From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>, Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>, Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>, linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Subject: [PATCH, RFC 05/62] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 17:43:25 +0300 Message-ID: <20190508144422.13171-6-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> For encrypted memory, we need to allocate pages for a specific encryption KeyID. There are two cases when we need to allocate a page for encryption: - Allocation for an encrypted VMA; - Allocation for migration of encrypted page; The first case can be covered within alloc_page_vma(). We know KeyID from the VMA. The second case requires few new page allocation routines that would allocate the page for a specific KeyID. An encrypted page has to be cleared after KeyID set. This is handled in prep_encrypted_page() that will be provided by arch-specific code. Any custom allocator that dials with encrypted pages has to call prep_encrypted_page() too. See compaction_alloc() for instance. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> --- include/linux/gfp.h | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- include/linux/migrate.h | 14 +++++++++--- mm/compaction.c | 3 +++ mm/mempolicy.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++------ mm/migrate.c | 4 ++-- mm/page_alloc.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h index b101aa294157..1716dbe587c9 100644 --- a/include/linux/gfp.h +++ b/include/linux/gfp.h @@ -463,16 +463,43 @@ static inline void arch_free_page(struct page *page, int order) { } static inline void arch_alloc_page(struct page *page, int order) { } #endif +#ifndef prep_encrypted_page +static inline void prep_encrypted_page(struct page *page, int order, + int keyid, bool zero) +{ +} +#endif + +/* + * Encrypted page has to be cleared once keyid is set, not on allocation. + */ +static inline bool deferred_page_zero(int keyid, gfp_t *gfp_mask) +{ + if (keyid && (*gfp_mask & __GFP_ZERO)) { + *gfp_mask &= ~__GFP_ZERO; + return true; + } + + return false; +} + struct page * __alloc_pages_nodemask(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order, int preferred_nid, nodemask_t *nodemask); +struct page * +__alloc_pages_nodemask_keyid(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order, + int preferred_nid, nodemask_t *nodemask, int keyid); + static inline struct page * __alloc_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order, int preferred_nid) { return __alloc_pages_nodemask(gfp_mask, order, preferred_nid, NULL); } +struct page *__alloc_pages_node_keyid(int nid, int keyid, + gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order); + /* * Allocate pages, preferring the node given as nid. The node must be valid and * online. For more general interface, see alloc_pages_node(). @@ -500,6 +527,19 @@ static inline struct page *alloc_pages_node(int nid, gfp_t gfp_mask, return __alloc_pages_node(nid, gfp_mask, order); } +static inline struct page *alloc_pages_node_keyid(int nid, int keyid, + gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order) +{ + if (nid == NUMA_NO_NODE) + nid = numa_mem_id(); + + return __alloc_pages_node_keyid(nid, keyid, gfp_mask, order); +} + +extern struct page *alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, + struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, + int node, bool hugepage); + #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA extern struct page *alloc_pages_current(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned order); @@ -508,14 +548,9 @@ alloc_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order) { return alloc_pages_current(gfp_mask, order); } -extern struct page *alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, - struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, - int node, bool hugepage); #else #define alloc_pages(gfp_mask, order) \ alloc_pages_node(numa_node_id(), gfp_mask, order) -#define alloc_pages_vma(gfp_mask, order, vma, addr, node, false)\ - alloc_pages(gfp_mask, order) #endif #define alloc_page(gfp_mask) alloc_pages(gfp_mask, 0) #define alloc_page_vma(gfp_mask, vma, addr) \ diff --git a/include/linux/migrate.h b/include/linux/migrate.h index e13d9bf2f9a5..a6e068762d08 100644 --- a/include/linux/migrate.h +++ b/include/linux/migrate.h @@ -38,9 +38,16 @@ static inline struct page *new_page_nodemask(struct page *page, unsigned int order = 0; struct page *new_page = NULL; - if (PageHuge(page)) + if (PageHuge(page)) { + /* + * HugeTLB doesn't support encryption. We shouldn't see + * such pages. + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(page_keyid(page))) + return NULL; return alloc_huge_page_nodemask(page_hstate(compound_head(page)), preferred_nid, nodemask); + } if (PageTransHuge(page)) { gfp_mask |= GFP_TRANSHUGE; @@ -50,8 +57,9 @@ static inline struct page *new_page_nodemask(struct page *page, if (PageHighMem(page) || (zone_idx(page_zone(page)) == ZONE_MOVABLE)) gfp_mask |= __GFP_HIGHMEM; - new_page = __alloc_pages_nodemask(gfp_mask, order, - preferred_nid, nodemask); + /* Allocate a page with the same KeyID as the source page */ + new_page = __alloc_pages_nodemask_keyid(gfp_mask, order, + preferred_nid, nodemask, page_keyid(page)); if (new_page && PageTransHuge(new_page)) prep_transhuge_page(new_page); diff --git a/mm/compaction.c b/mm/compaction.c index 3319e0872d01..559b8bd6d245 100644 --- a/mm/compaction.c +++ b/mm/compaction.c @@ -1557,6 +1557,9 @@ static struct page *compaction_alloc(struct page *migratepage, list_del(&freepage->lru); cc->nr_freepages--; + /* Prepare the page using the same KeyID as the source page */ + if (freepage) + prep_encrypted_page(freepage, 0, page_keyid(migratepage), false); return freepage; } diff --git a/mm/mempolicy.c b/mm/mempolicy.c index 14b18449c623..5cad39fb7b35 100644 --- a/mm/mempolicy.c +++ b/mm/mempolicy.c @@ -961,22 +961,29 @@ static void migrate_page_add(struct page *page, struct list_head *pagelist, /* page allocation callback for NUMA node migration */ struct page *alloc_new_node_page(struct page *page, unsigned long node) { - if (PageHuge(page)) + if (PageHuge(page)) { + /* + * HugeTLB doesn't support encryption. We shouldn't see + * such pages. + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(page_keyid(page))) + return NULL; return alloc_huge_page_node(page_hstate(compound_head(page)), node); - else if (PageTransHuge(page)) { + } else if (PageTransHuge(page)) { struct page *thp; - thp = alloc_pages_node(node, + thp = alloc_pages_node_keyid(node, page_keyid(page), (GFP_TRANSHUGE | __GFP_THISNODE), HPAGE_PMD_ORDER); if (!thp) return NULL; prep_transhuge_page(thp); return thp; - } else - return __alloc_pages_node(node, GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE | - __GFP_THISNODE, 0); + } else { + return __alloc_pages_node_keyid(node, page_keyid(page), + GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE | __GFP_THISNODE, 0); + } } /* @@ -2053,9 +2060,13 @@ alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp, int order, struct vm_area_struct *vma, { struct mempolicy *pol; struct page *page; - int preferred_nid; + bool deferred_zero; + int keyid, preferred_nid; nodemask_t *nmask; + keyid = vma_keyid(vma); + deferred_zero = deferred_page_zero(keyid, &gfp); + pol = get_vma_policy(vma, addr); if (pol->mode == MPOL_INTERLEAVE) { @@ -2097,6 +2108,8 @@ alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp, int order, struct vm_area_struct *vma, page = __alloc_pages_nodemask(gfp, order, preferred_nid, nmask); mpol_cond_put(pol); out: + if (page) + prep_encrypted_page(page, order, keyid, deferred_zero); return page; } diff --git a/mm/migrate.c b/mm/migrate.c index 663a5449367a..04b36a56865d 100644 --- a/mm/migrate.c +++ b/mm/migrate.c @@ -1880,7 +1880,7 @@ static struct page *alloc_misplaced_dst_page(struct page *page, int nid = (int) data; struct page *newpage; - newpage = __alloc_pages_node(nid, + newpage = __alloc_pages_node_keyid(nid, page_keyid(page), (GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE | __GFP_THISNODE | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC | __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOWARN) & @@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ int migrate_misplaced_transhuge_page(struct mm_struct *mm, int page_lru = page_is_file_cache(page); unsigned long start = address & HPAGE_PMD_MASK; - new_page = alloc_pages_node(node, + new_page = alloc_pages_node_keyid(node, page_keyid(page), (GFP_TRANSHUGE_LIGHT | __GFP_THISNODE), HPAGE_PMD_ORDER); if (!new_page) diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index c02cff1ed56e..ab1d8661aa87 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -3930,6 +3930,41 @@ should_compact_retry(struct alloc_context *ac, unsigned int order, int alloc_fla } #endif /* CONFIG_COMPACTION */ +#ifndef CONFIG_NUMA +struct page *alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, + struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, + int node, bool hugepage) +{ + struct page *page; + bool deferred_zero; + int keyid = vma_keyid(vma); + + deferred_zero = deferred_page_zero(keyid, &gfp_mask); + page = alloc_pages(gfp_mask, order); + if (page) + prep_encrypted_page(page, order, keyid, deferred_zero); + + return page; +} +#endif + +struct page * __alloc_pages_node_keyid(int nid, int keyid, + gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order) +{ + struct page *page; + bool deferred_zero; + + VM_BUG_ON(nid < 0 || nid >= MAX_NUMNODES); + VM_WARN_ON(!node_online(nid)); + + deferred_zero = deferred_page_zero(keyid, &gfp_mask); + page = __alloc_pages(gfp_mask, order, nid); + if (page) + prep_encrypted_page(page, order, keyid, deferred_zero); + + return page; +} + #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP static struct lockdep_map __fs_reclaim_map = STATIC_LOCKDEP_MAP_INIT("fs_reclaim", &__fs_reclaim_map); @@ -4645,6 +4680,21 @@ __alloc_pages_nodemask(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order, int preferred_nid, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__alloc_pages_nodemask); +struct page * +__alloc_pages_nodemask_keyid(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order, + int preferred_nid, nodemask_t *nodemask, int keyid) +{ + struct page *page; + bool deferred_zero; + + deferred_zero = deferred_page_zero(keyid, &gfp_mask); + page = __alloc_pages_nodemask(gfp_mask, order, preferred_nid, nodemask); + if (page) + prep_encrypted_page(page, order, keyid, deferred_zero); + return page; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__alloc_pages_nodemask_keyid); + /* * Common helper functions. Never use with __GFP_HIGHMEM because the returned * address cannot represent highmem pages. Use alloc_pages and then kmap if -- 2.20.1
