From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] umh: fix refcount underflow in fork_usermode_blob().
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2020 18:46:19 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a802dfd6-aeda-c454-6dd3-68e32a4cf914@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200312143801.GJ23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
On 2020/03/12 23:38, Al Viro wrote:
> It _does_ look like that double-fput() is real, but
> I'd like a confirmation before going further - umh is convoluted
> enough for something subtle to be hidden there. Alexei, what
> the refcounting behaviour was supposed to be? As in "this
> function consumes the reference passed to it in this argument",
> etc.
>
Yes, double-fput() is easily observable as POISON_FREE pattern
using debug printk() patch and sample kernel module shown below.
---------- debug printk() patch start ----------
diff --git a/kernel/umh.c b/kernel/umh.c
index 7f255b5a8845..8313736b39b9 100644
--- a/kernel/umh.c
+++ b/kernel/umh.c
@@ -507,6 +507,7 @@ int fork_usermode_blob(void *data, size_t len, struct umh_info *info)
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
+ printk("writecount=%d fcount=%ld\n", atomic_read(&file_inode(file)->i_writecount), atomic_long_read(&file->f_count));
written = kernel_write(file, data, len, &pos);
if (written != len) {
err = written;
@@ -522,12 +523,15 @@ int fork_usermode_blob(void *data, size_t len, struct umh_info *info)
goto out;
err = call_usermodehelper_exec(sub_info, UMH_WAIT_EXEC);
+ printk("err=%d writecount=%d fcount=%ld\n", err, atomic_read(&file_inode(file)->i_writecount), atomic_long_read(&file->f_count));
if (!err) {
mutex_lock(&umh_list_lock);
list_add(&info->list, &umh_list);
mutex_unlock(&umh_list_lock);
}
out:
+ schedule_timeout_killable(HZ);
+ printk("err=%d writecount=%d fcount=%ld\n", err, atomic_read(&file_inode(file)->i_writecount), atomic_long_read(&file->f_count));
fput(file);
return err;
}
---------- debug printk() patch end ----------
---------- test.c start ----------
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/umh.h>
static int __init test_init(void)
{
struct umh_info *info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL);
printk("fork_usermode_blob()=%d\n", fork_usermode_blob((void *) "#!/bin/true\n", 12, info));
return -EINVAL;
}
module_init(test_init);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
---------- test.c end ----------
---------- without refcount-fix patch ----------
[ 30.775698] test: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel.
[ 30.792584] writecount=0 fcount=1
[ 30.794844] err=0 writecount=1 fcount=0
[ 31.843778] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ 31.847903] CPU: 3 PID: 4131 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 5.6.0-rc5+ #978
[ 31.850292] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/29/2019
[ 31.853578] RIP: 0010:fork_usermode_blob+0xaa/0x190
[ 31.855248] Code: 41 89 c4 78 06 41 bc f4 ff ff ff bf e8 03 00 00 e8 ab 75 61 00 48 8b 43 20 48 8b 8b 80 00 00 00 44 89 e6 48 c7 c7 98 ec db b6 <8b> 90 20 02 00 00 31 c0 e8 92 35 05 00 48 89 df e8 61 ab 1c 00 44
[ 31.860535] RSP: 0018:ffffba7586287c48 EFLAGS: 00010296
[ 31.862173] RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffffa124e05df0c0 RCX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
[ 31.864457] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffffb6dbec98
[ 31.866585] RBP: ffffba7586287c78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 31.868966] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 31.871051] R13: ffffa124d4ef1a40 R14: ffffffffc0541024 R15: ffffba7586287e68
[ 31.873188] FS: 00007fc8f6c2b740(0000) GS:ffffa124e7a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 31.875748] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 31.877856] CR2: 000055b90eba7e38 CR3: 000000021e06b005 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[ 31.879968] Call Trace:
[ 31.880842] ? 0xffffffffc054d000
[ 31.881943] test_init+0x2e/0x1000 [test]
[ 31.883207] do_one_initcall+0x6f/0x360
[ 31.884431] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2d8/0x380
[ 31.885926] do_init_module+0x5b/0x210
[ 31.887137] load_module+0x16b6/0x1d50
[ 31.888384] ? m_show+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 31.889524] __do_sys_finit_module+0xa9/0x100
[ 31.890965] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x15/0x20
