* [PATCH v33 01/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-22 17:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control " Jarkko Sakkinen
` (19 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, Borislav Petkov,
Jethro Beekman, Jarkko Sakkinen, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Add X86_FEATURE_SGX from CPUID.(EAX=7, ECX=1), which informs whether the
CPU has SGX.
Add X86_FEATURE_SGX1 and X86_FEATURE_SGX2 from CPUID.(EAX=12H, ECX=0),
which describe the level of SGX support available [1].
Add IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_ENABLE. BIOS can use this bit to opt-in SGX
before locking the feature control MSR [2].
[1] Intel SDM: 36.7.2 Intel® SGX Resource Enumeration Leaves
[2] Intel SDM: 36.7.1 Intel® SGX Opt-In Configuration
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 5 +++--
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 7 ++++++-
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++++
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 7 ++++++-
7 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
index 59bf91c57aa8..efbdba5170a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafs
CPUID_7_ECX,
CPUID_8000_0007_EBX,
CPUID_7_EDX,
+ CPUID_12_EAX,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \
REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \
- BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19))
+ BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))
#define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \
( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \
@@ -112,7 +113,7 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \
DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \
- BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19))
+ BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))
#define cpu_has(c, bit) \
(__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 02dabc9e77b0..545ac3e0e269 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
/*
* Defines x86 CPU feature bits
*/
-#define NCAPINTS 19 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
+#define NCAPINTS 20 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
#define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */
/*
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */
#define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE ( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/
#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST ( 9*32+ 1) /* TSC adjustment MSR 0x3B */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX ( 9*32+ 2) /* Software Guard Extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_BMI1 ( 9*32+ 3) /* 1st group bit manipulation extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_HLE ( 9*32+ 4) /* Hardware Lock Elision */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX2 ( 9*32+ 5) /* AVX2 instructions */
@@ -373,6 +374,10 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES (18*32+30) /* "" IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES MSR */
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+/* Intel-defined SGX features, CPUID level 0x00000012:0 (EAX), word 19 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (19*32+ 0) /* SGX1 leaf functions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (19*32+ 1) /* SGX2 leaf functions */
+
/*
* BUG word(s)
*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 4ea8584682f9..dbe534d5153f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -28,13 +28,18 @@
# define DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR (1<<(X86_FEATURE_CYRIX_ARR & 31))
# define DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR (1<<(X86_FEATURE_CENTAUR_MCR & 31))
# define DISABLE_PCID 0
+# define DISABLE_SGX1 0
+# define DISABLE_SGX2 0
#else
# define DISABLE_VME 0
# define DISABLE_K6_MTRR 0
# define DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR 0
# define DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR 0
# define DISABLE_PCID (1<<(X86_FEATURE_PCID & 31))
-#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+# define DISABLE_SGX1 (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SGX1 & 31))
+# define DISABLE_SGX2 (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SGX2 & 31))
+ #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
# define DISABLE_PKU 0
@@ -56,6 +61,12 @@
# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX
+# define DISABLE_SGX 0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_SGX (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SGX & 31))
+#endif
+
/*
* Make sure to add features to the correct mask
*/
@@ -68,7 +79,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK6 0
#define DISABLED_MASK7 (DISABLE_PTI)
#define DISABLED_MASK8 0
-#define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SMAP)
+#define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SMAP|DISABLE_SGX)
#define DISABLED_MASK10 0
#define DISABLED_MASK11 0
#define DISABLED_MASK12 0
@@ -78,6 +89,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)
#define DISABLED_MASK17 0
#define DISABLED_MASK18 0
-#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
+#define DISABLED_MASK19 (DISABLE_SGX1|DISABLE_SGX2)
+#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
#endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index e8370e64a155..18e08da19f16 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -582,6 +582,7 @@
#define FEAT_CTL_LOCKED BIT(0)
#define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX BIT(1)
#define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX BIT(2)
+#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED BIT(18)
#define FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED BIT(20)
#define MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST 0x0000003b
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h
index 6847d85400a8..039e58be2fe6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h
@@ -101,6 +101,6 @@
#define REQUIRED_MASK16 0
#define REQUIRED_MASK17 0
#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0
-#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
+#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
#endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 043d93cdcaad..93105b14effd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -914,6 +914,10 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
c->x86_capability[CPUID_D_1_EAX] = eax;
}
+ /* Additional Intel-defined SGX flags: level 0x00000012 */
+ if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000012)
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_12_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x00000012);
+
/* AMD-defined flags: level 0x80000001 */
eax = cpuid_eax(0x80000000);
c->extended_cpuid_level = eax;
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index db189945e9b0..fc4422f747d5 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
/*
* Defines x86 CPU feature bits
*/
-#define NCAPINTS 19 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
+#define NCAPINTS 20 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
#define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */
/*
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */
#define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE ( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/
#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST ( 9*32+ 1) /* TSC adjustment MSR 0x3B */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX ( 9*32+ 2) /* Software Guard Extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_BMI1 ( 9*32+ 3) /* 1st group bit manipulation extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_HLE ( 9*32+ 4) /* Hardware Lock Elision */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX2 ( 9*32+ 5) /* AVX2 instructions */
@@ -372,6 +373,10 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES (18*32+30) /* "" IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES MSR */
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+/* Intel-defined SGX features, CPUID level 0x00000012:0 (EAX), word 19 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (19*32+ 0) /* SGX1 leaf functions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (19*32+ 1) /* SGX2 leaf functions */
+
/*
* BUG word(s)
*/
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 01/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 01/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-22 17:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-25 1:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-22 17:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson,
Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:23AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
>
> Add X86_FEATURE_SGX from CPUID.(EAX=7, ECX=1), which informs whether the
> CPU has SGX.
>
> Add X86_FEATURE_SGX1 and X86_FEATURE_SGX2 from CPUID.(EAX=12H, ECX=0),
> which describe the level of SGX support available [1].
>
> Add IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_ENABLE. BIOS can use this bit to opt-in SGX
I'm guessing that wants to be
IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL.SGX_ENABLE
judging by the diff and the SDM chapter.
> before locking the feature control MSR [2].
>
> [1] Intel SDM: 36.7.2 Intel® SGX Resource Enumeration Leaves
> [2] Intel SDM: 36.7.1 Intel® SGX Opt-In Configuration
>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 5 +++--
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 7 ++++++-
> arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++++
> tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 7 ++++++-
Also, please drop this change to tools/, see
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622141737.GA30611@kernel.org
from today.
With those addressed:
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 01/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits
2020-06-22 17:37 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-25 1:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-25 1:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson,
Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Mon, Jun 22, 2020 at 07:37:11PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:23AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> >
> > Add X86_FEATURE_SGX from CPUID.(EAX=7, ECX=1), which informs whether the
> > CPU has SGX.
> >
> > Add X86_FEATURE_SGX1 and X86_FEATURE_SGX2 from CPUID.(EAX=12H, ECX=0),
> > which describe the level of SGX support available [1].
> >
> > Add IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_ENABLE. BIOS can use this bit to opt-in SGX
>
> I'm guessing that wants to be
>
> IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL.SGX_ENABLE
>
> judging by the diff and the SDM chapter.
Underscore must be just a typo.
>
> > before locking the feature control MSR [2].
> >
> > [1] Intel SDM: 36.7.2 Intel® SGX Resource Enumeration Leaves
> > [2] Intel SDM: 36.7.1 Intel® SGX Opt-In Configuration
> >
> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> > Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> > Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 5 +++--
> > arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 7 ++++++-
> > arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
> > arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 2 +-
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++++
> > tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 7 ++++++-
>
> Also, please drop this change to tools/, see
>
> https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622141737.GA30611@kernel.org
>
> from today.
OK I reverted it [*].
> With those addressed:
>
> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Thank you, I'll update this to the commit.
>
> Thx.
>
> --
> Regards/Gruss,
> Boris.
>
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
[*] By "git diff -R HEAD~1 -- tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | patch -p1".
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 01/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-24 13:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
` (18 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, Jethro Beekman,
Jarkko Sakkinen, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Add X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, which informs whether or not the CPU supports SGX
Launch Control.
Add MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}, which when combined contain a
SHA256 hash of a 3072-bit RSA public key. SGX backed software packages, so
called enclaves, are always signed. All enclaves signed with the public key
are unconditionally allowed to initialize. [1]
Add FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_LE_WR bit of the feature control MSR, which informs
whether the aformentioned MSRs are writable or not. If the bit is off, the
public key MSRs are read-only for the OS.
If the MSRs are read-only, the platform must provide a launch enclave (LE).
LE can create cryptographic tokens for other enclaves that they can pass
together with their signature to the ENCLS(EINIT) opcode, which is used
to initialize enclaves.
Linux is unlikely to support the locked configuration because it takes away
the control of the launch decisions from the kernel.
[1] Intel SDM: 38.1.4 Intel SGX Launch Control Configuration
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 545ac3e0e269..0a4541e4f076 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -352,6 +352,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_CLDEMOTE (16*32+25) /* CLDEMOTE instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIRI (16*32+27) /* MOVDIRI instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B (16*32+28) /* MOVDIR64B instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC (16*32+30) /* Software Guard Extensions Launch Control */
/* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000007 (EBX), word 17 */
#define X86_FEATURE_OVERFLOW_RECOV (17*32+ 0) /* MCA overflow recovery support */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 18e08da19f16..3d7c89a8533f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -582,6 +582,7 @@
#define FEAT_CTL_LOCKED BIT(0)
#define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX BIT(1)
#define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX BIT(2)
+#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED BIT(17)
#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED BIT(18)
#define FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED BIT(20)
@@ -602,6 +603,12 @@
#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079
#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV 0x0000008b
+/* Intel SGX Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs */
+#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 0x0000008C
+#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH1 0x0000008D
+#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH2 0x0000008E
+#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3 0x0000008F
+
#define MSR_IA32_SMM_MONITOR_CTL 0x0000009b
#define MSR_IA32_SMBASE 0x0000009e
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control " Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-24 13:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-24 14:34 ` Sean Christopherson
0 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-24 13:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson,
Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:24AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
>
> Add X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, which informs whether or not the CPU supports SGX
> Launch Control.
>
> Add MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}, which when combined contain a
> SHA256 hash of a 3072-bit RSA public key. SGX backed software packages, so
> called enclaves, are always signed. All enclaves signed with the public key
> are unconditionally allowed to initialize. [1]
>
> Add FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_LE_WR bit of the feature control MSR, which informs
LE_WR or LC_ENABLED?
With that addressed:
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits
2020-06-24 13:04 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-24 14:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-25 1:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2020-06-24 14:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Jethro Beekman,
akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Wed, Jun 24, 2020 at 03:04:34PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:24AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> >
> > Add X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, which informs whether or not the CPU supports SGX
> > Launch Control.
> >
> > Add MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}, which when combined contain a
> > SHA256 hash of a 3072-bit RSA public key. SGX backed software packages, so
> > called enclaves, are always signed. All enclaves signed with the public key
> > are unconditionally allowed to initialize. [1]
> >
> > Add FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_LE_WR bit of the feature control MSR, which informs
>
> LE_WR or LC_ENABLED?
It should be FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED, i.e. the actual code is correct. We
updated the #define to use the SDM name to be consistent with the other bits
and neglected to update the changelog.
Thanks!
> With that addressed:
>
> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
>
> --
> Regards/Gruss,
> Boris.
>
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits
2020-06-24 14:34 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-06-25 1:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-25 1:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Borislav Petkov, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Jethro Beekman,
akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Wed, Jun 24, 2020 at 07:34:40AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 24, 2020 at 03:04:34PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:24AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> > >
> > > Add X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, which informs whether or not the CPU supports SGX
> > > Launch Control.
> > >
> > > Add MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}, which when combined contain a
> > > SHA256 hash of a 3072-bit RSA public key. SGX backed software packages, so
> > > called enclaves, are always signed. All enclaves signed with the public key
> > > are unconditionally allowed to initialize. [1]
> > >
> > > Add FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_LE_WR bit of the feature control MSR, which informs
> >
> > LE_WR or LC_ENABLED?
>
> It should be FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED, i.e. the actual code is correct. We
> updated the #define to use the SDM name to be consistent with the other bits
> and neglected to update the changelog.
>
> Thanks!
>
> > With that addressed:
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
I'll update the commit according to this information.
> >
> > --
> > Regards/Gruss,
> > Boris.
> >
> > https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
Thank you.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 01/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control " Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-25 8:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 04/21] x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
` (17 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, Jethro Beekman,
Jarkko Sakkinen, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Include SGX bit to the PF error codes and throw SIGSEGV with PF_SGX when
a #PF with SGX set happens.
CPU throws a #PF with the SGX bit in the event of Enclave Page Cache Map
(EPCM) conflict. The EPCM is a CPU-internal table, which describes the
properties for a enclave page. Enclaves are measured and signed software
entities, which SGX hosts. [1]
Although the primary purpose of the EPCM conflict checks is to prevent
malicious accesses to an enclave, an illegit access can happen also for
legit reasons.
All SGX reserved memory, including EPCM is encrypted with a transient
key that does not survive from the power transition. Throwing a SIGSEGV
allows user space software react when this happens (e.g. rec-create the
enclave, which was invalidated).
[1] Intel SDM: 36.5.1 Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 1 +
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 13 +++++++++++++
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index 714b1a30e7b0..ee3617b67bf4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -58,5 +58,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {
X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3,
X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4,
X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5,
+ X86_PF_SGX = 1 << 15,
};
#endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 66be9bd60307..25d48aae36c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1055,6 +1055,19 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
if (error_code & X86_PF_PK)
return 1;
+ /*
+ * Access is blocked by the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), i.e. the
+ * access is allowed by the PTE but not the EPCM. This usually happens
+ * when the EPCM is yanked out from under us, e.g. by hardware after a
+ * suspend/resume cycle. In any case, software, i.e. the kernel, can't
+ * fix the source of the fault as the EPCM can't be directly modified by
+ * software. Handle the fault as an access error in order to signal
+ * userspace so that userspace can rebuild their enclave(s), even though
+ * userspace may not have actually violated access permissions.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(error_code & X86_PF_SGX))
+ return 1;
+
/*
* Make sure to check the VMA so that we do not perform
* faults just to hit a X86_PF_PK as soon as we fill in a
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-25 8:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-25 15:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-25 20:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 2 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-25 8:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson,
Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:25AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
>
> Include SGX bit to the PF error codes and throw SIGSEGV with PF_SGX when
> a #PF with SGX set happens.
