From: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Bharata B Rao <bharata@amd.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com"
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"catalin.marinas@arm.com" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
"will@kernel.org" <will@kernel.org>,
"shuah@kernel.org" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"oleg@redhat.com" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"ananth.narayan@amd.com" <ananth.narayan@amd.com>,
"Andrew Cooper" <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v0 3/6] x86: Enable Upper Address Ignore(UAI) feature
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 19:46:59 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7fccb7f2-fc88-993e-e1b2-919448844112@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220310111545.10852-4-bharata@amd.com>
On 10/03/2022 11:15, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> index f7a132eb794d..12615b1b4af5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> @@ -740,6 +740,12 @@ dump_kernel_offset(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long v, void *p)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static inline void __init uai_enable(void)
> +{
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_UAI))
> + msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_UAI);
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Determine if we were loaded by an EFI loader. If so, then we have also been
> * passed the efi memmap, systab, etc., so we should use these data structures
> @@ -1146,6 +1152,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
>
> x86_init.paging.pagetable_init();
>
> + uai_enable();
I would think incredibly carefully before enabling UAI by default.
Suffice it to say that Intel were talked down from 7 bits to 6, and
apparently AMD didn't get the same memo from the original requesters.
The problem is that UAI + LA57 means that all the poison pointers cease
functioning as a defence-in-depth mechanism, and become legal pointers
pointing at random positions in user or kernel space.
~Andrew
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-10 19:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-10 11:15 [RFC PATCH v0 0/6] x86/AMD: Userspace address tagging Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 1/6] mm, arm64: Update PR_SET/GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL interface Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 2/6] x86/cpufeatures: Add Upper Address Ignore(UAI) as CPU feature Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 3/6] x86: Enable Upper Address Ignore(UAI) feature Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 19:46 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2022-03-10 22:37 ` David Laight
2022-03-10 22:46 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-11 12:37 ` Boris Petkov
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 4/6] x86: Provide an implementation of untagged_addr() Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 5/6] x86: Untag user pointers in access_ok() Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 6/6] x86: Add prctl() options to control tagged user addresses ABI Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 14:32 ` [RFC PATCH v0 0/6] x86/AMD: Userspace address tagging David Laight
2022-03-10 16:45 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 17:19 ` David Laight
2022-03-11 5:42 ` Bharata B Rao
2022-03-11 8:15 ` David Laight
2022-03-11 9:11 ` Bharata B Rao
2022-03-11 9:36 ` David Laight
2022-03-11 16:51 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 15:16 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 15:22 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-14 5:00 ` Bharata B Rao
2022-03-14 7:03 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-21 22:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-03-21 22:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-22 5:31 ` David Laight
2022-03-23 7:48 ` Bharata B Rao
2022-04-01 19:25 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-05 5:58 ` Bharata B Rao
2022-04-01 19:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-05 8:14 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-04-05 8:40 ` Bharata B Rao
2022-04-08 17:41 ` Catalin Marinas
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