From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>, Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>, Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>, linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 10:30:07 +0300 Message-ID: <20190529073006.GG3656@rapoport-lnx> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> On Wed, May 08, 2019 at 05:43:20PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > = Intro = > > The patchset brings enabling of Intel Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption. > It consists of changes into multiple subsystems: > > * Core MM: infrastructure for allocation pages, dealing with encrypted VMAs > and providing API setup encrypted mappings. > * arch/x86: feature enumeration, program keys into hardware, setup > page table entries for encrypted pages and more. > * Key management service: setup and management of encryption keys. > * DMA/IOMMU: dealing with encrypted memory on IO side. > * KVM: interaction with virtualization side. > * Documentation: description of APIs and usage examples. > > The patchset is huge. This submission aims to give view to the full picture and > get feedback on the overall design. The patchset will be split into more > digestible pieces later. > > Please review. Any feedback is welcome. It would be nice to have a brief usage description in cover letter rather than in the last patches in the series ;-) > = Overview = > > Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME)[1] is a technology that allows > transparent memory encryption in upcoming Intel platforms. It uses a new > instruction (PCONFIG) for key setup and selects a key for individual pages by > repurposing physical address bits in the page tables. > > These patches add support for MKTME into the existing kernel keyring subsystem > and add a new mprotect_encrypt() system call that can be used by applications > to encrypt anonymous memory with keys obtained from the keyring. > > This architecture supports encrypting both normal, volatile DRAM and persistent > memory. However, these patches do not implement persistent memory support. We > anticipate adding that support next. > > == Hardware Background == > > MKTME is built on top of an existing single-key technology called TME. TME > encrypts all system memory using a single key generated by the CPU on every > boot of the system. TME provides mitigation against physical attacks, such as > physically removing a DIMM or watching memory bus traffic. > > MKTME enables the use of multiple encryption keys[2], allowing selection of the > encryption key per-page using the page tables. Encryption keys are programmed > into each memory controller and the same set of keys is available to all > entities on the system with access to that memory (all cores, DMA engines, > etc...). > > MKTME inherits many of the mitigations against hardware attacks from TME. Like > TME, MKTME does not mitigate vulnerable or malicious operating systems or > virtual machine managers. MKTME offers additional mitigations when compared to > TME. > > TME and MKTME use the AES encryption algorithm in the AES-XTS mode. This mode, > typically used for block-based storage devices, takes the physical address of > the data into account when encrypting each block. This ensures that the > effective key is different for each block of memory. Moving encrypted content > across physical address results in garbage on read, mitigating block-relocation > attacks. This property is the reason many of the discussed attacks require > control of a shared physical page to be handed from the victim to the attacker. > > == MKTME-Provided Mitigations == > > MKTME adds a few mitigations against attacks that are not mitigated when using > TME alone. The first set are mitigations against software attacks that are > familiar today: > > * Kernel Mapping Attacks: information disclosures that leverage the > kernel direct map are mitigated against disclosing user data. > * Freed Data Leak Attacks: removing an encryption key from the > hardware mitigates future user information disclosure. > > The next set are attacks that depend on specialized hardware, such as an “evil > DIMM” or a DDR interposer: > > * Cross-Domain Replay Attack: data is captured from one domain > (guest) and replayed to another at a later time. > * Cross-Domain Capture and Delayed Compare Attack: data is captured > and later analyzed to discover secrets. > * Key Wear-out Attack: data is captured and analyzed in order to > Weaken the AES encryption itself. > > More details on these attacks are below. > > === Kernel Mapping Attacks === > > Information disclosure vulnerabilities leverage the kernel direct map because > many vulnerabilities involve manipulation of kernel data structures (examples: > CVE-2017-7277, CVE-2017-9605). We normally think of these bugs as leaking > valuable *kernel* data, but they can leak application data when application > pages are recycled for kernel use. > > With this MKTME implementation, there is a direct map created for each MKTME > KeyID which is used whenever the kernel needs to access plaintext. But, all > kernel data structures are accessed via the direct map for KeyID-0. Thus, > memory reads which are not coordinated with the KeyID get garbage (for example, > accessing KeyID-4 data with the KeyID-0 mapping). > > This means that if sensitive data encrypted using MKTME is leaked via the > KeyID-0 direct map, ciphertext decrypted with the wrong key will be disclosed. > To disclose plaintext, an attacker must “pivot” to the correct direct mapping, > which is non-trivial because there are no kernel data structures in the > KeyID!