From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:13:43 -0800
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKoNQJ1FNVisxr6VHD9DuUFL2eLV5pD5orHe__sDGr5MA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181218223718.96738-1-mortonm@chromium.org>
On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 2:37 PM <mortonm@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> From: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
>
> This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the
> security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is
> used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for
> the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag
> passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether
> security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by
> the proposed SafeSetID LSM).
>
> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
> ---
> Changes since the last patch: Changed the code to use a bitmask instead
> of a struct to represent the options passed to security_capable.
FWIW, I too prefer this v2 patch. I don't see a reason to keep an
"option-ified" function around if it's been generalized into a
bitfield argument.
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 8 +++++---
> include/linux/security.h | 28 +++++++++++++-------------
> kernel/capability.c | 22 +++++++++++---------
> kernel/seccomp.c | 4 ++--
> security/apparmor/capability.c | 14 ++++++-------
> security/apparmor/include/capability.h | 2 +-
> security/apparmor/ipc.c | 3 ++-
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 4 ++--
> security/commoncap.c | 17 ++++++++--------
> security/security.c | 14 +++++--------
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 +++++++--------
> security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +-
> 12 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index aaeb7fa24dc4..ef955a44a782 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@
> * @cred contains the credentials to use.
> * @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in
> * @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
> - * @audit contains whether to write an audit message or not
> + * @opts contains options for the capable check <include/linux/security.h>
> * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
> * @syslog:
> * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing
> @@ -1446,8 +1446,10 @@ union security_list_options {
> const kernel_cap_t *effective,
> const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
> const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
> - int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> - int cap, int audit);
> + int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred,
> + struct user_namespace *ns,
> + int cap,
> + unsigned int opts);
> int (*quotactl)(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
> int (*quota_on)(struct dentry *dentry);
> int (*syslog)(int type);
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index d170a5b031f3..038e6779948c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -54,9 +54,12 @@ struct xattr;
> struct xfrm_sec_ctx;
> struct mm_struct;
>
> +/* Default (no) options for the capable function */
> +#define SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT 0x0
bikeshed: maybe we should call this CAP_OPT_* ? (Then this might be
CAP_OPT_NONE?)
> /* If capable should audit the security request */
> -#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0
> -#define SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT 1
> +#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0x01
> +/* If capable is being called by a setid function */
> +#define SECURITY_CAP_INSETID 0x02
For the 1 and 2 case, can you use BIT(0) and BIT(1) instead? This
makes it clear this is a bitfield here (and does all the type magic
for higher-order bits if we ever get ther).
> /* LSM Agnostic defines for sb_set_mnt_opts */
> #define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS 1
> @@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ enum lsm_event {
>
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> - int cap, int audit);
> + int cap, unsigned int opts);
> extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
> extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
> @@ -233,10 +236,10 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> const kernel_cap_t *effective,
> const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
> const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
> -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> - int cap);
> -int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> - int cap);
> +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
> + struct user_namespace *ns,
> + int cap,
> + unsigned int opts);
> int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
> int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry);
> int security_syslog(int type);
> @@ -492,14 +495,11 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new,
> }
>
> static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
> - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> + struct user_namespace *ns,
> + int cap,
> + unsigned int opts)
> {
> - return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> -}
> -
> -static inline int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred,
> - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) {
> - return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> + return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, opts);
> }
>
> static inline int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id,
> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> index 1e1c0236f55b..454576743b1b 100644
> --- a/kernel/capability.c
> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
> @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
> int ret;
>
> rcu_read_lock();
> - ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
> + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT);
> rcu_read_unlock();
>
> return (ret == 0);
> @@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
One argument for _keeping_ the _noaudit() function as in v3 is that
keeping this one but removing the other seems inconsistent.
