linux-next: build warnings after merge of the crypto tree

linux-next: build warnings after merge of the crypto tree

[Stephen Rothwell]

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Hi Herbert,

After merging the crypto tree, today's linux-next build (powerpc
ppc44x_defconfig, i386 defconfig and sparc defconfig) produced these
warnings:

In file included from crypto/testmgr.c:30:0:
include/crypto/drbg.h: In function 'drbg_max_addtl':
include/crypto/drbg.h:157:2: warning: left shift count >= width of type
  return (1UL<<35);
  ^
include/crypto/drbg.h: In function 'drbg_max_requests':
include/crypto/drbg.h:163:2: warning: left shift count >= width of type
  return (1UL<<48);
  ^

Introduced by commit 05c81ccd9087 ("crypto: drbg - remove configuration
of fixed values").  These are all 32 bit builds.

-- 
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell                    sfr@canb.auug.org.au

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Re: linux-next: build warnings after merge of the crypto tree

[Herbert Xu]

On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 04:14:56PM +1000, Stephen Rothwell wrote:
> Hi Herbert,
> 
> After merging the crypto tree, today's linux-next build (powerpc
> ppc44x_defconfig, i386 defconfig and sparc defconfig) produced these
> warnings:
> 
> In file included from crypto/testmgr.c:30:0:
> include/crypto/drbg.h: In function 'drbg_max_addtl':
> include/crypto/drbg.h:157:2: warning: left shift count >= width of type
>   return (1UL<<35);
>   ^
> include/crypto/drbg.h: In function 'drbg_max_requests':
> include/crypto/drbg.h:163:2: warning: left shift count >= width of type
>   return (1UL<<48);
>   ^
> 
> Introduced by commit 05c81ccd9087 ("crypto: drbg - remove configuration
> of fixed values").  These are all 32 bit builds.

Stephan, could you take a look at this?

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

Re: linux-next: build warnings after merge of the crypto tree

[Stephan Mueller]

Am Dienstag, 26. August 2014, 14:38:12 schrieb Herbert Xu:

Hi Herbert,

>On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 04:14:56PM +1000, Stephen Rothwell wrote:
>> Hi Herbert,
>> 
>> After merging the crypto tree, today's linux-next build (powerpc
>> ppc44x_defconfig, i386 defconfig and sparc defconfig) produced these
>> warnings:
>> 
>> In file included from crypto/testmgr.c:30:0:
>> include/crypto/drbg.h: In function 'drbg_max_addtl':
>> include/crypto/drbg.h:157:2: warning: left shift count >= width of
>> type> 
>>   return (1UL<<35);
>>   ^
>> 
>> include/crypto/drbg.h: In function 'drbg_max_requests':
>> include/crypto/drbg.h:163:2: warning: left shift count >= width of
>> type> 
>>   return (1UL<<48);
>>   ^
>> 
>> Introduced by commit 05c81ccd9087 ("crypto: drbg - remove
>> configuration of fixed values").  These are all 32 bit builds.
>
>Stephan, could you take a look at this?

I am on it. Thanks.
>
>Thanks,


Ciao
Stephan

[PATCH] DRBG: fix bit shifting on 32 bit systems

[Stephan Mueller]

Use ULL to mark a 64 bit value.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
 include/crypto/drbg.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h
index 3d8e73a..dd52aee 100644
--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
+++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
@@ -154,13 +154,13 @@ static inline size_t drbg_max_request_bytes(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 static inline size_t drbg_max_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
 	/* SP800-90A requires 2**35 bytes additional info str / pers str */
-	return (1UL<<35);
+	return (1ULL<<35);
 }
 
 static inline size_t drbg_max_requests(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
 	/* SP800-90A requires 2**48 maximum requests before reseeding */
-	return (1UL<<48);
+	return (1ULL<<48);
 }
 
 /*
-- 
1.9.3

Re: [PATCH] DRBG: fix bit shifting on 32 bit systems

[Herbert Xu]

On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 09:31:02AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Use ULL to mark a 64 bit value.
> 
> Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
> Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>

I don't think this works as size_t is still 32-bit which means
that you'll return zero.