=0 direct mapping. > > === Freed Data Leak Attack === > > The kernel has a history of bugs around uninitialized data. Usually, we think > of these bugs as leaking sensitive kernel data, but they can also be used to > leak application secrets. > > MKTME can help mitigate the case where application secrets are leaked: > > * App (or VM) places a secret in a page > * App exits or frees memory to kernel allocator > * Page added to allocator free list > * Attacker reallocates page to a purpose where it can read the page > > Now, imagine MKTME was in use on the memory being leaked. The data can only be > leaked as long as the key is programmed in the hardware. If the key is > de-programmed, like after all pages are freed after a guest is shut down, any > future reads will just see ciphertext. > > Basically, the key is a convenient choke-point: you can be more confident that > data encrypted with it is inaccessible once the key is removed. > > === Cross-Domain Replay Attack === > > MKTME mitigates cross-domain replay attacks where an attacker replaces an > encrypted block owned by one domain with a block owned by another domain. > MKTME does not prevent this replacement from occurring, but it does mitigate > plaintext from being disclosed if the domains use different keys. > > With TME, the attack could be executed by: > * A victim places secret in memory, at a given physical address. > Note: AES-XTS is what restricts the attack to being performed at a > single physical address instead of across different physical > addresses > * Attacker captures victim secret’s ciphertext > * Later on, after victim frees the physical address, attacker gains > ownership > * Attacker puts the ciphertext at the address and get the secret > plaintext > > But, due to the presumably different keys used by the attacker and the victim, > the attacker can not successfully decrypt old ciphertext. > > === Cross-Domain Capture and Delayed Compare Attack === > > This is also referred to as a kind of dictionary attack. > > Similarly, MKTME protects against cross-domain capture-and-compare attacks. > Consider the following scenario: > * A victim places a secret in memory, at a known physical address > * Attacker captures victim’s ciphertext > * Attacker gains control of the target physical address, perhaps > after the victim’s VM is shut down or its memory reclaimed. > * Attacker computes and writes many possible plaintexts until new > ciphertext matches content captured previously. > > Secrets which have low (plaintext) entropy are more vulnerable to this attack > because they reduce the number of possible plaintexts an attacker has to > compute and write. > > The attack will not work if attacker and victim uses different keys. > > === Key Wear-out Attack === > > Repeated use of an encryption key might be used by an attacker to infer > information about the key or the plaintext, weakening the encryption. The > higher the bandwidth of the encryption engine, the more vulnerable the key is > to wear-out. The MKTME memory encryption hardware works at the speed of the > memory bus, which has high bandwidth. > > Such a weakness has been demonstrated[3] on a theoretical cipher with similar > properties as AES-XTS. > > An attack would take the following steps: > * Victim system is using TME with AES-XTS-128 > * Attacker repeatedly captures ciphertext/plaintext pairs (can be > Performed with online hardware attack like an interposer). > * Attacker compels repeated use of the key under attack for a > sustained time period without a system reboot[4]. > * Attacker discovers a cipertext collision (two plaintexts > translating to the same ciphertext) > * Attacker can induce controlled modifications to the targeted > plaintext by modifying the colliding ciphertext > > MKTME mitigates key wear-out in two ways: > * Keys can be rotated periodically to mitigate wear-out. Since TME > keys are generated at boot, rotation of TME keys requires a > reboot. In contrast, MKTME allows rotation while the system is > booted. An application could implement a policy to rotate keys at > a frequency which is not feasible to attack. > * In the case that MKTME is used to encrypt two guests’ memory with > two different keys, an attack on one guest’s key would not weaken > the key used in the second guest. > > -- > > [1] https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/a5/16/Multi-Key-Total-Memory-Encryption-Spec.pdf > [2] The MKTME architecture supports up to 16 bits of KeyIDs, so a > maximum of 65535 keys on top of the “TME key” at KeyID-0. The > first implementation is expected to support 5 bits, making 63 keys > available to applications. However, this is not guaranteed. The > number of available keys could be reduced if, for instance, > additional physical address space is desired over additional > KeyIDs. > [3] http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf > [4] This sustained time required for an attack could vary from days > to years depending on the attacker’s goals. > > Alison Schofield (33): > x86/pconfig: Set a valid encryption algorithm for all MKTME commands > keys/mktme: Introduce a Kernel Key Service for MKTME > keys/mktme: Preparse the MKTME key payload > keys/mktme: Instantiate and destroy MKTME keys > keys/mktme: Move the MKTME payload into a cache aligned structure > keys/mktme: Strengthen the entropy of CPU generated MKTME keys > keys/mktme: Set up PCONFIG programming targets for MKTME keys > keys/mktme: Program MKTME keys into the platform hardware > keys/mktme: Set up a percpu_ref_count for MKTME keys > keys/mktme: Require CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability for MKTME keys > keys/mktme: Store MKTME payloads if cmdline parameter allows > acpi: Remove __init from acpi table parsing functions > acpi/hmat: Determine existence of an ACPI HMAT > keys/mktme: Require ACPI HMAT to register the MKTME Key Service > acpi/hmat: Evaluate topology presented in ACPI HMAT for MKTME > keys/mktme: Do not allow key creation in unsafe topologies > keys/mktme: Support CPU hotplug for MKTME key service > keys/mktme: Find new PCONFIG targets during memory hotplug > keys/mktme: Program new PCONFIG targets with MKTME keys > keys/mktme: Support memory hotplug for MKTME keys > mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions > syscall/x86: Wire up a system call for MKTME encryption keys > x86/mm: Set KeyIDs in encrypted VMAs for MKTME > mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call for MKTME > x86/mm: Keep