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From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "security@kernel.org" <security@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH)
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 11:48:10 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFzXNU-eJ7KeZyv5YYKKtm8iorG-o3QtD7NXx0GTzuH+Bw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b121a1082bf3365fda22a131782147c169c969f5.1377112282.git.luto@amacapital.net>

On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
>
> So let's be careful for now: only allow linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH)
> if the target is I_LINKABLE.

So I really detest this just because it's such a special case. Now
this is only useful for that one special case, and the thing very
fundamentally checks that one special case in a place that is
impossible to check for the /proc case, so the proc case remains
totally separate.

Which just bothers me.

I think we could easily at least allow the "file->f_creds ==
current->creds" case (and yes, I literally mean comparing the pointers
- not only is it cheaper, but it literally means "nothing odd has
happened in between opening and the lookup").

And I'm wondering if we shouldn't actually do that at "path_init"
time. Right now the code says:

                /* Caller must check execute permissions on the
starting path component */
                struct fd f = fdget_raw(dfd);

and then uses the struct file mindlessly.

I'm wondering if we should just do some validation in that place, and say:

 - for directories, we require exec permissions here
 - for everything else, we require that f->f_cred == current->cred check.

I dunno. But that I_LINKABLE thing just bothers me. It screams "I'm
hacky" to me.

               Linus

  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-08-22 18:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-08-21 19:14 [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) Andy Lutomirski
     [not found] ` <CA+55aFxi-ps2f2M8xPhfbuQ0pToqupPrDsLi2+GPUK2sqdYfUw@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]   ` <CALCETrW7+LcexA6v6RQDKhni_yJAduOmiSDneCpq3v8sPDvwUQ@mail.gmail.com>
2013-08-21 20:16     ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 18:48 ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2013-08-22 18:53   ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 19:05     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 19:23       ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:10         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:15           ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 20:22             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:44               ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:48                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:54                   ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:58                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-23  1:07                     ` Al Viro
2013-08-25  3:37                       ` Al Viro
2013-08-25  7:26                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-25 14:23                           ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 17:04                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-25 19:57                         ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 20:06                           ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 20:23                             ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 17:37                               ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 18:07                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 18:11                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 19:16                                   ` [RFC PATCH] fs: Add user_file_or_path_at and use it for truncate Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 19:32                                     ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 20:28                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-28  6:16                                         ` Al Viro
2013-08-28 16:24                                           ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-28 19:04                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-28 19:59                                             ` Al Viro
2013-08-28 21:07                                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 23:08                                     ` Al Viro
2013-08-27 23:13                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-24 18:29             ` /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-24 21:24               ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-25  5:23                 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25  6:50                   ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-25 18:51                     ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 19:48                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 20:05                         ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 15:33                           ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 16:37                             ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 17:54                               ` [PATCH] proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:09                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 19:35                                   ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 20:20                                     ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-27 15:05                                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 14:39                                     ` [PATCH 0/1] proc: make /proc/self point to thread Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 14:40                                       ` [PATCH 1/1] " Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 16:39                                         ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 17:49                                           ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 18:15                                             ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 18:28                                               ` Oleg Nesterov
     [not found]                                     ` <CALCETrXP-mYBPRon=0NzexW1FK1Qxz2+Bwv7-WeHBQpvW7ywRg@mail.gmail.com>
2013-08-27 15:45                                       ` [PATCH] proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:32                                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 18:46                                   ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:56                                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 19:10                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-27 14:53                                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 18:32                   ` /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 19:11                     ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 19:17                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-09-03 15:58                     ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-25 15:45                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-22 19:39       ` [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) Willy Tarreau

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