Cheers,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

Re: [PATCH] DRBG: fix bit shifting on 32 bit systems

[Stephan Mueller]

Am Dienstag, 26. August 2014, 15:32:19 schrieb Herbert Xu:

Hi Herbert,

> On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 09:31:02AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > Use ULL to mark a 64 bit value.
> > 
> > Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
> > Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
> 
> I don't think this works as size_t is still 32-bit which means
> that you'll return zero.

Oops, yes. Thank you for catching this. I guess I need __u64 for this value. A 
patch will come shortly.
> 
> Cheers,


-- 
Ciao
Stephan

[PATCH] DRBG: fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems

[Stephan Mueller]

The maximum values for additional input string or generated blocks is
larger than 1<<32. To ensure a sensible value on 32 bit systems, return
SIZE_MAX on 32 bit systems. This value is lower than the maximum allowed
values defined in SP800-90A. The standard allow lower maximum values,
but not larger values.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
 include/crypto/drbg.h | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h
index 3d8e73a..5ac482a 100644
--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
+++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
@@ -154,13 +154,21 @@ static inline size_t drbg_max_request_bytes(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 static inline size_t drbg_max_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
 	/* SP800-90A requires 2**35 bytes additional info str / pers str */
+#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
+	return SIZE_MAX;
+#else
 	return (1UL<<35);
+#endif
 }
 
 static inline size_t drbg_max_requests(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
 	/* SP800-90A requires 2**48 maximum requests before reseeding */
+#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
+	return SIZE_MAX;
+#else
 	return (1UL<<48);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
-- 
1.9.3

Re: [PATCH] DRBG: fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems

[Herbert Xu]

On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 10:06:52AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> The maximum values for additional input string or generated blocks is
> larger than 1<<32. To ensure a sensible value on 32 bit systems, return
> SIZE_MAX on 32 bit systems. This value is lower than the maximum allowed
> values defined in SP800-90A. The standard allow lower maximum values,
> but not larger values.
> 
> Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
> Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>

Unfortunately there's a place in drbg where you add one to
drbg_max_addtl which will cause it to overflow back to zero.

Cheers,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

[PATCH v2] DRBG: fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems

[Stephan Mueller]

The maximum values for additional input string or generated blocks is
larger than 1<<32. To ensure a sensible value on 32 bit systems, return
SIZE_MAX on 32 bit systems. This value is lower than the maximum
allowed values defined in SP800-90A. The standard allow lower maximum
values, but not larger values.

SIZE_MAX - 1 is used for drbg_max_addtl to allow
drbg_healthcheck_sanity to check the enforcement of the variable
without wrapping.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
 include/crypto/drbg.h | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h
index 3d8e73a..5186f75 100644
--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
+++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
@@ -154,13 +154,26 @@ static inline size_t drbg_max_request_bytes(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 static inline size_t drbg_max_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
 	/* SP800-90A requires 2**35 bytes additional info str / pers str */
+#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
+	/*
+	 * SP800-90A allows smaller maximum numbers to be returned -- we
+	 * return SIZE_MAX - 1 to allow the verification of the enforcement
+	 * of this value in drbg_healthcheck_sanity.
+	 */
+	return (SIZE_MAX - 1);
+#else
 	return (1UL<<35);
+#endif
 }
 
 static inline size_t drbg_max_requests(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
 	/* SP800-90A requires 2**48 maximum requests before reseeding */
+#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
+	return SIZE_MAX;
+#else
 	return (1UL<<48);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
-- 
1.9.3

Re: [PATCH v2] DRBG: fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems

[Herbert Xu]

On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 10:29:45AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> The maximum values for additional input string or generated blocks is
> larger than 1<<32. To ensure a sensible value on 32 bit systems, return
> SIZE_MAX on 32 bit systems. This value is lower than the maximum
> allowed values defined in SP800-90A. The standard allow lower maximum
> values, but not larger values.
> 
> SIZE_MAX - 1 is used for drbg_max_addtl to allow
> drbg_healthcheck_sanity to check the enforcement of the variable
> without wrapping.

This is really ugly but OK.  However, I'm not sure how the sanity
check ever worked.  It would appear that the drbg_generate call in
drbg_healthcheck_sanity should always fail because you explicitly
set addtl->len to drbg_max_addtl + 1, which should trigger the
"DRBG: additional information string too long" error, no?

Obviously it's working for you but I'd like to understand why
it's working and whether it'll continue to work.