reference counts on encrypted VMAs for MKTME > mm: Restrict MKTME memory encryption to anonymous VMAs > selftests/x86/mktme: Test the MKTME APIs > x86/mktme: Overview of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption > x86/mktme: Document the MKTME provided security mitigations > x86/mktme: Document the MKTME kernel configuration requirements > x86/mktme: Document the MKTME Key Service API > x86/mktme: Document the MKTME API for anonymous memory encryption > x86/mktme: Demonstration program using the MKTME APIs > > Jacob Pan (3): > iommu/vt-d: Support MKTME in DMA remapping > x86/mm: introduce common code for mem encryption > x86/mm: Use common code for DMA memory encryption > > Kai Huang (2): > mm, x86: export several MKTME variables > kvm, x86, mmu: setup MKTME keyID to spte for given PFN > > Kirill A. Shutemov (24): > mm: Do no merge VMAs with different encryption KeyIDs > mm: Add helpers to setup zero page mappings > mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs > mm/page_alloc: Unify alloc_hugepage_vma() > mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory > mm/khugepaged: Handle encrypted pages > x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn > x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs > x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() > x86/mm: Detect MKTME early > x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a page > x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a VMA > x86/mm: Add hooks to allocate and free encrypted pages > x86/mm: Map zero pages into encrypted mappings correctly > x86/mm: Rename CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING > x86/mm: Allow to disable MKTME after enumeration > x86/mm: Calculate direct mapping size > x86/mm: Implement syncing per-KeyID direct mappings > x86/mm: Handle encrypted memory in page_to_virt() and __pa() > mm/page_ext: Export lookup_page_ext() symbol > mm/rmap: Clear vma->anon_vma on unlink_anon_vmas() > x86/mm: Disable MKTME on incompatible platform configurations > x86/mm: Disable MKTME if not all system memory supports encryption > x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME > > .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst | 1 + > .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 + > Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst | 13 + > .../x86/mktme/mktme_configuration.rst | 17 + > Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_demo.rst | 53 ++ > Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_encrypt.rst | 57 ++ > Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_keys.rst | 96 +++ > Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_mitigations.rst | 150 ++++ > Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst | 57 ++ > Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 4 + > arch/alpha/include/asm/page.h | 2 +- > arch/x86/Kconfig | 29 +- > arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + > arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + > arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 2 + > arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pconfig.h | 14 +- > arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 29 + > arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h | 93 +++ > arch/x86/include/asm/page.h | 4 + > arch/x86/include/asm/page_32.h | 1 + > arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h | 4 +- > arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 19 + > arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 23 +- > arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h | 6 + > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 58 +- > arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 4 + > arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 3 + > arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 18 +- > arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 3 + > arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 68 ++ > arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 11 +- > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c | 28 + > arch/x86/mm/mktme.c | 630 ++++++++++++++ > drivers/acpi/hmat/hmat.c | 67 ++ > drivers/acpi/tables.c | 10 +- > drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 25 +- > drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 29 +- > fs/dax.c | 3 +- > fs/exec.c | 4 +- > fs/userfaultfd.c | 7 +- > include/asm-generic/pgtable.h | 8 + > include/keys/mktme-type.h | 39 + > include/linux/acpi.h | 9 +- > include/linux/dma-direct.h | 4 +- > include/linux/efi.h | 1 + > include/linux/gfp.h | 51 +- > include/linux/intel-iommu.h | 9 +- > include/linux/mem_encrypt.h | 23 +- > include/linux/migrate.h | 14 +- > include/linux/mm.h | 27 +- > include/linux/page_ext.h | 11 +- > include/linux/syscalls.h | 2 + > include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 +- > kernel/fork.c | 2 + > kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + > mm/compaction.c | 3 + > mm/huge_memory.c | 6 +- > mm/khugepaged.c | 10 + > mm/ksm.c | 17 + > mm/madvise.c | 2 +- > mm/memory.c | 3 +- > mm/mempolicy.c | 30 +- > mm/migrate.c | 4 +- > mm/mlock.c | 2 +- > mm/mmap.c | 31 +- > mm/mprotect.c | 98 ++- > mm/page_alloc.c | 50 ++ > mm/page_ext.c | 5 + > mm/rmap.c | 4 +- > mm/userfaultfd.c | 3 +- > security/keys/Makefile | 1 + > security/keys/mktme_keys.c | 768 ++++++++++++++++++ > .../selftests/x86/mktme/encrypt_tests.c | 433 ++++++++++ > .../testing/selftests/x86/mktme/flow_tests.c | 266 ++++++ > tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/key_tests.c | 526 ++++++++++++ > .../testing/selftests/x86/mktme/mktme_test.c | 300 +++++++ > 76 files changed, 4301 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst > create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_configuration.rst > create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_demo.rst > create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_encrypt.rst > create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_keys.rst > create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_mitigations.rst > create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst > create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h > create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c > create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mktme.c > create mode 100644 include/keys/mktme-type.h > create mode 100644 security/keys/mktme_keys.c > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/encrypt_tests.c > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/flow_tests.c > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/key_tests.c > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/mktme_test.c > > -- > 2.20.1 > -- Sincerely yours, Mike.
