > > *
> > > > > * Restart config...
> > > > > *
> > > > > *
> > > > > * KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector
> > > > > *
> > > > > KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector (KCSAN) [N/y/?] (NEW)
> > > > >
> > > > > Might be OK in this case because it is quite obvious what it is doing.
> > > > > (Avoiding pain from this is the reason that CONFIG_RCU_EXPERT exists.)
> > > > >
> > > > > But I will just mention this in the pull request.
> > > > >
> > > > > If there is a -rc8, there is of course a higher probability of making it
> > > > > into the next merge window.
> > > > >
> > > > > Fair enough?
> > > >
> > > > Totally fine with that, sounds like a good plan, thanks!
> > > >
> > > > If it helps, in theory we can also drop and delay the bitops
> > > > instrumentation patch until the new bitops instrumentation
> > > > infrastructure is in 5.5-rc1. There won't be any false positives if
> > > > this is missing, we might just miss a few data races until we have it.
> > >
> > > That sounds advisable for an attempt to hit this coming merge window.
> > >
> > > So just to make sure I understand, I drop 8/10 and keep the rest during
> > > a rebase to 5.4-rc7, correct?
> >
> > Yes, that's right.
>
> Very good, I just now pushed a "kcsan" branch on -rcu, and am running
> rcutorture, first without KCSAN enabled and then with it turned on.
> If all that works out, I set my -next branch to that point and see what
> -next testing and kbuild test robot think about it.  If all goes well,
> an RFC pull request.
>
> Look OK?

Looks good to me, many thanks!

-- Marco

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-16 18:09                   ` Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-16 18:28                     ` Paul E. McKenney
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Paul E. McKenney @ 2019-11-16 18:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Marco Elver
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Peter Zijlstra,
	Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet, kasan-dev,
	linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Sat, Nov 16, 2019 at 07:09:21PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Sat, 16 Nov 2019 at 16:34, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Sat, Nov 16, 2019 at 09:20:54AM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > On Fri, 15 Nov 2019 at 21:43, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 06:14:46PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, 15 Nov 2019 at 17:42, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 01:02:08PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > > > On Thu, 14 Nov 2019 at 23:16, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:33:03PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > > > > > On Thu, 14 Nov 2019, Paul E. McKenney wrote:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 07:02:53PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> > > > > > > > > > > KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> > > > > > > > > > > are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> > > > > > > > > > > only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> > > > > > > > > > > architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> > > > > > > > > > > experimental ARM64 and POWER support).
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > To gather early feedback, we announced KCSAN back in September, and have
> > > > > > > > > > > integrated the feedback where possible:
> > > > > > > > > > > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNPJ_bHjfLZCAPV23AXFfiPiyXXqqu72n6TgWzb2Gnu1eA@mail.gmail.com
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > The current list of known upstream fixes for data races found by KCSAN
> > > > > > > > > > > can be found here:
> > > > > > > > > > > https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN#upstream-fixes-of-data-races-found-by-kcsan
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > We want to point out and acknowledge the work surrounding the LKMM,
> > > > > > > > > > > including several articles that motivate why data races are dangerous
> > > > > > > > > > > [1, 2], justifying a data race detector such as KCSAN.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
> > > > > > > > > > > [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/799218/
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > I queued this and ran a quick rcutorture on it, which completed
> > > > > > > > > > successfully with quite a few reports.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Great. Many thanks for queuing this in -rcu. And regarding merge window
> > > > > > > > > you mentioned, we're fine with your assumption to targeting the next
> > > > > > > > > (v5.6) merge window.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > I've just had a look at linux-next to check what a future rebase
> > > > > > > > > requires:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > - There is a change in lib/Kconfig.debug and moving KCSAN to the
> > > > > > > > >   "Generic Kernel Debugging Instruments" section seems appropriate.
> > > > > > > > > - bitops-instrumented.h was removed and split into 3 files, and needs
> > > > > > > > >   re-inserting the instrumentation into the right places.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Otherwise there are no issues. Let me know what you recommend.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Sounds good!
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I will be rebasing onto v5.5-rc1 shortly after it comes out.  My usual
> > > > > > > > approach is to fix any conflicts during that rebasing operation.
> > > > > > > > Does that make sense, or would you prefer to send me a rebased stack at
> > > > > > > > that point?  Either way is fine for me.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > That's fine with me, thanks!  To avoid too much additional churn on
> > > > > > > your end, I just replied to the bitops patch with a version that will
> > > > > > > apply with the change to bitops-instrumented infrastructure.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > My first thought was to replace 8/10 of the previous version of your
> > > > > > patch in -rcu (047ca266cfab "asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation
> > > > > > for bitops"), but this does not apply.  So I am guessing that I instead
> > > > > > do this substitution when a rebase onto -rc1..
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Except...
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Also considering the merge window, we had a discussion and there are
> > > > > > > some arguments for targeting the v5.5 merge window:
> > > > > > > - we'd unblock ARM and POWER ports;
> > > > > > > - we'd unblock people wanting to use the data_race macro;
> > > > > > > - we'd unblock syzbot just tracking upstream;
> > > > > > > Unless there are strong reasons to not target v5.5, I leave it to you
> > > > > > > if you think it's appropriate.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > My normal process is to send the pull request shortly after -rc5 comes
> > > > > > out, but you do call out some benefits of getting it in sooner, so...
> > > > > >
> > > > > > What I will do is to rebase your series onto (say) -rc7, test it, and
> > > > > > see about an RFC pull request.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > One possible complication is the new 8/10 patch.  But maybe it will
> > > > > > apply against -rc7?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Another possible complication is this:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > scripts/kconfig/conf  --syncconfig Kconfig
> > > > > > *
> > > > > > * Restart config...
> > > > > > *
> > > > > > *
> > > > > > * KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector
> > > > > > *
> > > > > > KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector (KCSAN) [N/y/?] (NEW)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Might be OK in this case because it is quite obvious what it is doing.
> > > > > > (Avoiding pain from this is the reason that CONFIG_RCU_EXPERT exists.)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > But I will just mention this in the pull request.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > If there is a -rc8, there is of course a higher probability of making it
> > > > > > into the next merge window.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Fair enough?
> > > > >
> > > > > Totally fine with that, sounds like a good plan, thanks!
> > > > >
> > > > > If it helps, in theory we can also drop and delay the bitops
> > > > > instrumentation patch until the new bitops instrumentation
> > > > > infrastructure is in 5.5-rc1. There won't be any false positives if
> > > > > this is missing, we might just miss a few data races until we have it.
> > > >
> > > > That sounds advisable for an attempt to hit this coming merge window.
> > > >
> > > > So just to make sure I understand, I drop 8/10 and keep the rest during
> > > > a rebase to 5.4-rc7, correct?
> > >
> > > Yes, that's right.
> >
> > Very good, I just now pushed a "kcsan" branch on -rcu, and am running
> > rcutorture, first without KCSAN enabled and then with it turned on.
> > If all that works out, I set my -next branch to that point and see what
> > -next testing and kbuild test robot think about it.  If all goes well,
> > an RFC pull request.
> >
> > Look OK?
> 
> Looks good to me, many thanks!

And I did get one failure on the KCSAN=n run for the TREE03 scenario,
but it does not appear to be your fault.  Looks like a race between a
swait_queue_head swake_up_one() invocation and one of the CPU hotplug
operations done late in system shutdown.  I have included the splat
below for your amusement.

Starting the KCSAN=y runs now.

							Thanx, Paul

------------------------------------------------------------------------

[  601.009355] reboot: Power down
[  601.010447] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  601.011020] sched: Unexpected reschedule of offline CPU#1!
[  601.011639] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 0 at arch/x86/kernel/apic/ipi.c:67 native_smp_send_reschedule+0x2f/0x40
[  601.012692] Modules linked in:
[  601.013037] CPU: 7 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc7+ #1497
[  601.013755] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  601.014708] RIP: 0010:native_smp_send_reschedule+0x2f/0x40
[  601.015312] Code: 05 f6 62 5d 01 73 15 48 8b 05 cd ba 28 01 be fd 00 00 00 48 8b 40 30 e9 bf b0 db 00 89 fe 48 c7 c7 d0 df 5e a7 e8 01 20 02 00 <0f> 0b c3 0f 1f 40 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 05 99 ba
[  601.017357] RSP: 0018:ffffa1afc020cee0 EFLAGS: 00010086
[  601.017942] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8d5c1ed24a54 RCX: 0000000000000005
[  601.018716] RDX: 0000000080000005 RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[  601.019500] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000cd5 R09: 000000000000003d
[  601.020283] R10: ffff8d5c1f067f80 R11: 20666f20656c7564 R12: 0000000000000001
[  601.021074] R13: 0000000000027f40 R14: 0000000000000087 R15: ffff8d5c1ed23f00
[  601.021851] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d5c1f1c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  601.022731] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  601.023360] CR2: 00000000ffffffff CR3: 000000001120a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  601.024140] Call Trace:
[  601.024437]  <IRQ>
[  601.024671]  try_to_wake_up+0x2b3/0x650
[  601.025103]  swake_up_locked.part.6+0xe/0x30
[  601.025579]  swake_up_one+0x22/0x30
[  601.025968]  rcu_try_advance_all_cbs+0x71/0x80
[  601.026459]  rcu_cleanup_after_idle+0x28/0x40
[  601.026941]  rcu_irq_enter+0xfb/0x130
[  601.027347]  irq_enter+0x5/0x50
[  601.027704]  smp_reboot_interrupt+0x1a/0xb0
[  601.028175]  ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa1/0x180
[  601.028711]  reboot_interrupt+0xf/0x20
[  601.029134]  </IRQ>
[  601.029374] RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x1e/0x170
[  601.029853] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 41 55 41 54 55 53 e8 c5 c5 91 ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d e6 b4 54 00 fb f4 <e8> ad c5 91 ff 89 c5 0f 1f 44 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d c3 65 8b 05
[  601.031884] RSP: 0018:ffffa1afc00afec0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff07
[  601.032716] RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: 0000000000000007
[  601.033498] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000087 RDI: ffffffffa769a760
[  601.034280] RBP: ffffffffa7a1c160 R08: 0000009a8e03a656 R09: 0000000000000001
[  601.035062] R10: 0000000000000400 R11: 00000000000001d8 R12: 0000000000000000
[  601.035842] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  601.036632]  do_idle+0x1a6/0x240
[  601.036996]  cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20
[  601.037433]  start_secondary+0x150/0x180
[  601.037869]  secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
[  601.038339] ---[ end trace e4c21199f3882c03 ]---
[  601.038991] acpi_power_off called

