From: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@android.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ovl: filter of trusted xattr results in audit
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2019 09:42:08 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7c610f92-5e1f-32ef-0a60-ed47ea999fe3@android.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191007161725.GB988623@kroah.com>
On 10/7/19 9:17 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 07, 2019 at 06:16:16PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> On Mon, Oct 07, 2019 at 09:09:16AM -0700, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
>>> When filtering xattr list for reading, presence of trusted xattr
>>> results in a security audit log. However, if there is other content
>>> no errno will be set, and if there isn't, the errno will be -ENODATA
>>> and not -EPERM as is usually associated with a lack of capability.
>>> The check does not block the request to list the xattrs present.
>>>
>>> Switch to has_capability_noaudit to reflect a more appropriate check.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
>>> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
>>> Cc: kernel-team@android.com
>>> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.18
>>> Fixes: upstream a082c6f680da ("ovl: filter trusted xattr for non-admin")
>>> Fixes: 3.18 4bcc9b4b3a0a ("ovl: filter trusted xattr for non-admin")
>>> ---
>>> Replaced ns_capable_noaudit with 3.18.y tree specific
>>> has_capability_noaudit present in original submission to kernel.org
>>> commit 5c2e9f346b815841f9bed6029ebcb06415caf640
>>> ("ovl: filter of trusted xattr results in audit")
>>>
>>> fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 3 ++-
>>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
>>> index a01ec1836a72..1175efa5e956 100644
>>> --- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
>>> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
>>> @@ -265,7 +265,8 @@ static bool ovl_can_list(const char *s)
>>> return true;
>>>
>>> /* Never list trusted.overlay, list other trusted for superuser only */
>>> - return !ovl_is_private_xattr(s) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
>>> + return !ovl_is_private_xattr(s) &&
>>> + has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
>>> }
>>>
>>> ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
>>> --
>>> 2.23.0.581.g78d2f28ef7-goog
>>>
>> Thanks for the backport, this one worked!
> I spoke too soon:
>
> ERROR: "has_capability_noaudit" [fs/overlayfs/overlay.ko] undefined!
>
> That function isn't exported for modules :(
>
> greg k-h
<sigh>
Now what is the playbook, we have three options in order of preference:
1) #ifdef MODULE use capable() to preserve API, add a short comment
about the side effects if overlayfs is used as a module.
2) export has_capability_nodaudit (proc and oom_kill use it, and are
both built-in only), but affect the 3.18 API at near EOL. AFAIK no one
wants that?
3) Do nothing more. Make this a distro concern only. Leave this posted
as a back-port for the record, but never merged, for those that are
_interested_ and declare 3.18 stable as noisy for sepolicy and overlayfs
under some usage patterns with few user space mitigation unless they
explicitly take this back-port into their tree (eg: android common
kernel) if used built-in. This way, in 3.18.y at least the module and
built-in version behave the _same_ in stable.
Looking for feedback.
Sincerely -- Mark Salyzyn
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-07 16:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-07 16:09 [PATCH] ovl: filter of trusted xattr results in audit Mark Salyzyn
2019-10-07 16:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-07 16:17 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-07 16:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-07 16:43 ` Mark Salyzyn
2019-10-07 16:42 ` Mark Salyzyn [this message]
2019-10-07 16:48 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=7c610f92-5e1f-32ef-0a60-ed47ea999fe3@android.com \
--to=salyzyn@android.com \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=kernel-team@android.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=miklos@szeredi.hu \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).