>
> CPU throws a #PF with the SGX bit in the event of Enclave Page Cache Map
^
set
> (EPCM) conflict. The EPCM is a CPU-internal table, which describes the
> properties for a enclave page. Enclaves are measured and signed software
> entities, which SGX hosts. [1]
>
> Although the primary purpose of the EPCM conflict checks is to prevent
> malicious accesses to an enclave, an illegit access can happen also for
> legit reasons.
>
> All SGX reserved memory, including EPCM is encrypted with a transient
> key that does not survive from the power transition. Throwing a SIGSEGV
> allows user space software react when this happens (e.g. rec-create the
^
to recreate
> enclave, which was invalidated).
>
> [1] Intel SDM: 36.5.1 Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)
>
> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> index 714b1a30e7b0..ee3617b67bf4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> @@ -58,5 +58,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {
> X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3,
> X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4,
> X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5,
> + X86_PF_SGX = 1 << 15,
Needs to be added to the doc above it.
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> index 66be9bd60307..25d48aae36c1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> @@ -1055,6 +1055,19 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> if (error_code & X86_PF_PK)
> return 1;
>
> + /*
> + * Access is blocked by the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), i.e. the
> + * access is allowed by the PTE but not the EPCM. This usually happens
> + * when the EPCM is yanked out from under us, e.g. by hardware after a
> + * suspend/resume cycle. In any case, software, i.e. the kernel, can't
> + * fix the source of the fault as the EPCM can't be directly modified by
> + * software. Handle the fault as an access error in order to signal
> + * userspace so that userspace can rebuild their enclave(s), even though
> + * userspace may not have actually violated access permissions.
> + */
Lemme check whether I understand this correctly: userspace must check
whether the SIGSEGV is generated on an access to an enclave page?
Also, do I see it correctly that when this happens, dmesg will have
printk("%s%s[%d]: segfault at %lx ip %px sp %px error %lx",
due to:
if (likely(show_unhandled_signals))
show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk);
which does:
if (!unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV))
return;
or is the task expected to register a SIGSEGV handler so that the
segfault doesn't land in dmesg?
If so, are we documenting this?
If not, then we should not issue any "segfault" messages to dmesg
because that would be wrong.
Or maybe I'm not seeing it right but I don't have the hardware to test
this out...
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX
2020-06-25 8:59 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-25 15:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-25 16:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-25 20:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2020-06-25 15:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Jethro Beekman,
akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 10:59:31AM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:25AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> > index 66be9bd60307..25d48aae36c1 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> > @@ -1055,6 +1055,19 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> > if (error_code & X86_PF_PK)
> > return 1;
> >
> > + /*
> > + * Access is blocked by the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), i.e. the
> > + * access is allowed by the PTE but not the EPCM. This usually happens
> > + * when the EPCM is yanked out from under us, e.g. by hardware after a
> > + * suspend/resume cycle. In any case, software, i.e. the kernel, can't
> > + * fix the source of the fault as the EPCM can't be directly modified by
> > + * software. Handle the fault as an access error in order to signal
> > + * userspace so that userspace can rebuild their enclave(s), even though
> > + * userspace may not have actually violated access permissions.
> > + */
>
> Lemme check whether I understand this correctly: userspace must check
> whether the SIGSEGV is generated on an access to an enclave page?
Sort of. Technically it's that's an accurate statement, but practically
speaking userspace can only access enclave pages when it is executing in
the enclave, and exceptions in enclaves have unique behavior. Exceptions
in enclaves essentially bounce through a userspace-software-defined
location prior to being delivered to the kernel. The trampoline is done
by the CPU so that the CPU can scrub the GPRs, XSAVE state, etc... and
hide the true RIP of the exception. The pre-exception enclave state is
saved into protected memory and restored when userspace resumes the enclave.
Enterring or resuming an enclave can only be done through dedicted ENCLU
instructions, so really it ends up being that the SIGSEGV handler needs to
check the IP that "caused" the fault, which is actually the IP of the
trampoline.
But, that's only the first half of the story...
> Also, do I see it correctly that when this happens, dmesg will have
>
> printk("%s%s[%d]: segfault at %lx ip %px sp %px error %lx",
>
> due to:
>
> if (likely(show_unhandled_signals))
> show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk);
>
> which does:
>
> if (!unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV))
> return;
>
> or is the task expected to register a SIGSEGV handler so that the
> segfault doesn't land in dmesg?
Yes, without extra help, any task running an enclave is expected to register
a SIGSEGV handler so that the task can restart the enclave if the EPC is
"lost".
However, building and running enclaves is complex, and the vast majority of
SGX enabled applications are expected to leverage a library of one kind or
another to hand the bulk of the gory details. But, signal handling in
libraries is a mess, e.g. requires filtering/forwarding, resignaling, etc...
To that end, in v14 of this patch[1], Andy Lutomirski came up with the idea
of adding a vDSO function to provide the low level enclave EENTER/ERESUME and
trampoline, and then teaching the kernel to do exception fixup on the
relevant instructions in the vDSO. The vDSO's exception fixup then returns
to normal userspace, with a (technically optional) struct holding the details
of the exception. That allows for synchronous delivery of exceptions in
enclaves, obviates the need for userspace to regsiter a SIGSEGV handler, and
also means the SIGSEGV will never show up in dmesg so long as userspace is
using the vDSO. The kernel still supports direct EENTER/ERESUME, but AFAIK
everyone is moving (or has moved) to the vDSO interface.
The vDSO stuff is in patches 15-18 of this series.
There's a gigantic thread on all the alternatives that were considered[2].
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrXByb2UVuZ6AXUeOd8y90NAikbZuvdN3wf_TjHZ+CxNhA@mail.gmail.com
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrWdpoDkbZjkucKL91GWpDPG9p=VqYrULade2pFDR7S=GQ@mail.gmail.com
>
> If so, are we documenting this?
>
> If not, then we should not issue any "segfault" messages to dmesg
> because that would be wrong.
>
> Or maybe I'm not seeing it right but I don't have the hardware to test
> this out...
>
> Thx.
>
> --
> Regards/Gruss,
> Boris.
>
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX
2020-06-25 15:34 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-06-25 16:49 ` Borislav Petkov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-25 16:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Jethro Beekman,
akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 08:34:31AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> However, building and running enclaves is complex, and the vast majority of
> SGX enabled applications are expected to leverage a library of one kind or
> another to hand the bulk of the gory details.
I gotta say this rings a bell: dhansen alluded on IRC to the jumping
through hoops one needs to do in order to run SGX enclaves.
...
> The vDSO stuff is in patches 15-18 of this series.
>
> There's a gigantic thread on all the alternatives that were considered[2].
>
> [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrXByb2UVuZ6AXUeOd8y90NAikbZuvdN3wf_TjHZ+CxNhA@mail.gmail.com
> [2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrWdpoDkbZjkucKL91GWpDPG9p=VqYrULade2pFDR7S=GQ@mail.gmail.com
Yeah, that makes it very clear. Thanks a lot for taking the time and
writing it down. I've snipped it for brevity but it is very useful!
Thx!
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX
2020-06-25 8:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-25 15:34 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-06-25 20:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-25 21:11 ` Borislav Petkov
1 sibling, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-25 20:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson,
Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 10:59:31AM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:25AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> >
> > Include SGX bit to the PF error codes and throw SIGSEGV with PF_SGX when
> > a #PF with SGX set happens.
> >
> > CPU throws a #PF with the SGX bit in the event of Enclave Page Cache Map
> ^
> set
>
> > (EPCM) conflict. The EPCM is a CPU-internal table, which describes the
> > properties for a enclave page. Enclaves are measured and signed software
> > entities, which SGX hosts. [1]
> >
> > Although the primary purpose of the EPCM conflict checks is to prevent
> > malicious accesses to an enclave, an illegit access can happen also for
> > legit reasons.
> >
> > All SGX reserved memory, including EPCM is encrypted with a transient
> > key that does not survive from the power transition. Throwing a SIGSEGV
> > allows user space software react when this happens (e.g. rec-create the
> ^
> to recreate
>
> > enclave, which was invalidated).
> >
> > [1] Intel SDM: 36.5.1 Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)
> >
> > Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 1 +
> > arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> > 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> > index 714b1a30e7b0..ee3617b67bf4 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> > @@ -58,5 +58,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {
> > X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3,
> > X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4,
> > X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5,
> > + X86_PF_SGX = 1 << 15,
>
> Needs to be added to the doc above it.
I ended up with:
* bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access
* bit 6 == 1: inside SGX enclave
*/
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX
2020-06-25 20:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-25 21:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-26 13:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-25 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson,
Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 11:52:11PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> I ended up with:
>
> * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access
> * bit 6 == 1: inside SGX enclave
You mean bit 15.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX
2020-06-25 21:11 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-26 13:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-26 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson,
Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 11:11:03PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 11:52:11PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > I ended up with:
> >
> > * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access
> > * bit 6 == 1: inside SGX enclave
>
> You mean bit 15.
Duh, did this last thing before falling into sleep last night :-/
Yes, it should be 15.
I'll also rephrase the text to "inside an SGX enclave".
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 04/21] x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 05/21] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions Jarkko Sakkinen
` (16 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Jarkko Sakkinen, Jethro Beekman, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, sean.j.christopherson, tglx, yaozhangx
Define the SGX microarchitectural data structures used by various SGX
opcodes. This is not an exhaustive representation of all SGX data
structures but only those needed by the kernel.
The data structures are described in:
Intel SDM: 37.6 INTEL® SGX DATA STRUCTURES OVERVIEW
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h | 343 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 343 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ddae55e9d4d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */
+/**
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Contains data structures defined by the SGX architecture. Data structures
+ * defined by the Linux software stack should not be placed here.
+ */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H
+#define _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H
+
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define SGX_CPUID 0x12
+#define SGX_CPUID_FIRST_VARIABLE_SUB_LEAF 2
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_return_code - The return code type for ENCLS, ENCLU and ENCLV
+ * %SGX_NOT_TRACKED: Previous ETRACK's shootdown sequence has not
+ * been completed yet.
+ * %SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN: EINITTOKEN is invalid and enclave signer's
+ * public key does not match IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH.
+ * %SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT: An unmasked event, e.g. INTR, was received
+ */
+enum sgx_return_code {
+ SGX_NOT_TRACKED = 11,
+ SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN = 16,
+ SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT = 128,
+};
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_sub_leaf_types - SGX CPUID variable sub-leaf types
+ * %SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_INVALID: Indicates this sub-leaf is invalid.
+ * %SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_EPC_SECTION: Sub-leaf enumerates an EPC section.
+ */
+enum sgx_sub_leaf_types {
+ SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_INVALID = 0x0,
+ SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_EPC_SECTION = 0x1,
+};
+
+#define SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_TYPE_MASK GENMASK(3, 0)
+
+#define SGX_MODULUS_SIZE 384
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_miscselect - additional information to an SSA frame
+ * %SGX_MISC_EXINFO: Report #PF or #GP to the SSA frame.
+ *
+ * Save State Area (SSA) is a stack inside the enclave used to store processor
+ * state when an exception or interrupt occurs. This enum defines additional
+ * information stored to an SSA frame.
+ */
+enum sgx_miscselect {
+ SGX_MISC_EXINFO = BIT(0),
+};
+
+#define SGX_MISC_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 1)
+
+#define SGX_SSA_GPRS_SIZE 184
+#define SGX_SSA_MISC_EXINFO_SIZE 16
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_attributes - the attributes field in &struct sgx_secs
+ * %SGX_ATTR_INIT: Enclave can be entered (is initialized).
+ * %SGX_ATTR_DEBUG: Allow ENCLS(EDBGRD) and ENCLS(EDBGWR).
+ * %SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT: Tell that this a 64-bit enclave.
+ * %SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY: Allow to use provisioning keys for remote
+ * attestation.
+ * %SGX_ATTR_KSS: Allow to use key separation and sharing (KSS).
+ * %SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY: Allow to use token signing key that is used to
+ * sign cryptographic tokens that can be passed to
+ * EINIT as an authorization to run an enclave.
+ */
+enum sgx_attribute {
+ SGX_ATTR_INIT = BIT(0),
+ SGX_ATTR_DEBUG = BIT(1),
+ SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT = BIT(2),
+ SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY = BIT(4),
+ SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY = BIT(5),
+ SGX_ATTR_KSS = BIT(7),
+};
+
+#define SGX_ATTR_RESERVED_MASK (BIT_ULL(3) | BIT_ULL(6) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 8))
+#define SGX_ATTR_ALLOWED_MASK (SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT | \
+ SGX_ATTR_KSS)
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_secs - SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS)
+ * @size: size of the address space
+ * @base: base address of the address space
+ * @ssa_frame_size: size of an SSA frame
+ * @miscselect: additional information stored to an SSA frame
+ * @attributes: attributes for enclave
+ * @xfrm: XSave-Feature Request Mask (subset of XCR0)
+ * @mrenclave: SHA256-hash of the enclave contents
+ * @mrsigner: SHA256-hash of the public key used to sign the SIGSTRUCT
+ * @config_id: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation
+ * @isv_prod_id: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation
+ * @isv_svn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation
+ * @config_svn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation
+ *
+ * SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) is a special enclave page that is not
+ * visible in the address space. In fact, this structure defines the address
+ * range and other global attributes for the enclave and it is the first EPC
+ * page created for any enclave. It is moved from a temporary buffer to an EPC
+ * by the means of ENCLS(ECREATE) leaf.
+ */
+struct sgx_secs {
+ u64 size;
+ u64 base;
+ u32 ssa_frame_size;
+ u32 miscselect;
+ u8 reserved1[24];
+ u64 attributes;
+ u64 xfrm;
+ u32 mrenclave[8];
+ u8 reserved2[32];
+ u32 mrsigner[8];
+ u8 reserved3[32];
+ u32 config_id[16];
+ u16 isv_prod_id;
+ u16 isv_svn;
+ u16 config_svn;
+ u8 reserved4[3834];
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_tcs_flags - execution flags for TCS
+ * %SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN: If enabled allows single-stepping and breakpoints
+ * inside an enclave. It is cleared by EADD but can
+ * be set later with EDBGWR.