> int ret;
>
> rcu_read_lock();
> - ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
> + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> rcu_read_unlock();
>
> return (ret == 0);
> @@ -363,7 +363,9 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
> return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
> }
>
> -static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit)
> +static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns,
> + int cap,
> + unsigned int opts)
> {
> int capable;
>
> @@ -372,8 +374,7 @@ static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit)
> BUG();
> }
>
> - capable = audit ? security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) :
> - security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), ns, cap);
> + capable = security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap, opts);
> if (capable == 0) {
> current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> return true;
> @@ -394,7 +395,7 @@ static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit)
> */
> bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> {
> - return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, true);
> + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
>
> @@ -412,7 +413,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
> */
> bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> {
> - return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, false);
> + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit);
>
> @@ -448,10 +449,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
> bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap)
> {
> +
> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap)))
> return false;
>
> - if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0)
> + if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) == 0)
> return true;
>
> return false;
> @@ -500,10 +502,12 @@ bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns)
> {
> int ret = 0; /* An absent tracer adds no restrictions */
> const struct cred *cred;
> +
> rcu_read_lock();
> cred = rcu_dereference(tsk->ptracer_cred);
> if (cred)
> - ret = security_capable_noaudit(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
> + ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
> + SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> rcu_read_unlock();
> return (ret == 0);
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index f2ae2324c232..ddf615eb1bf7 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -383,8 +383,8 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
> * behavior of privileged children.
> */
> if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
> - security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
> - CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
> + security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
> + CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) != 0)
> return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
>
> /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
> index 253ef6e9d445..0f6dca54b66e 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
> @@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
> * profile_capable - test if profile allows use of capability @cap
> * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined)
> * @cap: capability to test if allowed
> - * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated
> + * @opts: SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
> * @sa: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing)
> *
> * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM
> */
> -static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit,
> - struct common_audit_data *sa)
> +static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
> + unsigned int opts, struct common_audit_data *sa)
> {
> int error;
>
> @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit,
> else
> error = -EPERM;
>
> - if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) {
> + if (opts & SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) {
> if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
> return error;
> /* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it
> @@ -142,13 +142,13 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit,
> * aa_capable - test permission to use capability
> * @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL)
> * @cap: capability to be tested
> - * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated
> + * @opts: SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
> *
> * Look up capability in profile capability set.
> *
> * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code.
> */
> -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit)
> +int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts)
> {
> struct aa_profile *profile;
> int error = 0;
> @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit)
>
> sa.u.cap = cap;
> error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
> - profile_capable(profile, cap, audit, &sa));
> + profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &sa));
>
> return error;
> }
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
> index e0304e2aeb7f..1b3663b6ab12 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
> @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct aa_caps {
>
> extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[];
>
> -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit);
> +int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts);
>
> static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps)
> {
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
> index 527ea1557120..4a1da2313162 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
> @@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
> aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
> aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
> aad(sa)->request = 0;
> - aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
> + aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
> + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT);
>
> return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
> }
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 42446a216f3b..0bd817084fc1 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -176,14 +176,14 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
> }
>
> static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> - int cap, int audit)
> + int cap, unsigned int opts)
> {
> struct aa_label *label;
> int error = 0;
>
> label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
> if (!unconfined(label))
> - error = aa_capable(label, cap, audit);
> + error = aa_capable(label, cap, opts);
> aa_put_label(label);
>
> return error;
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 232db019f051..3d8609192e17 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
> * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
> */
> int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
> - int cap, int audit)
> + int cap, unsigned int opts)
> {
> struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns;
>
> @@ -222,12 +222,11 @@ int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
> */
> static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
> {
> -
> /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
> * capability
> */
> if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
> - CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
> + CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) == 0)
> return 0;
> return 1;
> }
> @@ -1208,8 +1207,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
> || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
> || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
> - current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
> - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
> + current_cred()->user_ns,
> + CAP_SETPCAP,
> + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) != 0) /*[4]*/
> /*
> * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
> * [2] no unlocking of locks
> @@ -1304,9 +1304,10 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
> {
> int cap_sys_admin = 0;
>
> - if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> - SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
> + if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns,
> + CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
> cap_sys_admin = 1;
> +
> return cap_sys_admin;
> }
>
> @@ -1325,7 +1326,7 @@ int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
>
> if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
> ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
> - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT);
> /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
> if (ret == 0)