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 153+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-05-08 14:43 [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 01/62] mm: Do no merge VMAs with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 02/62] mm: Add helpers to setup zero page mappings Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 03/62] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-10 18:07 ` Dave Hansen 2019-05-13 14:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 04/62] mm/page_alloc: Unify alloc_hugepage_vma() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message] 2019-05-29 7:21 ` [PATCH, RFC 05/62] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 12:47 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 06/62] mm/khugepaged: Handle encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 07/62] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 08/62] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 09/62] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 9:15 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 13:03 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 10/62] x86/mm: Detect MKTME early Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 11/62] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a page Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 12/62] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a VMA Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 13/62] x86/mm: Add hooks to allocate and free encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 9:34 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 11:04 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 13:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 13:43 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 22:41 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 9:25 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 13:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 14/62] x86/mm: Map zero pages into encrypted mappings correctly Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 15/62] x86/mm: Rename CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 16/62] x86/mm: Allow to disable MKTME after enumeration Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 17/62] x86/mm: Calculate direct mapping size Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 18/62] x86/mm: Implement syncing per-KeyID direct mappings Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 22:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 9:27 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 14:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 14:51 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 15:17 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 19/62] x86/mm: Handle encrypted memory in page_to_virt() and __pa() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:10 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 20/62] mm/page_ext: Export lookup_page_ext() symbol Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:12 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 22:44 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 9:30 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 11:01 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-17 11:13 ` Huang, Kai 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 21/62] mm/rmap: Clear vma->anon_vma on unlink_anon_vmas() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 22/62] x86/pconfig: Set a valid encryption algorithm for all MKTME commands Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 23/62] keys/mktme: Introduce a Kernel Key Service for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 24/62] keys/mktme: Preparse the MKTME key payload Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 25/62] keys/mktme: Instantiate and destroy MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 26/62] keys/mktme: Move the MKTME payload into a cache aligned structure Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:35 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 17:10 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 27/62] keys/mktme: Strengthen the entropy of CPU generated MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 28/62] keys/mktme: Set up PCONFIG programming targets for " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 29/62] keys/mktme: Program MKTME keys into the platform hardware Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 30/62] keys/mktme: Set up a percpu_ref_count for MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 31/62] keys/mktme: Require CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 32/62] keys/mktme: Store MKTME payloads if cmdline parameter allows Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 33/62] acpi: Remove __init from acpi table parsing functions Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 34/62] acpi/hmat: Determine existence of an ACPI HMAT Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 35/62] keys/mktme: Require ACPI HMAT to register the MKTME Key Service Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 36/62] acpi/hmat: Evaluate topology presented in ACPI HMAT for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 37/62] keys/mktme: Do not allow key creation in unsafe topologies Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 38/62] keys/mktme: Support CPU hotplug for MKTME key service Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 39/62] keys/mktme: Find new PCONFIG targets during memory hotplug Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 40/62] keys/mktme: Program new PCONFIG targets with MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 41/62] keys/mktme: Support memory hotplug for " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 42/62] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 43/62] syscall/x86: Wire up a