+ */
+enum sgx_tcs_flags {
+ SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN = 0x01,
+};
+
+#define SGX_TCS_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 1)
+#define SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE 4024
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_tcs - Thread Control Structure (TCS)
+ * @state: used to mark an entered TCS
+ * @flags: execution flags (cleared by EADD)
+ * @ssa_offset: SSA stack offset relative to the enclave base
+ * @ssa_index: the current SSA frame index (cleard by EADD)
+ * @nr_ssa_frames: the number of frame in the SSA stack
+ * @entry_offset: entry point offset relative to the enclave base
+ * @exit_addr: address outside the enclave to exit on an exception or
+ * interrupt
+ * @fs_offset: offset relative to the enclave base to become FS
+ * segment inside the enclave
+ * @gs_offset: offset relative to the enclave base to become GS
+ * segment inside the enclave
+ * @fs_limit: size to become a new FS-limit (only 32-bit enclaves)
+ * @gs_limit: size to become a new GS-limit (only 32-bit enclaves)
+ *
+ * Thread Control Structure (TCS) is an enclave page visible in its address
+ * space that defines an entry point inside the enclave. A thread enters inside
+ * an enclave by supplying address of TCS to ENCLU(EENTER). A TCS can be entered
+ * by only one thread at a time.
+ */
+struct sgx_tcs {
+ u64 state;
+ u64 flags;
+ u64 ssa_offset;
+ u32 ssa_index;
+ u32 nr_ssa_frames;
+ u64 entry_offset;
+ u64 exit_addr;
+ u64 fs_offset;
+ u64 gs_offset;
+ u32 fs_limit;
+ u32 gs_limit;
+ u8 reserved[SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE];
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_pageinfo - an enclave page descriptor
+ * @addr: address of the enclave page
+ * @contents: pointer to the page contents
+ * @metadata: pointer either to a SECINFO or PCMD instance
+ * @secs: address of the SECS page
+ */
+struct sgx_pageinfo {
+ u64 addr;
+ u64 contents;
+ u64 metadata;
+ u64 secs;
+} __packed __aligned(32);
+
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_page_type - bits in the SECINFO flags defining the page type
+ * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS: a SECS page
+ * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS: a TCS page
+ * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG: a regular page
+ * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA: a VA page
+ * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM: a page in trimmed state
+ */
+enum sgx_page_type {
+ SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS,
+ SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS,
+ SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG,
+ SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA,
+ SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM,
+};
+
+#define SGX_NR_PAGE_TYPES 5
+#define SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK GENMASK(7, 0)
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_secinfo_flags - the flags field in &struct sgx_secinfo
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_R: allow read
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_W: allow write
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_X: allow execution
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_SECS: a SECS page
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_TCS: a TCS page
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_REG: a regular page
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_VA: a VA page
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_TRIM: a page in trimmed state
+ */
+enum sgx_secinfo_flags {
+ SGX_SECINFO_R = BIT(0),
+ SGX_SECINFO_W = BIT(1),
+ SGX_SECINFO_X = BIT(2),
+ SGX_SECINFO_SECS = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS << 8),
+ SGX_SECINFO_TCS = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS << 8),
+ SGX_SECINFO_REG = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG << 8),
+ SGX_SECINFO_VA = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA << 8),
+ SGX_SECINFO_TRIM = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM << 8),
+};
+
+#define SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK GENMASK_ULL(2, 0)
+#define SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK << 8)
+#define SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK ~(SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK | \
+ SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK)
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_secinfo - describes attributes of an EPC page
+ * @flags: permissions and type
+ *
+ * Used together with ENCLS leaves that add or modify an EPC page to an
+ * enclave to define page permissions and type.
+ */
+struct sgx_secinfo {
+ u64 flags;
+ u8 reserved[56];
+} __packed __aligned(64);
+
+#define SGX_PCMD_RESERVED_SIZE 40
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_pcmd - Paging Crypto Metadata (PCMD)
+ * @enclave_id: enclave identifier
+ * @mac: MAC over PCMD, page contents and isvsvn
+ *
+ * PCMD is stored for every swapped page to the regular memory. When ELDU loads
+ * the page back it recalculates the MAC by using a isvsvn number stored in a
+ * VA page. Together these two structures bring integrity and rollback
+ * protection.
+ */
+struct sgx_pcmd {
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ u64 enclave_id;
+ u8 reserved[SGX_PCMD_RESERVED_SIZE];
+ u8 mac[16];
+} __packed __aligned(128);
+
+#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED1_SIZE 84
+#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED2_SIZE 20
+#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED3_SIZE 32
+#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED4_SIZE 12
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_sigstruct_header - defines author of the enclave
+ * @header1: constant byte string
+ * @vendor: must be either 0x0000 or 0x8086
+ * @date: YYYYMMDD in BCD
+ * @header2: costant byte string
+ * @swdefined: software defined value
+ */
+struct sgx_sigstruct_header {
+ u64 header1[2];
+ u32 vendor;
+ u32 date;
+ u64 header2[2];
+ u32 swdefined;
+ u8 reserved1[84];
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_sigstruct_body - defines contents of the enclave
+ * @miscselect: additional information stored to an SSA frame
+ * @misc_mask: required miscselect in SECS
+ * @attributes: attributes for enclave
+ * @xfrm: XSave-Feature Request Mask (subset of XCR0)
+ * @attributes_mask: required attributes in SECS
+ * @xfrm_mask: required XFRM in SECS
+ * @mrenclave: SHA256-hash of the enclave contents
+ * @isvprodid: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation
+ * @isvsvn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation
+ */
+struct sgx_sigstruct_body {
+ u32 miscselect;
+ u32 misc_mask;
+ u8 reserved2[20];
+ u64 attributes;
+ u64 xfrm;
+ u64 attributes_mask;
+ u64 xfrm_mask;
+ u8 mrenclave[32];
+ u8 reserved3[32];
+ u16 isvprodid;
+ u16 isvsvn;
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_sigstruct - an enclave signature
+ * @header: defines author of the enclave
+ * @modulus: the modulus of the public key
+ * @exponent: the exponent of the public key
+ * @signature: the signature calculated over the fields except modulus,
+ * @body: defines contents of the enclave
+ * @q1: a value used in RSA signature verification
+ * @q2: a value used in RSA signature verification
+ *
+ * Header and body are the parts that are actual signed. The remaining fields
+ * define the signature of the enclave.
+ */
+struct sgx_sigstruct {
+ struct sgx_sigstruct_header header;
+ u8 modulus[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE];
+ u32 exponent;
+ u8 signature[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE];
+ struct sgx_sigstruct_body body;
+ u8 reserved4[12];
+ u8 q1[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE];
+ u8 q2[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE];
+} __packed;
+
+#define SGX_LAUNCH_TOKEN_SIZE 304
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H */
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 05/21] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 04/21] x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 06/21] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support Jarkko Sakkinen
` (15 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Jarkko Sakkinen, Jethro Beekman,
Sean Christopherson, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
ENCLS is a ring 0 instruction, which contains a set of leaf functions for
managing an enclave. Enclaves are measured and signed software entities,
which are protected by asserting the outside memory accesses and memory
encryption.
Add a two-layer macro system along with an encoding scheme to allow
wrappers to return trap numbers along ENCLS-specific error codes. The
bottom layer of the macro system splits between the leafs that return an
error code and those that do not. The second layer generates the correct
input/output annotations based on the number of operands for each leaf
function.
ENCLS leaf functions are documented in
Intel SDM: 36.6 ENCLAVE INSTRUCTIONS AND INTEL®
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 238 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 238 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f716b4328614
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */
+#ifndef _X86_ENCLS_H
+#define _X86_ENCLS_H
+
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+enum sgx_encls_leaf {
+ ECREATE = 0x00,
+ EADD = 0x01,
+ EINIT = 0x02,
+ EREMOVE = 0x03,
+ EDGBRD = 0x04,
+ EDGBWR = 0x05,
+ EEXTEND = 0x06,
+ ELDU = 0x08,
+ EBLOCK = 0x09,
+ EPA = 0x0A,
+ EWB = 0x0B,
+ ETRACK = 0x0C,
+};
+
+/**
+ * ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG - flag signifying an ENCLS return code is a trapnr
+ *
+ * ENCLS has its own (positive value) error codes and also generates
+ * ENCLS specific #GP and #PF faults. And the ENCLS values get munged
+ * with system error codes as everything percolates back up the stack.
+ * Unfortunately (for us), we need to precisely identify each unique
+ * error code, e.g. the action taken if EWB fails varies based on the
+ * type of fault and on the exact SGX error code, i.e. we can't simply
+ * convert all faults to -EFAULT.
+ *
+ * To make all three error types coexist, we set bit 30 to identify an
+ * ENCLS fault. Bit 31 (technically bits N:31) is used to differentiate
+ * between positive (faults and SGX error codes) and negative (system
+ * error codes) values.
+ */
+#define ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG 0x40000000
+
+/* Retrieve the encoded trapnr from the specified return code. */
+#define ENCLS_TRAPNR(r) ((r) & ~ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)
+
+/* Issue a WARN() about an ENCLS leaf. */
+#define ENCLS_WARN(r, name) { \
+ do { \
+ int _r = (r); \
+ WARN_ONCE(_r, "%s returned %d (0x%x)\n", (name), _r, _r); \
+ } while (0); \
+}
+
+/**
+ * encls_failed() - Check if an ENCLS leaf function failed
+ * @ret: the return value of an ENCLS leaf function call
+ *
+ * Check if an ENCLS leaf function failed. This happens when the leaf function
+ * causes a fault that is not caused by an EPCM conflict or when the leaf
+ * function returns a non-zero value.
+ */
+static inline bool encls_failed(int ret)
+{
+ int epcm_trapnr;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX2))
+ epcm_trapnr = X86_TRAP_PF;
+ else
+ epcm_trapnr = X86_TRAP_GP;
+
+ if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)
+ return ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret) != epcm_trapnr;
+
+ return !!ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __encls_ret_N - encode an ENCLS leaf that returns an error code in EAX
+ * @rax: leaf number
+ * @inputs: asm inputs for the leaf
+ *
+ * Emit assembly for an ENCLS leaf that returns an error code, e.g. EREMOVE.
+ * And because SGX isn't complex enough as it is, leafs that return an error
+ * code also modify flags.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * SGX error code on failure
+ */
+#define __encls_ret_N(rax, inputs...) \
+ ({ \
+ int ret; \
+ asm volatile( \
+ "1: .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xcf;\n\t" \
+ "2:\n" \
+ ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \
+ "3: orl $"__stringify(ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)",%%eax\n" \
+ " jmp 2b\n" \
+ ".previous\n" \
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(1b, 3b) \
+ : "=a"(ret) \
+ : "a"(rax), inputs \
+ : "memory", "cc"); \
+ ret; \
+ })
+
+#define __encls_ret_1(rax, rcx) \
+ ({ \
+ __encls_ret_N(rax, "c"(rcx)); \
+ })
+
+#define __encls_ret_2(rax, rbx, rcx) \
+ ({ \
+ __encls_ret_N(rax, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx)); \
+ })
+
+#define __encls_ret_3(rax, rbx, rcx, rdx) \
+ ({ \
+ __encls_ret_N(rax, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx), "d"(rdx)); \
+ })
+
+/**
+ * __encls_N - encode an ENCLS leaf that doesn't return an error code
+ * @rax: leaf number
+ * @rbx_out: optional output variable
+ * @inputs: asm inputs for the leaf
+ *
+ * Emit assembly for an ENCLS leaf that does not return an error code,
+ * e.g. ECREATE. Leaves without error codes either succeed or fault.
+ * @rbx_out is an optional parameter for use by EDGBRD, which returns
+ * the the requested value in RBX.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * trapnr with ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG set on fault
+ */
+#define __encls_N(rax, rbx_out, inputs...) \
+ ({ \
+ int ret; \
+ asm volatile( \
+ "1: .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xcf;\n\t" \
+ " xor %%eax,%%eax;\n" \
+ "2:\n" \
+ ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \
+ "3: orl $"__stringify(ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)",%%eax\n" \
+ " jmp 2b\n" \
+ ".previous\n" \
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(1b, 3b) \
+ : "=a"(ret), "=b"(rbx_out) \
+ : "a"(rax), inputs \
+ : "memory"); \
+ ret; \
+ })
+
+#define __encls_2(rax, rbx, rcx) \
+ ({ \
+ unsigned long ign_rbx_out; \
+ __encls_N(rax, ign_rbx_out, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx)); \
+ })
+
+#define __encls_1_1(rax, data, rcx) \
+ ({ \
+ unsigned long rbx_out; \
+ int ret = __encls_N(rax, rbx_out, "c"(rcx)); \
+ if (!ret) \
+ data = rbx_out; \
+ ret; \
+ })
+
+static inline int __ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *secs)
+{
+ return __encls_2(ECREATE, pginfo, secs);
+}
+
+static inline int __eextend(void *secs, void *addr)
+{
+ return __encls_2(EEXTEND, secs, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __eadd(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr)
+{
+ return __encls_2(EADD, pginfo, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __einit(void *sigstruct, void *token, void *secs)
+{
+ return __encls_ret_3(EINIT, sigstruct, secs, token);
+}
+
+static inline int __eremove(void *addr)
+{
+ return __encls_ret_1(EREMOVE, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __edbgwr(void *addr, unsigned long *data)
+{
+ return __encls_2(EDGBWR, *data, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __edbgrd(void *addr, unsigned long *data)
+{
+ return __encls_1_1(EDGBRD, *data, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __etrack(void *addr)
+{
+ return __encls_ret_1(ETRACK, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __eldu(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr,
+ void *va)
+{
+ return __encls_ret_3(ELDU, pginfo, addr, va);
+}
+
+static inline int __eblock(void *addr)
+{
+ return __encls_ret_1(EBLOCK, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __epa(void *addr)
+{
+ unsigned long rbx = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA;
+
+ return __encls_2(EPA, rbx, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __ewb(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr,
+ void *va)
+{
+ return __encls_ret_3(EWB, pginfo, addr, va);
+}
+
+#endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 06/21] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 05/21] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 07/21] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter Jarkko Sakkinen
` (14 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, Jethro Beekman,
Jarkko Sakkinen, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Configure SGX as part of feature control MSR initialization and update
the associated X86_FEATURE flags accordingly. Because the kernel will
require the LE hash MSRs to be writable when running native enclaves,
disable X86_FEATURE_SGX (and all derivatives) if SGX Launch Control is
not (or cannot) be fully enabled via feature control MSR.