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

Re: [PATCH v2] DRBG: fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems

[Stephan Mueller]

Am Dienstag, 26. August 2014, 16:43:43 schrieb Herbert Xu:

Hi Herbert,

> On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 10:29:45AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > The maximum values for additional input string or generated blocks is
> > larger than 1<<32. To ensure a sensible value on 32 bit systems, return
> > SIZE_MAX on 32 bit systems. This value is lower than the maximum
> > allowed values defined in SP800-90A. The standard allow lower maximum
> > values, but not larger values.
> > 
> > SIZE_MAX - 1 is used for drbg_max_addtl to allow
> > drbg_healthcheck_sanity to check the enforcement of the variable
> > without wrapping.
> 
> This is really ugly but OK.  However, I'm not sure how the sanity
> check ever worked.  It would appear that the drbg_generate call in
> drbg_healthcheck_sanity should always fail because you explicitly
> set addtl->len to drbg_max_addtl + 1, which should trigger the
> "DRBG: additional information string too long" error, no?

That is exactly what the test shall do: the test is intended to check whether 
the maximum values are enforced. And it does that by checking whether an error 
is returned.

	/* get the maximum value */
        max_addtllen = drbg_max_addtl(drbg);
	/* add one to definitely overflow the maximum value */
        drbg_string_fill(&addtl, buf, max_addtllen + 1);
        /* overflow addtllen with additonal info string */
        len = drbg_generate(drbg, buf, OUTBUFLEN, &addtl);
	/*
	 * check that the drbg_generate does not return a positive
	 * value, i.e. check that drbg_generate does not generate anything
	 */
        BUG_ON(0 < len);
> 
> Obviously it's working for you but I'd like to understand why
> it's working and whether it'll continue to work.
> 
> Thanks,


-- 
Ciao
Stephan

Re: [PATCH v2] DRBG: fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems

[Herbert Xu]

On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 10:52:45AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Dienstag, 26. August 2014, 16:43:43 schrieb Herbert Xu:
> 
> Hi Herbert,
> 
> > On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 10:29:45AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > > The maximum values for additional input string or generated blocks is
> > > larger than 1<<32. To ensure a sensible value on 32 bit systems, return
> > > SIZE_MAX on 32 bit systems. This value is lower than the maximum
> > > allowed values defined in SP800-90A. The standard allow lower maximum
> > > values, but not larger values.
> > > 
> > > SIZE_MAX - 1 is used for drbg_max_addtl to allow
> > > drbg_healthcheck_sanity to check the enforcement of the variable
> > > without wrapping.
> > 
> > This is really ugly but OK.  However, I'm not sure how the sanity
> > check ever worked.  It would appear that the drbg_generate call in
> > drbg_healthcheck_sanity should always fail because you explicitly
> > set addtl->len to drbg_max_addtl + 1, which should trigger the
> > "DRBG: additional information string too long" error, no?
> 
> That is exactly what the test shall do: the test is intended to check whether 
> the maximum values are enforced. And it does that by checking whether an error 
> is returned.

OK that makes sense.  Patch applied.  Thanks!
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

Re: [PATCH v2] DRBG: fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems

[Stephan Mueller]

Am Dienstag, 26. August 2014, 16:58:53 schrieb Herbert Xu:

Hi Herbert,

> On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 10:52:45AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > Am Dienstag, 26. August 2014, 16:43:43 schrieb Herbert Xu:
> > 
> > Hi Herbert,
> > 
> > > On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 10:29:45AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > > > The maximum values for additional input string or generated blocks is
> > > > larger than 1<<32. To ensure a sensible value on 32 bit systems,
> > > > return
> > > > SIZE_MAX on 32 bit systems. This value is lower than the maximum
> > > > allowed values defined in SP800-90A. The standard allow lower maximum
> > > > values, but not larger values.
> > > > 
> > > > SIZE_MAX - 1 is used for drbg_max_addtl to allow
> > > > drbg_healthcheck_sanity to check the enforcement of the variable
> > > > without wrapping.
> > > 
> > > This is really ugly but OK.  However, I'm not sure how the sanity
> > > check ever worked.  It would appear that the drbg_generate call in
> > > drbg_healthcheck_sanity should always fail because you explicitly
> > > set addtl->len to drbg_max_addtl + 1, which should trigger the
> > > "DRBG: additional information string too long" error, no?
> > 
> > That is exactly what the test shall do: the test is intended to check
> > whether the maximum values are enforced. And it does that by checking
> > whether an error is returned.
> 
> OK that makes sense.  Patch applied.  Thanks!

