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From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@umich.edu>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] selinux: fix SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS flag handling on double mount
Date: Fri,  9 Apr 2021 13:12:54 +0200
Message-ID: <20210409111254.271800-3-omosnace@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210409111254.271800-1-omosnace@redhat.com>

When mounting an NFS export that is a mountpoint on the host, doing the
same mount a second time leads to a security_sb_set_mnt_opts() call on
an already intialized superblock, which leaves the
SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS flag unset even if it's provided by the FS.
NFS then obediently clears NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL from its server
capability set, leading to any newly created inodes for this superblock
to end up without labels.

To fix this, make sure to return the SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS flag
when security_sb_set_mnt_opts() is called on an already initialized
superblock with matching security options.

While there, also do a sanity check to ensure that
SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS is set in kflags if and only if
sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE.

Minimal reproducer:
    # systemctl start nfs-server
    # exportfs -o rw,no_root_squash,security_label localhost:/
    # mount -t nfs -o "nfsvers=4.2" localhost:/etc /mnt
    # mount -t nfs -o "nfsvers=4.2" localhost:/etc /mnt
    # ls -lZ /mnt
    [all labels are system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0]

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1daf7bec4bb0..b8efb14a1d1a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -741,7 +741,24 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 		/* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
 		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
 			goto out_double_mount;
+
+		/*
+		 * If we are checking an already initialized mount and the
+		 * options match, make sure to return back the
+		 * SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS flag if applicable. If the
+		 * superblock has the NATIVE behavior set and the FS is not
+		 * signaling its support (or vice versa), then it is a
+		 * programmer error, so emit a WARNING and return -EINVAL.
+		 */
 		rc = 0;
+		if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
+			if (WARN_ON(!(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS)))
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+			else
+				*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+		} else if (WARN_ON(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS)) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		}
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-- 
2.30.2


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-09 11:12 [PATCH 0/2] vfs/security/NFS/btrfs: clean up and fix LSM option handling Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-04-09 11:12 ` [PATCH 1/2] vfs,LSM: introduce the FS_HANDLES_LSM_OPTS flag Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-04-09 11:12 ` Ondrej Mosnacek [this message]
2021-04-09 12:27 ` [PATCH 0/2] vfs/security/NFS/btrfs: clean up and fix LSM option handling Al Viro
2021-04-09 17:39   ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-05-17 13:46     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-04-09 17:00 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-04-09 17:43   ` Ondrej Mosnacek

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