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From: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
To: 'Dave Hansen' <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	'Bharata B Rao' <bharata@amd.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com"
	<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"catalin.marinas@arm.com" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	"will@kernel.org" <will@kernel.org>,
	"shuah@kernel.org" <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"oleg@redhat.com" <oleg@redhat.com>,
	"ananth.narayan@amd.com" <ananth.narayan@amd.com>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH v0 0/6] x86/AMD: Userspace address tagging
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 17:19:40 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f6212ddf70bc408a80d7eb690c46bccc@AcuMS.aculab.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <286efdb9-7dbf-82f3-b172-29c575a3791b@intel.com>

From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
> Sent: 10 March 2022 16:46
> 
> On 3/10/22 06:32, David Laight wrote:
> >> UAI allows software to store a tag in the upper 7 bits of a logical
> >> address [63:57]. When enabled, the processor will suppress the
> >> traditional canonical address checks on the addresses. More information
> >> about UAI can be found in section 5.10 of 'AMD64 Architecture
> >> Programmer's Manual, Vol 2: System Programming' which is available from
> >>
> >> https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=300549
> > Is that really allowing bit 63 to be used?
> > That is normally the user-kernel bit.
> > I can't help feeling that will just badly break things.
> 
> Yeah, this does seem worrisome.  The LAM approach[1] retains
> canonicality checking for bit 63.

Actually it is rather worse than 'worrisome'.
Allowing the user all address upto the base of the valid
kernel addresses (probably tags to 3e, but not 3f)
means that you can't use a fast address check in access_ok().
You are forced to use the strict test that 32bit kernels use.

Otherwise for 64bit access_ok() need only test address < 0
and rely on kernel code reading something below the (big)
offset to valid kernel addresses.
No real need to include the length at all.

If the hardware is just ignoring the high address bits
then the should be no need to mask them in kernel.
The required kernel accesses to user memory should 'just work'.

Of course, the bit to enable this (wherever it is) needs
to be restored on every process switch.

	David

-
Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK
Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)

  reply	other threads:[~2022-03-10 17:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-10 11:15 [RFC PATCH v0 0/6] x86/AMD: Userspace address tagging Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 1/6] mm, arm64: Update PR_SET/GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL interface Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 2/6] x86/cpufeatures: Add Upper Address Ignore(UAI) as CPU feature Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 3/6] x86: Enable Upper Address Ignore(UAI) feature Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 19:46   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-03-10 22:37     ` David Laight
2022-03-10 22:46       ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-11 12:37   ` Boris Petkov
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 4/6] x86: Provide an implementation of untagged_addr() Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 5/6] x86: Untag user pointers in access_ok() Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 11:15 ` [RFC PATCH v0 6/6] x86: Add prctl() options to control tagged user addresses ABI Bharata B Rao
2022-03-10 14:32 ` [RFC PATCH v0 0/6] x86/AMD: Userspace address tagging David Laight
2022-03-10 16:45   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 17:19     ` David Laight [this message]
2022-03-11  5:42       ` Bharata B Rao
2022-03-11  8:15         ` David Laight
2022-03-11  9:11           ` Bharata B Rao
2022-03-11  9:36             ` David Laight
2022-03-11 16:51               ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 15:16 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 15:22   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-14  5:00   ` Bharata B Rao
2022-03-14  7:03     ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-21 22:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-03-21 22:59   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-22  5:31   ` David Laight
2022-03-23  7:48   ` Bharata B Rao
2022-04-01 19:25     ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-05  5:58       ` Bharata B Rao
2022-04-01 19:41     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-05  8:14     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-04-05  8:40       ` Bharata B Rao
2022-04-08 17:41   ` Catalin Marinas

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