From: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@gmail.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: igor.stoppa@huawei.com, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 07/17] prmem: lkdtm tests for memory protection
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 00:34:54 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181023213504.28905-8-igor.stoppa@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181023213504.28905-1-igor.stoppa@huawei.com>
Various cases meant to verify that illegal operations on protected
memory will either BUG() or WARN().
The test cases fall into 2 main categories:
- trying to overwrite (directly) something that is write protected
- trying to use write rare functions on something that is not write rare
Signed-off-by: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>
CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CC: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
CC: linux-mm@kvack.org
CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 13 ++
drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 13 ++
drivers/misc/lkdtm/perms.c | 248 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 274 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c
index 2154d1bfd18b..41a3ba16bc57 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c
@@ -155,6 +155,19 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
CRASHTYPE(ACCESS_USERSPACE),
CRASHTYPE(WRITE_RO),
CRASHTYPE(WRITE_RO_AFTER_INIT),
+ CRASHTYPE(WRITE_WR_AFTER_INIT),
+ CRASHTYPE(WRITE_WR_AFTER_INIT_ON_RO_AFTER_INIT),
+ CRASHTYPE(WRITE_WR_AFTER_INIT_ON_CONST),
+#ifdef CONFIG_PRMEM
+ CRASHTYPE(WRITE_RO_PMALLOC),
+ CRASHTYPE(WRITE_AUTO_RO_PMALLOC),
+ CRASHTYPE(WRITE_WR_PMALLOC),
+ CRASHTYPE(WRITE_AUTO_WR_PMALLOC),
+ CRASHTYPE(WRITE_START_WR_PMALLOC),
+ CRASHTYPE(WRITE_WR_PMALLOC_ON_RO_PMALLOC),
+ CRASHTYPE(WRITE_WR_PMALLOC_ON_CONST),
+ CRASHTYPE(WRITE_WR_PMALLOC_ON_RO_AFT_INIT),
+#endif
CRASHTYPE(WRITE_KERN),
CRASHTYPE(REFCOUNT_INC_OVERFLOW),
CRASHTYPE(REFCOUNT_ADD_OVERFLOW),
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h
index 9e513dcfd809..08368c4545f7 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h
@@ -38,6 +38,19 @@ void lkdtm_READ_BUDDY_AFTER_FREE(void);
void __init lkdtm_perms_init(void);
void lkdtm_WRITE_RO(void);
void lkdtm_WRITE_RO_AFTER_INIT(void);
+void lkdtm_WRITE_WR_AFTER_INIT(void);
+void lkdtm_WRITE_WR_AFTER_INIT_ON_RO_AFTER_INIT(void);
+void lkdtm_WRITE_WR_AFTER_INIT_ON_CONST(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_PRMEM
+void lkdtm_WRITE_RO_PMALLOC(void);
+void lkdtm_WRITE_AUTO_RO_PMALLOC(void);
+void lkdtm_WRITE_WR_PMALLOC(void);
+void lkdtm_WRITE_AUTO_WR_PMALLOC(void);
+void lkdtm_WRITE_START_WR_PMALLOC(void);
+void lkdtm_WRITE_WR_PMALLOC_ON_RO_PMALLOC(void);
+void lkdtm_WRITE_WR_PMALLOC_ON_CONST(void);
+void lkdtm_WRITE_WR_PMALLOC_ON_RO_AFT_INIT(void);
+#endif
void lkdtm_WRITE_KERN(void);
void lkdtm_EXEC_DATA(void);
void lkdtm_EXEC_STACK(void);
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/perms.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/perms.c
index 53b85c9d16b8..3c14fd4d90ac 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/perms.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/perms.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/prmemextra.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
/* Whether or not to fill the target memory area with do_nothing(). */
@@ -27,6 +28,10 @@ static const unsigned long rodata = 0xAA55AA55;
/* This is marked __ro_after_init, so it should ultimately be .rodata. */
static unsigned long ro_after_init __ro_after_init = 0x55AA5500;
+/* This is marked __wr_after_init, so it should be in .rodata. */
+static
+unsigned long wr_after_init __wr_after_init = 0x55AA5500;
+
/*
* This just returns to the caller. It is designed to be copied into
* non-executable memory regions.
@@ -104,6 +109,247 @@ void lkdtm_WRITE_RO_AFTER_INIT(void)
*ptr ^= 0xabcd1234;
}
+void lkdtm_WRITE_WR_AFTER_INIT(void)
+{
+ unsigned long *ptr = &wr_after_init;
+
+ /*
+ * Verify we were written to during init. Since an Oops
+ * is considered a "success", a failure is to just skip the
+ * real test.