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-19 19:27   ` Qian Cai
  2019-11-19 19:54     ` Marco Elver
  2020-01-03  5:13   ` Qian Cai
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Qian Cai @ 2019-11-19 19:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Marco Elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

On Thu, 2019-11-14 at 19:02 +0100, 'Marco Elver' via kasan-dev wrote:

> +menuconfig KCSAN
> +	bool "KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector"
> +	depends on HAVE_ARCH_KCSAN && !KASAN && STACKTRACE

"!KASAN" makes me sorrow. What's problem of those two?

> +	default n
> +	help
> +	  Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer is a dynamic data race detector, which
> +	  uses a watchpoint-based sampling approach to detect races. See
> +	  <file:Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst> for more details.
> +


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
                   ` (10 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-11-14 19:50 ` [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Paul E. McKenney
@ 2019-11-19 19:50 ` Qian Cai
  2019-11-19 20:12 ` Qian Cai
  12 siblings, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Qian Cai @ 2019-11-19 19:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Marco Elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

On Thu, 2019-11-14 at 19:02 +0100, 'Marco Elver' via kasan-dev wrote:
> This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> experimental ARM64 and POWER support).

Just booting x86 systems because kcsan_setup_watchpoint() disabled hard irqs?

[    8.926145][    T0] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    8.927850][    T0] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!current->hardirqs_enabled)
[    80] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4406
check_flags.part.26+0x102/0x240
[    8.933072][    T0] Modules linked in:
[    8.933072][    T0] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc8-next-
20191119+ #2
[    8.933072][    T0] Hardware name: HP ProLiant XL420 Gen9/ProLiant XL420
Gen9, BIOS U19 12/27/2015
[    8.933072][    T0] RIP: 0010:check_flags.part.26+0x102/0x240
[    8.933072][    T0] Code: 7b a2 e8 51 6d 15 00 44 8b 05 fa df 45 01 45 85 c0
0f 85 27 76 00 00 48 c7 c6 02 d6 3b a2 48 c7 c7 79 36 3b a2 e8 2f 9f f5 ff <0f>
e9 0d 76 00 00 65 48 8b 3c 25 40 3f 01 00 e8 89 f0 ff ff e8
[    8.933072][    T0] RSP: 0000:ffffffffa2603860 EFLAGS: 00010086
[    8.933072][    T0] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffa2617b40 RCX:
0000000000000000
[    8.933072][    T0] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI:
0000000000000000
[    8.933072][    T0] RBP: ffffffffa2603868 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
0000ffffa27bcad4
[    8.933072][    T0] R10: 0000ffffffffffff R11: 0000ffffa27bcad7 R12:
0000000000000168
[    8.933072][    T0] R13: 0000000000092cc0 R14: 0000000000000246 R15:
ffffffffa1664c89
[    8.933072][    T0] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8987f3000000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[    8.933072][    T0] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    8.933072][    T0] CR2: ffff898bfc9ff000 CR3: 000000033dc0e001 CR4:
00000000001606f0
[    8.933072][    T0] Call Trace:
[    8.933072][    T0]  lock_is_held_type+0x66/0x13072][    T0]  ?
rcu_is_watching+0x79/0xa0
[    8.933072][    T0]  ? create_object+0x69/0x690
[    8.933072][    T0]  rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x7f/0xa0
[    8.933072][    T0]  kmem_cache_alloc+0x3b2/0x420
[    8.933072][    T0]  ? create_object+0x69/0x690
[    8.933072][    T0]  create_object+0x69/0x690
[    8.933072][    T0]  ? find_next_bit+0x7b/0xa0
[    8.933072][    T0]  kmemleak_alloc_percpu+0xde/0x170
[    8.933072][    T0]  pcpu_alloc+0x683/0xc90
[    8.933072][    T0]  __alloc_percpu+0x2d/0x40
[    8.933072][    T0]  alloc_vfsmnt+0xd1/0x380
[    8.933072][    T0]  vfs_create_mount+0x7f/0x2e0
[    8.933072][    T0]  ? proc_get_tree+0x4d/0x60
[    8.933072][    T0]  fc_mount+0x6d/0x80
[    8.933072][    T0]  pid_ns_prepare_proc+0x133/0x190
[    8.933072][    T0]  alloc_pid+0x5c3/0x600
[    8.933072][    T0]  copy_process+0x1ca3/0x3480
[    8.933072][    T0]  ? __lock_acquire+0x739/0x25d0
[    8.933072][    T0]  _do_fork+0xaa/0x9c0
[    8.933072][    T0]  ? rcu_blocking_is_gp+0x83/0xb0
[    8.933072][    T0]  ? synchronize_rcu_expedited+0x80/0x6c0
[    8.933072][    T0]  ? rcu_blocking_is_gp+0x83/0xb0
[    8.933072][    T0]  ? rest_init+0x381/0x381
[    8.933072][    T0]  kernel_thread+0xb0/0xe0
[    8.933072][    T0]  ? rest_init+0x381/0x381
[    8.933072][    T0]  rest_init+0x31/0x381
[    8.933072][   st_init+0x17/0x29
[    8.933072][    T0]  start_kernel+0x6ac/0x6d0
[    8.933072][    T0]  x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x26
[    8.933072][    T0]  x86_64_start_kernel+0xef/0xf6
[    8.933072][    T0]  secondary_startup_64+0xb6/0xc0
[    8.933072][    T0] irq event stamp: 75594
[    8.933072][    T0] hardirqs last  enabled at (75593): [<ffffffffa1203d52>]
trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[    8.933072][    T0] hardirqs last disabled at (75594): [<ffffffffa14b4f96>]
kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x96/0x200
[    8.933072][    T0] softirqs last  enabled at (75592): [<ffffffffa200034c>]
__do_softirq+0x34c/0x57c
[    8.933072][    T0] softirqs last disabled at (75585): [<ffffffffa12c6fb2>]
irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0
[    8.933072][    T0] ---[ end trace f4a667495da45c20 ]---
[    8.933072][    T0] possible reason: unannotated irqs-on.
[    8.933072][    T0] irq event stamp: 75594
[    8.933072][    T0] hardirqs last  enabled at (75593): [<ffffffffa1203d52>]
trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[    8.933072][    T0] hardirqs last disabled at (75594): [<ffffffffa14b4f96>]
kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x96/0x200
[    8.933072][    T0] softirqs last  enabled at (75592): [<ffffffffa200034c>]
__do_softirq+0x34c/0x57c
[    8.933072][    T0] softirqs last disabled at (75585): [<ffffffffa12c6fb2>]
irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0


