From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>,
X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/3] wire up IMA secure boot for arm64
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2020 20:12:33 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMj1kXFuHTruFRudKT512Cmj35KJjcJkTfeHtEjVbfCUZ6oBFQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c044fc25be309e7b25a4c64845fd753515c84804.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On Wed, 4 Nov 2020 at 20:03, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 2020-11-04 at 19:50 +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On Wed, 4 Nov 2020 at 19:20, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Ard, Chester,
> > >
> > > On Mon, 2020-11-02 at 23:37 +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > > > This is a follow-up to Chester's series [0] to enable IMA to the secure
> > > > boot state of arm64 platforms, which is EFI based.
> > > >
> > > > This v4 implements the changes I suggested to Chester, in particular:
> > > > - disregard MokSbState when factoring out secure boot mode discovery
> > > > - turn the x86 IMA arch code into shared code for all architectures.
> > > >
> > > > This reduces the final patch to a one liner enabling a Kconfig option
> > > > for arm64 when EFI is enabled.
> > > >
> > > > Build tested only.
> > >
> > > Thank you! This patch set is now queued in the linux-integrity next-
> > > integrity-testing branch.
> > >
> >
> > I don't mind per se, but this touches a number of different trees,
> > including x86 and arm64, and nobody has acked it yet.
> >
> > As far as the EFI tree is concerned, it looks like I should be able to
> > avoid any conflicts with other stuff that is in flight, and if not, we
> > can always use your branch up until the last patch in this serires as
> > a shared tag (assuming you won't rebase it).
>
> The next-integrity-testing branch is just a place holder waiting for
> additional tags. I've reviewed and tested the patch set on x86. Based
> on the secure boot status and how the kernel is configured, the
> appropriate policy rules are enabled. Similarly the IMA appraise mode
> (ima_appraise=) is working properly. I have not tested on arm64.
>
> I do not have a problem with this patch set being upstream via EFI.
>
Ah right. That is probably better, as EFI goes via the x86 tree, and I
work closely with the arm64 maintainers on other things as well.
Please let me know once you are ready to ack this from IMA pov, and I
will carry it further.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-04 19:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-02 22:37 [PATCH v4 0/3] wire up IMA secure boot for arm64 Ard Biesheuvel
2020-11-02 22:37 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] efi: generalize efi_get_secureboot Ard Biesheuvel
2020-11-03 18:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-03 19:01 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-11-03 20:03 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-02 22:37 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] ima: generalize x86/EFI arch glue for other EFI architectures Ard Biesheuvel
2020-11-06 3:41 ` Chester Lin
2020-11-06 6:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-11-02 22:38 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] arm64/ima: add ima_arch support Ard Biesheuvel
2020-11-14 12:18 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 18:20 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] wire up IMA secure boot for arm64 Mimi Zohar
2020-11-04 18:50 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-11-04 19:03 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-04 19:12 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2020-11-04 19:55 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-05 7:55 ` Ard Biesheuvel
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