From: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
To: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailinglist <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux FSDEVEL Mailinglist <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs/open: Fix most outstanding security bugs
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 09:56:58 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190402075657.GA14882@linux-8ccs> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190401090113.22946-1-jthumshirn@suse.de>
+++ Johannes Thumshirn [01/04/19 11:01 +0200]:
>Over the last 20 years, the Linux kernel has accumulated hundreds if not
>thousands of security vulnerabilities.
>
>One common pattern in most of these security related reports is processes
>called "syzkaller", "trinity" or "syz-executor" opening files and then
>abuse kernel interfaces causing kernel crashes or even worse threats using
>memory overwrites or by exploiting race conditions.
>
>Hunting down these bugs has become time consuming and very expensive, so
>I've decided to put an end to it.
>
>If one of the above mentioned processes tries opening a file, return -EPERM
>indicating this process does not have the permission to open files on Linux
>anymore.
>
>Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
:-)
>---
> fs/open.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
>index f1c2f855fd43..3a3b460beccd 100644
>--- a/fs/open.c
>+++ b/fs/open.c
>@@ -1056,6 +1056,20 @@ long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags, umode_t mode)
> struct open_flags op;
> int fd = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op);
> struct filename *tmp;
>+ char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
>+ int i;
>+ static const char * const list[] = {
>+ "syzkaller",
>+ "syz-executor,"
>+ "trinity",
>+ NULL
>+ };
>+
>+ get_task_comm(comm, current);
>+
>+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(list); i++)
>+ if (!strncmp(comm, list[i], strlen(list[i])))
>+ return -EPERM;
>
> if (fd)
> return fd;
>--
>2.16.4
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-02 7:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-01 9:01 [PATCH] fs/open: Fix most outstanding security bugs Johannes Thumshirn
2019-04-01 11:22 ` Matthew Wilcox
2019-04-01 11:48 ` Johannes Thumshirn
2019-04-01 11:53 ` Mukesh Ojha
2019-04-01 13:04 ` Torsten Duwe
2019-04-01 14:14 ` Nikolay Borisov
2019-04-01 17:28 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-04-01 21:27 ` Kees Cook
2019-04-01 17:38 ` Eric Biggers
2019-04-01 20:35 ` Darrick J. Wong
2019-04-02 7:56 ` Jessica Yu [this message]
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