> 
> To gather early feedback, we announced KCSAN back in September, and have
> integrated the feedback where possible:
> http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNPJ_bHjfLZCAPV23AXFfiPiyXXqqu72n6TgWzb2Gnu1eA@mail.gmail.com
> 
> The current list of known upstream fixes for data races found by KCSAN
> can be found here:
> https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN#upstream-fixes-of-data-races-found-by-kcsan
> 
> We want to point out and acknowledge the work surrounding the LKMM,
> including several articles that motivate why data races are dangerous
> [1, 2], justifying a data race detector such as KCSAN.
> 
> [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
> [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/799218/
> 
> Race conditions vs. data races
> ------------------------------
> 
> Race conditions are logic bugs, where unexpected interleaving of racing
> concurrent operations result in an erroneous state.
> 
> Data races on the other hand are defined at the *memory model/language
> level*.  Many data races are also harmful race conditions, which a tool
> like KCSAN reports!  However, not all data races are race conditions and
> vice-versa.  KCSAN's intent is to report data races according to the
> LKMM. A data race detector can only work at the memory model/language
> level.
> 
> Deeper analysis, to find high-level race conditions only, requires
> conveying the intended kernel logic to a tool. This requires (1) the
> developer writing a specification or model of their code, and then (2)
> the tool verifying that the implementation matches. This has been done
> for small bits of code using model checkers and other formal methods,
> but does not scale to the level of what can be covered with a dynamic
> analysis based data race detector such as KCSAN.
> 
> For reasons outlined in [1, 2], data races can be much more subtle, but
> can cause no less harm than high-level race conditions.
> 
> Changelog
> ---------
> v4:
> * Major changes:
>  - Optimizations resulting in performance improvement of 33% (on
>    microbenchmark).
>  - Deal with nested interrupts for atomic_next.
>  - Simplify report.c (removing double-locking as well), in preparation
>    for KCSAN_REPORT_VALUE_CHANGE_ONLY.
>  - Add patch to introduce "data_race(expr)" macro.
>  - Introduce KCSAN_REPORT_VALUE_CHANGE_ONLY option for further filtering of data
>    races: if a conflicting write was observed via a watchpoint, only report the
>    data race if a value change was observed as well. The option will be enabled
>    by default on syzbot. (rcu-functions will be excluded from this filter at
>    request of Paul McKenney.) Context:
>    http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNOepvb6+zJmDePxj21n2rctM4Sp4rJ66x_J-L1UmNK54A@mail.gmail.com
> 
> v3: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191104142745.14722-1-elver@google.com
> * Major changes:
>  - Add microbenchmark.
>  - Add instruction watchpoint skip randomization.
>  - Refactor API and core runtime fast-path and slow-path. Compared to
>    the previous version, with a default config and benchmarked using the
>    added microbenchmark, this version is 3.8x faster.
>  - Make __tsan_unaligned __alias of generic accesses.
>  - Rename kcsan_{begin,end}_atomic ->
>    kcsan_{nestable,flat}_atomic_{begin,end}
>  - For filter list in debugfs.c use kmalloc+krealloc instead of
>    kvmalloc.
>  - Split Documentation into separate patch.
> 
> v2: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191017141305.146193-1-elver@google.com
> * Major changes:
>  - Replace kcsan_check_access(.., {true, false}) with
>    kcsan_check_{read,write}.
>  - Change atomic-instrumented.h to use __atomic_check_{read,write}.
>  - Use common struct kcsan_ctx in task_struct and for per-CPU interrupt
>    contexts.
> 
> v1: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191016083959.186860-1-elver@google.com
> 
> Marco Elver (10):
>   kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
>   include/linux/compiler.h: Introduce data_race(expr) macro
>   kcsan: Add Documentation entry in dev-tools
>   objtool, kcsan: Add KCSAN runtime functions to whitelist
>   build, kcsan: Add KCSAN build exceptions
>   seqlock, kcsan: Add annotations for KCSAN
>   seqlock: Require WRITE_ONCE surrounding raw_seqcount_barrier
>   asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation for bitops
>   locking/atomics, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation
>   x86, kcsan: Enable KCSAN for x86
> 
>  Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst         |   1 +
>  Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst         | 256 +++++++++
>  MAINTAINERS                               |  11 +
>  Makefile                                  |   3 +-
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                          |   1 +
>  arch/x86/boot/Makefile                    |   2 +
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile         |   2 +
>  arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile              |   3 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h             |   6 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/Makefile                  |   4 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile              |   3 +
>  arch/x86/lib/Makefile                     |   4 +
>  arch/x86/mm/Makefile                      |   4 +
>  arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile               |   2 +
>  arch/x86/realmode/Makefile                |   3 +
>  arch/x86/realmode/rm/Makefile             |   3 +
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile     |   2 +
>  include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h | 393 +++++++-------
>  include/asm-generic/bitops-instrumented.h |  18 +
>  include/linux/compiler-clang.h            |   9 +
>  include/linux/compiler-gcc.h              |   7 +
>  include/linux/compiler.h                  |  57 +-
>  include/linux/kcsan-checks.h              |  97 ++++
>  include/linux/kcsan.h                     | 115 ++++
>  include/linux/sched.h                     |   4 +
>  include/linux/seqlock.h                   |  51 +-
>  init/init_task.c                          |   8 +
>  init/main.c                               |   2 +
>  kernel/Makefile                           |   6 +
>  kernel/kcsan/Makefile                     |  11 +
>  kernel/kcsan/atomic.h                     |  27 +
>  kernel/kcsan/core.c                       | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  kernel/kcsan/debugfs.c                    | 275 ++++++++++
>  kernel/kcsan/encoding.h                   |  94 ++++
>  kernel/kcsan/kcsan.h                      | 108 ++++
>  kernel/kcsan/report.c                     | 320 +++++++++++
>  kernel/kcsan/test.c                       | 121 +++++
>  kernel/sched/Makefile                     |   6 +
>  lib/Kconfig.debug                         |   2 +
>  lib/Kconfig.kcsan                         | 118 ++++
>  lib/Makefile                              |   3 +
>  mm/Makefile                               |   8 +
>  scripts/Makefile.kcsan                    |   6 +
>  scripts/Makefile.lib                      |  10 +
>  scripts/atomic/gen-atomic-instrumented.sh |  17 +-
>  tools/objtool/check.c                     |  18 +
>  46 files changed, 2641 insertions(+), 206 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst
>  create mode 100644 include/linux/kcsan-checks.h
>  create mode 100644 include/linux/kcsan.h
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/Makefile
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/atomic.h
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/core.c
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/debugfs.c
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/encoding.h
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/kcsan.h
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/report.c
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/test.c
>  create mode 100644 lib/Kconfig.kcsan
>  create mode 100644 scripts/Makefile.kcsan
> 
> -- 
> 2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  2019-11-19 19:27   ` Qian Cai
@ 2019-11-19 19:54     ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-19 21:42       ` Qian Cai
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-19 19:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Qian Cai
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Paul E. McKenney,
	Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet,
	kasan-dev, linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Tue, 19 Nov 2019 at 20:27, Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 2019-11-14 at 19:02 +0100, 'Marco Elver' via kasan-dev wrote:
>
> > +menuconfig KCSAN
> > +     bool "KCSAN: watchpoint-based dynamic data race detector"
> > +     depends on HAVE_ARCH_KCSAN && !KASAN && STACKTRACE
>
> "!KASAN" makes me sorrow. What's problem of those two?

Both of them instrument memory accesses, and gcc doesn't let us
combine '-fsanitize={kernel-,}address' and '-fsanitize=thread'.

> cc1: error: ‘-fsanitize=address’ and ‘-fsanitize=kernel-address’ are incompatible with ‘-fsanitize=thread’

In principle, it may be possible:
- either by updating the compiler, which we want to avoid because we'd
have to convince gcc and clang to do this; I can see this being
infeasible because the compiler needs to become aware (somehow
propagate in the IR) of what is ASAN inline-instrumentation and what
is TSAN instrumentation and not emit recursive instrumentation.
- or somehow merging the instrumentation, but, IMHO this is probably a
really bad idea for various other reasons (complexity, performance,
stability, etc.).

Regardless of approach, my guess is that the complexity outweighs any
benefits this may provide in the end. Not only would a hypothetical
kernel that combines these be extremely slow, it'd also diminish the
practical value because testing and finding bugs would also be
impaired due to performance.

Thanks,
-- Marco

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
                   ` (11 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-11-19 19:50 ` Qian Cai
@ 2019-11-19 20:12 ` Qian Cai
  2019-11-19 21:50   ` Marco Elver
  12 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Qian Cai @ 2019-11-19 20:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Marco Elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, glider, parri.andrea, andreyknvl, luto,
	ard.biesheuvel, arnd, boqun.feng, bp, dja, dlustig, dave.hansen,
	dhowells, dvyukov, hpa, mingo, j.alglave, joel, corbet, jpoimboe,
	luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck, peterz, tglx, will,
	edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-efi,
	linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86

On Thu, 2019-11-14 at 19:02 +0100, 'Marco Elver' via kasan-dev wrote:
> This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> experimental ARM64 and POWER support).

This does not allow the system to boot. Just hang forever at the end.

https://cailca.github.io/files/dmesg.txt

the config (dselect KASAN and select KCSAN with default options):

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cailca/linux-mm/master/x86.config

