From: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/12] vfs: allow unprivileged whiteout creation
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2019 05:22:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJfpegtY9Lg4=OSQqYhqDe9kC=5CrvdV22E924qgMWTHVwAWMQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191217035144.GU4203@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 4:51 AM Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 04:59:36PM +0100, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > Whiteouts are special, but unlike real device nodes they should not require
> > privileges to create.
>
> More detailed analysis, please. Maybe I'm missing something obvious,
> but I don't see off-hand why it's safe.
The general concern with device nodes is that opening them can have
side effects. The kernel already avoids zero major, so opening will
result in ENODEV, but the patch also makes sure that registering a
device with 0/0 number is forbidden (fs/char_dev.c).
Thanks,
Miklos
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-17 4:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-28 15:59 [PATCH 00/12] various vfs patches Miklos Szeredi
2019-11-28 15:59 ` [PATCH 01/12] aio: fix async fsync creds Miklos Szeredi
2019-12-13 9:32 ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-05-04 8:05 ` Avi Kivity
2019-11-28 15:59 ` [PATCH 02/12] fs_parse: fix fs_param_v_optional handling Miklos Szeredi
2019-11-29 11:31 ` Andrew Price
2019-11-29 14:43 ` Miklos Szeredi
2019-11-29 15:56 ` Andrew Price
2019-12-16 23:28 ` Al Viro
2019-12-17 1:18 ` Al Viro
2019-12-17 3:27 ` Al Viro
2019-11-28 15:59 ` [PATCH 03/12] vfs: verify param type in vfs_parse_sb_flag() Miklos Szeredi
2019-11-28 15:59 ` [PATCH 04/12] uapi: deprecate STATX_ALL Miklos Szeredi
2019-11-28 15:59 ` [PATCH 05/12] statx: don't clear STATX_ATIME on SB_RDONLY Miklos Szeredi
2019-11-28 15:59 ` [PATCH 06/12] utimensat: AT_EMPTY_PATH support Miklos Szeredi
2019-11-28 15:59 ` [PATCH 07/12] f*xattr: allow O_PATH descriptors Miklos Szeredi
2019-11-28 15:59 ` [PATCH 08/12] vfs: allow unprivileged whiteout creation Miklos Szeredi
2019-12-17 3:51 ` Al Viro
2019-12-17 4:22 ` Miklos Szeredi [this message]
2019-11-28 15:59 ` [PATCH 09/12] fs_parser: "string" with missing value is a "flag" Miklos Szeredi
2019-12-17 17:32 ` Al Viro
2019-12-17 18:31 ` Al Viro
2019-11-28 15:59 ` [PATCH 10/12] vfs: don't parse forbidden flags Miklos Szeredi
2019-11-28 15:59 ` [PATCH 11/12] vfs: don't parse "posixacl" option Miklos Szeredi
2019-12-17 3:42 ` Al Viro
2019-12-17 4:18 ` Miklos Szeredi
2019-12-17 4:28 ` Al Viro
2019-11-28 15:59 ` [PATCH 12/12] vfs: don't parse "silent" option Miklos Szeredi
2019-12-17 3:37 ` Al Viro
2019-12-17 4:12 ` Miklos Szeredi
2019-12-17 4:16 ` Miklos Szeredi
2019-12-17 4:19 ` Al Viro
2019-12-17 4:23 ` Miklos Szeredi
2019-12-17 4:28 ` Miklos Szeredi
2019-12-17 4:17 ` Al Viro
2019-12-13 9:33 ` [PATCH 00/12] various vfs patches Miklos Szeredi
2019-12-16 23:13 ` Al Viro
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