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From: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
To: Linux Kernel Mailinglist <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux FSDEVEL Mailinglist <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH] fs/open: Fix most outstanding security bugs
Date: Mon,  1 Apr 2019 11:01:13 +0200
Message-ID: <20190401090113.22946-1-jthumshirn@suse.de> (raw)

Over the last 20 years, the Linux kernel has accumulated hundreds if not
thousands of security vulnerabilities.

One common pattern in most of these security related reports is processes
called "syzkaller", "trinity" or "syz-executor" opening files and then
abuse kernel interfaces causing kernel crashes or even worse threats using
memory overwrites or by exploiting race conditions.

Hunting down these bugs has become time consuming and very expensive, so
I've decided to put an end to it.

If one of the above mentioned processes tries opening a file, return -EPERM
indicating this process does not have the permission to open files on Linux
anymore.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
---
 fs/open.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index f1c2f855fd43..3a3b460beccd 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -1056,6 +1056,20 @@ long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags, umode_t mode)
 	struct open_flags op;
 	int fd = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op);
 	struct filename *tmp;
+	char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+	int i;
+	static const char * const list[] = {
+		"syzkaller",
+		"syz-executor,"
+		"trinity",
+		NULL
+	};
+
+	get_task_comm(comm, current);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(list); i++)
+		if (!strncmp(comm, list[i], strlen(list[i])))
+			return -EPERM;
 
 	if (fd)
 		return fd;
-- 
2.16.4


             reply index

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-01  9:01 Johannes Thumshirn [this message]
2019-04-01 11:22 ` Matthew Wilcox
2019-04-01 11:48   ` Johannes Thumshirn
2019-04-01 11:53 ` Mukesh Ojha
2019-04-01 13:04 ` Torsten Duwe
2019-04-01 14:14 ` Nikolay Borisov
2019-04-01 17:28   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-04-01 21:27     ` Kees Cook
2019-04-01 17:38 ` Eric Biggers
2019-04-01 20:35 ` Darrick J. Wong
2019-04-02  7:56 ` Jessica Yu

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