The check is done for every CPU, not just BSP, in order to verify that
MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL is correctly configured on all CPUs. The other
parts of the kernel, like the enclave driver, expect the same
configuration from all CPUs.
Note, unlike VMX, clear the X86_FEATURE_SGX* flags for all CPUs if any
CPU lacks SGX support as the kernel expects SGX to be available on all
CPUs. X86_FEATURE_VMX is intentionally cleared only for the current CPU
so that KVM can provide additional information if KVM fails to load,
e.g. print which CPU doesn't support VMX. KVM/VMX requires additional
per-CPU enabling, e.g. to set CR4.VMXE and do VMXON, and so already has
the necessary infrastructure to do per-CPU checks. SGX on the other
hand doesn't require additional enabling, so clearing the feature flags
on all CPUs means the SGX subsystem doesn't need to manually do support
checks on a per-CPU basis.
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c
index 29a3bedabd06..c3afcd2e4342 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c
@@ -93,16 +93,35 @@ static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES */
+static void clear_sgx_caps(void)
+{
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX1);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX2);
+}
+
void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
bool tboot = tboot_enabled();
+ bool enable_sgx;
u64 msr;
if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr)) {
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
+ clear_sgx_caps();
return;
}
+ /*
+ * Enable SGX if and only if the kernel supports SGX and Launch Control
+ * is supported, i.e. disable SGX if the LE hash MSRs can't be written.
+ */
+ enable_sgx = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX) &&
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX1) &&
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) &&
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_SGX);
+
if (msr & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED)
goto update_caps;
@@ -124,13 +143,16 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
}
+ if (enable_sgx)
+ msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED | FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, msr);
update_caps:
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL);
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
- return;
+ goto update_sgx;
if ( (tboot && !(msr & FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX)) ||
(!tboot && !(msr & FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX))) {
@@ -143,4 +165,12 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
init_vmx_capabilities(c);
#endif
}
+
+update_sgx:
+ if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED) ||
+ !(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) || !enable_sgx) {
+ if (enable_sgx)
+ pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS\n");
+ clear_sgx_caps();
+ }
}
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 07/21] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 06/21] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 08/21] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections Jarkko Sakkinen
` (13 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Jarkko Sakkinen, Sean Christopherson, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
Add kernel parameter to disable Intel SGX kernel support.
Tested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 9 +++++++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index fb95fad81c79..e747bd9ca911 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3314,6 +3314,8 @@
nosep [BUGS=X86-32] Disables x86 SYSENTER/SYSEXIT support.
+ nosgx [X86-64,SGX] Disables Intel SGX kernel support.
+
nosmp [SMP] Tells an SMP kernel to act as a UP kernel,
and disable the IO APIC. legacy for "maxcpus=0".
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c
index c3afcd2e4342..1837df39527f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c
@@ -101,6 +101,15 @@ static void clear_sgx_caps(void)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX2);
}
+static int __init nosgx(char *str)
+{
+ clear_sgx_caps();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+early_param("nosgx", nosgx);
+
void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
bool tboot = tboot_enabled();
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 08/21] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 07/21] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-25 10:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 09/21] x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page() Jarkko Sakkinen
` (12 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, Jethro Beekman, Serge Ayoun,
Jarkko Sakkinen, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Enumerate Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections via CPUID and add the data
structures necessary to track EPC pages so that they can be easily borrowed
for different uses.
Embed section index to the first eight bits of the EPC page descriptor.
Existing client hardware supports only a single section, while upcoming
server hardware will support at most eight sections. Thus, eight bits
should be enough for long term needs.
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Serge Ayoun <serge.ayoun@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge Ayoun <serge.ayoun@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 17 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 216 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 53 ++++++++
5 files changed, 289 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 6a0cc524882d..e9a9c530c087 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1926,6 +1926,23 @@ config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO
side channel attacks- equals the tsx=auto command line parameter.
endchoice
+config INTEL_SGX
+ bool "Intel SGX"
+ depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ depends on CRYPTO=y
+ depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y
+ select SRCU
+ select MMU_NOTIFIER
+ help
+ Intel(R) Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions
+ that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code
+ and data, referred to as enclaves. An enclave's private memory can
+ only be accessed by code running within the enclave. Accesses from
+ outside the enclave, including other enclaves, are disallowed by
+ hardware.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
config EFI
bool "EFI runtime service support"
depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
index dba6a83bc349..b00f801601f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MCE) += mce/
obj-$(CONFIG_MTRR) += mtrr/
obj-$(CONFIG_MICROCODE) += microcode/
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL) += resctrl/
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_SGX) += sgx/
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) += perfctr-watchdog.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..79510ce01b3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+obj-y += \
+ main.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c5831e3db14a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+// Copyright(c) 2016-17 Intel Corporation.
+
+#include <linux/freezer.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "encls.h"
+
+struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS];
+static int sgx_nr_epc_sections;
+static struct task_struct *ksgxswapd_tsk;
+
+static void sgx_sanitize_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *page;
+ LIST_HEAD(secs_list);
+ int ret;
+
+ while (!list_empty(§ion->unsanitized_page_list)) {
+ if (kthread_should_stop())
+ return;
+
+ spin_lock(§ion->lock);
+
+ page = list_first_entry(§ion->unsanitized_page_list,
+ struct sgx_epc_page, list);
+
+ ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_addr(page));
+ if (!ret)
+ list_move(&page->list, §ion->page_list);
+ else
+ list_move_tail(&page->list, &secs_list);
+
+ spin_unlock(§ion->lock);
+
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+}
+
+static int ksgxswapd(void *p)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ set_freezable();
+
+ /*
+ * Reset all pages to uninitialized state. Pages could be in initialized
+ * on kmemexec.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++)
+ sgx_sanitize_section(&sgx_epc_sections[i]);
+
+ /*
+ * 2nd round for the SECS pages as they cannot be removed when they
+ * still hold child pages.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) {
+ sgx_sanitize_section(&sgx_epc_sections[i]);
+
+ /* Should never happen. */
+ if (!list_empty(&sgx_epc_sections[i].unsanitized_page_list))
+ WARN(1, "EPC section %d has unsanitized pages.\n", i);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tsk;
+
+ tsk = kthread_run(ksgxswapd, NULL, "ksgxswapd");
+ if (IS_ERR(tsk))
+ return false;
+
+ ksgxswapd_tsk = tsk;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void __init sgx_free_epc_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *page;
+
+ while (!list_empty(§ion->page_list)) {
+ page = list_first_entry(§ion->page_list,
+ struct sgx_epc_page, list);
+ list_del(&page->list);
+ kfree(page);
+ }
+
+ while (!list_empty(§ion->unsanitized_page_list)) {
+ page = list_first_entry(§ion->unsanitized_page_list,
+ struct sgx_epc_page, list);
+ list_del(&page->list);
+ kfree(page);
+ }
+
+ memunmap(section->va);
+}
+
+static bool __init sgx_setup_epc_section(u64 addr, u64 size,
+ unsigned long index,
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section)
+{
+ unsigned long nr_pages = size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *page;
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ section->va = memremap(addr, size, MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (!section->va)
+ return false;
+
+ section->pa = addr;
+ spin_lock_init(§ion->lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(§ion->page_list);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(§ion->unsanitized_page_list);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
+ page = kzalloc(sizeof(*page), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ goto err_out;
+
+ page->desc = (addr + (i << PAGE_SHIFT)) | index;
+ list_add_tail(&page->list, §ion->unsanitized_page_list);
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+err_out:
+ sgx_free_epc_section(section);
+ return false;
+}
+
+static void __init sgx_page_cache_teardown(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++)
+ sgx_free_epc_section(&sgx_epc_sections[i]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * A section metric is concatenated in a way that @low bits 12-31 define the
+ * bits 12-31 of the metric and @high bits 0-19 define the bits 32-51 of the
+ * metric.
+ */
+static inline u64 __init sgx_calc_section_metric(u64 low, u64 high)
+{
+ return (low & GENMASK_ULL(31, 12)) +
+ ((high & GENMASK_ULL(19, 0)) << 32);
+}
+
+static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void)
+{
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx, type;
+ u64 pa, size;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sgx_epc_sections); i++) {
+ cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, i + SGX_CPUID_FIRST_VARIABLE_SUB_LEAF,
+ &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ type = eax & SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_TYPE_MASK;
+ if (type == SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_INVALID)
+ break;
+
+ if (type != SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_EPC_SECTION) {
+ pr_err_once("Unknown EPC section type: %u\n", type);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ pa = sgx_calc_section_metric(eax, ebx);
+ size = sgx_calc_section_metric(ecx, edx);
+
+ pr_info("EPC section 0x%llx-0x%llx\n", pa, pa + size - 1);
+
+ if (!sgx_setup_epc_section(pa, size, i, &sgx_epc_sections[i])) {
+ pr_err("No free memory for an EPC section\n");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ sgx_nr_epc_sections++;
+ }
+
+ if (!sgx_nr_epc_sections) {
+ pr_err("There are zero EPC sections.\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void __init sgx_init(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX))
+ return;
+
+ if (!sgx_page_cache_init())
+ return;
+
+ if (!sgx_page_reclaimer_init())
+ goto err_page_cache;
+
+ return;
+
+err_page_cache:
+ sgx_page_cache_teardown();
+}
+
+device_initcall(sgx_init);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6508bfefd6d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */
+#ifndef _X86_SGX_H
+#define _X86_SGX_H
+
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include "arch.h"
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "sgx: " fmt
+
+struct sgx_epc_page {
+ unsigned long desc;
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+/*
+ * The firmware can define multiple chunks of EPC to the different areas of the
+ * physical memory e.g. for memory areas of the each node. This structure is
+ * used to store EPC pages for one EPC section and virtual memory area where
+ * the pages have been mapped.
+ */
+struct sgx_epc_section {
+ unsigned long pa;
+ void *va;
+ struct list_head page_list;
+ struct list_head unsanitized_page_list;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+};
+
+#define SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK GENMASK(7, 0)
+#define SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS (SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK + 1)
+
+extern struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS];
+
+static inline struct sgx_epc_section *sgx_get_epc_section(
+ struct sgx_epc_page *page)
+{
+ return &sgx_epc_sections[page->desc & SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK];
+}
+
+static inline void *sgx_get_epc_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section = sgx_get_epc_section(page);
+
+ return section->va + (page->desc & PAGE_MASK) - section->pa;
+}
+
+#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 08/21] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 08/21] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-25 10:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-25 20:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-25 10:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson,
Jethro Beekman, Serge Ayoun, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:30AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> +static inline struct sgx_epc_section *sgx_get_epc_section(
> + struct sgx_epc_page *page)
Just let it stick out - breaking lines on arg opening brace are the
ugliest. Also:
bdc48fa11e46 ("checkpatch/coding-style: deprecate 80-column warning")
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 08/21] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections
2020-06-25 10:14 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-25 20:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-25 20:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson,
Jethro Beekman, Serge Ayoun, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 12:14:41PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:30AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > +static inline struct sgx_epc_section *sgx_get_epc_section(
> > + struct sgx_epc_page *page)
>
> Just let it stick out - breaking lines on arg opening brace are the
> ugliest. Also:
>
> bdc48fa11e46 ("checkpatch/coding-style: deprecate 80-column warning")
>
> Thx.
>
> --
> Regards/Gruss,
> Boris.
>
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
OK, I put everything into one line.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 09/21] x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page()
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 08/21] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-25 17:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 10/21] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Jarkko Sakkinen
` (11 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Jarkko Sakkinen, Jethro Beekman,
Sean Christopherson, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page(), which iterates through EPC sections and borrows
a page structure that is not used by anyone else. When a page is no longer
needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page(). This function
implicitly calls ENCLS[EREMOVE], which will return the page to the
uninitialized state (i.e. not required from caller part).
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 3 ++
2 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
index c5831e3db14a..b776d249289f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
@@ -83,6 +83,67 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void)
return true;
}
+static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *page;
+
+ if (list_empty(§ion->page_list))
+ return NULL;
+
+ page = list_first_entry(§ion->page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list);
+ list_del_init(&page->list);
+ return page;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __sgx_alloc_epc_page() - Allocate an EPC page
+ *
+ * Iterate through EPC sections and borrow a free EPC page to the caller. When a
+ * page is no longer needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page().
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * an EPC page,
+ * -errno on error
+ */
+struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *page;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) {
+ section = &sgx_epc_sections[i];
+ spin_lock(§ion->lock);
+ page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section(section);
+ spin_unlock(§ion->lock);
+
+ if (page)
+ return page;
+ }
+
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_free_epc_page() - Free an EPC page
+ * @page: an EPC page
+ *
+ * Call EREMOVE for an EPC page and insert it back to the list of free pages.
+ */
+void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section = sgx_get_epc_section(page);
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_addr(page));
+ if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret))
+ return;
+
+ spin_lock(§ion->lock);
+ list_add_tail(&page->list, §ion->page_list);
+ spin_unlock(§ion->lock);
+}
+
static void __init sgx_free_epc_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section)
{
struct sgx_epc_page *page;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
index 6508bfefd6d9..aae6bfb3bc8a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
@@ -50,4 +50,7 @@ static inline void *sgx_get_epc_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
return section->va + (page->desc & PAGE_MASK) - section->pa;
}
+struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void);
+void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
+
#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 09/21] x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page()
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 09/21] x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page() Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-25 17:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-25 20:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-25 17:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Jethro Beekman,
Sean Christopherson, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:31AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page(), which iterates through EPC sections and borrows
> a page structure that is not used by anyone else. When a page is no longer
> needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page(). This function
> implicitly calls ENCLS[EREMOVE], which will return the page to the
> uninitialized state (i.e. not required from caller part).