> 
> To gather early feedback, we announced KCSAN back in September, and have
> integrated the feedback where possible:
> http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNPJ_bHjfLZCAPV23AXFfiPiyXXqqu72n6TgWzb2Gnu1eA@mail.gmail.com
> 
> The current list of known upstream fixes for data races found by KCSAN
> can be found here:
> https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN#upstream-fixes-of-data-races-found-by-kcsan
> 
> We want to point out and acknowledge the work surrounding the LKMM,
> including several articles that motivate why data races are dangerous
> [1, 2], justifying a data race detector such as KCSAN.
> 
> [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
> [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/799218/
> 
> Race conditions vs. data races
> ------------------------------
> 
> Race conditions are logic bugs, where unexpected interleaving of racing
> concurrent operations result in an erroneous state.
> 
> Data races on the other hand are defined at the *memory model/language
> level*.  Many data races are also harmful race conditions, which a tool
> like KCSAN reports!  However, not all data races are race conditions and
> vice-versa.  KCSAN's intent is to report data races according to the
> LKMM. A data race detector can only work at the memory model/language
> level.
> 
> Deeper analysis, to find high-level race conditions only, requires
> conveying the intended kernel logic to a tool. This requires (1) the
> developer writing a specification or model of their code, and then (2)
> the tool verifying that the implementation matches. This has been done
> for small bits of code using model checkers and other formal methods,
> but does not scale to the level of what can be covered with a dynamic
> analysis based data race detector such as KCSAN.
> 
> For reasons outlined in [1, 2], data races can be much more subtle, but
> can cause no less harm than high-level race conditions.
> 
> Changelog
> ---------
> v4:
> * Major changes:
>  - Optimizations resulting in performance improvement of 33% (on
>    microbenchmark).
>  - Deal with nested interrupts for atomic_next.
>  - Simplify report.c (removing double-locking as well), in preparation
>    for KCSAN_REPORT_VALUE_CHANGE_ONLY.
>  - Add patch to introduce "data_race(expr)" macro.
>  - Introduce KCSAN_REPORT_VALUE_CHANGE_ONLY option for further filtering of data
>    races: if a conflicting write was observed via a watchpoint, only report the
>    data race if a value change was observed as well. The option will be enabled
>    by default on syzbot. (rcu-functions will be excluded from this filter at
>    request of Paul McKenney.) Context:
>    http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANpmjNOepvb6+zJmDePxj21n2rctM4Sp4rJ66x_J-L1UmNK54A@mail.gmail.com
> 
> v3: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191104142745.14722-1-elver@google.com
> * Major changes:
>  - Add microbenchmark.
>  - Add instruction watchpoint skip randomization.
>  - Refactor API and core runtime fast-path and slow-path. Compared to
>    the previous version, with a default config and benchmarked using the
>    added microbenchmark, this version is 3.8x faster.
>  - Make __tsan_unaligned __alias of generic accesses.
>  - Rename kcsan_{begin,end}_atomic ->
>    kcsan_{nestable,flat}_atomic_{begin,end}
>  - For filter list in debugfs.c use kmalloc+krealloc instead of
>    kvmalloc.
>  - Split Documentation into separate patch.
> 
> v2: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191017141305.146193-1-elver@google.com
> * Major changes:
>  - Replace kcsan_check_access(.., {true, false}) with
>    kcsan_check_{read,write}.
>  - Change atomic-instrumented.h to use __atomic_check_{read,write}.
>  - Use common struct kcsan_ctx in task_struct and for per-CPU interrupt
>    contexts.
> 
> v1: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191016083959.186860-1-elver@google.com
> 
> Marco Elver (10):
>   kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
>   include/linux/compiler.h: Introduce data_race(expr) macro
>   kcsan: Add Documentation entry in dev-tools
>   objtool, kcsan: Add KCSAN runtime functions to whitelist
>   build, kcsan: Add KCSAN build exceptions
>   seqlock, kcsan: Add annotations for KCSAN
>   seqlock: Require WRITE_ONCE surrounding raw_seqcount_barrier
>   asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation for bitops
>   locking/atomics, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation
>   x86, kcsan: Enable KCSAN for x86
> 
>  Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst         |   1 +
>  Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst         | 256 +++++++++
>  MAINTAINERS                               |  11 +
>  Makefile                                  |   3 +-
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                          |   1 +
>  arch/x86/boot/Makefile                    |   2 +
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile         |   2 +
>  arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile              |   3 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h             |   6 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/Makefile                  |   4 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile              |   3 +
>  arch/x86/lib/Makefile                     |   4 +
>  arch/x86/mm/Makefile                      |   4 +
>  arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile               |   2 +
>  arch/x86/realmode/Makefile                |   3 +
>  arch/x86/realmode/rm/Makefile             |   3 +
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile     |   2 +
>  include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h | 393 +++++++-------
>  include/asm-generic/bitops-instrumented.h |  18 +
>  include/linux/compiler-clang.h            |   9 +
>  include/linux/compiler-gcc.h              |   7 +
>  include/linux/compiler.h                  |  57 +-
>  include/linux/kcsan-checks.h              |  97 ++++
>  include/linux/kcsan.h                     | 115 ++++
>  include/linux/sched.h                     |   4 +
>  include/linux/seqlock.h                   |  51 +-
>  init/init_task.c                          |   8 +
>  init/main.c                               |   2 +
>  kernel/Makefile                           |   6 +
>  kernel/kcsan/Makefile                     |  11 +
>  kernel/kcsan/atomic.h                     |  27 +
>  kernel/kcsan/core.c                       | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  kernel/kcsan/debugfs.c                    | 275 ++++++++++
>  kernel/kcsan/encoding.h                   |  94 ++++
>  kernel/kcsan/kcsan.h                      | 108 ++++
>  kernel/kcsan/report.c                     | 320 +++++++++++
>  kernel/kcsan/test.c                       | 121 +++++
>  kernel/sched/Makefile                     |   6 +
>  lib/Kconfig.debug                         |   2 +
>  lib/Kconfig.kcsan                         | 118 ++++
>  lib/Makefile                              |   3 +
>  mm/Makefile                               |   8 +
>  scripts/Makefile.kcsan                    |   6 +
>  scripts/Makefile.lib                      |  10 +
>  scripts/atomic/gen-atomic-instrumented.sh |  17 +-
>  tools/objtool/check.c                     |  18 +
>  46 files changed, 2641 insertions(+), 206 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst
>  create mode 100644 include/linux/kcsan-checks.h
>  create mode 100644 include/linux/kcsan.h
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/Makefile
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/atomic.h
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/core.c
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/debugfs.c
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/encoding.h
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/kcsan.h
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/report.c
>  create mode 100644 kernel/kcsan/test.c
>  create mode 100644 lib/Kconfig.kcsan
>  create mode 100644 scripts/Makefile.kcsan
> 
> -- 
> 2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  2019-11-19 19:54     ` Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-19 21:42       ` Qian Cai
  2019-11-19 21:53         ` Marco Elver
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Qian Cai @ 2019-11-19 21:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Marco Elver
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Paul E. McKenney,
	Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet,
	kasan-dev, linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers



> On Nov 19, 2019, at 2:54 PM, Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
> 
> Regardless of approach, my guess is that the complexity outweighs any
> benefits this may provide in the end. Not only would a hypothetical
> kernel that combines these be extremely slow, it'd also diminish the
> practical value because testing and finding bugs would also be
> impaired due to performance.

On the other hand, it is valuable for distros to be able to select both for the debug kernel variant. Performance is usually not a major concern over there and could be migrated by other means like selecting powerful systems etc.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-19 20:12 ` Qian Cai
@ 2019-11-19 21:50   ` Marco Elver
  2019-11-20 15:54     ` Marco Elver
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-19 21:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Qian Cai
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Paul E. McKenney,
	Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet,
	kasan-dev, linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Tue, 19 Nov 2019 at 21:13, Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 2019-11-14 at 19:02 +0100, 'Marco Elver' via kasan-dev wrote:
> > This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> > KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> > are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> > only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> > architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> > experimental ARM64 and POWER support).
>
> This does not allow the system to boot. Just hang forever at the end.
>
> https://cailca.github.io/files/dmesg.txt
>
> the config (dselect KASAN and select KCSAN with default options):
>
> https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cailca/linux-mm/master/x86.config

Thanks! That config enables lots of other debug code. I could
reproduce the hang. It's related to CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING etc.

The problem is definitely not the fact that kcsan_setup_watchpoint
disables interrupts (tested by removing that code). Although lockdep
still complains here, and looking at the code in kcsan/core.c, I just
can't see how local_irq_restore cannot be called before returning (in
the stacktrace you provided, there is no kcsan function), and
interrupts should always be re-enabled. (Interrupts are only disabled
during delay in kcsan_setup_watchpoint.)

What I also notice is that this happens when the console starts
getting spammed with data-race reports (presumably because some extra
debug code has lots of data races according to KCSAN).

My guess is that some of the extra debug logic enabled in that config
is incompatible with KCSAN. However, so far I cannot tell where
exactly the problem is. For now the work-around would be not using
KCSAN with these extra debug options.  I will investigate more, but
nothing obviously wrong stands out..

Many thanks,
-- Marco

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  2019-11-19 21:42       ` Qian Cai
@ 2019-11-19 21:53         ` Marco Elver
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-19 21:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Qian Cai
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Paul E. McKenney,
	Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet,
	kasan-dev, linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Tue, 19 Nov 2019 at 22:42, Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Nov 19, 2019, at 2:54 PM, Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > Regardless of approach, my guess is that the complexity outweighs any
> > benefits this may provide in the end. Not only would a hypothetical
> > kernel that combines these be extremely slow, it'd also diminish the
> > practical value because testing and finding bugs would also be
> > impaired due to performance.
>
> On the other hand, it is valuable for distros to be able to select both for the debug kernel variant. Performance is usually not a major concern over there and could be migrated by other means like selecting powerful systems etc.

Fair enough. However, right now none of gcc nor clang would support
this. It is something to revisit in future, but is certainly not
something that can trivially be resolved.

Thanks,
-- Marco

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
  2019-11-19 21:50   ` Marco Elver
@ 2019-11-20 15:54     ` Marco Elver
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2019-11-20 15:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Qian Cai
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Paul E. McKenney,
	Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet,
	kasan-dev, linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Tue, 19 Nov 2019, Marco Elver wrote:

> On Tue, 19 Nov 2019 at 21:13, Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, 2019-11-14 at 19:02 +0100, 'Marco Elver' via kasan-dev wrote:
> > > This is the patch-series for the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN).
> > > KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based *data race detector*. More details
> > > are included in **Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst**. This patch-series
> > > only enables KCSAN for x86, but we expect adding support for other
> > > architectures is relatively straightforward (we are aware of
> > > experimental ARM64 and POWER support).
> >
> > This does not allow the system to boot. Just hang forever at the end.
> >
> > https://cailca.github.io/files/dmesg.txt
> >
> > the config (dselect KASAN and select KCSAN with default options):
> >
> > https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cailca/linux-mm/master/x86.config
> 
> Thanks! That config enables lots of other debug code. I could
> reproduce the hang. It's related to CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING etc.
> 
> The problem is definitely not the fact that kcsan_setup_watchpoint
> disables interrupts (tested by removing that code). Although lockdep
> still complains here, and looking at the code in kcsan/core.c, I just
> can't see how local_irq_restore cannot be called before returning (in
> the stacktrace you provided, there is no kcsan function), and
> interrupts should always be re-enabled. (Interrupts are only disabled
> during delay in kcsan_setup_watchpoint.)
> 
> What I also notice is that this happens when the console starts
> getting spammed with data-race reports (presumably because some extra
> debug code has lots of data races according to KCSAN).
> 
> My guess is that some of the extra debug logic enabled in that config
> is incompatible with KCSAN. However, so far I cannot tell where
> exactly the problem is. For now the work-around would be not using
> KCSAN with these extra debug options.  I will investigate more, but
> nothing obviously wrong stands out..