system call for MKTME encryption keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 18:12 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 44/62] x86/mm: Set KeyIDs in encrypted VMAs for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:44 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 17:33 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 18:26 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-14 18:46 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 19:11 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 45/62] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:47 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 17:35 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 11:51 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-15 0:32 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-17 9:08 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 15:07 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-17 15:28 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 15:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-17 18:27 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 19:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-17 21:36 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 0:48 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 1:50 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 2:11 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 4:24 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 14:19 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 0:05 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 0:15 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 1:35 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 1:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 2:23 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 9:12 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-18 14:09 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 16:15 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-18 16:22 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 16:36 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 16:48 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 14:13 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 23:59 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 1:34 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-06-18 1:40 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 2:02 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-06-18 4:19 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 46/62] x86/mm: Keep reference counts on encrypted VMAs " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:54 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 18:39 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 47/62] mm: Restrict MKTME memory encryption to anonymous VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:55 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-15 0:07 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 48/62] selftests/x86/mktme: Test the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 17:09 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 49/62] mm, x86: export several MKTME variables Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:56 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 3:14 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-17 7:46 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 8:39 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-17 11:25 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 50/62] kvm, x86, mmu: setup MKTME keyID to spte for given PFN Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 51/62] iommu/vt-d: Support MKTME in DMA remapping Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 12:04 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 52/62] x86/mm: introduce common code for mem encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 16:58 ` Christoph Hellwig 2019-05-08 20:52 ` Jacob Pan 2019-05-08 21:21 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 53/62] x86/mm: Use common code for DMA memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 54/62] x86/mm: Disable MKTME on incompatible platform configurations Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 55/62] x86/mm: Disable MKTME if not all system memory supports encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 56/62] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 57/62] x86/mktme: Overview of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 18:13 ` Alison Schofield 2019-07-14 18:16 ` Randy Dunlap 2019-07-15 9:02 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 58/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME provided security mitigations Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 59/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME kernel configuration requirements Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 60/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME Key Service API Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 61/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME API for anonymous memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 62/62] x86/mktme: Demonstration program using the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:30 ` [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 18:20 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 12:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
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