From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Juerg Haefliger <juergh@gmail.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
jsteckli@amazon.de, Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com>,
deepa.srinivasan@oracle.com, chris hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>,
"Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>LSM List <linux>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:49:04 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXFzWFMrV-zDa4QFjB=4WnC9RZmorBko65dLGhymDpeQw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8d314750-251c-7e6a-7002-5df2462ada6b@oracle.com>
On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 10:33 AM Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> wrote:
>
> On 4/17/19 11:09 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> >
> > * Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> wrote:
> >
> >>> I.e. the original motivation of the XPFO patches was to prevent execution
> >>> of direct kernel mappings. Is this motivation still present if those
> >>> mappings are non-executable?
> >>>
> >>> (Sorry if this has been asked and answered in previous discussions.)
> >>
> >> Hi Ingo,
> >>
> >> That is a good question. Because of the cost of XPFO, we have to be very
> >> sure we need this protection. The paper from Vasileios, Michalis and
> >> Angelos - <http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~vpk/papers/ret2dir.sec14.pdf>,
> >> does go into how ret2dir attacks can bypass SMAP/SMEP in sections 6.1
> >> and 6.2.
> >
> > So it would be nice if you could generally summarize external arguments
> > when defending a patchset, instead of me having to dig through a PDF
> > which not only causes me to spend time that you probably already spent
> > reading that PDF, but I might also interpret it incorrectly. ;-)
>
> Sorry, you are right. Even though that paper explains it well, a summary
> is always useful.
>
> >
> > The PDF you cited says this:
> >
> > "Unfortunately, as shown in Table 1, the W^X prop-erty is not enforced
> > in many platforms, including x86-64. In our example, the content of
> > user address 0xBEEF000 is also accessible through kernel address
> > 0xFFFF87FF9F080000 as plain, executable code."
> >
> > Is this actually true of modern x86-64 kernels? We've locked down W^X
> > protections in general.
> >
> > I.e. this conclusion:
> >
> > "Therefore, by simply overwriting kfptr with 0xFFFF87FF9F080000 and
> > triggering the kernel to dereference it, an attacker can directly
> > execute shell code with kernel privileges."
> >
> > ... appears to be predicated on imperfect W^X protections on the x86-64
> > kernel.
> >
> > Do such holes exist on the latest x86-64 kernel? If yes, is there a
> > reason to believe that these W^X holes cannot be fixed, or that any fix
> > would be more expensive than XPFO?
>
> Even if physmap is not executable, return-oriented programming (ROP) can
> still be used to launch an attack. Instead of placing executable code at
> user address 0xBEEF000, attacker can place an ROP payload there. kfptr
> is then overwritten to point to a stack-pivoting gadget. Using the
> physmap address aliasing, the ROP payload becomes kernel-mode stack. The
> execution can then be hijacked upon execution of ret instruction. This
> is a gist of the subsection titled "Non-executable physmap" under
> section 6.2 and it looked convincing enough to me. If you have a
> different take on this, I am very interested in your point of view.
My issue with all this is that XPFO is really very expensive. I think
that, if we're going to seriously consider upstreaming expensive
exploit mitigations like this, we should consider others first, in
particular CFI techniques. grsecurity's RAP would be a great start.
I also proposed using a gcc plugin (or upstream gcc feature) to add
some instrumentation to any code that pops RSP to verify that the
resulting (unsigned) change in RSP is between 0 and THREAD_SIZE bytes.
This will make ROP quite a bit harder.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
deepa.srinivasan@oracle.com, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, jsteckli@amazon.de,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
chris hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Khalid Aziz <khalid@gonehiking.org>,
Juerg Haefliger <juergh@gmail.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:49:04 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXFzWFMrV-zDa4QFjB=4WnC9RZmorBko65dLGhymDpeQw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20190417194904.ge1vnOeYIlTROauRLfaYEAZ5oc3Fg05iSm8XuNFhHok@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8d314750-251c-7e6a-7002-5df2462ada6b@oracle.com>
On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 10:33 AM Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> wrote:
>
> On 4/17/19 11:09 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> >
> > * Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> wrote:
> >
> >>> I.e. the original motivation of the XPFO patches was to prevent execution
> >>> of direct kernel mappings. Is this motivation still present if those
> >>> mappings are non-executable?
> >>>
> >>> (Sorry if this has been asked and answered in previous discussions.)