>
> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 3 ++
> 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
> index c5831e3db14a..b776d249289f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
> @@ -83,6 +83,67 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void)
> return true;
> }
>
> +static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section)
> +{
> + struct sgx_epc_page *page;
> +
> + if (list_empty(§ion->page_list))
> + return NULL;
> +
> + page = list_first_entry(§ion->page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list);
> + list_del_init(&page->list);
<---- newline here.
> + return page;
> +}
Otherwise looks good; nice comments.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 09/21] x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page()
2020-06-25 17:06 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-25 20:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-25 20:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Jethro Beekman,
Sean Christopherson, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 07:06:48PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:31AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page(), which iterates through EPC sections and borrows
> > a page structure that is not used by anyone else. When a page is no longer
> > needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page(). This function
> > implicitly calls ENCLS[EREMOVE], which will return the page to the
> > uninitialized state (i.e. not required from caller part).
> >
> > Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
> > Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 3 ++
> > 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
> > index c5831e3db14a..b776d249289f 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
> > @@ -83,6 +83,67 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void)
> > return true;
> > }
> >
> > +static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section)
> > +{
> > + struct sgx_epc_page *page;
> > +
> > + if (list_empty(§ion->page_list))
> > + return NULL;
> > +
> > + page = list_first_entry(§ion->page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list);
> > + list_del_init(&page->list);
>
> <---- newline here.
>
> > + return page;
> > +}
>
> Otherwise looks good; nice comments.
Thanks!
>
> Thx.
>
> --
> Regards/Gruss,
> Boris.
>
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
/Jarko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 10/21] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 09/21] x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page() Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-25 17:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver Jarkko Sakkinen
` (10 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, Jethro Beekman,
Jarkko Sakkinen, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Add vm_ops()->may_mprotect() to check additional constraints.
SGX uses this callback to add two constraints:
1. Verify that the address range does not have holes: for each page
address, there is an actual enclave page created.
2. Mapped permissions do not surpass the lowest enclave page permissions
in the address range.
linux-mm@kvack.org
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++
mm/mprotect.c | 14 +++++++++++---
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index dc7b87310c10..be40b9c29327 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -542,6 +542,8 @@ struct vm_operations_struct {
void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr);
int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
+ int (*may_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end, unsigned long prot);
vm_fault_t (*fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf);
vm_fault_t (*huge_fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf,
enum page_entry_size pe_size);
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index ce8b8a5eacbb..f7731dc13ff0 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -603,13 +603,21 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
goto out;
}
+ tmp = vma->vm_end;
+ if (tmp > end)
+ tmp = end;
+
+ if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect) {
+ error = vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect(vma, nstart, tmp,
+ prot);
+ if (error)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
if (error)
goto out;
- tmp = vma->vm_end;
- if (tmp > end)
- tmp = end;
error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
if (error)
goto out;
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 10/21] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 10/21] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-25 17:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-25 17:30 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-06-25 22:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 2 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-25 17:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson,
Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx, linux-mm
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:32AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
>
> Add vm_ops()->may_mprotect() to check additional constraints.
>
> SGX uses this callback to add two constraints:
>
> 1. Verify that the address range does not have holes: for each page
> address, there is an actual enclave page created.
> 2. Mapped permissions do not surpass the lowest enclave page permissions
> in the address range.
>
> linux-mm@kvack.org
> Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Something ate the Cc:s. Lemme add the mm list, akpm is already on Cc.
Leaving in the rest for mm folks.
> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++
> mm/mprotect.c | 14 +++++++++++---
> 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> index dc7b87310c10..be40b9c29327 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> @@ -542,6 +542,8 @@ struct vm_operations_struct {
> void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
> int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr);
> int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
> + int (*may_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
> + unsigned long end, unsigned long prot);
> vm_fault_t (*fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf);
> vm_fault_t (*huge_fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf,
> enum page_entry_size pe_size);
> diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
> index ce8b8a5eacbb..f7731dc13ff0 100644
> --- a/mm/mprotect.c
> +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
> @@ -603,13 +603,21 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
> goto out;
> }
>
> + tmp = vma->vm_end;
> + if (tmp > end)
> + tmp = end;
> +
> + if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect) {
> + error = vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect(vma, nstart, tmp,
> + prot);
> + if (error)
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
> if (error)
> goto out;
>
> - tmp = vma->vm_end;
> - if (tmp > end)
> - tmp = end;
> error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
> if (error)
> goto out;
> --
> 2.25.1
>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 10/21] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
2020-06-25 17:14 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-25 17:30 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-06-25 18:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-25 22:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Matthew Wilcox @ 2020-06-25 17:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
Sean Christopherson, Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko,
asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish,
dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy,
ludloff, luto, nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx,
yaozhangx, linux-mm
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 07:14:16PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:32AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
>
> Something ate the Cc:s. Lemme add the mm list, akpm is already on Cc.
>
> Leaving in the rest for mm folks.
Thanks!
> > diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> > index dc7b87310c10..be40b9c29327 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> > @@ -542,6 +542,8 @@ struct vm_operations_struct {
> > void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
> > int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr);
> > int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
> > + int (*may_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
> > + unsigned long end, unsigned long prot);
This is unlike any other vm operation. Every other one is a verb.
> > diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
> > index ce8b8a5eacbb..f7731dc13ff0 100644
> > --- a/mm/mprotect.c
> > +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
> > @@ -603,13 +603,21 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
> > goto out;
> > }
> >
> > + tmp = vma->vm_end;
> > + if (tmp > end)
> > + tmp = end;
> > +
> > + if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect) {
> > + error = vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect(vma, nstart, tmp,
> > + prot);
> > + if (error)
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
> > if (error)
> > goto out;
> >
I think the right way to do this is:
error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
if (error)
goto out;
tmp = vma->vm_end;
if (tmp > end)
tmp = end;
+ if (vma->vm_ops->mprotect)
+ error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp,
+ newflags);
+ else
+ error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp,
+ newflags);
- error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
if (error)
goto out;
and then the vma owner can do whatever it needs to before calling
mprotect_fixup(), which is already not static.
(how did we get to v33 with this kind of problem still in the patch set?)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 10/21] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
2020-06-25 17:30 ` Matthew Wilcox
@ 2020-06-25 18:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-25 22:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2020-06-25 18:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Matthew Wilcox
Cc: Borislav Petkov, Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx, linux-mm
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 06:30:50PM +0100, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 07:14:16PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:32AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
> > > index ce8b8a5eacbb..f7731dc13ff0 100644
> > > --- a/mm/mprotect.c
> > > +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
> > > @@ -603,13 +603,21 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
> > > goto out;
> > > }
> > >
> > > + tmp = vma->vm_end;
> > > + if (tmp > end)
> > > + tmp = end;
> > > +
> > > + if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect) {
> > > + error = vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect(vma, nstart, tmp,
> > > + prot);
> > > + if (error)
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
> > > if (error)
> > > goto out;
> > >
>
> I think the right way to do this is:
>
> error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
> if (error)
> goto out;
>
> tmp = vma->vm_end;
> if (tmp > end)
> tmp = end;
> + if (vma->vm_ops->mprotect)
> + error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp,
> + newflags);
> + else
> + error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp,
> + newflags);
> - error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
> if (error)
> goto out;
>
> and then the vma owner can do whatever it needs to before calling
> mprotect_fixup(), which is already not static.
I'm certainly not opposed to a straight ->mprotect() hook. ->may_protect()
came about because I/we thought it would be less objectionable to allow the
vma owner to apply additional restrictions as opposed to a wholesale
replacement.
> (how did we get to v33 with this kind of problem still in the patch set?)
Because no one from the mm world has looked at it. Which is completely
understandable because it's a giant patch set and the first 25 or so versions
were spent sorting out fundamental architectural/design issue (there have
been a _lot_ of speed bumps), e.g. the need for hooking mprotect() didn't
even come about until v21.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 10/21] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
2020-06-25 18:06 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-06-25 22:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-25 22:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Matthew Wilcox, Borislav Petkov, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx, linux-mm
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 11:06:46AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 06:30:50PM +0100, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 07:14:16PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:32AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
> > > > index ce8b8a5eacbb..f7731dc13ff0 100644
> > > > --- a/mm/mprotect.c
> > > > +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
> > > > @@ -603,13 +603,21 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
> > > > goto out;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > + tmp = vma->vm_end;
> > > > + if (tmp > end)
> > > > + tmp = end;
> > > > +
> > > > + if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect) {
> > > > + error = vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect(vma, nstart, tmp,
> > > > + prot);
> > > > + if (error)
> > > > + goto out;
> > > > + }
> > > > +
> > > > error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
> > > > if (error)
> > > > goto out;
> > > >
> >
> > I think the right way to do this is:
> >
> > error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
> > if (error)
> > goto out;
> >
> > tmp = vma->vm_end;
> > if (tmp > end)
> > tmp = end;
> > + if (vma->vm_ops->mprotect)
> > + error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp,
> > + newflags);
> > + else
> > + error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp,
> > + newflags);
> > - error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
> > if (error)
> > goto out;
> >
> > and then the vma owner can do whatever it needs to before calling
> > mprotect_fixup(), which is already not static.
>
> I'm certainly not opposed to a straight ->mprotect() hook. ->may_protect()
> came about because I/we thought it would be less objectionable to allow the
> vma owner to apply additional restrictions as opposed to a wholesale
> replacement.
Can you send fixes to associated patches to linux-sgx (i.e. this and
driver)?
> > (how did we get to v33 with this kind of problem still in the patch set?)
>
> Because no one from the mm world has looked at it. Which is completely
> understandable because it's a giant patch set and the first 25 or so versions
> were spent sorting out fundamental architectural/design issue (there have
> been a _lot_ of speed bumps), e.g. the need for hooking mprotect() didn't
> even come about until v21.
Actually also because we did not have an explicit linux-mm CC.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 10/21] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
2020-06-25 17:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-25 17:30 ` Matthew Wilcox
@ 2020-06-25 22:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-25 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson,
Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx, linux-mm
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 07:14:16PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:32AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> >
> > Add vm_ops()->may_mprotect() to check additional constraints.
> >
> > SGX uses this callback to add two constraints:
> >
> > 1. Verify that the address range does not have holes: for each page
> > address, there is an actual enclave page created.
> > 2. Mapped permissions do not surpass the lowest enclave page permissions
> > in the address range.
> >
> > linux-mm@kvack.org
> > Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
>
> Something ate the Cc:s. Lemme add the mm list, akpm is already on Cc.
>
> Leaving in the rest for mm folks.
Thank you. So it seems. I've fixed them now.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 10/21] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-25 17:23 ` Borislav Petkov
` (5 more replies)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation Jarkko Sakkinen
` (9 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 6 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Jarkko Sakkinen, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Sean Christopherson,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that
can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and
data. The code outside the SGX hosted software entity is disallowed to
access the memory inside the enclave enforced by the CPU. We call these
entities as enclaves.
This commit implements a driver that provides an ioctl API to construct
and run enclaves. Enclaves are constructed from pages residing in
reserved physical memory areas. The contents of these pages can only be
accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware
thread running inside the enclave.
The starting state of an enclave consists of a fixed measured set of
pages that are copied to the EPC during the construction process by
using ENCLS leaf functions and Software Enclave Control Structure (SECS)
that defines the enclave properties.
Enclave are constructed by using ENCLS leaf functions ECREATE, EADD and
EINIT. ECREATE initializes SECS, EADD copies pages from system memory to
the EPC and EINIT check a given signed measurement and moves the enclave
into a state ready for execution.
An initialized enclave can only be accessed through special Thread Control
Structure (TCS) pages by using ENCLU (ring-3 only) leaf EENTER. This leaf
function converts a thread into enclave mode and continues the execution in
the offset defined by the TCS provided to EENTER. An enclave is exited
through syscall, exception, interrupts or by explicitly calling another
ENCLU leaf EEXIT.
The permissions, which enclave page is added will set the limit for maximum
permissions that can be set for mmap() and mprotect(). This will
effectively allow to build different security schemes between producers and
consumers of enclaves. Later on we can increase granularity with LSM hooks
for page addition (i.e. for producers) and mapping of the enclave (i.e. for
consumers)
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Chunyang Hui <sanqian.hcy@antfin.com>
Tested-by: Jordan Hand <jorhand@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Seth Moore <sethmo@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
.../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst | 1 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 66 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 3 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 194 +++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 30 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 335 +++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 87 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 706 ++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 11 +
9 files changed, 1433 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
index 59472cd6a11d..35f713e3a267 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Code Seq# Include File Comments
<mailto:tlewis@mindspring.com>
0xA3 90-9F linux/dtlk.h
0xA4 00-1F uapi/linux/tee.h Generic TEE subsystem
+0xA4 00-1F uapi/asm/sgx.h Intel SGX subsystem (a legit conflict as TEE and SGX do not co-exist)
0xAA 00-3F linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
0xAB 00-1F linux/nbd.h
0xAC 00-1F linux/raw.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5edb08ab8fd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) WITH Linux-syscall-note */
+/*
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H
+#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/ioctl.h>
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_epage_flags - page control flags
+ * %SGX_PAGE_MEASURE: Measure the page contents with a sequence of
+ * ENCLS[EEXTEND] operations.
