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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
	Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
	Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH, RFC 46/62] x86/mm: Keep reference counts on encrypted VMAs for MKTME
Date: Wed,  8 May 2019 17:44:06 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190508144422.13171-47-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

From: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>

The MKTME (Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption) Key Service needs
a reference count on encrypted VMAs. This reference count is used
to determine when a hardware encryption KeyID is no longer in use
and can be freed and reassigned to another Userspace Key.

The MKTME Key service does the percpu_ref_init and _kill, so
these gets/puts on encrypted VMA's can be considered the
intermediaries in the lifetime of the key.

Increment/decrement the reference count during encrypt_mprotect()
system call for initial or updated encryption on a VMA.

Piggy back on the vm_area_dup/free() helpers. If the VMAs being
duplicated, or freed are encrypted, adjust the reference count.

Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h |  5 +++++
 arch/x86/mm/mktme.c          | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 include/linux/mm.h           |  2 ++
 kernel/fork.c                |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h
index 0e6df07f1921..14da002d2e85 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h
@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ extern int mktme_keyid_shift;
 extern void mprotect_set_encrypt(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int newkeyid,
 				unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
 
+/* MTKME encrypt_count for VMAs */
+extern struct percpu_ref *encrypt_count;
+extern void vma_get_encrypt_ref(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+extern void vma_put_encrypt_ref(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mktme_enabled_key);
 static inline bool mktme_enabled(void)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c b/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c
index 91b49e88ca3f..df70651816a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c
@@ -66,11 +66,12 @@ void mprotect_set_encrypt(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int newkeyid,
 
 	if (oldkeyid == newkeyid)
 		return;
-
+	vma_put_encrypt_ref(vma);
 	newprot = pgprot_val(vma->vm_page_prot);
 	newprot &= ~mktme_keyid_mask;
 	newprot |= (unsigned long)newkeyid << mktme_keyid_shift;
 	vma->vm_page_prot = __pgprot(newprot);
+	vma_get_encrypt_ref(vma);
 
 	/*
 	 * The VMA doesn't have any inherited pages.
@@ -79,6 +80,18 @@ void mprotect_set_encrypt(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int newkeyid,
 	unlink_anon_vmas(vma);
 }
 
+void vma_get_encrypt_ref(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma_keyid(vma))
+		percpu_ref_get(&encrypt_count[vma_keyid(vma)]);
+}
+
+void vma_put_encrypt_ref(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma_keyid(vma))
+		percpu_ref_put(&encrypt_count[vma_keyid(vma)]);
+}
+
 /* Prepare page to be used for encryption. Called from page allocator. */
 void __prep_encrypted_page(struct page *page, int order, int keyid, bool zero)
 {
@@ -102,6 +115,22 @@ void __prep_encrypted_page(struct page *page, int order, int keyid, bool zero)
 
 		page++;
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure the KeyID cannot be freed until the last page that
+	 * uses the KeyID is gone.
+	 *
+	 * This is required because the page may live longer than VMA it
+	 * is mapped into (i.e. in get_user_pages() case) and having
+	 * refcounting per-VMA is not enough.
+	 *
+	 * Taking a reference per-4K helps in case if the page will be
+	 * split after the allocation. free_encrypted_page() will balance
+	 * out the refcount even if the page was split and freed as bunch
+	 * of 4K pages.
+	 */
+
+	percpu_ref_get_many(&encrypt_count[keyid], 1 << order);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -110,7 +139,9 @@ void __prep_encrypted_page(struct page *page, int order, int keyid, bool zero)
  */
 void free_encrypted_page(struct page *page, int order)
 {
-	int i;
+	int i, keyid;
+
+	keyid = page_keyid(page);
 
 	/*
 	 * The hardware/CPU does not enforce coherency between mappings
@@ -125,6 +156,8 @@ void free_encrypted_page(struct page *page, int order)
 		lookup_page_ext(page)->keyid = 0;
 		page++;
 	}
+
+	percpu_ref_put_many(&encrypt_count[keyid], 1 << order);
 }
 
 static int sync_direct_mapping_pte(unsigned long keyid,
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index a7f52d053826..00c0fd70816b 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2831,6 +2831,8 @@ static inline void mprotect_set_encrypt(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 					int newkeyid,
 					unsigned long start,
 					unsigned long end) {}
+static inline void vma_get_encrypt_ref(struct vm_area_struct *vma) {}
+static inline void vma_put_encrypt_ref(struct vm_area_struct *vma) {}
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME */
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 9dcd18aa210b..f0e35ed76f5a 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -342,12 +342,14 @@ struct vm_area_struct *vm_area_dup(struct vm_area_struct *orig)
 	if (new) {
 		*new = *orig;
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->anon_vma_chain);
+		vma_get_encrypt_ref(new);
 	}
 	return new;
 }
 