> current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index d670136dda2c..d2334697797a 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -294,16 +294,12 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> effective, inheritable, permitted);
> }
>
> -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> - int cap)
> +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
> + struct user_namespace *ns,
> + int cap,
> + unsigned int opts)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> -}
> -
> -int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> - int cap)
> -{
> - return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> + return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts);
> }
>
> int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index a67459eb62d5..a4b2e49213de 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -1769,7 +1769,7 @@ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
>
> /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
> static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
> - int cap, int audit, bool initns)
> + int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
> {
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> struct av_decision avd;
> @@ -1796,7 +1796,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
>
> rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
> sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
> - if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
> + if (!(opts & SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT)) {
> int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
> sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
> if (rc2)
> @@ -2316,9 +2316,9 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> */
>
> static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> - int cap, int audit)
> + int cap, unsigned int opts)
> {
> - return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns);
> + return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
> }
>
> static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
> @@ -3245,11 +3245,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
> static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
> {
> const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> - int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT;
> + unsigned int opts = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT;
>
> - if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit))
> + if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
> return false;
> - if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true))
> + if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
> return false;
> return true;
> }
> @@ -3649,7 +3649,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
> case KDSKBENT:
> case KDSKBSENT:
> error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
> - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true);
> + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT, true);
> break;
>
> /* default case assumes that the command will go
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
> index 9a4c0ad46518..fac2a21aa7d4 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
> @@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred)
> struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
> int rc;
>
> - rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> + rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT);
> if (rc)
> return false;
>
> --
> 2.20.0.405.gbc1bbc6f85-goog
>
Otherwise, this looks fine to me.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
James, Stephen, thoughts?
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply index
Thread overview: 88+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-31 15:28 [PATCH] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2018-10-31 21:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-10-31 21:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-31 22:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01 1:12 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 6:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 15:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01 15:56 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 16:18 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 6:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 16:11 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 16:22 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 16:41 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 17:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01 19:52 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 16:05 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-02 17:12 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 18:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-02 18:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-02 19:02 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-02 19:22 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-08 20:53 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-08 21:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-09 0:30 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-09 23:21 ` [PATCH] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable mortonm
2018-11-21 16:54 ` [PATCH] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2018-12-06 0:08 ` Kees Cook
2018-12-06 17:51 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-11 17:13 ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2019-01-15 0:38 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 18:04 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] LSM: mark all set*uid call sites in kernel/sys.c mortonm
2019-01-15 19:34 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 18:04 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2019-01-15 19:44 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 21:50 ` [PATCH v4 " mortonm
2019-01-15 22:32 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-16 15:46 ` [PATCH v5 " mortonm
2019-01-16 16:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-22 20:40 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-22 22:28 ` James Morris
2019-01-22 22:40 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-22 22:42 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] " mortonm
2019-01-25 15:51 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-25 20:15 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] " James Morris
2019-01-25 21:06 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-28 19:47 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-28 19:56 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-28 20:09 ` James Morris
2019-01-28 20:19 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-28 20:30 ` [PATCH] LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM mortonm
2019-01-28 22:12 ` James Morris
2019-01-28 22:33 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls Micah Morton
2019-01-29 17:25 ` James Morris
2019-01-29 21:14 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-30 7:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-06 19:03 ` [PATCH] LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest mortonm
2019-02-06 19:26 ` Edwin Zimmerman
2019-02-07 21:54 ` Micah Morton
2019-02-12 19:01 ` James Morris
2019-01-15 21:58 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls Micah Morton
2019-01-15 19:49 ` [PATCH v2] " Micah Morton
2019-01-15 19:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 4:07 ` James Morris
2019-01-15 19:42 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 19:28 ` [PATCH] " Micah Morton
2018-11-06 19:09 ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2018-11-06 20:59 ` [PATCH] " James Morris
2018-11-06 21:21 ` [PATCH v3] " mortonm
2018-11-02 18:07 ` [PATCH] " Stephen Smalley
2018-11-02 19:13 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-19 18:54 ` [PATCH] [PATCH] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable mortonm
2018-12-13 22:29 ` Micah Morton
2018-12-13 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-12-14 0:05 ` Micah Morton
2018-12-18 22:37 ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2019-01-07 17:55 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 18:16 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-07 18:36 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 18:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-07 19:02 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 22:57 ` [PATCH v3] " mortonm
2019-01-07 23:13 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-01-08 0:10 ` [PATCH v4] " mortonm
2019-01-08 0:20 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-09 18:39 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-10 22:31 ` James Morris
2019-01-10 23:03 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-08 0:10 ` [PATCH v2] " Micah Morton
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