+ */
+enum sgx_page_flags {
+ SGX_PAGE_MEASURE = 0x01,
+};
+
+#define SGX_MAGIC 0xA4
+
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE \
+ _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES \
+ _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT \
+ _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x02, struct sgx_enclave_init)
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
+ * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE ioctl
+ * @src: address for the SECS page data
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_create {
+ __u64 src;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_add_pages - parameter structure for the
+ * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE ioctl
+ * @src: start address for the page data
+ * @offset: starting page offset
+ * @length: length of the data (multiple of the page size)
+ * @secinfo: address for the SECINFO data
+ * @flags: page control flags
+ * @count: number of bytes added (multiple of the page size)
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_add_pages {
+ __u64 src;
+ __u64 offset;
+ __u64 length;
+ __u64 secinfo;
+ __u64 flags;
+ __u64 count;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_init - parameter structure for the
+ * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT ioctl
+ * @sigstruct: address for the SIGSTRUCT data
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_init {
+ __u64 sigstruct;
+};
+
+#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile
index 79510ce01b3b..91d3dc784a29 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile
@@ -1,2 +1,5 @@
obj-y += \
+ driver.o \
+ encl.o \
+ ioctl.o \
main.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b4aa7b9f8376
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+
+#include <linux/acpi.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include "driver.h"
+#include "encl.h"
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Intel SGX Enclave Driver");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
+
+u64 sgx_encl_size_max_32;
+u64 sgx_encl_size_max_64;
+u32 sgx_misc_reserved_mask;
+u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask;
+u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask = ~0x3;
+u32 sgx_xsave_size_tbl[64];
+
+static int sgx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl *encl;
+ int ret;
+
+ encl = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!encl)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ atomic_set(&encl->flags, 0);
+ kref_init(&encl->refcount);
+ INIT_RADIX_TREE(&encl->page_tree, GFP_KERNEL);
+ mutex_init(&encl->lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&encl->mm_list);
+ spin_lock_init(&encl->mm_lock);
+
+ ret = init_srcu_struct(&encl->srcu);
+ if (ret) {
+ kfree(encl);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ file->private_data = encl;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
+
+ for ( ; ; ) {
+ spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock);
+
+ if (list_empty(&encl->mm_list)) {
+ encl_mm = NULL;
+ } else {
+ encl_mm = list_first_entry(&encl->mm_list,
+ struct sgx_encl_mm, list);
+ list_del_rcu(&encl_mm->list);
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock);
+
+ /* The list is empty, ready to go. */
+ if (!encl_mm)
+ break;
+
+ synchronize_srcu(&encl->srcu);
+ mmu_notifier_unregister(&encl_mm->mmu_notifier, encl_mm->mm);
+ kfree(encl_mm);
+ };
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+ atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_DEAD, &encl->flags);
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ kref_put(&encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+static long sgx_compat_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ return sgx_ioctl(filep, cmd, arg);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_may_map(encl, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
+ vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC));
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_mm_add(encl, vma->vm_mm);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ vma->vm_ops = &sgx_vm_ops;
+ vma->vm_flags |= VM_PFNMAP | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP | VM_IO;
+ vma->vm_private_data = encl;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file,
+ unsigned long addr,
+ unsigned long len,
+ unsigned long pgoff,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ if (flags & MAP_PRIVATE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
+ return addr;
+
+ return current->mm->get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = sgx_open,
+ .release = sgx_release,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = sgx_ioctl,
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ .compat_ioctl = sgx_compat_ioctl,
+#endif
+ .mmap = sgx_mmap,
+ .get_unmapped_area = sgx_get_unmapped_area,
+};
+
+const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = {
+ .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+ .name = "enclave",
+ .nodename = "sgx/enclave",
+ .fops = &sgx_encl_fops,
+};
+
+int __init sgx_drv_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ u64 attr_mask, xfrm_mask;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC)) {
+ pr_info("The public key MSRs are not writable.\n");
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ sgx_misc_reserved_mask = ~ebx | SGX_MISC_RESERVED_MASK;
+ sgx_encl_size_max_64 = 1ULL << ((edx >> 8) & 0xFF);
+ sgx_encl_size_max_32 = 1ULL << (edx & 0xFF);
+
+ cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ attr_mask = (((u64)ebx) << 32) + (u64)eax;
+ sgx_attributes_reserved_mask = ~attr_mask | SGX_ATTR_RESERVED_MASK;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE)) {
+ xfrm_mask = (((u64)edx) << 32) + (u64)ecx;
+
+ for (i = 2; i < 64; i++) {
+ cpuid_count(0x0D, i, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ if ((1 << i) & xfrm_mask)
+ sgx_xsave_size_tbl[i] = eax + ebx;
+ }
+
+ sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask = ~xfrm_mask;
+ }
+
+ ret = misc_register(&sgx_dev_enclave);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("Creating /dev/sgx/enclave failed with %d.\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e4063923115b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */
+#ifndef __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__
+#define __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
+#include <linux/radix-tree.h>
+#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <uapi/asm/sgx.h>
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+#define SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT 20
+#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT 50
+#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME 20
+
+extern u64 sgx_encl_size_max_32;
+extern u64 sgx_encl_size_max_64;
+extern u32 sgx_misc_reserved_mask;
+extern u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask;
+extern u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask;
+extern u32 sgx_xsave_size_tbl[64];
+
+long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
+
+int sgx_drv_init(void);
+
+#endif /* __ARCH_X86_SGX_DRIVER_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..939b2faa185a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+
+#include <linux/lockdep.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
+#include "arch.h"
+#include "encl.h"
+#include "encls.h"
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long addr)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+ unsigned int flags;
+
+ /* If process was forked, VMA is still there but vm_private_data is set
+ * to NULL.
+ */
+ if (!encl)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+ flags = atomic_read(&encl->flags);
+
+ if ((flags & SGX_ENCL_DEAD) || !(flags & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+ entry = radix_tree_lookup(&encl->page_tree, addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ if (!entry)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+ /* Page is already resident in the EPC. */
+ if (entry->epc_page)
+ return entry;
+
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+}
+
+static void sgx_mmu_notifier_release(struct mmu_notifier *mn,
+ struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm =
+ container_of(mn, struct sgx_encl_mm, mmu_notifier);
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *tmp = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * The enclave itself can remove encl_mm. Note, objects can't be moved
+ * off an RCU protected list, but deletion is ok.
+ */
+ spin_lock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(tmp, &encl_mm->encl->mm_list, list) {
+ if (tmp == encl_mm) {
+ list_del_rcu(&encl_mm->list);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock);
+
+ if (tmp == encl_mm) {
+ synchronize_srcu(&encl_mm->encl->srcu);
+ mmu_notifier_put(mn);
+ }
+}
+
+static void sgx_mmu_notifier_free(struct mmu_notifier *mn)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm =
+ container_of(mn, struct sgx_encl_mm, mmu_notifier);
+
+ kfree(encl_mm);
+}
+
+static const struct mmu_notifier_ops sgx_mmu_notifier_ops = {
+ .release = sgx_mmu_notifier_release,
+ .free_notifier = sgx_mmu_notifier_free,
+};
+
+static struct sgx_encl_mm *sgx_encl_find_mm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = NULL;
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *tmp;
+ int idx;
+
+ idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(tmp, &encl->mm_list, list) {
+ if (tmp->mm == mm) {
+ encl_mm = tmp;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
+
+ return encl_mm;
+}
+
+int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* mm_list can be accessed only by a single thread at a time. */
+ mmap_assert_write_locked(mm);
+
+ if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_DEAD)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * mm_structs are kept on mm_list until the mm or the enclave dies,
+ * i.e. once an mm is off the list, it's gone for good, therefore it's
+ * impossible to get a false positive on @mm due to a stale mm_list.
+ */
+ if (sgx_encl_find_mm(encl, mm))
+ return 0;
+
+ encl_mm = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_mm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!encl_mm)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ encl_mm->encl = encl;
+ encl_mm->mm = mm;
+ encl_mm->mmu_notifier.ops = &sgx_mmu_notifier_ops;
+
+ ret = __mmu_notifier_register(&encl_mm->mmu_notifier, mm);
+ if (ret) {
+ kfree(encl_mm);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock);
+ list_add_rcu(&encl_mm->list, &encl->mm_list);
+ spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void sgx_vma_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
+
+ if (!encl)
+ return;
+
+ if (sgx_encl_mm_add(encl, vma->vm_mm))
+ vma->vm_private_data = NULL;
+}
+
+static unsigned int sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+ unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+ int ret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
+ unsigned long pfn;
+
+ if (!encl)
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
+ if (unlikely(PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY))
+ ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!follow_pfn(vma, addr, &pfn))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(entry->epc_page->desc));
+ if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
+ ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_may_map() - Check if a requested VMA mapping is allowed
+ * @encl: an enclave
+ * @start: lower bound of the address range, inclusive
+ * @end: upper bound of the address range, exclusive
+ * @vm_prot_bits: requested protections of the address range
+ *
+ * Iterate through the enclave pages contained within [@start, @end) to verify
+ * the permissions requested by @vm_prot_bits do not exceed that of any enclave
+ * page to be mapped.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * -EACCES if VMA permissions exceed enclave page permissions
+ */
+int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_prot_bits)
+{
+ unsigned long idx, idx_start, idx_end;
+ struct sgx_encl_page *page;
+
+ /*
+ * Disallow RIE tasks as their VMA permissions might conflict with the
+ * enclave page permissions.
+ */
+ if (!!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ idx_start = PFN_DOWN(start);
+ idx_end = PFN_DOWN(end - 1);
+
+ for (idx = idx_start; idx <= idx_end; ++idx) {
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+ page = radix_tree_lookup(&encl->page_tree, idx);
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ if (!page || (~page->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits))
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end, unsigned long prot)
+{
+ return sgx_encl_may_map(vma->vm_private_data, start, end,
+ calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0));
+}
+
+const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = {
+ .open = sgx_vma_open,
+ .fault = sgx_vma_fault,
+ .may_mprotect = sgx_vma_mprotect,
+};
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_find - find an enclave
+ * @mm: mm struct of the current process
+ * @addr: address in the ELRANGE
+ * @vma: the resulting VMA
+ *
+ * Find an enclave identified by the given address. Give back a VMA that is
+ * part of the enclave and located in that address. The VMA is given back if it
+ * is a proper enclave VMA even if an &sgx_encl instance does not exist yet
+ * (enclave creation has not been performed).
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * -EINVAL if an enclave was not found,
+ * -ENOENT if the enclave has not been created yet
+ */
+int sgx_encl_find(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
+ struct vm_area_struct **vma)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *result;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl;
+
+ result = find_vma(mm, addr);
+ if (!result || result->vm_ops != &sgx_vm_ops || addr < result->vm_start)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ encl = result->vm_private_data;
+ *vma = result;
+
+ return encl ? 0 : -ENOENT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_destroy() - destroy enclave resources
+ * @encl: an &sgx_encl instance
+ */
+void sgx_encl_destroy(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+ struct radix_tree_iter iter;
+ void **slot;
+
+ atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_DEAD, &encl->flags);
+
+ radix_tree_for_each_slot(slot, &encl->page_tree, &iter, 0) {
+ entry = *slot;
+
+ if (entry->epc_page) {
+ sgx_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page);
+ encl->secs_child_cnt--;
+ entry->epc_page = NULL;
+ }
+
+ radix_tree_delete(&entry->encl->page_tree,
+ PFN_DOWN(entry->desc));
+ kfree(entry);
+ }
+
+ if (!encl->secs_child_cnt && encl->secs.epc_page) {
+ sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
+ encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_release - Destroy an enclave instance
+ * @kref: address of a kref inside &sgx_encl
+ *
+ * Used together with kref_put(). Frees all the resources associated with the
+ * enclave and the instance itself.
+ */
+void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = container_of(ref, struct sgx_encl, refcount);
+
+ sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
+
+ if (encl->backing)
+ fput(encl->backing);
+
+ cleanup_srcu_struct(&encl->srcu);
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&encl->mm_list));
+
+ /* Detect EPC page leak's. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->secs_child_cnt);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->secs.epc_page);
+
+ kfree(encl);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1d1bc5d590ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */
+/**
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+#ifndef _X86_ENCL_H
+#define _X86_ENCL_H
+
+#include <linux/cpumask.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
+#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/radix-tree.h>
+#include <linux/srcu.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_encl_page_desc - defines bits for an enclave page's descriptor
+ * %SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR_MASK: Holds the virtual address of the page.
+ *
+ * The page address for SECS is zero and is used by the subsystem to recognize
+ * the SECS page.
+ */
+enum sgx_encl_page_desc {
+ /* Bits 11:3 are available when the page is not swapped. */
+ SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR_MASK = PAGE_MASK,
+};
+
+#define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(page) \
+ ((page)->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR_MASK)
+
+struct sgx_encl_page {
+ unsigned long desc;
+ unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl;
+};
+
+enum sgx_encl_flags {
+ SGX_ENCL_CREATED = BIT(0),
+ SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED = BIT(1),
+ SGX_ENCL_DEBUG = BIT(2),
+ SGX_ENCL_DEAD = BIT(3),
+ SGX_ENCL_IOCTL = BIT(4),
+};
+
+struct sgx_encl_mm {
+ struct sgx_encl *encl;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct mmu_notifier mmu_notifier;
+};
+
+struct sgx_encl {
+ atomic_t flags;
+ u64 secs_attributes;
+ u64 allowed_attributes;
+ unsigned int page_cnt;
+ unsigned int secs_child_cnt;
+ struct mutex lock;
+ struct list_head mm_list;
+ spinlock_t mm_lock;
+ struct file *backing;
+ struct kref refcount;
+ struct srcu_struct srcu;
+ unsigned long base;
+ unsigned long size;
+ unsigned long ssaframesize;
+ struct radix_tree_root page_tree;
+ struct sgx_encl_page secs;
+ cpumask_t cpumask;
+};
+
+extern const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops;
+
+int sgx_encl_find(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
+ struct vm_area_struct **vma);
+void sgx_encl_destroy(struct sgx_encl *encl);
+void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref);
+int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm);
+int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_prot_bits);
+
+#endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..420d13fc03da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,706 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+// Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation.
+
+#include <asm/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include "driver.h"
+#include "encl.h"
+#include "encls.h"
+
+/* A per-cpu cache for the last known values of IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHx MSRs. */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64 [4], sgx_lepubkeyhash_cache);
+
+static u32 sgx_calc_ssaframesize(u32 miscselect, u64 xfrm)
+{
+ u32 size_max = PAGE_SIZE;
+ u32 size;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 2; i < 64; i++) {
+ if (!((1 << i) & xfrm))
+ continue;
+
+ size = SGX_SSA_GPRS_SIZE + sgx_xsave_size_tbl[i];
+ if (miscselect & SGX_MISC_EXINFO)
+ size += SGX_SSA_MISC_EXINFO_SIZE;
+
+ if (size > size_max)
+ size_max = size;
+ }
+
+ return PFN_UP(size_max);
+}
+
+static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
+ unsigned long ssaframesize)
+{
+ if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
+ secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
+ secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
+ if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!(secs->xfrm & XFEATURE_MASK_FP) ||
+ !(secs->xfrm & XFEATURE_MASK_SSE) ||
+ (((secs->xfrm >> XFEATURE_BNDREGS) & 1) !=
+ ((secs->xfrm >> XFEATURE_BNDCSR) & 1)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!secs->ssa_frame_size || ssaframesize > secs->ssa_frame_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (memchr_inv(secs->reserved1, 0, sizeof(secs->reserved1)) ||
+ memchr_inv(secs->reserved2, 0, sizeof(secs->reserved2)) ||
+ memchr_inv(secs->reserved3, 0, sizeof(secs->reserved3)) ||
+ memchr_inv(secs->reserved4, 0, sizeof(secs->reserved4)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long offset,
+ u64 secinfo_flags)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+ unsigned long prot;
+
+ encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!encl_page)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset;
+ encl_page->encl = encl;
+
+ prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC);
+
+ /*
+ * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO
+ * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided
+ * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions.