 void vm_area_free(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
+	vma_put_encrypt_ref(vma);
 	kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-05-08 14:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 153+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-08 14:43 [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 01/62] mm: Do no merge VMAs with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 02/62] mm: Add helpers to setup zero page mappings Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:21   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 03/62] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-10 18:07   ` Dave Hansen
2019-05-13 14:27     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 04/62] mm/page_alloc: Unify alloc_hugepage_vma() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 05/62] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:21   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29 12:47     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 06/62] mm/khugepaged: Handle encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 07/62] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 08/62] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 09/62] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14  9:15   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 13:03     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 10/62] x86/mm: Detect MKTME early Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 11/62] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a page Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 12/62] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a VMA Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 13/62] x86/mm: Add hooks to allocate and free encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14  9:34   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 11:04     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 13:28       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 13:43         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 22:41           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17  9:25             ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 13:14     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 14/62] x86/mm: Map zero pages into encrypted mappings correctly Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 15/62] x86/mm: Rename CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 16/62] x86/mm: Allow to disable MKTME after enumeration Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 17/62] x86/mm: Calculate direct mapping size Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 18/62] x86/mm: Implement syncing per-KeyID direct mappings Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14  9:51   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 22:43     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17  9:27       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17 14:43         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17 14:51           ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17 15:17             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 19/62] x86/mm: Handle encrypted memory in page_to_virt() and __pa() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:10   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 20/62] mm/page_ext: Export lookup_page_ext() symbol Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:12   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 22:44     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17  9:30       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17 11:01         ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17 11:13           ` Huang, Kai
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 21/62] mm/rmap: Clear vma->anon_vma on unlink_anon_vmas() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 22/62] x86/pconfig: Set a valid encryption algorithm for all MKTME commands Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 23/62] keys/mktme: Introduce a Kernel Key Service for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 24/62] keys/mktme: Preparse the MKTME key payload Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 25/62] keys/mktme: Instantiate and destroy MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 26/62] keys/mktme: Move the MKTME payload into a cache aligned structure Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:35   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 17:10     ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 27/62] keys/mktme: Strengthen the entropy of CPU generated MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 28/62] keys/mktme: Set up PCONFIG programming targets for " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 29/62] keys/mktme: Program MKTME keys into the platform hardware Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 30/62] keys/mktme: Set up a percpu_ref_count for MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 31/62] keys/mktme: Require CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 32/62] keys/mktme: Store MKTME payloads if cmdline parameter allows Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 33/62] acpi: Remove __init from acpi table parsing functions Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 34/62] acpi/hmat: Determine existence of an ACPI HMAT Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 35/62] keys/mktme: Require ACPI HMAT to register the MKTME Key Service Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 36/62] acpi/hmat: Evaluate topology presented in ACPI HMAT for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 37/62] keys/mktme: Do not allow key creation in unsafe topologies Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 38/62] keys/mktme: Support CPU hotplug for MKTME key service Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 39/62] keys/mktme: Find new PCONFIG targets during memory hotplug Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 40/62] keys/mktme: Program new PCONFIG targets with MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 41/62] keys/mktme: Support memory hotplug for " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 42/62] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 43/62] syscall/x86: Wire up a system call for MKTME encryption keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:21   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29 18:12     ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 44/62] x86/mm: Set KeyIDs in encrypted VMAs for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:44   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 17:33     ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 18:26       ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-14 18:46         ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 19:11           ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17  9:10             ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 45/62] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:47   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 17:35     ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 11:51   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-15  0:32     ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-17  9:08       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17 15:07   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 15:28     ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 15:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 18:27         ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 19:12           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 21:36             ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18  0:48               ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  1:50                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  2:11                   ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  4:24                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18 14:19                   ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18  0:05             ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  0:15               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  1:35                 ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  1:43                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  2:23                     ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  9:12                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-18 14:09                         ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18 16:15                           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-18 16:22                             ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18 16:36                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18 16:48                                 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18 14:13                 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 23:59           ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  1:34             ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-06-18  1:40               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  2:02                 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-06-18  4:19                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-08 14:44 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2019-06-14 11:54   ` [PATCH, RFC 46/62] x86/mm: Keep reference counts on encrypted VMAs " Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 18:39     ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 47/62] mm: Restrict MKTME memory encryption to anonymous VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:55   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-15  0:07     ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 48/62] selftests/x86/mktme: Test the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 17:09   ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 49/62] mm, x86: export several MKTME variables Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:56   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17  3:14     ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17  7:46       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17  8:39         ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17 11:25           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 50/62] kvm, x86, mmu: setup MKTME keyID to spte for given PFN Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 51/62] iommu/vt-d: Support MKTME in DMA remapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 12:04   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 52/62] x86/mm: introduce common code for mem encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 16:58   ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-05-08 20:52     ` Jacob Pan
2019-05-08 21:21       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 53/62] x86/mm: Use common code for DMA memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 54/62] x86/mm: Disable MKTME on incompatible platform configurations Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 55/62] x86/mm: Disable MKTME if not all system memory supports encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 56/62] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 57/62] x86/mktme: Overview of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:21   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29 18:13     ` Alison Schofield
2019-07-14 18:16   ` Randy Dunlap
2019-07-15  9:02     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 58/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME provided security mitigations Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 59/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME kernel configuration requirements Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 60/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME Key Service API Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 61/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME API for anonymous memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 62/62] x86/mktme: Demonstration program using the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:30 ` [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29 18:20   ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 12:15 ` Peter Zijlstra

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