I am wondering about the current code in Linus' tree though considering the 
applied patch:

Linus' code contains:

static inline size_t drbg_max_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
        return (1UL<<(drbg->core->max_addtllen));
}

static inline size_t drbg_max_requests(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
        return (1UL<<(drbg->core->max_req));
}

The max_addtllen and max_req are defined in drbg_cores[] in crypto/drbg.c for 
each DRBG type. As size_t on a 32 bit system is 32 bit the bit shifts would 
not work either.

Thus, I am wondering whether the just applied patch would need to go to Linus 
tree too? I would think that the following patch would be in order:

static inline size_t drbg_max_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
        return (SIZE_MAX - 1);
#else
        return (1UL<<(drbg->core->max_addtllen));
#endif
}

static inline size_t drbg_max_requests(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
        return SIZE_MAX;
#else
        return (1UL<<(drbg->core->max_req));
#endif
}


-- 
Ciao
Stephan

Re: [PATCH v2] DRBG: fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems

[Herbert Xu]

On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 11:36:54AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>
> The max_addtllen and max_req are defined in drbg_cores[] in crypto/drbg.c for 
> each DRBG type. As size_t on a 32 bit system is 32 bit the bit shifts would 
> not work either.
> 
> Thus, I am wondering whether the just applied patch would need to go to Linus 
> tree too? I would think that the following patch would be in order:

Have you actually tested this on a 32-bit box? If so and it
actually works then I'd be happy to push it.

Cheers,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

Re: [PATCH v2] DRBG: fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems

[Stephan Mueller]

Am Mittwoch, 27. August 2014, 21:35:28 schrieb Herbert Xu:

Hi Herbert,

>On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 11:36:54AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>> The max_addtllen and max_req are defined in drbg_cores[] in
>> crypto/drbg.c for each DRBG type. As size_t on a 32 bit system is 32
>> bit the bit shifts would not work either.
>> 
>> Thus, I am wondering whether the just applied patch would need to go
>> to Linus
>> tree too? I would think that the following patch would be in order:
>Have you actually tested this on a 32-bit box? If so and it
>actually works then I'd be happy to push it.

I will have it tested by tomorrow.
>
>Cheers,


Ciao
Stephan

Re: [PATCH v2] DRBG: fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems

[Stephan Mueller]

Am Mittwoch, 27. August 2014, 21:35:28 schrieb Herbert Xu:

Hi Herbert,

> On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 11:36:54AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > The max_addtllen and max_req are defined in drbg_cores[] in crypto/drbg.c
> > for each DRBG type. As size_t on a 32 bit system is 32 bit the bit shifts
> > would not work either.
> > 
> > Thus, I am wondering whether the just applied patch would need to go to
> > Linus
> > tree too? I would think that the following patch would be in order:
> Have you actually tested this on a 32-bit box? If so and it
> actually works then I'd be happy to push it.

I tested the current cryptodev-2.6:

- on x86_64 and on i386

- in FIPS mode and without FIPS mode on both arches

- executing the CAVS testing in FIPS mode and non-FIPS mode on both arches

- executing stress tests (obtain random values at a size randomly selected 
between 1 through 1 million bytes) in both modes on both arches

- adding some debug printks to check for the drbg_max_addtl() on both arches

- adding some debug printks to check for the drbg_max_requests() on both 
arches

I found a bug that was introduced with 
bc034ef5573ef4d81daa666c02a3df1ad28e24a7 when booting in FIPS mode, i.e. it is 
not in Linus' tree. The patch will be on your desk shortly.

Thus, the fix in b9347aff91ce4789619168539f08202d8d6a1177 works. However, this 
patch is based on 05c81ccd9087d238c10b234eadb55632742e5518. So, if we want to 
fix Linus' tree with minimal impact, either these two patches are pushed to 
Linus or I have to port b9347aff91ce4789619168539f08202d8d6a1177 to the 
current Linus tree.
> 
> Cheers,


-- 
Ciao
Stephan

DRBG: remove test for uninitialized DRBG handle

[Stephan Mueller]

The drbg_healthcheck() contains a test to call the DRBG with an
uninitialized DRBG cipher handle. As this is an inappropriate use of the
kernel crypto API to try to generate random numbers before
initialization, checks verifying for an initialized DRBG during the
generate function have been removed in previous patches.

