From: casey.schaufler@intel.com (Schaufler, Casey)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 22:24:34 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <99FC4B6EFCEFD44486C35F4C281DC6732146256E@ORSMSX107.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez1NqoW8bByrYe30MdyCn2th3X+tth=VhMHA2MA-PoaQVw@mail.gmail.com>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jann Horn [mailto:jannh at google.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, September 26, 2018 2:26 PM
> To: Schaufler, Casey <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>; kernel list
> <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>; linux-security-module <linux-security-
> module at vger.kernel.org>; selinux at tycho.nsa.gov; Hansen, Dave
> <dave.hansen@intel.com>; Dock, Deneen T <deneen.t.dock@intel.com>;
> kristen at linux.intel.com; Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
>
> On Wed, Sep 26, 2018 at 10:35 PM Casey Schaufler
> <casey.schaufler@intel.com> wrote:
> > Allow a complete ptrace access check with mode PTRACE_MODE_SCHED.
> > Disable the inappropriate privilege check in the capability code
> > that does incompatible locking.
>
> What's that locking you're talking about?
ns_capable() eventually gets you to an audit call. The audit code
is going to do the locking. Fortunately, the preceding cap_issubset()
is the check that we really need here.
>
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/ptrace.c | 2 --
> > security/commoncap.c | 2 ++
> > 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
> > index 99cfddde6a55..0b6a9df51c3b 100644
> > --- a/kernel/ptrace.c
> > +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
> > @@ -331,8 +331,6 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct
> *task, unsigned int mode)
> > !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
> > return -EPERM;
> >
> > - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED)
> > - return 0;
> > return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
> > }
> >
> > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> > index 2e489d6a3ac8..e77457110d05 100644
> > --- a/security/commoncap.c
> > +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> > @@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
> *child, unsigned int mode)
> > if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
> > cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
> > goto out;
> > + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED)
> > + goto out;
>
> So for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED, this function always returns 0, right?
That can't be right, can it? Determining that we have PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
at this point should result in -EPERM. I mucked up on the logic flow. The
next revision will fix this.
> If that's intentional, perhaps you should instead just put "if (mode &
> PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) return 0;" at the start of the function, to avoid
> taking the RCU read lock in this case.
>
> > if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
> > goto out;
> > ret = -EPERM;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-26 22:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-26 20:34 [PATCH v5 0/5] LSM: Support ptrace sidechannel access checks Casey Schaufler
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Casey Schaufler
2018-09-26 21:16 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-26 21:18 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-26 22:47 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] Smack: " Casey Schaufler
2018-09-26 21:30 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-26 22:53 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 22:58 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-04 7:47 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-10-04 11:36 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-16 11:44 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2018-09-27 15:50 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-27 16:23 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Casey Schaufler
2018-09-26 21:26 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-26 22:24 ` Schaufler, Casey [this message]
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel Casey Schaufler
2018-09-27 21:45 ` James Morris
2018-09-27 22:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-27 22:47 ` James Morris
2018-09-27 23:19 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-27 23:43 ` James Morris
2018-09-27 23:47 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-28 16:33 ` James Morris
2018-09-28 17:40 ` Schaufler, Casey
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