+ */
+ if ((*ptr & 0xAA) != 0xAA) {
+ pr_info("%p was NOT written during init!?\n", ptr);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad wr_after_init write at %p\n", ptr);
+ *ptr ^= 0xabcd1234;
+}
+
+#define INIT_VAL 0x5A
+#define END_VAL 0xA5
+
+/* Verify that write rare will not work against read-only memory. */
+static int ro_after_init_data __ro_after_init = INIT_VAL;
+void lkdtm_WRITE_WR_AFTER_INIT_ON_RO_AFTER_INIT(void)
+{
+ pr_info("attempting illegal write rare to __ro_after_init");
+ if (wr_int(&ro_after_init_data, END_VAL) ||
+ ro_after_init_data == END_VAL)
+ pr_info("Unexpected successful write to __ro_after_init");
+}
+
+/*
+ * "volatile" to force the compiler to not optimize away the reading back.
+ * Is there a better way to do it, than using volatile?
+ */
+static volatile const int const_data = INIT_VAL;
+void lkdtm_WRITE_WR_AFTER_INIT_ON_CONST(void)
+{
+ pr_info("attempting illegal write rare to const data");
+ if (wr_int((int *)&const_data, END_VAL) || const_data == END_VAL)
+ pr_info("Unexpected successful write to const memory");
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PRMEM
+
+#define MSG_NO_POOL "Cannot allocate memory for the pool."
+#define MSG_NO_PMEM "Cannot allocate memory from the pool."
+
+void lkdtm_WRITE_RO_PMALLOC(void)
+{
+ struct pmalloc_pool *pool;
+ int *i;
+
+ pool = pmalloc_create_pool(PMALLOC_MODE_RO);
+ if (!pool) {
+ pr_info(MSG_NO_POOL);
+ return;
+ }
+ i = pmalloc(pool, sizeof(int));
+ if (!i) {
+ pr_info(MSG_NO_PMEM);
+ pmalloc_destroy_pool(pool);
+ return;
+ }
+ *i = INT_MAX;
+ pmalloc_protect_pool(pool);
+ pr_info("attempting bad pmalloc write at %p\n", i);
+ *i = 0; /* Note: this will crash and leak the pool memory. */
+}
+
+void lkdtm_WRITE_AUTO_RO_PMALLOC(void)
+{
+ struct pmalloc_pool *pool;
+ int *i;
+
+ pool = pmalloc_create_pool(PMALLOC_MODE_AUTO_RO);
+ if (!pool) {
+ pr_info(MSG_NO_POOL);
+ return;
+ }
+ i = pmalloc(pool, sizeof(int));
+ if (!i) {
+ pr_info(MSG_NO_PMEM);
+ pmalloc_destroy_pool(pool);
+ return;
+ }
+ *i = INT_MAX;
+ pmalloc(pool, PMALLOC_DEFAULT_REFILL_SIZE);
+ pr_info("attempting bad pmalloc write at %p\n", i);
+ *i = 0; /* Note: this will crash and leak the pool memory. */
+}
+
+void lkdtm_WRITE_WR_PMALLOC(void)
+{
+ struct pmalloc_pool *pool;
+ int *i;
+
+ pool = pmalloc_create_pool(PMALLOC_MODE_WR);
+ if (!pool) {
+ pr_info(MSG_NO_POOL);
+ return;
+ }
+ i = pmalloc(pool, sizeof(int));
+ if (!i) {
+ pr_info(MSG_NO_PMEM);
+ pmalloc_destroy_pool(pool);
+ return;
+ }
+ *i = INT_MAX;
+ pmalloc_protect_pool(pool);
+ pr_info("attempting bad pmalloc write at %p\n", i);
+ *i = 0; /* Note: this will crash and leak the pool memory. */
+}
+
+void lkdtm_WRITE_AUTO_WR_PMALLOC(void)
+{
+ struct pmalloc_pool *pool;
+ int *i;
+
+ pool = pmalloc_create_pool(PMALLOC_MODE_AUTO_WR);
+ if (!pool) {
+ pr_info(MSG_NO_POOL);
+ return;
+ }
+ i = pmalloc(pool, sizeof(int));
+ if (!i) {
+ pr_info(MSG_NO_PMEM);
+ pmalloc_destroy_pool(pool);
+ return;
+ }
+ *i = INT_MAX;
+ pmalloc(pool, PMALLOC_DEFAULT_REFILL_SIZE);
+ pr_info("attempting bad pmalloc write at %p\n", i);
+ *i = 0; /* Note: this will crash and leak the pool memory. */
+}
+
+void lkdtm_WRITE_START_WR_PMALLOC(void)
+{
+ struct pmalloc_pool *pool;
+ int *i;
+
+ pool = pmalloc_create_pool(PMALLOC_MODE_START_WR);
+ if (!pool) {
+ pr_info(MSG_NO_POOL);
+ return;
+ }
+ i = pmalloc(pool, sizeof(int));
+ if (!i) {
+ pr_info(MSG_NO_PMEM);
+ pmalloc_destroy_pool(pool);
+ return;
+ }
+ *i = INT_MAX;
+ pr_info("attempting bad pmalloc write at %p\n", i);
+ *i = 0; /* Note: this will crash and leak the pool memory. */
+}
+
+void lkdtm_WRITE_WR_PMALLOC_ON_RO_PMALLOC(void)
+{
+ struct pmalloc_pool *pool;
+ int *var_ptr;
+
+ pool = pmalloc_create_pool(PMALLOC_MODE_RO);
+ if (!pool) {
+ pr_info(MSG_NO_POOL);
+ return;
+ }
+ var_ptr = pmalloc(pool, sizeof(int));
+ if (!var_ptr) {
+ pr_info(MSG_NO_PMEM);
+ pmalloc_destroy_pool(pool);
+ return;
+ }
+ *var_ptr = INIT_VAL;
+ pmalloc_protect_pool(pool);
+ pr_info("attempting illegal write rare to R/O pool");
+ if (wr_int(var_ptr, END_VAL))
+ pr_info("Unexpected successful write to R/O pool");
+ pmalloc_destroy_pool(pool);
+}
+
+void lkdtm_WRITE_WR_PMALLOC_ON_CONST(void)
+{
+ struct pmalloc_pool *pool;
+ int *dummy;
+ bool write_result;
+
+ /*
+ * The pool operations are only meant to simulate an attacker
+ * using a random pool as parameter for the attack against the
+ * const.
+ */
+ pool = pmalloc_create_pool(PMALLOC_MODE_WR);
+ if (!pool) {
+ pr_info(MSG_NO_POOL);
+ return;
+ }
+ dummy = pmalloc(pool, sizeof(*dummy));
+ if (!dummy) {
+ pr_info(MSG_NO_PMEM);
+ pmalloc_destroy_pool(pool);
+ return;
+ }
+ *dummy = 1;
+ pmalloc_protect_pool(pool);
+ pr_info("attempting illegal write rare to const data");
+ write_result = wr_int((int *)&const_data, END_VAL);
+ pmalloc_destroy_pool(pool);
+ if (write_result || const_data != INIT_VAL)
+ pr_info("Unexpected successful write to const memory");
+}
+
+void lkdtm_WRITE_WR_PMALLOC_ON_RO_AFT_INIT(void)
