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From: casey.schaufler@intel.com (Casey Schaufler)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 13:34:42 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180926203446.2004-2-casey.schaufler@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180926203446.2004-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com>

From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

A ptrace access check with mode PTRACE_MODE_SCHED gets called
from process switching code. This precludes the use of audit,
as the locking is incompatible. Don't do audit in the PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
case.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
---
 security/apparmor/domain.c      | 2 +-
 security/apparmor/include/ipc.h | 2 +-
 security/apparmor/ipc.c         | 8 +++++---
 security/apparmor/lsm.c         | 5 +++--
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 08c88de0ffda..28300f4c3ef9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct aa_label *to_label,
 	if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerl))
 		goto out;
 
-	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerl, to_label, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerl, to_label, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, true);
 
 out:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
index 5ffc218d1e74..299d1c45fef0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ struct aa_profile;
 	"xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"
 
 int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
-		  u32 request);
+		  u32 request, bool audit);
 int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig);
 
 #endif /* __AA_IPC_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index 527ea1557120..9ed110afc822 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -121,15 +121,17 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
  * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
  */
 int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
-		  u32 request)
+		  u32 request, bool audit)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
 	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
 
 	return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
-			profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
-			profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
+			profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request,
+					    audit ? &sa : NULL),
+			profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest,
+					    audit ? &sa : NULL));
 }
 
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 8b8b70620bbe..da9d0b228857 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 	tracee = aa_get_task_label(child);
 	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee,
 			(mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ
-						  : AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
+						  : AA_PTRACE_TRACE,
+			!(mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED));
 	aa_put_label(tracee);
 	end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);
 
@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 
 	tracee = begin_current_label_crit_section();
 	tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent);
-	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
+	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE, true);
 	aa_put_label(tracer);
 	end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);
 
-- 
2.17.1

  reply	other threads:[~2018-09-26 20:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-26 20:34 [PATCH v5 0/5] LSM: Support ptrace sidechannel access checks Casey Schaufler
2018-09-26 20:34 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2018-09-26 21:16   ` [PATCH v5 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Jann Horn
2018-09-26 21:18     ` Jann Horn
2018-09-26 22:47       ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] Smack: " Casey Schaufler
2018-09-26 21:30   ` Jann Horn
2018-09-26 22:53     ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 22:58       ` Jann Horn
2018-10-04  7:47         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-10-04 11:36           ` Jann Horn
2018-10-16 11:44             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2018-09-27 15:50   ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-27 16:23     ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Casey Schaufler
2018-09-26 21:26   ` Jann Horn
2018-09-26 22:24     ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel Casey Schaufler
2018-09-27 21:45   ` James Morris
2018-09-27 22:39     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-27 22:47       ` James Morris
2018-09-27 23:19         ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-27 23:43           ` James Morris
2018-09-27 23:47             ` Jann Horn
2018-09-28 16:33               ` James Morris
2018-09-28 17:40                 ` Schaufler, Casey

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