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From: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Bharata B Rao <bharata@amd.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com"
	<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"catalin.marinas@arm.com" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	"will@kernel.org" <will@kernel.org>,
	"shuah@kernel.org" <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"oleg@redhat.com" <oleg@redhat.com>,
	"ananth.narayan@amd.com" <ananth.narayan@amd.com>,
	"Andrew Cooper" <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v0 3/6] x86: Enable Upper Address Ignore(UAI) feature
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 19:46:59 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7fccb7f2-fc88-993e-e1b2-919448844112@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220310111545.10852-4-bharata@amd.com>

On 10/03/2022 11:15, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> index f7a132eb794d..12615b1b4af5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> @@ -740,6 +740,12 @@ dump_kernel_offset(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long v, void *p)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static inline void __init uai_enable(void)
> +{
> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_UAI))
> +		msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_UAI);
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * Determine if we were loaded by an EFI loader.  If so, then we have also been
>   * passed the efi memmap, systab, etc., so we should use these data structures
> @@ -1146,6 +1152,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
>  
>  	x86_init.paging.pagetable_init();
>  
> +	uai_enable();

I would think incredibly carefully before enabling UAI by default.

Suffice it to say that Intel were talked down from 7 bits to 6, and
apparently AMD didn't get the same memo from the original requesters.

The problem is that UAI + LA57 means that all the poison pointers cease
functioning as a defence-in-depth mechanism, and become legal pointers
pointing at random positions in user or kernel space.

~Andrew

  reply	other threads:[~2022-03-10 19:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-10 11:15 [RFC PATCH v0 0/6] x86/AMD: Userspace address tagging Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 1/6] mm, arm64: Update PR_SET/GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL interface Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 2/6] x86/cpufeatures: Add Upper Address Ignore(UAI) as CPU feature Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 3/6] x86: Enable Upper Address Ignore(UAI) feature Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 19:46   ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2022-03-10 22:37     ` David Laight
2022-03-10 22:46       ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-11 12:37   ` Boris Petkov
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 4/6] x86: Provide an implementation of untagged_addr() Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 5/6] x86: Untag user pointers in access_ok() Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 6/6] x86: Add prctl() options to control tagged user addresses ABI Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 14:32 ` [RFC PATCH v0 0/6] x86/AMD: Userspace address tagging David Laight
2022-03-10 16:45   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 17:19     ` David Laight
2022-03-11  5:42       ` Bharata B Rao
2022-03-11  8:15         ` David Laight
2022-03-11  9:11           ` Bharata B Rao
2022-03-11  9:36             ` David Laight
2022-03-11 16:51               ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 15:16 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 15:22   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-14  5:00   ` Bharata B Rao
2022-03-14  7:03     ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-21 22:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-03-21 22:59   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-22  5:31   ` David Laight
2022-03-23  7:48   ` Bharata B Rao
2022-04-01 19:25     ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-05  5:58       ` Bharata B Rao
2022-04-01 19:41     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-05  8:14     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-04-05  8:40       ` Bharata B Rao
2022-04-08 17:41   ` Catalin Marinas

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