From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
deneen.t.dock@intel.com, kristen@linux.intel.com,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/5] Smack: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2018 09:47:25 +0200 (CEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1810040942110.14430@cbobk.fhfr.pm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez1+9Bfadu4y4TzPYJfFpLk+N8w7GdCE+xwNCM5TfQ8W8Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, 27 Sep 2018, Jann Horn wrote:
> > Yes. Since the PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT was in PTRACE_MODE_IBPB in Jiri's
> > previous patch set and not in PTRACE_MODE_SCHED in this one I assumed
> > that there was a good reason for it.
>
> Jiri, was there a good reason for it, and if so, what was it?
[ FWIW PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT being in PTRACE_MODE_IBPB goes back to original
Tim's pre-CRD patchset ]
Well, we can't really call out into audit from scheduler code, and the
previous versions of the patchsets didn't have PTRACE_MODE_SCHED, so it
had to be included in PTRACE_MODE_IBPB in order to make sure we're not
calling into audit from context switch code.
Or did I misunderstand the question?
Thanks,
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-04 7:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-26 20:34 [PATCH v5 0/5] LSM: Support ptrace sidechannel access checks Casey Schaufler
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Casey Schaufler
2018-09-26 21:16 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-26 21:18 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-26 22:47 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] Smack: " Casey Schaufler
2018-09-26 21:30 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-26 22:53 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 22:58 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-04 7:47 ` Jiri Kosina [this message]
2018-10-04 11:36 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-16 11:44 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2018-09-27 15:50 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-27 16:23 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Casey Schaufler
2018-09-26 21:26 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-26 22:24 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel Casey Schaufler
2018-09-27 21:45 ` James Morris
2018-09-27 22:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-27 22:47 ` James Morris
2018-09-27 23:19 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-27 23:43 ` James Morris
2018-09-27 23:47 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-28 16:33 ` James Morris
2018-09-28 17:40 ` Schaufler, Casey
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