Now, the drbg_healthcheck test trying to generate random numbers with
an uninstantiated DRBG must also be removed.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
 crypto/drbg.c | 3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index 39ed918..54cfd48 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -1872,9 +1872,6 @@ static inline int __init drbg_healthcheck_sanity(void)
 	/* overflow max addtllen with personalization string */
 	ret = drbg_instantiate(drbg, &addtl, coreref, pr);
 	BUG_ON(0 == ret);
-	/* test uninstantated DRBG */
-	len = drbg_generate(drbg, buf, (max_request_bytes + 1), NULL);
-	BUG_ON(0 < len);
 	/* all tests passed */
 	rc = 0;
 
-- 
1.9.3

[PATCH v2] DRBG: remove check for uninitialized DRBG handle

[Stephan Mueller]

The drbg_healthcheck() contained a test to call the DRBG with an
uninitialized DRBG cipher handle. As this is an inappropriate use of the
kernel crypto API to try to generate random numbers before
initialization, checks verifying for an initialized DRBG have been
removed in previous patches.

Now, the drbg_healthcheck test must also be removed.

Changes V2: Added patch marker to email subject line.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
 crypto/drbg.c | 3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index 39ed918..54cfd48 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -1872,9 +1872,6 @@ static inline int __init drbg_healthcheck_sanity(void)
 	/* overflow max addtllen with personalization string */
 	ret = drbg_instantiate(drbg, &addtl, coreref, pr);
 	BUG_ON(0 == ret);
-	/* test uninstantated DRBG */
-	len = drbg_generate(drbg, buf, (max_request_bytes + 1), NULL);
-	BUG_ON(0 < len);
 	/* all tests passed */
 	rc = 0;
 
-- 
1.9.3

Re: [PATCH v2] DRBG: remove check for uninitialized DRBG handle

[Stephan Mueller]

Am Montag, 1. September 2014, 07:11:20 schrieb Stephan Mueller:

Hi Herbert,

may I ask for consideration of this patch as this covers an oops FIPS mode?

In addition, may I ask for guidance on how to fix the 32 bit code path in 
Linus' tree as asked on 28.8? To quote: "Thus, the fix in 
b9347aff91ce4789619168539f08202d8d6a1177 works. However, this 
patch is based on 05c81ccd9087d238c10b234eadb55632742e5518. So, if we want to 
fix Linus' tree with minimal impact, either these two patches are pushed to 
Linus or I have to port b9347aff91ce4789619168539f08202d8d6a1177 to the 
current Linus tree."

Thanks a lot
Stephan

> The drbg_healthcheck() contained a test to call the DRBG with an
> uninitialized DRBG cipher handle. As this is an inappropriate use of the
> kernel crypto API to try to generate random numbers before
> initialization, checks verifying for an initialized DRBG have been
> removed in previous patches.
> 
> Now, the drbg_healthcheck test must also be removed.
> 
> Changes V2: Added patch marker to email subject line.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
> ---
>  crypto/drbg.c | 3 ---
>  1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
> index 39ed918..54cfd48 100644
> --- a/crypto/drbg.c
> +++ b/crypto/drbg.c
> @@ -1872,9 +1872,6 @@ static inline int __init drbg_healthcheck_sanity(void)
> /* overflow max addtllen with personalization string */
>  	ret = drbg_instantiate(drbg, &addtl, coreref, pr);
>  	BUG_ON(0 == ret);
> -	/* test uninstantated DRBG */
> -	len = drbg_generate(drbg, buf, (max_request_bytes + 1), NULL);
> -	BUG_ON(0 < len);
>  	/* all tests passed */
>  	rc = 0;


-- 
Ciao
Stephan

Re: [PATCH v2] DRBG: remove check for uninitialized DRBG handle

[Herbert Xu]

On Wed, Sep 03, 2014 at 03:33:16AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Montag, 1. September 2014, 07:11:20 schrieb Stephan Mueller:
> 
> Hi Herbert,
> 
> may I ask for consideration of this patch as this covers an oops FIPS mode?
> 
> In addition, may I ask for guidance on how to fix the 32 bit code path in 
> Linus' tree as asked on 28.8? To quote: "Thus, the fix in 
> b9347aff91ce4789619168539f08202d8d6a1177 works. However, this 
> patch is based on 05c81ccd9087d238c10b234eadb55632742e5518. So, if we want to 
> fix Linus' tree with minimal impact, either these two patches are pushed to 
> Linus or I have to port b9347aff91ce4789619168539f08202d8d6a1177 to the 
> current Linus tree."