It seems that due to spinlock_debug.c containing data races, the console
gets spammed with reports. However, it's also possible to encounter
deadlock, e.g.  printk lock -> spinlock_debug -> KCSAN detects data race
-> kcsan_print_report() -> printk lock -> deadlock.

So the best thing is to fix the data races in spinlock_debug. I will
send a patch separately for you to test.

The issue that lockdep still reports inconsistency in IRQ flags tracing
I cannot yet say what the problem is. It seems that lockdep IRQ flags
tracing may have an issue with KCSAN for numerous reasons: let's say
lockdep and IRQ flags tracing code is instrumented, which then calls
into KCSAN, which disables/enables interrupts, but due to tracing calls
back into lockdep code. In other words, there may be some recursion
which corrupts hardirqs_enabled.

Thanks,
-- Marco

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure Marco Elver
  2019-11-19 19:27   ` Qian Cai
@ 2020-01-03  5:13   ` Qian Cai
  2020-01-06 12:46     ` Marco Elver
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Qian Cai @ 2020-01-03  5:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Marco Elver
  Cc: akiyks, stern, Alexander Potapenko, parri.andrea, andreyknvl,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, boqun.feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, dlustig, Dave Hansen, dhowells,
	Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar, j.alglave, joel,
	corbet, jpoimboe, luc.maranget, mark.rutland, npiggin, paulmck,
	peterz, tglx, will, edumazet, kasan-dev, linux-arch, linux-doc,
	linux-efi, linux-kbuild, linux-kernel, linux-mm, x86



> On Nov 14, 2019, at 1:02 PM, 'Marco Elver' via kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> +static noinline void kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr,
> +					    size_t size, bool is_write)
> +{
> +	atomic_long_t *watchpoint;
> +	union {
> +		u8 _1;
> +		u16 _2;
> +		u32 _4;
> +		u64 _8;
> +	} expect_value;
> +	bool value_change = false;
> +	unsigned long ua_flags = user_access_save();
> +	unsigned long irq_flags;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Always reset kcsan_skip counter in slow-path to avoid underflow; see
> +	 * should_watch().
> +	 */
> +	reset_kcsan_skip();
> +
> +	if (!kcsan_is_enabled())
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	if (!check_encodable((unsigned long)ptr, size)) {
> +		kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_UNENCODABLE_ACCESSES);
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Disable interrupts & preemptions to avoid another thread on the same
> +	 * CPU accessing memory locations for the set up watchpoint; this is to
> +	 * avoid reporting races to e.g. CPU-local data.
> +	 *
> +	 * An alternative would be adding the source CPU to the watchpoint
> +	 * encoding, and checking that watchpoint-CPU != this-CPU. There are
> +	 * several problems with this:
> +	 *   1. we should avoid stealing more bits from the watchpoint encoding
> +	 *      as it would affect accuracy, as well as increase performance
> +	 *      overhead in the fast-path;
> +	 *   2. if we are preempted, but there *is* a genuine data race, we
> +	 *      would *not* report it -- since this is the common case (vs.
> +	 *      CPU-local data accesses), it makes more sense (from a data race
> +	 *      detection point of view) to simply disable preemptions to ensure
> +	 *      as many tasks as possible run on other CPUs.
> +	 */
> +	local_irq_save(irq_flags);

Enabling KCSAN will now generate a warning during boot here.

Config (need to deselect KASAN and select KCSAN):

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cailca/linux-mm/master/x86.config

[   13.358813][    T0] Spectre V2 : Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch
[   13.361606][    T0] Speculative Store Bypass: Vulnerable
[   13.363254][    T0] TAA: Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode
[   13.366836][    T0] MDS: Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode
[   13.369877][    T0] debug: unmapping init [mem 0xffffffff8dd83000-0xffffffff8dd87fff]
[   13.415028][    T1] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   13.416814][    T1] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!current->hardirqs_enabled)
[   13.416814][    T1] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4406 check_flags.part.26+0x102/0x240
[   13.416814][    T1] Modules linked in:
[   13.416814][    T1] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc2-next-20191220+ #4
[   13.416814][    T1] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL580 Gen9/ProLiant DL580 Gen9, BIOS U17 07/21/2016
[   13.416814][    T1] RIP: 0010:check_flags.part.26+0x102/0x240
[   13.416814][    T1] Code: bc 8d e8 51 a1 15 00 44 8b 05 2a a0 46 01 45 85 c0 0f 85 57 76 00 00 48 c7 c6 5d fa 7b 8d 48 c7 c7 b1 54 7b 8d e8 10 91 f5 ff <0f> 0b e9 3d 76 00 00 65 48 8b 3c 25 40 7f 01 00 e8 89 f0 ff ff e8
[   13.416814][    T1] RSP: 0000:ffff9d3206287ce8 EFLAGS: 00010082
[   13.416814][    T1] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8e5b8541e040 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   13.416814][    T1] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   13.416814][    T1] RBP: ffff9d3206287cf0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000ffff8dbcc254
[   13.416814][    T1] R10: 0000ffffffffffff R11: 0000ffff8dbcc257 R12: 0000000000000235
[   13.416814][    T1] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000246 R15: 000000000000001b
[   13.416814][    T1] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e61e3200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   13.416814][    T1] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   13.416814][    T1] CR2: ffff8e79f07ff000 CR3: 0000001284c0e001 CR4: 00000000003606f0
[   13.416814][    T1] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   13.416814][    T1] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   13.416814][    T1] Call Trace:
[   13.416814][    T1]  lock_is_held_type+0x66/0x160
[   13.416814][    T1]  ___might_sleep+0xc1/0x1d0
[   13.416814][    T1]  __might_sleep+0x5b/0xa0
[   13.416814][    T1]  slab_pre_alloc_hook+0x7b/0xa0
[   13.416814][    T1]  __kmalloc_node+0x60/0x300
[   13.416814   T1]  ? alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x44/0x70
[   13.416814][    T1]  ? topology_phys_to_logical_die+0x7e/0x180
[   13.416814][    T1]  alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x44/0x70
[   13.416814][    T1]  zalloc_cpumask_var+0x2a/0x40
[   13.416814][    T1]  native_smp_prepare_cpus+0x246/0x425
[   13.416814][    T1]  kernel_init_freeable+0x1b8/0x496
[   13.416814][    T1]  ? rest_init+0x381/0x381
[   13.416814][    T1]  kernel_init+0x18/0x17f
[   13.416814][    T1]  ? rest_init+0x381/0x381
[   13.416814][    T1]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[   13.416814][    T1] irq event stamp: 910
[   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last  enabled at (909): [<ffffffff8d1240f3>] _raw_write_unlock_irqrestore+0x53/0x57
[   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last disabled at (910): [<ffffffff8c8bba76>] kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x96/0x460
[   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8c6b697a>] copy_process+0x11fa/0x34f0
[   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[   13.416814][    T1] ---[ end trace 7d1df66da055aa92 ]---
[   13.416814][    T1] possible reason: unannotated irqs-on.
[   13.416814][ent stamp: 910
[   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last  enabled at (909): [<ffffffff8d1240f3>] _raw_write_unlock_irqrestore+0x53/0x57
[   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last disabled at (910): [<ffffffff8c8bba76>] kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x96/0x460
[   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8c6b697a>] copy_process+0x11fa/0x34f0
[   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0


The other issue is that the system is unable to boot due to endless of those messages.

[   17.976814][  T578] Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
[   17.976814][  T578] CPU: 12 PID: 578 Comm: pgdatinit1 Tainted: G        W         5.5.0-rc2-next-20191220+ #4
[   17.976814][  T578] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL580 Gen9/ProLiant DL580 Gen9, BIOS U17 07/21/2016
[   17.976814][  T578] ==================================================================
[   17.976814][  T578] ==================================================================
[   17.976814][  T578] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __change_page_attr / __change_page_attr
[   17.976814][  T578] 
[   17.976814][  T578] write to 0xffffffff8dda0de0 of 8 bytes by task 577 on cpu 2:
[   17.976814][  T578]  __change_page_attr+0xef7/0x16a0
[   17.976814][  T578]  __change_page_attr_set_clr+0xec/0x4f0
[   17.97681pages_np+0xcc/0x100
[   17.976814][  T578]  __kernel_map_pages+0xd6/0xdb
[   17.976814][  T578]  __free_pages_ok+0x1a8/0x730
[   17.976814][  T578]  __free_pages+0x51/0x90
[   17.976814][  T578]  __free_pages_core+0x1c7/0x2c0
[   17.976814][  T578]  deferred_free_range+0x59/0x8f
[   17.976814][  T578]  deferred_init_maxorder+0x1d6/0x21d
[   17.976814][  T578]  deferred_init_memmap+0x14a/0x1c1
[   17.976814][  T578]  kthread+0x1e0/0x200
[   17.976814][  T578]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[   17.976814][  T578] 
[   17.976814][  T578] read to 0xffffffff8dda0de0 of 8 bytes by task 578 on cpu 12:
[   17.976814][  T578]  __change_page_attr+0xed1/0x16a0
[   17.976814][  T578]  __change_page_attr_set_clr+0xec/0x4f0
[   17.976814][  T578]  __set_pages_np+0xcc/0x100
[   17.976814][  T578]  __kernel_map_pages+0xd6/0xdb
[   17.976814][  T578]  __free_pages_ok+0x1a8/0x730
[   17.976814][  T578]  __free_pages+0x51/0x90
[   17.976814][  T578]  __free_pages_core+0x1c7/0x2c0
[   17.976814][  T578]  deferred_free_range+0x59/0x8f
[   17.976814][  T578]  deferred_init_maxorder+0x1aa/0x21d
[   17.976814][  T578]  deferred_init_memmap+0x14a/0x1c1
[   17.976814][  T578]  kthread+0x1e0/0x200
[   17.976814][  T578]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