[ 31.892387] do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x1e0
[ 31.893601] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 31.895119] RIP: 0033:0x7fc8f60ffba9
[ 31.896305] Code: 01 00 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 97 e2 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 31.901836] RSP: 002b:00007ffe67506d88 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[ 31.904191] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000001a671e0 RCX: 00007fc8f60ffba9
[ 31.906317] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000041a96e RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 31.908417] RBP: 000000000041a96e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffe67506f28
[ 31.910563] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 31.913395] R13: 0000000001a66120 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 31.916120] Modules linked in: test(O+) af_packet nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv4 sunrpc mousedev vmw_balloon intel_rapl_perf input_leds led_class psmouse pcspkr sg vmw_vmci intel_agp intel_gtt i2c_piix4 rtc_cmos evdev mac_hid ac button ip_tables x_tables xfs libcrc32c crc32c_generic sd_mod ata_generic pata_acpi vmwgfx drm_kms_helper cfbfillrect syscopyarea cfbimgblt sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ahci cfbcopyarea mptspi libahci scsi_transport_spi fb fbdev mptscsih ttm mptbase ata_piix drm nvme drm_panel_orientation_quirks nvme_core libata t10_pi agpgart e1000 i2c_core scsi_mod serio_raw atkbd libps2 i8042 serio unix ipv6 crc_ccitt nf_defrag_ipv6
[ 31.936929] ---[ end trace 8073d6b33b84006e ]---
[ 31.939179] RIP: 0010:fork_usermode_blob+0xaa/0x190
[ 31.941431] Code: 41 89 c4 78 06 41 bc f4 ff ff ff bf e8 03 00 00 e8 ab 75 61 00 48 8b 43 20 48 8b 8b 80 00 00 00 44 89 e6 48 c7 c7 98 ec db b6 <8b> 90 20 02 00 00 31 c0 e8 92 35 05 00 48 89 df e8 61 ab 1c 00 44
[ 31.949189] RSP: 0018:ffffba7586287c48 EFLAGS: 00010296
[ 31.951763] RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffffa124e05df0c0 RCX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
[ 31.954909] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffffb6dbec98
[ 31.957834] RBP: ffffba7586287c78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 31.960818] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 31.963821] R13: ffffa124d4ef1a40 R14: ffffffffc0541024 R15: ffffba7586287e68
[ 31.966644] FS: 00007fc8f6c2b740(0000) GS:ffffa124e7a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 31.970102] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 31.972786] CR2: 000055b90eba7e38 CR3: 000000021e06b005 CR4: 00000000003606e0
---------- without refcount-fix patch ----------
And this refcount fix patch makes consistent for both success and fail cases.
---------- with refcount-fix patch and without tomoyo ----------
[ 26.901802] test: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel.
[ 26.917614] writecount=0 fcount=1
[ 26.922823] err=0 writecount=0 fcount=1
[ 27.984948] err=0 writecount=0 fcount=1
[ 27.986274] fork_usermode_blob()=0
---------- with refcount-fix patch and without tomoyo ----------
---------- with refcount-fix patch and with tomoyo ----------
[ 24.784915] test: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel.
[ 24.788705] writecount=0 fcount=1
[ 24.790663] err=-2 writecount=0 fcount=1
[ 25.796113] err=-2 writecount=0 fcount=1
[ 25.799777] fork_usermode_blob()=-2
---------- with refcount-fix patch and with tomoyo ----------
Well, this -ENOENT assumption was introduced by commit 26a2a1c9eb88d9ac ("Domain transition handler.") in 2.6.30
and remains broken since commit 51f39a1f0cea1cac ("syscalls: implement execveat() system call") in 3.19...
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-13 9:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-03-12 13:43 [PATCH] umh: fix refcount underflow in fork_usermode_blob() Tetsuo Handa
2020-03-12 14:38 ` Al Viro
2020-03-13 9:46 ` Tetsuo Handa [this message]
2020-03-20 10:31 ` Tetsuo Handa
2020-03-27 0:51 ` [PATCH (repost)] " Tetsuo Handa
2020-03-29 0:55 ` Andrew Morton
2020-03-29 4:28 ` Tetsuo Handa
2020-03-29 3:17 ` Al Viro
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=a802dfd6-aeda-c454-6dd3-68e32a4cf914@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
--to=penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
--cc=ast@kernel.org \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).