+{
+ struct pmalloc_pool *pool;
+ int *dummy;
+ bool write_result;
+
+ /*
+ * The pool operations are only meant to simulate an attacker
+ * using a random pool as parameter for the attack against the
+ * const.
+ */
+ pool = pmalloc_create_pool(PMALLOC_MODE_WR);
+ if (WARN(!pool, MSG_NO_POOL))
+ return;
+ dummy = pmalloc(pool, sizeof(*dummy));
+ if (WARN(!dummy, MSG_NO_PMEM)) {
+ pmalloc_destroy_pool(pool);
+ return;
+ }
+ *dummy = 1;
+ pmalloc_protect_pool(pool);
+ pr_info("attempting illegal write rare to ro_after_init");
+ write_result = wr_int(&ro_after_init_data, END_VAL);
+ pmalloc_destroy_pool(pool);
+ WARN(write_result || ro_after_init_data != INIT_VAL,
+ "Unexpected successful write to ro_after_init memory");
+}
+#endif
+
void lkdtm_WRITE_KERN(void)
{
size_t size;
@@ -200,4 +446,6 @@ void __init lkdtm_perms_init(void)
/* Make sure we can write to __ro_after_init values during __init */
ro_after_init |= 0xAA;
+ /* Make sure we can write to __wr_after_init during __init */
+ wr_after_init |= 0xAA;
}
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-23 21:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 140+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-23 21:34 [RFC v1 PATCH 00/17] prmem: protected memory Igor Stoppa
2018-10-23 21:34 ` [PATCH 01/17] prmem: linker section for static write rare Igor Stoppa
2018-10-23 21:34 ` [PATCH 02/17] prmem: write rare for static allocation Igor Stoppa
2018-10-25 0:24 ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-29 18:03 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-26 9:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-29 20:01 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-23 21:34 ` [PATCH 03/17] prmem: vmalloc support for dynamic allocation Igor Stoppa
2018-10-25 0:26 ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-29 18:07 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-23 21:34 ` [PATCH 04/17] prmem: " Igor Stoppa
2018-10-23 21:34 ` [PATCH 05/17] prmem: shorthands for write rare on common types Igor Stoppa
2018-10-25 0:28 ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-29 18:12 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-23 21:34 ` [PATCH 06/17] prmem: test cases for memory protection Igor Stoppa
2018-10-24 3:27 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-24 14:24 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-25 16:43 ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-29 18:16 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-23 21:34 ` Igor Stoppa [this message]
2018-10-23 21:34 ` [PATCH 08/17] prmem: struct page: track vmap_area Igor Stoppa
2018-10-24 3:12 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-24 23:01 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-25 2:13 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-29 18:21 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-23 21:34 ` [PATCH 09/17] prmem: hardened usercopy Igor Stoppa
2018-10-29 11:45 ` Chris von Recklinghausen
2018-10-29 18:24 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-23 21:34 ` [PATCH 10/17] prmem: documentation Igor Stoppa
2018-10-24 3:48 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-24 14:30 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-24 23:04 ` Mike Rapoport
2018-10-29 19:05 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-26 9:26 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-26 10:20 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-29 19:28 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-26 10:46 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-28 18:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-29 21:04 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-30 15:26 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-30 16:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-30 17:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-30 17:58 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-30 18:03 ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-31 9:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-30 18:28 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-30 19:20 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-30 20:43 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-30 21:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-30 21:07 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-30 21:25 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-30 22:15 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-31 10:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-31 20:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-31 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-31 9:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-30 21:35 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-30 21:49 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-31 4:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-31 9:08 