# ./scripts/faddr2line vmlinux __change_page_attr+0xef7/0x16a0
__change_page_attr+0xef7/0x16a0:
static_protections at arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:528
(inlined by) __change_page_attr at arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:1516

# ./scripts/faddr2line vmlinux __change_page_attr+0xed1/0x16a0
__change_page_attr+0xed1/0x16a0:
cpa_inc_4k_install at arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:131
(inlined by) __change_page_attr at arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:1514

> +
> +	watchpoint = insert_watchpoint((unsigned long)ptr, size, is_write);
> +	if (watchpoint == NULL) {
> +		/*
> +		 * Out of capacity: the size of `watchpoints`, and the frequency
> +		 * with which `should_watch()` returns true should be tweaked so
> +		 * that this case happens very rarely.
> +		 */
> +		kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_NO_CAPACITY);
> +		goto out_unlock;
> +	}
> +


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  2020-01-03  5:13   ` Qian Cai
@ 2020-01-06 12:46     ` Marco Elver
  2020-01-14 11:08       ` Qian Cai
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2020-01-06 12:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Qian Cai
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Paul E. McKenney,
	Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet,
	kasan-dev, linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Fri, 3 Jan 2020 at 06:13, Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Nov 14, 2019, at 1:02 PM, 'Marco Elver' via kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> > +static noinline void kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr,
> > +                                         size_t size, bool is_write)
> > +{
> > +     atomic_long_t *watchpoint;
> > +     union {
> > +             u8 _1;
> > +             u16 _2;
> > +             u32 _4;
> > +             u64 _8;
> > +     } expect_value;
> > +     bool value_change = false;
> > +     unsigned long ua_flags = user_access_save();
> > +     unsigned long irq_flags;
> > +
> > +     /*
> > +      * Always reset kcsan_skip counter in slow-path to avoid underflow; see
> > +      * should_watch().
> > +      */
> > +     reset_kcsan_skip();
> > +
> > +     if (!kcsan_is_enabled())
> > +             goto out;
> > +
> > +     if (!check_encodable((unsigned long)ptr, size)) {
> > +             kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_UNENCODABLE_ACCESSES);
> > +             goto out;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     /*
> > +      * Disable interrupts & preemptions to avoid another thread on the same
> > +      * CPU accessing memory locations for the set up watchpoint; this is to
> > +      * avoid reporting races to e.g. CPU-local data.
> > +      *
> > +      * An alternative would be adding the source CPU to the watchpoint
> > +      * encoding, and checking that watchpoint-CPU != this-CPU. There are
> > +      * several problems with this:
> > +      *   1. we should avoid stealing more bits from the watchpoint encoding
> > +      *      as it would affect accuracy, as well as increase performance
> > +      *      overhead in the fast-path;
> > +      *   2. if we are preempted, but there *is* a genuine data race, we
> > +      *      would *not* report it -- since this is the common case (vs.
> > +      *      CPU-local data accesses), it makes more sense (from a data race
> > +      *      detection point of view) to simply disable preemptions to ensure
> > +      *      as many tasks as possible run on other CPUs.
> > +      */
> > +     local_irq_save(irq_flags);
>
> Enabling KCSAN will now generate a warning during boot here.
>
> Config (need to deselect KASAN and select KCSAN):
>
> https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cailca/linux-mm/master/x86.config

Thanks, I'll look into KCSAN + lockdep compatibility. It's probably
missing some KCSAN_SANITIZE := n in some Makefile.

> [   13.358813][    T0] Spectre V2 : Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch
> [   13.361606][    T0] Speculative Store Bypass: Vulnerable
> [   13.363254][    T0] TAA: Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode
> [   13.366836][    T0] MDS: Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode
> [   13.369877][    T0] debug: unmapping init [mem 0xffffffff8dd83000-0xffffffff8dd87fff]
> [   13.415028][    T1] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [   13.416814][    T1] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!current->hardirqs_enabled)
> [   13.416814][    T1] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4406 check_flags.part.26+0x102/0x240
> [   13.416814][    T1] Modules linked in:
> [   13.416814][    T1] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc2-next-20191220+ #4
> [   13.416814][    T1] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL580 Gen9/ProLiant DL580 Gen9, BIOS U17 07/21/2016
> [   13.416814][    T1] RIP: 0010:check_flags.part.26+0x102/0x240
> [   13.416814][    T1] Code: bc 8d e8 51 a1 15 00 44 8b 05 2a a0 46 01 45 85 c0 0f 85 57 76 00 00 48 c7 c6 5d fa 7b 8d 48 c7 c7 b1 54 7b 8d e8 10 91 f5 ff <0f> 0b e9 3d 76 00 00 65 48 8b 3c 25 40 7f 01 00 e8 89 f0 ff ff e8
> [   13.416814][    T1] RSP: 0000:ffff9d3206287ce8 EFLAGS: 00010082
> [   13.416814][    T1] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8e5b8541e040 RCX: 0000000000000000
> [   13.416814][    T1] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
> [   13.416814][    T1] RBP: ffff9d3206287cf0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000ffff8dbcc254
> [   13.416814][    T1] R10: 0000ffffffffffff R11: 0000ffff8dbcc257 R12: 0000000000000235
> [   13.416814][    T1] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000246 R15: 000000000000001b
> [   13.416814][    T1] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e61e3200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [   13.416814][    T1] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> [   13.416814][    T1] CR2: ffff8e79f07ff000 CR3: 0000001284c0e001 CR4: 00000000003606f0
> [   13.416814][    T1] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> [   13.416814][    T1] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> [   13.416814][    T1] Call Trace:
> [   13.416814][    T1]  lock_is_held_type+0x66/0x160
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ___might_sleep+0xc1/0x1d0
> [   13.416814][    T1]  __might_sleep+0x5b/0xa0
> [   13.416814][    T1]  slab_pre_alloc_hook+0x7b/0xa0
> [   13.416814][    T1]  __kmalloc_node+0x60/0x300
> [   13.416814   T1]  ? alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x44/0x70
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ? topology_phys_to_logical_die+0x7e/0x180
> [   13.416814][    T1]  alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x44/0x70
> [   13.416814][    T1]  zalloc_cpumask_var+0x2a/0x40
> [   13.416814][    T1]  native_smp_prepare_cpus+0x246/0x425
> [   13.416814][    T1]  kernel_init_freeable+0x1b8/0x496
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ? rest_init+0x381/0x381
> [   13.416814][    T1]  kernel_init+0x18/0x17f
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ? rest_init+0x381/0x381
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> [   13.416814][    T1] irq event stamp: 910
> [   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last  enabled at (909): [<ffffffff8d1240f3>] _raw_write_unlock_irqrestore+0x53/0x57
> [   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last disabled at (910): [<ffffffff8c8bba76>] kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x96/0x460
> [   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8c6b697a>] copy_process+0x11fa/0x34f0
> [   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
> [   13.416814][    T1] ---[ end trace 7d1df66da055aa92 ]---
> [   13.416814][    T1] possible reason: unannotated irqs-on.
> [   13.416814][ent stamp: 910
> [   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last  enabled at (909): [<ffffffff8d1240f3>] _raw_write_unlock_irqrestore+0x53/0x57
> [   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last disabled at (910): [<ffffffff8c8bba76>] kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x96/0x460
> [   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8c6b697a>] copy_process+0x11fa/0x34f0
> [   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
>
>
> The other issue is that the system is unable to boot due to endless of those messages.

Apart from fixing the data races, I can add a feature to KCSAN to
limit reporting too often (will send patch).