+ */
+ if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
+ prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+
+ /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */
+ encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
+
+ return encl_page;
+}
+
+static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
+{
+ unsigned long encl_size = secs->size + PAGE_SIZE;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *secs_epc;
+ unsigned long ssaframesize;
+ struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ struct file *backing;
+ long ret;
+
+ if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ssaframesize = sgx_calc_ssaframesize(secs->miscselect, secs->xfrm);
+ if (sgx_validate_secs(secs, ssaframesize)) {
+ pr_debug("invalid SECS\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ backing = shmem_file_setup("SGX backing", encl_size + (encl_size >> 5),
+ VM_NORESERVE);
+ if (IS_ERR(backing))
+ return PTR_ERR(backing);
+
+ encl->backing = backing;
+
+ secs_epc = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
+ if (IS_ERR(secs_epc)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(secs_epc);
+ goto err_out_backing;
+ }
+
+ encl->secs.epc_page = secs_epc;
+
+ pginfo.addr = 0;
+ pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)secs;
+ pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+ pginfo.secs = 0;
+ memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+
+ ret = __ecreate((void *)&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_addr(secs_epc));
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_debug("ECREATE returned %ld\n", ret);
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+
+ if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_DEBUG)
+ atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags);
+
+ encl->secs.encl = encl;
+ encl->secs_attributes = secs->attributes;
+ encl->allowed_attributes |= SGX_ATTR_ALLOWED_MASK;
+ encl->base = secs->base;
+ encl->size = secs->size;
+ encl->ssaframesize = secs->ssa_frame_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Set SGX_ENCL_CREATED only after the enclave is fully prepped. This
+ * allows setting and checking enclave creation without having to take
+ * encl->lock.
+ */
+ atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags);
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_out:
+ sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
+ encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
+
+err_out_backing:
+ fput(encl->backing);
+ encl->backing = NULL;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_create - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE
+ * @filep: open file to /dev/sgx
+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_create instance
+ *
+ * Allocate kernel data structures for a new enclave and execute ECREATE after
+ * verifying the correctness of the provided SECS.
+ *
+ * Note, enforcement of restricted and disallowed attributes is deferred until
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init(), only the architectural correctness of the SECS is
+ * checked by sgx_ioc_enclave_create().
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * -errno otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_create ecreate;
+ struct page *secs_page;
+ struct sgx_secs *secs;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&ecreate, arg, sizeof(ecreate)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ secs_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!secs_page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ secs = kmap(secs_page);
+ if (copy_from_user(secs, (void __user *)ecreate.src, sizeof(*secs))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_create(encl, secs);
+
+out:
+ kunmap(secs_page);
+ __free_page(secs_page);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo)
+{
+ u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;
+ u64 pt = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK;
+
+ if (pt != SGX_SECINFO_REG && pt != SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((perm & SGX_SECINFO_W) && !(perm & SGX_SECINFO_R))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * CPU will silently overwrite the permissions as zero, which means
+ * that we need to validate it ourselves.
+ */
+ if (pt == SGX_SECINFO_TCS && perm)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (memchr_inv(secinfo->reserved, 0, sizeof(secinfo->reserved)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page,
+ struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long src)
+{
+ struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ struct page *src_page;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Query vma's VM_MAYEXEC as an indirect path_noexec() check. */
+ if (encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits & VM_EXEC) {
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, src);
+ if (!vma)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC))
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ ret = get_user_pages(src, 1, 0, &src_page, NULL);
+ if (ret < 1)
+ return ret;
+
+ pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
+ pginfo.addr = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(encl_page);
+ pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)secinfo;
+ pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(src_page);
+
+ ret = __eadd(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page));
+
+ kunmap_atomic((void *)pginfo.contents);
+ put_page(src_page);
+
+ return ret ? -EIO : 0;
+}
+
+static int __sgx_encl_extend(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ ret = __eextend(sgx_get_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page),
+ sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page) + (i * 0x100));
+ if (ret) {
+ if (encls_failed(ret))
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EEXTEND");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
+ unsigned long offset, unsigned long length,
+ struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ int ret;
+
+ encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, offset, secinfo->flags);
+ if (IS_ERR(encl_page))
+ return PTR_ERR(encl_page);
+
+ epc_page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
+ if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
+ kfree(encl_page);
+ return PTR_ERR(epc_page);
+ }
+
+ if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) &
+ (SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED | SGX_ENCL_DEAD)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto err_out_free;
+ }
+
+ mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Insert prior to EADD in case of OOM. EADD modifies MRENCLAVE, i.e.
+ * can't be gracefully unwound, while failure on EADD/EXTEND is limited
+ * to userspace errors (or kernel/hardware bugs).
+ */
+ ret = radix_tree_insert(&encl->page_tree, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc),
+ encl_page);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_out_unlock;
+
+ ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, secinfo,
+ src);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_out;
+
+ /*
+ * Complete the "add" before doing the "extend" so that the "add"
+ * isn't in a half-baked state in the extremely unlikely scenario the
+ * the enclave will be destroyed in response to EEXTEND failure.
+ */
+ encl_page->encl = encl;
+ encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
+ encl->secs_child_cnt++;
+
+ if (flags & SGX_PAGE_MEASURE) {
+ ret = __sgx_encl_extend(encl, epc_page);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
+ return ret;
+
+err_out:
+ radix_tree_delete(&encl_page->encl->page_tree,
+ PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc));
+
+err_out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
+
+err_out_free:
+ sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+ kfree(encl_page);
+
+ /*
+ * Destroy enclave on ENCLS failure as this means that EPC has been
+ * invalidated.
+ */
+ if (ret == -EIO) {
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+ sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
+ * @encl: pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer)
+ * @arg: a user pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_add_pages instance
+ *
+ * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally extend the
+ * measurement with the contents of the page. The address range of pages must
+ * be contiguous. The SECINFO and measurement mask are applied to all pages.
+ *
+ * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because
+ * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in
+ * the measurement.
+ *
+ * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For each page
+ * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following
+ * heuristics:
+ *
+ * 1. A regular page: PROT_R, PROT_W and PROT_X match the SECINFO permissions.
+ * 2. A TCS page: PROT_R | PROT_W.
+ *
+ * mmap() is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum protection bits
+ * within the given address range.
+ *
+ * If ENCLS opcode fails, that effectively means that EPC has been invalidated.
+ * When this happens the enclave is destroyed and -EIO is returned to the
+ * caller.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * -EACCES if an executable source page is located in a noexec partition,
+ * -EIO if either ENCLS[EADD] or ENCLS[EEXTEND] fails
+ * -errno otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_add_pages addp;
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ unsigned long c;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (addp.offset + addp.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)addp.secinfo,
+ sizeof(secinfo)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (c = 0 ; c < addp.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ ret = -EINTR;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (need_resched())
+ cond_resched();
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp.src + c, addp.offset + c,
+ addp.length - c, &secinfo, addp.flags);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ addp.count = c;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(arg, &addp, sizeof(addp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sgx_get_key_hash(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const void *modulus,
+ void *hash)
+{
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
+
+ shash->tfm = tfm;
+
+ return crypto_shash_digest(shash, modulus, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, hash);
+}
+
+static int sgx_get_key_hash(const void *modulus, void *hash)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ int ret;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ ret = __sgx_get_key_hash(tfm, modulus, hash);
+
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash_msrs(u64 *lepubkeyhash, bool enforce)
+{
+ u64 *cache;
+ int i;
+
+ cache = per_cpu(sgx_lepubkeyhash_cache, smp_processor_id());
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+ if (enforce || (lepubkeyhash[i] != cache[i])) {
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 + i, lepubkeyhash[i]);
+ cache[i] = lepubkeyhash[i];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int sgx_einit(struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct, void *token,
+ struct sgx_epc_page *secs, u64 *lepubkeyhash)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ preempt_disable();
+ sgx_update_lepubkeyhash_msrs(lepubkeyhash, false);
+ ret = __einit(sigstruct, token, sgx_get_epc_addr(secs));
+ if (ret == SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN) {
+ sgx_update_lepubkeyhash_msrs(lepubkeyhash, true);
+ ret = __einit(sigstruct, token, sgx_get_epc_addr(secs));
+ }
+ preempt_enable();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
+ void *token)
+{
+ u64 mrsigner[4];
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+ int j;
+
+ /* Check that the required attributes have been authorized. */
+ if (encl->secs_attributes & ~encl->allowed_attributes)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) {
+ ret = sgx_einit(sigstruct, token, encl->secs.epc_page,
+ mrsigner);
+ if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+ continue;
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+ break;
+
+ msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME);
+
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) {
+ if (encls_failed(ret))
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT");
+
+ sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ } else if (ret) {
+ pr_debug("EINIT returned %d\n", ret);
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ } else {
+ atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags);
+ }
+
+err_out:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
+ *
+ * @filep: open file to /dev/sgx
+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_init instance
+ *
+ * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The
+ * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match
+ * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * SGX error code on EINIT failure,
+ * -errno otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct;
+ struct sgx_enclave_init einit;
+ struct page *initp_page;
+ void *token;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&einit, arg, sizeof(einit)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ initp_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!initp_page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ sigstruct = kmap(initp_page);
+ token = (void *)((unsigned long)sigstruct + PAGE_SIZE / 2);
+ memset(token, 0, SGX_LAUNCH_TOKEN_SIZE);
+
+ if (copy_from_user(sigstruct, (void __user *)einit.sigstruct,
+ sizeof(*sigstruct))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A legacy field used with Intel signed enclaves. These used to mean
+ * regular and architectural enclaves. The CPU only accepts these values
+ * but they do not have any other meaning.
+ *
+ * Thus, reject any other values.
+ */
+ if (sigstruct->header.vendor != 0x0000 &&
+ sigstruct->header.vendor != 0x8086) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_init(encl, sigstruct, token);
+
+out:
+ kunmap(initp_page);
+ __free_page(initp_page);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data;
+ int ret, encl_flags;
+
+ encl_flags = atomic_fetch_or(SGX_ENCL_IOCTL, &encl->flags);
+ if (encl_flags & SGX_ENCL_IOCTL)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (encl_flags & SGX_ENCL_DEAD) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_create(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_init(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
+ break;
+ }
+
+out:
+ atomic_andnot(SGX_ENCL_IOCTL, &encl->flags);
+
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
index b776d249289f..506cb0756147 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "driver.h"
+#include "encl.h"
#include "encls.h"
struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS];
@@ -259,6 +261,8 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void)
static void __init sgx_init(void)
{
+ int ret;
+
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX))
return;
@@ -268,8 +272,15 @@ static void __init sgx_init(void)
if (!sgx_page_reclaimer_init())
goto err_page_cache;
+ ret = sgx_drv_init();
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_kthread;
+
return;
+err_kthread:
+ kthread_stop(ksgxswapd_tsk);
+
err_page_cache:
sgx_page_cache_teardown();
}
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-25 17:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-25 18:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-25 20:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-25 18:53 ` Borislav Petkov
` (4 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 2 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-25 17:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Sean Christopherson,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that
> can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and
> data. The code outside the SGX hosted software entity is disallowed to
> access the memory inside the enclave enforced by the CPU. We call these
> entities as enclaves.
>
> This commit implements a driver that provides an ioctl API to construct
> and run enclaves. Enclaves are constructed from pages residing in
> reserved physical memory areas. The contents of these pages can only be
> accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware
> thread running inside the enclave.
>
> The starting state of an enclave consists of a fixed measured set of
> pages that are copied to the EPC during the construction process by
> using ENCLS leaf functions and Software Enclave Control Structure (SECS)
> that defines the enclave properties.
>
> Enclave are constructed by using ENCLS leaf functions ECREATE, EADD and
> EINIT. ECREATE initializes SECS, EADD copies pages from system memory to
> the EPC and EINIT check a given signed measurement and moves the enclave
> into a state ready for execution.
>
> An initialized enclave can only be accessed through special Thread Control
> Structure (TCS) pages by using ENCLU (ring-3 only) leaf EENTER. This leaf
> function converts a thread into enclave mode and continues the execution in
> the offset defined by the TCS provided to EENTER. An enclave is exited
> through syscall, exception, interrupts or by explicitly calling another
> ENCLU leaf EEXIT.
>
> The permissions, which enclave page is added will set the limit for maximum
> permissions that can be set for mmap() and mprotect(). This will
> effectively allow to build different security schemes between producers and
> consumers of enclaves. Later on we can increase granularity with LSM hooks
> for page addition (i.e. for producers) and mapping of the enclave (i.e. for
> consumers)
>
> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
> Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
> Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>
> Tested-by: Chunyang Hui <sanqian.hcy@antfin.com>
> Tested-by: Jordan Hand <jorhand@linux.microsoft.com>
> Tested-by: Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>
> Tested-by: Seth Moore <sethmo@google.com>
> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> Co-developed-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> .../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 66 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 3 +
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 194 +++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 30 +
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 335 +++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 87 +++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 706 ++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 11 +
> 9 files changed, 1433 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
> index 59472cd6a11d..35f713e3a267 100644
> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
> @@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Code Seq# Include File Comments
> <mailto:tlewis@mindspring.com>
> 0xA3 90-9F linux/dtlk.h
> 0xA4 00-1F uapi/linux/tee.h Generic TEE subsystem
> +0xA4 00-1F uapi/asm/sgx.h Intel SGX subsystem (a legit conflict as TEE and SGX do not co-exist)
> 0xAA 00-3F linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
> 0xAB 00-1F linux/nbd.h
> 0xAC 00-1F linux/raw.h
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..5edb08ab8fd0
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) WITH Linux-syscall-note */
Checkpatch complains here:
WARNING: 'SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) WITH Linux-syscall-note */' is not supported in LICENSES/...
