From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
"security@kernel.org" <security@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH)
Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2013 00:26:34 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrViJ8i3ty8xAECC0nqRuepVeKsW9r2W51tTCDUuB3V25g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130825033741.GX27005@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
On Sat, Aug 24, 2013 at 8:37 PM, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 02:07:26AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
>> On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 01:54:15PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>> > On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 1:48 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
>> > >
>> > > Sure. But aren't they always last?
>> >
>> > What do you mean? I'd say that the /proc lookup is always *innermost*.
>> > Which means that it certainly cannot bail out, since there are many
>> > levels of nesting outside of it.
>> >
>> > > With the current code structure, trying to enforce some kind of
>> > > security restriction in the middle of lookup seems really unpleasant.
>> >
>> > If it's conditional (ie "linkat behaves differently from openat"), it
>> > certainly means that we'd have to pass in that info in annoying ways.
>>
>> Nope. All we need to pass is one more LOOKUP_... Add
>> if (unlikely(nd->last_type == LAST_BIND)) {
>> if ((nd->flags & LOOKUP_BLAH) && !may_flink(...)) {
>> terminate_walk(nd);
>> return -EINVAL;
>> }
>> }
>> in the beginning of lookup_last() and pass LOOKUP_BLAH in flags when
>> linkat() calls user_path_at(). That will affect *only* the terminal
>> symlinks and cost nothing in all normal cases. The same check can
>> bloody well go into path_init() - take
>> if (*name) {
>> if (!can_lookup(dentry->d_inode)) {
>> fdput(f);
>> return -ENOTDIR;
>> }
>> }
>> in there and slap
>> else {
>> if ((flags & LOOKUP_BLAH) && !may_flink(...)) {
>> fdput(f);
>> return -EINVAL;
>> }
>> }
>> after it.
>
> OK, let me summarize these threads so far:
> * restrictions for flink() are needed and they'd better be
> consistent for AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW + /proc/<pid>/fd/<n> and simply
> passing the descriptor as dfd.
> * CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE is sufficient; so should be O_TMPFILE used
> to open that sucker.
> * lookup_last() is the natural place for catching the case
> of following a trailing procfs symlink - it can be done very cheaply
> there.
>
> FWIW, I'm tempted to try the following trick:
> * introduce FMODE_FLINK in file->f_mode; O_TMPFILE would set it,
> unless O_EXCL is present.
> * introduce LOOKUP_LINK, to be passed by sys_linkat() when
> resolving the target.
> * have path_init() called with empty pathname and LOOKUP_LINK in
> flags do checks for FMODE_FLINK or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
> * have ->proc_get_link() report whether the target is linkable
> (either as bool * or by returning 1 instead of 0). After the call of
> ->proc_get_link() check that and set nd->last_type to LAST_BIND_LINKABLE.
> Note that *all* places looking at ->last_type treat LAST_BIND as "none
> of the above" - we never compare with it, so splitting it in two wouldn't
> break anything.
> * have lookup_last() check if LOOKUP_LINK is present and ->last_type
> is LAST_BIND; fail unless we have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE.
>
> AFAICS, it gets more or less sane behaviour; additionally, it makes possible
> to introduce explicit "I want that descriptor to be suitable for flink()"
> open(2) flag - that would require teaching do_last() about LOOKUP_LINK,
> making it check for CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE if it sees LAST_BIND / LOOKUP_LINK,
> same as lookup_last() above (we obviously want to avoid the possibility
> to take a non-flinkable descriptor and use it to reopen the sucker in
> flinkable way).
>
> Alternatively we can revert "fs: Allow unprivileged linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH)
> aka flink" for the time being. flink() is certainly an awful mess and I
> seriously regret touching it ;-/
>
> Comments? Hell, maybe somebody even has printable ones - stranger things
> have happened...
I think this is more screwed up than just flink and open. For example:
$ echo 'WTF' >test
$ truncate -s 1 /proc/self/fd/3 3<test
$ cat test
W$
IMO that should have failed.
In an ideal world (I think) ffrob(N), frobat(N, "", AT_EMPTY_PATH),
and frobat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/fd/N) should generally do the same
thing. This includes flink (even though the flink variant doesn't
exist). open is a bit special.
Of course, we're rather inconsistent with AT_EMPTY_PATH. utimensat
accepts a null filename instead of a blank filename, and it doesn't
appear to check the file mode at all.
Sigh.
--Andy
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-25 7:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-21 19:14 [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CA+55aFxi-ps2f2M8xPhfbuQ0pToqupPrDsLi2+GPUK2sqdYfUw@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <CALCETrW7+LcexA6v6RQDKhni_yJAduOmiSDneCpq3v8sPDvwUQ@mail.gmail.com>
2013-08-21 20:16 ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 18:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 18:53 ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 19:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 19:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:15 ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 20:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-23 1:07 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 3:37 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 7:26 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2013-08-25 14:23 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 17:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-25 19:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 20:06 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 20:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 17:37 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 18:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 18:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 19:16 ` [RFC PATCH] fs: Add user_file_or_path_at and use it for truncate Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 19:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 20:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-28 6:16 ` Al Viro
2013-08-28 16:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-28 19:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-28 19:59 ` Al Viro
2013-08-28 21:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 23:08 ` Al Viro
2013-08-27 23:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-24 18:29 ` /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-24 21:24 ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-25 5:23 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 6:50 ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-25 18:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 19:48 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 20:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 15:33 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 16:37 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 17:54 ` [PATCH] proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 19:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 20:20 ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-27 15:05 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 14:39 ` [PATCH 0/1] proc: make /proc/self point to thread Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 14:40 ` [PATCH 1/1] " Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 16:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 17:49 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 18:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 18:28 ` Oleg Nesterov
[not found] ` <CALCETrXP-mYBPRon=0NzexW1FK1Qxz2+Bwv7-WeHBQpvW7ywRg@mail.gmail.com>
2013-08-27 15:45 ` [PATCH] proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 18:46 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 19:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-27 14:53 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 18:32 ` /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 19:11 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 19:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-09-03 15:58 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-25 15:45 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-22 19:39 ` [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) Willy Tarreau
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