> [   17.976814][  T578] Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
> [   17.976814][  T578] CPU: 12 PID: 578 Comm: pgdatinit1 Tainted: G        W         5.5.0-rc2-next-20191220+ #4
> [   17.976814][  T578] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL580 Gen9/ProLiant DL580 Gen9, BIOS U17 07/21/2016
> [   17.976814][  T578] ==================================================================
> [   17.976814][  T578] ==================================================================
> [   17.976814][  T578] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __change_page_attr / __change_page_attr
> [   17.976814][  T578]
> [   17.976814][  T578] write to 0xffffffff8dda0de0 of 8 bytes by task 577 on cpu 2:
> [   17.976814][  T578]  __change_page_attr+0xef7/0x16a0
> [   17.976814][  T578]  __change_page_attr_set_clr+0xec/0x4f0
> [   17.97681pages_np+0xcc/0x100
> [   17.976814][  T578]  __kernel_map_pages+0xd6/0xdb
> [   17.976814][  T578]  __free_pages_ok+0x1a8/0x730
> [   17.976814][  T578]  __free_pages+0x51/0x90
> [   17.976814][  T578]  __free_pages_core+0x1c7/0x2c0
> [   17.976814][  T578]  deferred_free_range+0x59/0x8f
> [   17.976814][  T578]  deferred_init_maxorder+0x1d6/0x21d
> [   17.976814][  T578]  deferred_init_memmap+0x14a/0x1c1
> [   17.976814][  T578]  kthread+0x1e0/0x200
> [   17.976814][  T578]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> [   17.976814][  T578]
> [   17.976814][  T578] read to 0xffffffff8dda0de0 of 8 bytes by task 578 on cpu 12:
> [   17.976814][  T578]  __change_page_attr+0xed1/0x16a0
> [   17.976814][  T578]  __change_page_attr_set_clr+0xec/0x4f0
> [   17.976814][  T578]  __set_pages_np+0xcc/0x100
> [   17.976814][  T578]  __kernel_map_pages+0xd6/0xdb
> [   17.976814][  T578]  __free_pages_ok+0x1a8/0x730
> [   17.976814][  T578]  __free_pages+0x51/0x90
> [   17.976814][  T578]  __free_pages_core+0x1c7/0x2c0
> [   17.976814][  T578]  deferred_free_range+0x59/0x8f
> [   17.976814][  T578]  deferred_init_maxorder+0x1aa/0x21d
> [   17.976814][  T578]  deferred_init_memmap+0x14a/0x1c1
> [   17.976814][  T578]  kthread+0x1e0/0x200
> [   17.976814][  T578]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
>
> # ./scripts/faddr2line vmlinux __change_page_attr+0xef7/0x16a0
> __change_page_attr+0xef7/0x16a0:
> static_protections at arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:528
> (inlined by) __change_page_attr at arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:1516
>
> # ./scripts/faddr2line vmlinux __change_page_attr+0xed1/0x16a0
> __change_page_attr+0xed1/0x16a0:
> cpa_inc_4k_install at arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:131
> (inlined by) __change_page_attr at arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:1514

Thanks,
-- Marco

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  2020-01-06 12:46     ` Marco Elver
@ 2020-01-14 11:08       ` Qian Cai
  2020-01-14 12:51         ` Marco Elver
  2020-01-14 19:22         ` Paul E. McKenney
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Qian Cai @ 2020-01-14 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Marco Elver
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Paul E. McKenney,
	Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet,
	kasan-dev, linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers



> On Jan 6, 2020, at 7:47 AM, Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
> 
> Thanks, I'll look into KCSAN + lockdep compatibility. It's probably
> missing some KCSAN_SANITIZE := n in some Makefile.

Can I have a update on fixing this? It looks like more of a problem that kcsan_setup_watchpoint() will disable IRQs and then dive into the page allocator where it would complain because it might sleep.

BTW, I saw Paul sent a pull request for 5.6 but it is ugly to have everybody could trigger a deadlock (sleep function called in atomic context) like this during boot once this hits the mainline not to mention about only recently it is possible to test this feature (thanks to warning ratelimit) with the existing debugging options because it was unable to boot due to the brokenness with debug_pagealloc as mentioned in this thread, so this does sounds like it needs more soak time for the mainline to me.

0000000000000400
[   13.416814][    T1] Call Trace:
[   13.416814][    T1]  lock_is_held_type+0x66/0x160
[   13.416814][    T1]  ___might_sleep+0xc1/0x1d0
[   13.416814][    T1]  __might_sleep+0x5b/0xa0
[   13.416814][    T1]  slab_pre_alloc_hook+0x7b/0xa0
[   13.416814][    T1]  __kmalloc_node+0x60/0x300
[   13.416814   T1]  ? alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x44/0x70
[   13.416814][    T1]  ? topology_phys_to_logical_die+0x7e/0x180
[   13.416814][    T1]  alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x44/0x70
[   13.416814][    T1]  zalloc_cpumask_var+0x2a/0x40
[   13.416814][    T1]  native_smp_prepare_cpus+0x246/0x425
[   13.416814][    T1]  kernel_init_freeable+0x1b8/0x496
[   13.416814][    T1]  ? rest_init+0x381/0x381
[   13.416814][    T1]  kernel_init+0x18/0x17f
[   13.416814][    T1]  ? rest_init+0x381/0x381
[   13.416814][    T1]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[   13.416814][    T1] irq event stamp: 910
[   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last  enabled at (909): [<ffffffff8d1240f3>] _raw_write_unlock_irqrestore+0x53/0x57
[   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last disabled at (910): [<ffffffff8c8bba76>] kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x96/0x460
[   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8c6b697a>] copy_process+0x11fa/0x34f0
[   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[   13.416814][    T1] ---[ end trace 7d1df66da055aa92 ]---
[   13.416814][    T1] possible reason: unannotated irqs-on.
[   13.416814][ent stamp: 910
[   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last  enabled at (909): [<ffffffff8d1240f3>] _raw_write_unlock_irqrestore+0x53/0x57
[   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last disabled at (910): [<ffffffff8c8bba76>] kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x96/0x460
[   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8c6b697a>] copy_process+0x11fa/0x34f0
[   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  2020-01-14 11:08       ` Qian Cai
@ 2020-01-14 12:51         ` Marco Elver
  2020-01-14 19:22         ` Paul E. McKenney
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2020-01-14 12:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Qian Cai
  Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Paul E. McKenney,
	Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet,
	kasan-dev, linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Tue, 14 Jan 2020 at 12:08, Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Jan 6, 2020, at 7:47 AM, Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > Thanks, I'll look into KCSAN + lockdep compatibility. It's probably
> > missing some KCSAN_SANITIZE := n in some Makefile.
>
> Can I have a update on fixing this? It looks like more of a problem that kcsan_setup_watchpoint() will disable IRQs and then dive into the page allocator where it would complain because it might sleep.

KCSAN does *not* keep IRQs disabled (we have a clear irqsave / restore
pair kcsan_setup_watchpoint).

If you look closer at the warning you sent in this thread, the warning
is not generated because IRQs are off when it wants to sleep, but
rather because IRQs are enabled but IRQ tracing state is inconsistent:
"DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!current->hardirqs_enabled)" in lockdep checks
that if IRQs are enabled, the trace state matches. These are only
checked with LOCKDEP_DEBUG and TRACE_IRQFLAGS.

In other words, IRQ trace flags got corrupted somewhere. AFAIK, this
problem here is only relevant with TRACE_IRQFLAGS -- again, it is
clear that IRQs are enabled but the IRQ tracing logic somehow ended up
corrupting hardirqs_enabled (TRACE_IRQFLAGS).

I believe this patch will take care of this issue:
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200114124919.11891-1-elver@google.com

Thanks,
-- Marco

> BTW, I saw Paul sent a pull request for 5.6 but it is ugly to have everybody could trigger a deadlock (sleep function called in atomic context) like this during boot once this hits the mainline not to mention about only recently it is possible to test this feature (thanks to warning ratelimit) with the existing debugging options because it was unable to boot due to the brokenness with debug_pagealloc as mentioned in this thread, so this does sounds like it needs more soak time for the mainline to me.
>
> 0000000000000400
> [   13.416814][    T1] Call Trace:
> [   13.416814][    T1]  lock_is_held_type+0x66/0x160
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ___might_sleep+0xc1/0x1d0
> [   13.416814][    T1]  __might_sleep+0x5b/0xa0
> [   13.416814][    T1]  slab_pre_alloc_hook+0x7b/0xa0
> [   13.416814][    T1]  __kmalloc_node+0x60/0x300
> [   13.416814   T1]  ? alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x44/0x70
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ? topology_phys_to_logical_die+0x7e/0x180
> [   13.416814][    T1]  alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x44/0x70
> [   13.416814][    T1]  zalloc_cpumask_var+0x2a/0x40
> [   13.416814][    T1]  native_smp_prepare_cpus+0x246/0x425
> [   13.416814][    T1]  kernel_init_freeable+0x1b8/0x496
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ? rest_init+0x381/0x381
> [   13.416814][    T1]  kernel_init+0x18/0x17f
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ? rest_init+0x381/0x381
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> [   13.416814][    T1] irq event stamp: 910
> [   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last  enabled at (909): [<ffffffff8d1240f3>] _raw_write_unlock_irqrestore+0x53/0x57
> [   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last disabled at (910): [<ffffffff8c8bba76>] kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x96/0x460
> [   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8c6b697a>] copy_process+0x11fa/0x34f0
> [   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
> [   13.416814][    T1] ---[ end trace 7d1df66da055aa92 ]---
> [   13.416814][    T1] possible reason: unannotated irqs-on.
> [   13.416814][ent stamp: 910
> [   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last  enabled at (909): [<ffffffff8d1240f3>] _raw_write_unlock_irqrestore+0x53/0x57
> [   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last disabled at (910): [<ffffffff8c8bba76>] kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x96/0x460
> [   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8c6b697a>] copy_process+0x11fa/0x34f0
> [   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  2020-01-14 11:08       ` Qian Cai
  2020-01-14 12:51         ` Marco Elver
@ 2020-01-14 19:22         ` Paul E. McKenney
  2020-01-14 20:30           ` Qian Cai
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Paul E. McKenney @ 2020-01-14 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Qian Cai
  Cc: Marco Elver, LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Peter Zijlstra,
	Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet, kasan-dev,
	linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Tue, Jan 14, 2020 at 06:08:29AM -0500, Qian Cai wrote:
> 
> 
> > On Jan 6, 2020, at 7:47 AM, Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
> > 
> > Thanks, I'll look into KCSAN + lockdep compatibility. It's probably
> > missing some KCSAN_SANITIZE := n in some Makefile.
> 
> Can I have a update on fixing this? It looks like more of a problem that kcsan_setup_watchpoint() will disable IRQs and then dive into the page allocator where it would complain because it might sleep.
> 
> BTW, I saw Paul sent a pull request for 5.6 but it is ugly to have everybody could trigger a deadlock (sleep function called in atomic context) like this during boot once this hits the mainline not to mention about only recently it is possible to test this feature (thanks to warning ratelimit) with the existing debugging options because it was unable to boot due to the brokenness with debug_pagealloc as mentioned in this thread, so this does sounds like it needs more soak time for the mainline to me.