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 153+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-05-08 14:43 Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 01/62] mm: Do no merge VMAs with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 02/62] mm: Add helpers to setup zero page mappings Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 03/62] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-10 18:07 ` Dave Hansen 2019-05-13 14:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 04/62] mm/page_alloc: Unify alloc_hugepage_vma() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 05/62] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 12:47 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 06/62] mm/khugepaged: Handle encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 07/62] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 08/62] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 09/62] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 9:15 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 13:03 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 10/62] x86/mm: Detect MKTME early Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 11/62] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a page Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 12/62] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a VMA Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 13/62] x86/mm: Add hooks to allocate and free encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 9:34 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 11:04 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 13:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 13:43 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 22:41 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 9:25 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 13:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 14/62] x86/mm: Map zero pages into encrypted mappings correctly Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 15/62] x86/mm: Rename CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 16/62] x86/mm: Allow to disable MKTME after enumeration Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 17/62] x86/mm: Calculate direct mapping size Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 18/62] x86/mm: Implement syncing per-KeyID direct mappings Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 22:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 9:27 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 14:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 14:51 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 15:17 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 19/62] x86/mm: Handle encrypted memory in page_to_virt() and __pa() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:10 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 20/62] mm/page_ext: Export lookup_page_ext() symbol Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:12 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 22:44 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 9:30 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 11:01 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-17 11:13 ` Huang, Kai 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 21/62] mm/rmap: Clear vma->anon_vma on unlink_anon_vmas() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 22/62] x86/pconfig: Set a valid encryption algorithm for all MKTME commands Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 23/62] keys/mktme: Introduce a Kernel Key Service for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 24/62] keys/mktme: Preparse the MKTME key payload Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 25/62] keys/mktme: Instantiate and destroy MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 26/62] keys/mktme: Move the MKTME payload into a cache aligned structure Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:35 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 17:10 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 27/62] keys/mktme: Strengthen the entropy of CPU generated MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 28/62] keys/mktme: Set up PCONFIG programming targets for " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 29/62] keys/mktme: Program MKTME keys into the platform hardware Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 30/62] keys/mktme: Set up a percpu_ref_count for MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 31/62] keys/mktme: Require CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 32/62] keys/mktme: Store MKTME payloads if cmdline parameter allows Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 33/62] acpi: Remove __init from acpi table parsing functions Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 34/62] acpi/hmat: Determine existence of an ACPI HMAT Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 35/62] keys/mktme: Require ACPI HMAT to register the MKTME Key Service Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 36/62] acpi/hmat: Evaluate topology presented in ACPI HMAT for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 37/62] keys/mktme: Do not allow key creation in unsafe topologies Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 38/62] keys/mktme: Support CPU hotplug for MKTME key service Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 39/62] keys/mktme: Find new PCONFIG targets during memory hotplug Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 40/62] keys/mktme: Program new PCONFIG targets with MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 41/62] keys/mktme: Support memory hotplug for " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 42/62] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 43/62] syscall/x86: Wire up a system call for MKTME encryption keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 18:12 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 44/62] x86/mm: Set KeyIDs in encrypted VMAs for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:44 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 17:33 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 18:26 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-14 18:46 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 19:11 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 45/62] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:47 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 17:35 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 11:51 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-15 0:32 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-17 9:08 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 15:07 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-17 15:28 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 15:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-17 18:27 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 19:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-17 21:36 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 0:48 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 1:50 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 2:11 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 4:24 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 14:19 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 0:05 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 0:15 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 1:35 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 1:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 2:23 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 9:12 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-18 14:09 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 16:15 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-18 16:22 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 16:36 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 16:48 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 14:13 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 23:59 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 1:34 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-06-18 1:40 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 2:02 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-06-18 4:19 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 46/62] x86/mm: Keep reference counts on encrypted VMAs " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:54 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 18:39 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 47/62] mm: Restrict MKTME memory encryption to anonymous VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:55 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-15 0:07 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 48/62] selftests/x86/mktme: Test the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 17:09 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 49/62] mm, x86: export several MKTME variables Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:56 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 3:14 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-17 7:46 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 8:39 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-17 11:25 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 50/62] kvm, x86, mmu: setup MKTME keyID to spte for given PFN Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 51/62] iommu/vt-d: Support MKTME in DMA remapping Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 12:04 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 52/62] x86/mm: introduce common code for mem encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 16:58 ` Christoph Hellwig 2019-05-08 20:52 ` Jacob Pan 2019-05-08 21:21 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 53/62] x86/mm: Use common code for DMA memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 54/62] x86/mm: Disable MKTME on incompatible platform configurations Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 55/62] x86/mm: Disable MKTME if not all system memory supports encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 56/62] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 57/62] x86/mktme: Overview of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 18:13 ` Alison Schofield 2019-07-14 18:16 ` Randy Dunlap 2019-07-15 9:02 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 58/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME provided security mitigations Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 59/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME kernel configuration requirements Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 60/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME Key Service API Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 61/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME API for anonymous memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 62/62] x86/mktme: Demonstration program using the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:30 ` Mike Rapoport [this message] 2019-05-29 18:20 ` [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 12:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
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