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From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH] umh: fix refcount underflow in fork_usermode_blob().
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2020 22:43:00 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2a8775b4-1dd5-9d5c-aa42-9872445e0942@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> (raw)

Before thinking how to fix a bug that tomoyo_realpath_nofollow() from
tomoyo_find_next_domain() likely fails with -ENOENT whenever
fork_usermode_blob() is used because 449325b52b7a6208 did not take into
account that TOMOYO security module needs to calculate symlink's pathname,
is this a correct fix for a bug that file_inode(file)->i_writecount != 0
and file->f_count < 0 ?



From 8a9891af757a89b2a52addbc88a9911c17f6a2a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2020 22:39:26 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] umh: fix refcount underflow in fork_usermode_blob().

Since free_bprm(bprm) always calls allow_write_access(bprm->file) and
fput(bprm->file) if bprm->file is set to non-NULL, __do_execve_file()
must call deny_write_access(file) and get_file(file) if called from
do_execve_file() path.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Fixes: 449325b52b7a6208 ("umh: introduce fork_usermode_blob() helper")
---
 fs/exec.c | 14 ++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index db17be51b112..ded3fa368dc7 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1761,11 +1761,17 @@ static int __do_execve_file(int fd, struct filename *filename,
 	check_unsafe_exec(bprm);
 	current->in_execve = 1;
 
-	if (!file)
+	if (!file) {
 		file = do_open_execat(fd, filename, flags);
-	retval = PTR_ERR(file);
-	if (IS_ERR(file))
-		goto out_unmark;
+		retval = PTR_ERR(file);
+		if (IS_ERR(file))
+			goto out_unmark;
+	} else {
+		retval = deny_write_access(file);
+		if (retval)
+			goto out_unmark;
+		get_file(file);
+	}
 
 	sched_exec();
 
-- 
2.18.2


             reply	other threads:[~2020-03-12 13:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-12 13:43 Tetsuo Handa [this message]
2020-03-12 14:38 ` [PATCH] umh: fix refcount underflow in fork_usermode_blob() Al Viro
2020-03-13  9:46   ` Tetsuo Handa
2020-03-20 10:31     ` Tetsuo Handa
2020-03-27  0:51       ` [PATCH (repost)] " Tetsuo Handa
2020-03-29  0:55         ` Andrew Morton
2020-03-29  4:28           ` Tetsuo Handa
2020-03-29  3:17         ` Al Viro

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