Just so I understand...  Does this problem happen even in CONFIG_KCSAN=n
kernels?

I have been running extensive CONFIG_KSCAN=y rcutorture tests for quite
awhile now, so even if this only happens for CONFIG_KSCAN=y, it is not
like it affects everyone.

Yes, it should be fixed, and Marco does have a patch on the way.

							Thanx, Paul

> 0000000000000400
> [   13.416814][    T1] Call Trace:
> [   13.416814][    T1]  lock_is_held_type+0x66/0x160
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ___might_sleep+0xc1/0x1d0
> [   13.416814][    T1]  __might_sleep+0x5b/0xa0
> [   13.416814][    T1]  slab_pre_alloc_hook+0x7b/0xa0
> [   13.416814][    T1]  __kmalloc_node+0x60/0x300
> [   13.416814   T1]  ? alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x44/0x70
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ? topology_phys_to_logical_die+0x7e/0x180
> [   13.416814][    T1]  alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x44/0x70
> [   13.416814][    T1]  zalloc_cpumask_var+0x2a/0x40
> [   13.416814][    T1]  native_smp_prepare_cpus+0x246/0x425
> [   13.416814][    T1]  kernel_init_freeable+0x1b8/0x496
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ? rest_init+0x381/0x381
> [   13.416814][    T1]  kernel_init+0x18/0x17f
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ? rest_init+0x381/0x381
> [   13.416814][    T1]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> [   13.416814][    T1] irq event stamp: 910
> [   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last  enabled at (909): [<ffffffff8d1240f3>] _raw_write_unlock_irqrestore+0x53/0x57
> [   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last disabled at (910): [<ffffffff8c8bba76>] kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x96/0x460
> [   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8c6b697a>] copy_process+0x11fa/0x34f0
> [   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
> [   13.416814][    T1] ---[ end trace 7d1df66da055aa92 ]---
> [   13.416814][    T1] possible reason: unannotated irqs-on.
> [   13.416814][ent stamp: 910
> [   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last  enabled at (909): [<ffffffff8d1240f3>] _raw_write_unlock_irqrestore+0x53/0x57
> [   13.416814][    T1] hardirqs last disabled at (910): [<ffffffff8c8bba76>] kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x96/0x460
> [   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8c6b697a>] copy_process+0x11fa/0x34f0
> [   13.416814][    T1] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  2020-01-14 19:22         ` Paul E. McKenney
@ 2020-01-14 20:30           ` Qian Cai
  2020-01-14 21:34             ` Paul E. McKenney
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Qian Cai @ 2020-01-14 20:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: paulmck
  Cc: Marco Elver, LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Peter Zijlstra,
	Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet, kasan-dev,
	linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers



> On Jan 14, 2020, at 2:22 PM, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> 
> Just so I understand...  Does this problem happen even in CONFIG_KCSAN=n
> kernels?

No.

> 
> I have been running extensive CONFIG_KSCAN=y rcutorture tests for quite
> awhile now, so even if this only happens for CONFIG_KSCAN=y, it is not
> like it affects everyone.
> 
> Yes, it should be fixed, and Marco does have a patch on the way.

The concern is really about setting KSCAN=y in a distro debug kernel where it has other debug options. I’ll try to dig into more of those issues in the next few days.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  2020-01-14 20:30           ` Qian Cai
@ 2020-01-14 21:34             ` Paul E. McKenney
  2020-01-14 21:48               ` Qian Cai
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Paul E. McKenney @ 2020-01-14 21:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Qian Cai
  Cc: Marco Elver, LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Peter Zijlstra,
	Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet, kasan-dev,
	linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Tue, Jan 14, 2020 at 03:30:53PM -0500, Qian Cai wrote:
> 
> 
> > On Jan 14, 2020, at 2:22 PM, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> > 
> > Just so I understand...  Does this problem happen even in CONFIG_KCSAN=n
> > kernels?
> 
> No.

Whew!!!  ;-)

> > I have been running extensive CONFIG_KSCAN=y rcutorture tests for quite
> > awhile now, so even if this only happens for CONFIG_KSCAN=y, it is not
> > like it affects everyone.
> > 
> > Yes, it should be fixed, and Marco does have a patch on the way.
> 
> The concern is really about setting KSCAN=y in a distro debug kernel where it has other debug options. I’ll try to dig into more of those issues in the next few days.

Understood.  But there are likely to be other issues with KCSAN, given how
new it is.  Yes, yes, I certainly would like to believe that the patches
we currently know about will make KCSAN perfect for distros, I have way
too much grey hair (and too little hair as well!) to really beleive that.

As an alternative, once the patches needed for your tests to pass
reach mainline, you could announce that KCSAN was ready to be enabled
in distros.

Though I confess that I don't know how that works.  Is there a separate
testing kernel binary provided by the distros in question?

							Thanx, Paul

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  2020-01-14 21:34             ` Paul E. McKenney
@ 2020-01-14 21:48               ` Qian Cai
  2020-01-14 22:09                 ` Paul E. McKenney
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 40+ messages in thread
From: Qian Cai @ 2020-01-14 21:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: paulmck
  Cc: Marco Elver, LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Peter Zijlstra,
	Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet, kasan-dev,
	linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers



> On Jan 14, 2020, at 4:34 PM, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> 
> As an alternative, once the patches needed for your tests to pass
> reach mainline, you could announce that KCSAN was ready to be enabled
> in distros.
> 
> Though I confess that I don't know how that works.  Is there a separate
> testing kernel binary provided by the distros in question?

I don’t think I have powers to announce that. Once the feature hit the mainline, distro people could start to use in the debug kernel variant, and it is a shame to only find out it is broken. Anyway, I’ll try to edge out those corner cases. Stay tuned.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
  2020-01-14 21:48               ` Qian Cai
@ 2020-01-14 22:09                 ` Paul E. McKenney
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 40+ messages in thread
From: Paul E. McKenney @ 2020-01-14 22:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Qian Cai
  Cc: Marco Elver, LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa, Alan Stern,
	Alexander Potapenko, Andrea Parri, Andrey Konovalov,
	Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Arnd Bergmann, Boqun Feng,
	Borislav Petkov, Daniel Axtens, Daniel Lustig, Dave Hansen,
	David Howells, Dmitry Vyukov, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
	Jade Alglave, Joel Fernandes, Jonathan Corbet, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Luc Maranget, Mark Rutland, Nicholas Piggin, Peter Zijlstra,
	Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, Eric Dumazet, kasan-dev,
	linux-arch, open list:DOCUMENTATION, linux-efi,
	Linux Kbuild mailing list, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	the arch/x86 maintainers

On Tue, Jan 14, 2020 at 04:48:22PM -0500, Qian Cai wrote:
> 
> 
> > On Jan 14, 2020, at 4:34 PM, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> wrote:
> > 
> > As an alternative, once the patches needed for your tests to pass
> > reach mainline, you could announce that KCSAN was ready to be enabled
> > in distros.
> > 
> > Though I confess that I don't know how that works.  Is there a separate
> > testing kernel binary provided by the distros in question?
> 
> I don’t think I have powers to announce that. Once the feature hit the mainline, distro people could start to use in the debug kernel variant, and it is a shame to only find out it is broken. Anyway, I’ll try to edge out those corner cases. Stay tuned.

Very good, thank you!

And you do have the power to announce.  But just like most of the rest
of use, myself included, you won't always have the power to make people
actually pay attention to what you say.  ;-)

							Thanx, Paul

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 40+ messages in thread

end of thread, back to index

Thread overview: 40+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure Marco Elver
2019-11-19 19:27   ` Qian Cai
2019-11-19 19:54     ` Marco Elver
2019-11-19 21:42       ` Qian Cai
2019-11-19 21:53         ` Marco Elver
2020-01-03  5:13   ` Qian Cai
2020-01-06 12:46     ` Marco Elver
2020-01-14 11:08       ` Qian Cai
2020-01-14 12:51         ` Marco Elver
2020-01-14 19:22         ` Paul E. McKenney
2020-01-14 20:30           ` Qian Cai
2020-01-14 21:34             ` Paul E. McKenney
2020-01-14 21:48               ` Qian Cai
2020-01-14 22:09                 ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] include/linux/compiler.h: Introduce data_race(expr) macro Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] kcsan: Add Documentation entry in dev-tools Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] objtool, kcsan: Add KCSAN runtime functions to whitelist Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] build, kcsan: Add KCSAN build exceptions Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] seqlock, kcsan: Add annotations for KCSAN Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] seqlock: Require WRITE_ONCE surrounding raw_seqcount_barrier Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation for bitops Marco Elver
2019-11-15 11:55   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] locking/atomics, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] x86, kcsan: Enable KCSAN for x86 Marco Elver
2019-11-14 19:50 ` [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-14 21:33   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-14 22:15     ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-15 12:02       ` Marco Elver
2019-11-15 16:41         ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-15 17:14           ` Marco Elver
2019-11-15 20:43             ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-16  8:20               ` Marco Elver
2019-11-16 15:34                 ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-16 18:09                   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-16 18:28                     ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-19 19:50 ` Qian Cai
2019-11-19 20:12 ` Qian Cai
2019-11-19 21:50   ` Marco Elver
2019-11-20 15:54     ` Marco Elver

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