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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"security@kernel.org" <security@kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] fs: Add user_file_or_path_at and use it for truncate
Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 14:07:44 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrU99=Ur_noMrtfgpSN-rGdYMSkp6fGPL8Oi+nOe1=AmjA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130828195934.GA13318@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 12:59 PM, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 12:04:43PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 11:16 PM, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
>> > On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 01:28:27PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >> There are also O_PATH fds, and I'm not sure what the semantics of
>> >> O_PATH fds are or should be when they refer to something other than a
>> >> directory.
>> >
>> > O_PATH file just points to specific location in the tree, no more and
>> > no less.
>>
>> I don't know whether ftruncate(some O_PATH fd) should work.  But this
>> probably barely matters.
>
> It shouldn't.  No IO on these guys at all.
>
>> > AFAICS, the *only* cases when we might possibly care are linkat() target,
>> > truncate() and open().  Note, BTW, that right now we *do* allow an attempt
>> > to reopen a file via procfs symlink r/w, even when file had been r/o.
>> > It's subject to permissions on the object being opened, but that's it.
>> >
>> > I'm not sure we can change that - again, it's a user-visible API, and
>> > the change is very likely to break some scripts.  In fact, it's about
>> > as dangerous as a full-blown switch to dup-style semantics for procfs
>> > opens, and it's a lot less attractive.
>> >
>> > For truncate() we would only need to have FMODE_WRITE reported, more or
>> > less the same way as FMODE_FLINK.  And without open() changes it doesn't
>> > buy us anything at all...
>> >
>> > I've no problem with unrolling the user_path_at() in do_sys_truncate()
>> > into an explicit loop by trailing symlinks and checking for indication
>> > left by proc_pid_follow_link(), more or less the same way as with
>> > LOOKUP_LINK in lookup_last().  It's _far_ less invasive than playing
>> > with "oh, here we fill a struct path or maybe a struct file" horrors,
>> > pinning struct file for no reason, etc.
>> >
>> > AFAICS, the real question is whether we dare to change open() behaviour on
>> > /proc/*/fd/*.  I've played with that a bit and I believe that I can do
>> > the switch to dup-style with very localized changes in fs/namei.c and
>> > fs/proc/{base,fd}.c.  Will be even binary compatible kernel-side -
>> > ->atomic_open() returns NULL/ERR_PTR where it used to return 0/-error,
>> > not that we had many instances to convert.  *IF* that variant is not
>> > out of consideration for userland API stability reasons, I would certainly
>> > prefer to go that way; turns out that these days we can pull it off without
>> > black magic in descriptor handling, etc.  Linus?
>>
>> I personally find the check-mode-but-get-a-new-struct-file version to
>> be less weird that the dup approach.  Either approach will break
>> scripts that try to write to /dev/stdin (which is the whole point).
>
> What, breaking existing userland?  IMO that's a thing to avoid, unless we
> have really, really strong reasons not to.  And yes, it goes for both
> variants...  FWIW, I'm not convinced that the reasons you are giving for
> it are strong enough - passing somebody a read-only file descriptor to
> a file they could open for write and relying on their inability to truncate
> the fscker just because it's not reachable via any path they've got search
> permissions to looks like a Bloody Bad Idea(tm), and not only because it won't
> do what you hope it'll do on existing kernels.  It's very easy to fuck up
> and end up with a searchable path to the damn thing; e.g. /proc/<pid>/cwd/foo
> will bypass the grandparent of foo not being searchable for you, etc.
>

This affects O_TMPFILE, for example -- create a file with O_TMPFILE |
O_RDWR and mode 0666 (by accident), write something, then
open("/proc/self/fd/N", O_RDONLY) and send the resulting fd to
someone.  They can't directly write it, but they can reopen it O_RDWR.

I agree that flink is the main issue here, FWIW.  I think that the
current semantics are just too screwed up to make it really safe to
pass around fds with reduced access modes and expect those modes to
stick.

--Andy

  reply	other threads:[~2013-08-28 21:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-08-21 19:14 [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) Andy Lutomirski
     [not found] ` <CA+55aFxi-ps2f2M8xPhfbuQ0pToqupPrDsLi2+GPUK2sqdYfUw@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]   ` <CALCETrW7+LcexA6v6RQDKhni_yJAduOmiSDneCpq3v8sPDvwUQ@mail.gmail.com>
2013-08-21 20:16     ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 18:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 18:53   ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 19:05     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 19:23       ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:10         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:15           ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 20:22             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:44               ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:48                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:54                   ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:58                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-23  1:07                     ` Al Viro
2013-08-25  3:37                       ` Al Viro
2013-08-25  7:26                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-25 14:23                           ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 17:04                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-25 19:57                         ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 20:06                           ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 20:23                             ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 17:37                               ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 18:07                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 18:11                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 19:16                                   ` [RFC PATCH] fs: Add user_file_or_path_at and use it for truncate Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 19:32                                     ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 20:28                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-28  6:16                                         ` Al Viro
2013-08-28 16:24                                           ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-28 19:04                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-28 19:59                                             ` Al Viro
2013-08-28 21:07                                               ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2013-08-27 23:08                                     ` Al Viro
2013-08-27 23:13                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-24 18:29             ` /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-24 21:24               ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-25  5:23                 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25  6:50                   ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-25 18:51                     ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 19:48                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 20:05                         ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 15:33                           ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 16:37                             ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 17:54                               ` [PATCH] proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:09                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 19:35                                   ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 20:20                                     ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-27 15:05                                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 14:39                                     ` [PATCH 0/1] proc: make /proc/self point to thread Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 14:40                                       ` [PATCH 1/1] " Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 16:39                                         ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 17:49                                           ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 18:15                                             ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 18:28                                               ` Oleg Nesterov
     [not found]                                     ` <CALCETrXP-mYBPRon=0NzexW1FK1Qxz2+Bwv7-WeHBQpvW7ywRg@mail.gmail.com>
2013-08-27 15:45                                       ` [PATCH] proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:32                                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 18:46                                   ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:56                                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 19:10                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-27 14:53                                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 18:32                   ` /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 19:11                     ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 19:17                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-09-03 15:58                     ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-25 15:45                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-22 19:39       ` [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) Willy Tarreau

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