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-31 19:38 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-31 10:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-31 20:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-31 21:00 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-31 22:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-31 23:10 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-31 23:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-31 23:26 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-11-01 8:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-01 15:58 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-11-01 17:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-30 18:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-30 19:14 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-30 21:25 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-30 21:55 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-30 22:08 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-31 9:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-30 23:18 ` Nadav Amit
2018-10-31 9:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-01 16:31 ` Nadav Amit
2018-11-02 21:11 ` Nadav Amit
2018-10-31 9:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-31 11:33 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-11-13 14:25 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-11-13 17:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-13 17:43 ` Nadav Amit
2018-11-13 17:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-13 18:06 ` Nadav Amit
2018-11-13 18:31 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-11-13 18:33 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-11-13 18:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-13 19:03 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-11-21 16:34 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-11-21 17:36 ` Nadav Amit
2018-11-21 18:01 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-11-21 18:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-22 19:27 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-11-22 20:04 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-11-22 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-04 12:34 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-11-13 18:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-13 19:35 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-11-13 18:26 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-11-13 18:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-13 19:01 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-31 9:27 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-26 11:09 ` Markus Heiser
2018-10-29 19:35 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-26 15:05 ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-10-29 19:38 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-29 20:35 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-23 21:34 ` [PATCH 11/17] prmem: llist: use designated initializer Igor Stoppa
2018-10-23 21:34 ` [PATCH 12/17] prmem: linked list: set alignment Igor Stoppa
2018-10-26 9:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-23 21:35 ` [PATCH 13/17] prmem: linked list: disable layout randomization Igor Stoppa
2018-10-24 13:43 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2018-10-29 19:40 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-26 9:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-26 10:17 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-30 15:39 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-23 21:35 ` [PATCH 14/17] prmem: llist, hlist, both plain and rcu Igor Stoppa
2018-10-24 11:37 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2018-10-24 14:03 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-24 14:56 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-24 22:52 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-25 8:11 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-28 9:52 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-29 19:43 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-26 9:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-23 21:35 ` [PATCH 15/17] prmem: test cases for prlist and prhlist Igor Stoppa
2018-10-23 21:35 ` [PATCH 16/17] prmem: pratomic-long Igor Stoppa
2018-10-25 0:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-29 21:17 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-30 15:58 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-30 16:28 ` Will Deacon
2018-10-31 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-01 3:28 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-23 21:35 ` [PATCH 17/17] prmem: ima: turn the measurements list write rare Igor Stoppa
2018-10-24 23:03 ` [RFC v1 PATCH 00/17] prmem: protected memory Dave Chinner
2018-10-29 19:47 ` Igor Stoppa
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