> >>
> >> Hi Ingo,
> >>
> >> That is a good question. Because of the cost of XPFO, we have to be very
> >> sure we need this protection. The paper from Vasileios, Michalis and
> >> Angelos - <http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~vpk/papers/ret2dir.sec14.pdf>,
> >> does go into how ret2dir attacks can bypass SMAP/SMEP in sections 6.1
> >> and 6.2.
> >
> > So it would be nice if you could generally summarize external arguments
> > when defending a patchset, instead of me having to dig through a PDF
> > which not only causes me to spend time that you probably already spent
> > reading that PDF, but I might also interpret it incorrectly. ;-)
>
> Sorry, you are right. Even though that paper explains it well, a summary
> is always useful.
>
> >
> > The PDF you cited says this:
> >
> > "Unfortunately, as shown in Table 1, the W^X prop-erty is not enforced
> > in many platforms, including x86-64. In our example, the content of
> > user address 0xBEEF000 is also accessible through kernel address
> > 0xFFFF87FF9F080000 as plain, executable code."
> >
> > Is this actually true of modern x86-64 kernels? We've locked down W^X
> > protections in general.
> >
> > I.e. this conclusion:
> >
> > "Therefore, by simply overwriting kfptr with 0xFFFF87FF9F080000 and
> > triggering the kernel to dereference it, an attacker can directly
> > execute shell code with kernel privileges."
> >
> > ... appears to be predicated on imperfect W^X protections on the x86-64
> > kernel.
> >
> > Do such holes exist on the latest x86-64 kernel? If yes, is there a
> > reason to believe that these W^X holes cannot be fixed, or that any fix
> > would be more expensive than XPFO?
>
> Even if physmap is not executable, return-oriented programming (ROP) can
> still be used to launch an attack. Instead of placing executable code at
> user address 0xBEEF000, attacker can place an ROP payload there. kfptr
> is then overwritten to point to a stack-pivoting gadget. Using the
> physmap address aliasing, the ROP payload becomes kernel-mode stack. The
> execution can then be hijacked upon execution of ret instruction. This
> is a gist of the subsection titled "Non-executable physmap" under
> section 6.2 and it looked convincing enough to me. If you have a
> different take on this, I am very interested in your point of view.
My issue with all this is that XPFO is really very expensive. I think
that, if we're going to seriously consider upstreaming expensive
exploit mitigations like this, we should consider others first, in
particular CFI techniques. grsecurity's RAP would be a great start.
I also proposed using a gcc plugin (or upstream gcc feature) to add
some instrumentation to any code that pops RSP to verify that the
resulting (unsigned) change in RSP is between 0 and THREAD_SIZE bytes.
This will make ROP quite a bit harder.
_______________________________________________
iommu mailing list
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-17 19:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-03 17:34 [RFC PATCH v9 00/13] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/13] xpfo, mm: optimize spinlock usage in xpfo_kunmap Khalid Aziz
[not found] ` <5bab13e12d4215112ad2180106cc6bb9b513754a.1554248002.git.khalid.aziz-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-04 7:56 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-04 16:06 ` Khalid Aziz
[not found] ` <cover.1554248001.git.khalid.aziz-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/13] mm: add MAP_HUGETLB support to vm_mmap Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/13] x86: always set IF before oopsing from page fault Khalid Aziz
[not found] ` <e6c57f675e5b53d4de266412aa526b7660c47918.1554248002.git.khalid.aziz-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-04 0:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrXvwuwkVSJ+S5s7wTBkNNj3fRVxpx9BvsXWrT=3ZdRnCw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-04 1:42 ` Tycho Andersen
2019-04-04 4:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrVp37Xo3EMHkeedP1zxUMf9og=mceBa8c55e1F4G1DRSQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-04 15:47 ` Tycho Andersen
2019-04-04 16:23 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-04-04 16:28 ` Thomas Gleixner
[not found] ` <alpine.DEB.2.21.1904041822320.1802-ecDvlHI5BZPZikZi3RtOZ1XZhhPuCNm+@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-04 17:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) Khalid Aziz
[not found] ` <f1ac3700970365fb979533294774af0b0dd84b3b.1554248002.git.khalid.aziz-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-04 7:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
[not found] ` <20190404072152.GN4038-Nxj+rRp3nVydTX5a5knrm8zTDFooKrT+cvkQGrU6aU0@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-04 9:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-04 14:48 ` Tycho Andersen
2019-04-04 7:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
[not found] ` <20190404074323.GO4038-Nxj+rRp3nVydTX5a5knrm8zTDFooKrT+cvkQGrU6aU0@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-04 15:15 ` Khalid Aziz
[not found] ` <b414bacc-2883-1914-38ec-3d8f4a032e10-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-04 17:01 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-17 16:15 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-17 16:15 ` Ingo Molnar
[not found] ` <20190417161042.GA43453-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-17 16:49 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-17 16:49 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-17 17:09 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-17 17:09 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-17 17:19 ` Nadav Amit
2019-04-17 17:19 ` Nadav Amit
2019-04-17 17:26 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-17 17:26 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-17 17:44 ` Nadav Amit