I will take care of this.

Cheers,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

Re: [PATCH v2] DRBG: remove check for uninitialized DRBG handle

[Stephan Mueller]

Am Donnerstag, 4. September 2014, 07:21:29 schrieb Herbert Xu:

Hi Herbert,

> On Wed, Sep 03, 2014 at 03:33:16AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > Am Montag, 1. September 2014, 07:11:20 schrieb Stephan Mueller:
> > 
> > Hi Herbert,
> > 
> > may I ask for consideration of this patch as this covers an oops FIPS
> > mode?
> > 
> > In addition, may I ask for guidance on how to fix the 32 bit code path in
> > Linus' tree as asked on 28.8? To quote: "Thus, the fix in
> > b9347aff91ce4789619168539f08202d8d6a1177 works. However, this
> > patch is based on 05c81ccd9087d238c10b234eadb55632742e5518. So, if we want
> > to fix Linus' tree with minimal impact, either these two patches are
> > pushed to Linus or I have to port
> > b9347aff91ce4789619168539f08202d8d6a1177 to the current Linus tree."
> 
> I will take care of this.

Thank you.
> 
> Cheers,


-- 
Ciao
Stephan

Re: [PATCH v2] DRBG: remove check for uninitialized DRBG handle

[Herbert Xu]

On Thu, Sep 04, 2014 at 01:50:32AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Donnerstag, 4. September 2014, 07:21:29 schrieb Herbert Xu:
> 
> Hi Herbert,
> 
> > On Wed, Sep 03, 2014 at 03:33:16AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > > Am Montag, 1. September 2014, 07:11:20 schrieb Stephan Mueller:
> > > 
> > > Hi Herbert,
> > > 
> > > may I ask for consideration of this patch as this covers an oops FIPS
> > > mode?
> > > 
> > > In addition, may I ask for guidance on how to fix the 32 bit code path in
> > > Linus' tree as asked on 28.8? To quote: "Thus, the fix in
> > > b9347aff91ce4789619168539f08202d8d6a1177 works. However, this
> > > patch is based on 05c81ccd9087d238c10b234eadb55632742e5518. So, if we want
> > > to fix Linus' tree with minimal impact, either these two patches are
> > > pushed to Linus or I have to port
> > > b9347aff91ce4789619168539f08202d8d6a1177 to the current Linus tree."
> > 
> > I will take care of this.
> 
> Thank you.

Here is the patch I will add for 3.17:

commit fb38ab4cd05e11184fd2c3ef916fa106ecc505fc
Author: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date:   Fri Sep 5 15:52:28 2014 +0800

    crypto: drbg - backport "fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems"
    
    This is a backport of commit b9347aff91ce4789619168539f08202d8d6a1177.
    This backport is needed as without it the code will crash on 32-bit
    systems.
    
    The maximum values for additional input string or generated blocks is
    larger than 1<<32. To ensure a sensible value on 32 bit systems, return
    SIZE_MAX on 32 bit systems. This value is lower than the maximum
    allowed values defined in SP800-90A. The standard allow lower maximum
    values, but not larger values.
    
    SIZE_MAX - 1 is used for drbg_max_addtl to allow
    drbg_healthcheck_sanity to check the enforcement of the variable
    without wrapping.
    
    Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
    Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
    Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h
index 831d786..882675e 100644
--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
+++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
@@ -162,12 +162,25 @@ static inline size_t drbg_max_request_bytes(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 
 static inline size_t drbg_max_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
+#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
+	/*
+	 * SP800-90A allows smaller maximum numbers to be returned -- we
+	 * return SIZE_MAX - 1 to allow the verification of the enforcement
+	 * of this value in drbg_healthcheck_sanity.
+	 */
+	return (SIZE_MAX - 1);
+#else
 	return (1UL<<(drbg->core->max_addtllen));
+#endif
 }
 
 static inline size_t drbg_max_requests(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
+#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
+	return SIZE_MAX;
+#else
 	return (1UL<<(drbg->core->max_req));
+#endif
 }
 
 /*

Cheers,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

Re: [PATCH v2] DRBG: remove check for uninitialized DRBG handle

[Herbert Xu]

On Mon, Sep 01, 2014 at 07:11:20AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> The drbg_healthcheck() contained a test to call the DRBG with an
> uninitialized DRBG cipher handle. As this is an inappropriate use of the
> kernel crypto API to try to generate random numbers before
> initialization, checks verifying for an initialized DRBG have been
> removed in previous patches.
> 
> Now, the drbg_healthcheck test must also be removed.
> 
> Changes V2: Added patch marker to email subject line.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>

Patch applied to crypto.  Thanks!
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

Re: [PATCH v2] DRBG: remove check for uninitialized DRBG handle

[Stephan Mueller]

Am Freitag, 5. September 2014, 15:55:49 schrieb Herbert Xu:

Hi Herbert,

>On Thu, Sep 04, 2014 at 01:50:32AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>> Am Donnerstag, 4. September 2014, 07:21:29 schrieb Herbert Xu:
>> 
>> Hi Herbert,
>> 
>> > On Wed, Sep 03, 2014 at 03:33:16AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>> > > Am Montag, 1. September 2014, 07:11:20 schrieb Stephan Mueller:
>> > > 
>> > > Hi Herbert,
>> > > 
>> > > may I ask for consideration of this patch as this covers an oops
>> > > FIPS
>> > > mode?
>> > > 
>> > > In addition, may I ask for guidance on how to fix the 32 bit code
>> > > path in Linus' tree as asked on 28.8? To quote: "Thus, the fix
>> > > in
>> > > b9347aff91ce4789619168539f08202d8d6a1177 works. However, this
>> > > patch is based on 05c81ccd9087d238c10b234eadb55632742e5518. So,
>> > > if we want to fix Linus' tree with minimal impact, either these
>> > > two patches are pushed to Linus or I have to port
>> > > b9347aff91ce4789619168539f08202d8d6a1177 to the current Linus
>> > > tree."
>> > 
>> > I will take care of this.
>> 
>> Thank you.
>
>Here is the patch I will add for 3.17:
>
>commit fb38ab4cd05e11184fd2c3ef916fa106ecc505fc
>Author: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
>Date:   Fri Sep 5 15:52:28 2014 +0800
>
>    crypto: drbg - backport "fix maximum value checks on 32 bit
>systems"
>
>    This is a backport of commit
>b9347aff91ce4789619168539f08202d8d6a1177. This backport is needed as
>without it the code will crash on 32-bit systems.

The kernel / module will not crash, It will simply refuse to work by 
always returning an error. I have tested the 3.17-rc1 code on 32 bit 
which returned always the error unless I apply this patch.
>
>    The maximum values for additional input string or generated blocks
>is larger than 1<<32. To ensure a sensible value on 32 bit systems,
>return SIZE_MAX on 32 bit systems. This value is lower than the
>maximum allowed values defined in SP800-90A. The standard allow lower
>maximum values, but not larger values.
>
>    SIZE_MAX - 1 is used for drbg_max_addtl to allow
>    drbg_healthcheck_sanity to check the enforcement of the variable
>    without wrapping.
>
>    Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
>    Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
>    Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
>
>diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h
>index 831d786..882675e 100644
>--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
>+++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
>@@ -162,12 +162,25 @@ static inline size_t
>drbg_max_request_bytes(struct drbg_state *drbg)
>
> static inline size_t drbg_max_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg)
> {
>+#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
>+	/*
>+	 * SP800-90A allows smaller maximum numbers to be returned -- we
>+	 * return SIZE_MAX - 1 to allow the verification of the 
enforcement
>+	 * of this value in drbg_healthcheck_sanity.
>+	 */
>+	return (SIZE_MAX - 1);
>+#else
> 	return (1UL<<(drbg->core->max_addtllen));
>+#endif
> }
>
> static inline size_t drbg_max_requests(struct drbg_state *drbg)
> {
>+#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
>+	return SIZE_MAX;
>+#else
> 	return (1UL<<(drbg->core->max_req));
>+#endif
> }
>
> /*
>
>Cheers,

Thank you very much!

Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>


Ciao
Stephan