2019-04-17 17:44 ` Nadav Amit
2019-04-17 21:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-17 21:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
[not found] ` <alpine.DEB.2.21.1904172317460.3174-ecDvlHI5BZPZikZi3RtOZ1XZhhPuCNm+@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-17 23:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-04-17 23:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-04-17 23:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-17 23:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-17 23:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-04-17 23:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-04-18 4:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-18 4:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-18 5:41 ` Kees Cook
2019-04-18 5:41 ` Kees Cook via iommu
2019-04-18 14:34 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-18 14:34 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-22 19:30 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-22 19:30 ` Khalid Aziz
[not found] ` <8f9d059d-e720-cd24-faa6-45493fc012e0-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-22 22:23 ` Kees Cook via iommu
2019-04-22 22:23 ` Kees Cook via iommu
[not found] ` <CAHk-=whUwOjFW6RjHVM8kNOv1QVLJuHj2Dda0=mpLPdJ1UyatQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-18 6:14 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-18 6:14 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-17 17:33 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-17 17:33 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-17 19:49 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2019-04-17 19:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrXFzWFMrV-zDa4QFjB=4WnC9RZmorBko65dLGhymDpeQw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-17 19:52 ` Tycho Andersen
2019-04-17 19:52 ` Tycho Andersen
2019-04-17 20:12 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-17 20:12 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-05-01 14:49 ` Waiman Long
2019-05-01 14:49 ` Waiman Long
2019-05-01 15:18 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-05-01 15:18 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/13] xpfo, x86: Add support for XPFO for x86-64 Khalid Aziz
[not found] ` <c15e7d09dfe3dfdb9947d39ed0ddd6573ff86dbf.1554248002.git.khalid.aziz-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-04 7:52 ` Peter Zijlstra
[not found] ` <20190404075206.GP4038-Nxj+rRp3nVydTX5a5knrm8zTDFooKrT+cvkQGrU6aU0@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-04 15:40 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/13] mm: add a user_virt_to_phys symbol Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/13] lkdtm: Add test for XPFO Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/13] arm64/mm: Add support " Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/13] swiotlb: Map the buffer if it was unmapped by XPFO Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/13] xpfo: add primitives for mapping underlying memory Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/13] arm64/mm, xpfo: temporarily map dcache regions Khalid Aziz
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/13] xpfo, mm: Defer TLB flushes for non-current CPUs (x86 only) Khalid Aziz
[not found] ` <4495dda4bfc4a06b3312cc4063915b306ecfaecb.1554248002.git.khalid.aziz-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-04 4:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrXMXxnWqN94d83UvGWhkD1BNWiwvH2vsUth1w0T3=0ywQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-04 22:55 ` Khalid Aziz
[not found] ` <91f1dbce-332e-25d1-15f6-0e9cfc8b797b-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-05 7:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
[not found] ` <alpine.DEB.2.21.1904050909520.1802-ecDvlHI5BZPZikZi3RtOZ1XZhhPuCNm+@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-05 14:44 ` Dave Hansen
[not found] ` <26b00051-b03c-9fce-1446-52f0d6ed52f8-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-05 15:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-05 15:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <DFA69954-3F0F-4B79-A9B5-893D33D87E51-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-05 15:56 ` Tycho Andersen
2019-04-05 15:56 ` Tycho Andersen
2019-04-05 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-05 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-05 15:56 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-05 15:56 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-05 16:01 ` Dave Hansen
2019-04-05 16:01 ` Dave Hansen
[not found] ` <36b999d4-adf6-08a3-2897-d77b9cba20f8-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-05 16:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-05 16:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <E0BBD625-6FE0-4A8A-884B-E10FAFC3319E-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-05 16:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-05 16:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-05 17:35 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-05 17:35 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-05 15:44 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-05 15:44 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-04-05 15:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-05 15:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-04 8:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/13] xpfo, mm: Optimize XPFO TLB flushes by batching them together Khalid Aziz
2019-04-06 6:40 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/13] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership Jon Masters
2019-04-06 6:40 ` Jon Masters
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