#114: FILE: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h:1:
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) WITH Linux-syscall-note */
Also, you had all patches until now split nice and logically doing one
thing only.
But this one is huge. Why?
Why can't you split out the facilities which the driver uses: encl.[ch]
into a patch, then ioctl.c into a separate one and then the driver into
a third one? Or do they all belong together inseparably?
I guess I'll find out eventually but it would've been nice if they were
split out...
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-25 17:23 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-25 18:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-25 18:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-26 14:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-25 20:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 2 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2020-06-25 18:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 07:23:19PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> Also, you had all patches until now split nice and logically doing one
> thing only.
>
> But this one is huge. Why?
>
> Why can't you split out the facilities which the driver uses: encl.[ch]
> into a patch, then ioctl.c into a separate one and then the driver into
> a third one? Or do they all belong together inseparably?
>
> I guess I'll find out eventually but it would've been nice if they were
> split out...
Hmm, I think the most reasonable way to break up this beast would be to
incrementally introduce functionality. E.g. four or so patches, one for
each ioctl() of ENCLAVE_CREATE, ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES, ENCLAVE_INIT and
ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE, in that order.
Splitting up by file probably wouldn't work very well. The split is
pretty arbitrary, e.g. encl.[ch] isn't simply a pure representation of an
enclave, there is a lot of the driver details/dependencies in there, i.e.
the functionality between encl/ioctl/driver is all pretty intertwined.
But I think serially introducing each ioctl() would be fairly clean, and
would help readers/reviewers better understand SGX as the patches would
naturally document the process of building an enclave, e.g. CREATE the
enclave, then ADD_PAGES, then INIT the enclave. SET_ATTRIBUTE is a bit
of an outlier in that it would be chronologically out of order with
respect to building the enclave, but I think that's ok.
Jarkko, thoughts?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-25 18:34 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-06-25 18:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-26 14:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-25 18:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 11:34:48AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Hmm, I think the most reasonable way to break up this beast would be to
> incrementally introduce functionality. E.g. four or so patches, one for
> each ioctl() of ENCLAVE_CREATE, ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES, ENCLAVE_INIT and
> ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE, in that order.
Yeah, I guess I can try reviewing it this way too and address each ioctl
separately. You can try splitting later so that we don't waste time now.
It would be good to have it split eventually, though, so that it is more
palatable for other rewiewers too...
> Splitting up by file probably wouldn't work very well. The split is
> pretty arbitrary, e.g. encl.[ch] isn't simply a pure representation of an
> enclave, there is a lot of the driver details/dependencies in there, i.e.
> the functionality between encl/ioctl/driver is all pretty intertwined.
... provided the functionality is not too intertwined to make a split
actually worse than a single big patch.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-25 18:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-25 18:45 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-26 14:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-26 14:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Borislav Petkov, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 11:34:48AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 07:23:19PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > Also, you had all patches until now split nice and logically doing one
> > thing only.
> >
> > But this one is huge. Why?
> >
> > Why can't you split out the facilities which the driver uses: encl.[ch]
> > into a patch, then ioctl.c into a separate one and then the driver into
> > a third one? Or do they all belong together inseparably?
> >
> > I guess I'll find out eventually but it would've been nice if they were
> > split out...
>
> Hmm, I think the most reasonable way to break up this beast would be to
> incrementally introduce functionality. E.g. four or so patches, one for
> each ioctl() of ENCLAVE_CREATE, ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES, ENCLAVE_INIT and
> ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE, in that order.
>
> Splitting up by file probably wouldn't work very well. The split is
> pretty arbitrary, e.g. encl.[ch] isn't simply a pure representation of an
> enclave, there is a lot of the driver details/dependencies in there, i.e.
> the functionality between encl/ioctl/driver is all pretty intertwined.
>
> But I think serially introducing each ioctl() would be fairly clean, and
> would help readers/reviewers better understand SGX as the patches would
> naturally document the process of building an enclave, e.g. CREATE the
> enclave, then ADD_PAGES, then INIT the enclave. SET_ATTRIBUTE is a bit
> of an outlier in that it would be chronologically out of order with
> respect to building the enclave, but I think that's ok.
>
> Jarkko, thoughts?
I proposed the same before I go this email so I guess we have a
consensus here.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-25 17:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-25 18:34 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-06-25 20:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-25 20:25 ` Borislav Petkov
1 sibling, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-25 20:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Sean Christopherson,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 07:23:19PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that
> > can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and
> > data. The code outside the SGX hosted software entity is disallowed to
> > access the memory inside the enclave enforced by the CPU. We call these
> > entities as enclaves.
> >
> > This commit implements a driver that provides an ioctl API to construct
> > and run enclaves. Enclaves are constructed from pages residing in
> > reserved physical memory areas. The contents of these pages can only be
> > accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware
> > thread running inside the enclave.
> >
> > The starting state of an enclave consists of a fixed measured set of
> > pages that are copied to the EPC during the construction process by
> > using ENCLS leaf functions and Software Enclave Control Structure (SECS)
> > that defines the enclave properties.
> >
> > Enclave are constructed by using ENCLS leaf functions ECREATE, EADD and
> > EINIT. ECREATE initializes SECS, EADD copies pages from system memory to
> > the EPC and EINIT check a given signed measurement and moves the enclave
> > into a state ready for execution.
> >
> > An initialized enclave can only be accessed through special Thread Control
> > Structure (TCS) pages by using ENCLU (ring-3 only) leaf EENTER. This leaf
> > function converts a thread into enclave mode and continues the execution in
> > the offset defined by the TCS provided to EENTER. An enclave is exited
> > through syscall, exception, interrupts or by explicitly calling another
> > ENCLU leaf EEXIT.
> >
> > The permissions, which enclave page is added will set the limit for maximum
> > permissions that can be set for mmap() and mprotect(). This will
> > effectively allow to build different security schemes between producers and
> > consumers of enclaves. Later on we can increase granularity with LSM hooks
> > for page addition (i.e. for producers) and mapping of the enclave (i.e. for
> > consumers)
> >
> > Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> > Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
> > Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
> > Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>
> > Tested-by: Chunyang Hui <sanqian.hcy@antfin.com>
> > Tested-by: Jordan Hand <jorhand@linux.microsoft.com>
> > Tested-by: Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>
> > Tested-by: Seth Moore <sethmo@google.com>
> > Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> > Co-developed-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> > ---
> > .../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst | 1 +
> > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 66 ++
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 3 +
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 194 +++++
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 30 +
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 335 +++++++++
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 87 +++
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 706 ++++++++++++++++++
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 11 +
> > 9 files changed, 1433 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
> > create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
> > create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
> > create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
> > create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
> > create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
> > index 59472cd6a11d..35f713e3a267 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
> > @@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Code Seq# Include File Comments
> > <mailto:tlewis@mindspring.com>
> > 0xA3 90-9F linux/dtlk.h
> > 0xA4 00-1F uapi/linux/tee.h Generic TEE subsystem
> > +0xA4 00-1F uapi/asm/sgx.h Intel SGX subsystem (a legit conflict as TEE and SGX do not co-exist)
> > 0xAA 00-3F linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
> > 0xAB 00-1F linux/nbd.h
> > 0xAC 00-1F linux/raw.h
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..5edb08ab8fd0
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) WITH Linux-syscall-note */
>
> Checkpatch complains here:
>
> WARNING: 'SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) WITH Linux-syscall-note */' is not supported in LICENSES/...
> #114: FILE: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h:1:
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) WITH Linux-syscall-note */
>
> Also, you had all patches until now split nice and logically doing one
> thing only.
>
> But this one is huge. Why?
>
> Why can't you split out the facilities which the driver uses: encl.[ch]
> into a patch, then ioctl.c into a separate one and then the driver into
> a third one? Or do they all belong together inseparably?
>
> I guess I'll find out eventually but it would've been nice if they were
> split out...
It's still kind a strongly connected set of functionalities, but I get
your point.
I'd consider splitting for a slighly different angle:
1. Commit for the base driver.
2. Commit for each ioctl, adding the necessary "framework" to get that
piece of functionality completed. The order would be:
A. Create
B. Add
C. Initialize
Would be probably easier to review also this way because the commit kind
of rationalizes why things exist.
What do you think?
/Jarkko
/Jarkko
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-25 20:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-25 20:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-26 13:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-25 20:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Sean Christopherson,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 11:21:48PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Would be probably easier to review also this way because the commit kind
> of rationalizes why things exist.
>
> What do you think?
Sounds like a plan but you can do this for the next version - no need to
do it now. I'll try to review this way, per ioctl as I said in my mail
to Sean.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-25 20:25 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-26 13:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-26 13:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Sean Christopherson,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 10:25:39PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 11:21:48PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Would be probably easier to review also this way because the commit kind
> > of rationalizes why things exist.
> >
> > What do you think?
>
> Sounds like a plan but you can do this for the next version - no need to
> do it now. I'll try to review this way, per ioctl as I said in my mail
> to Sean.
OK, sure I won't rush with a new version :-)
The code has been reworked so many times that it is somewhat easy to
make such split and I think it is one measure that an implementation is
somewhat sound when parts of functionality build up cleanly on top of
each other.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-25 17:23 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-25 18:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-26 14:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-26 9:14 ` Borislav Petkov
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-25 18:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Sean Christopherson,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
^
Add
> Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that
> can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and
> data. The code outside the SGX hosted software entity is disallowed to
> access the memory inside the enclave enforced by the CPU. We call these
> entities as enclaves.
s/as //
> This commit implements a driver that provides an ioctl API to construct
s/This commit implements/Implement/
> and run enclaves. Enclaves are constructed from pages residing in
> reserved physical memory areas. The contents of these pages can only be
> accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware
> thread running inside the enclave.
>
> The starting state of an enclave consists of a fixed measured set of
> pages that are copied to the EPC during the construction process by
> using ENCLS leaf functions and Software Enclave Control Structure (SECS)
> that defines the enclave properties.
>
> Enclave are constructed by using ENCLS leaf functions ECREATE, EADD and
Enclaves
> EINIT. ECREATE initializes SECS, EADD copies pages from system memory to
> the EPC and EINIT check a given signed measurement and moves the enclave
checks
> into a state ready for execution.
>
> An initialized enclave can only be accessed through special Thread Control
> Structure (TCS) pages by using ENCLU (ring-3 only) leaf EENTER. This leaf
> function converts a thread into enclave mode and continues the execution in
> the offset defined by the TCS provided to EENTER. An enclave is exited
> through syscall, exception, interrupts or by explicitly calling another
> ENCLU leaf EEXIT.
>
> The permissions, which enclave page is added will set the limit for maximum
> permissions that can be set for mmap() and mprotect().
I can't parse that sentence.
> This will
> effectively allow to build different security schemes between producers and
> consumers of enclaves. Later on we can increase granularity with LSM hooks
> for page addition (i.e. for producers) and mapping of the enclave (i.e. for
> consumers)
Other than that, nice explanation. I like that in a commit message.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-25 18:53 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-26 14:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-26 14:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Sean Christopherson,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 08:53:34PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>
> > Subject: Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
> ^
> Add
I'll change it to "Add SGX enclave driver".
>
> > Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that
> > can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and
> > data. The code outside the SGX hosted software entity is disallowed to
> > access the memory inside the enclave enforced by the CPU. We call these
> > entities as enclaves.
>
> s/as //
>
> > This commit implements a driver that provides an ioctl API to construct
>
> s/This commit implements/Implement/
>
> > and run enclaves. Enclaves are constructed from pages residing in
> > reserved physical memory areas. The contents of these pages can only be
> > accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware
> > thread running inside the enclave.
> >
> > The starting state of an enclave consists of a fixed measured set of
> > pages that are copied to the EPC during the construction process by
> > using ENCLS leaf functions and Software Enclave Control Structure (SECS)
> > that defines the enclave properties.
> >
> > Enclave are constructed by using ENCLS leaf functions ECREATE, EADD and
>
> Enclaves
>
> > EINIT. ECREATE initializes SECS, EADD copies pages from system memory to
> > the EPC and EINIT check a given signed measurement and moves the enclave
>
> checks
>
> > into a state ready for execution.
> >
> > An initialized enclave can only be accessed through special Thread Control
> > Structure (TCS) pages by using ENCLU (ring-3 only) leaf EENTER. This leaf
> > function converts a thread into enclave mode and continues the execution in
> > the offset defined by the TCS provided to EENTER. An enclave is exited
> > through syscall, exception, interrupts or by explicitly calling another
> > ENCLU leaf EEXIT.
> >
> > The permissions, which enclave page is added will set the limit for maximum
> > permissions that can be set for mmap() and mprotect().
>
> I can't parse that sentence.
Neither can I.
> > This will
> > effectively allow to build different security schemes between producers and
> > consumers of enclaves. Later on we can increase granularity with LSM hooks
> > for page addition (i.e. for producers) and mapping of the enclave (i.e. for
> > consumers)
I rephrased the whole paragraph:
"
The mmap() permissions are capped by the contained enclave page
permissions. The mapped areas must also be opaque, i.e. each page address
must contain a page. This logic is implemented in sgx_encl_may_map().
"
> Other than that, nice explanation. I like that in a commit message.
>
> Thx.
Thank you.
>
> --
> Regards/Gruss,
> Boris.
>
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-25 17:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-25 18:53 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-26 9:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-26 14:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-03 3:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-26 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
` (2 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 2 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-26 9:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Sean Christopherson,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
> index 59472cd6a11d..35f713e3a267 100644
> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
> @@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Code Seq# Include File Comments
> <mailto:tlewis@mindspring.com>
> 0xA3 90-9F linux/dtlk.h
> 0xA4 00-1F uapi/linux/tee.h Generic TEE subsystem
> +0xA4 00-1F uapi/asm/sgx.h Intel SGX subsystem (a legit conflict as TEE and SGX do not co-exist)
Maybe add <mailto:linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org> ?
> 0xAA 00-3F linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
> 0xAB 00-1F linux/nbd.h
> 0xAC 00-1F linux/raw.h
...
> +static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
> +{
> + unsigned long encl_size = secs->size + PAGE_SIZE;
Wait, you just copied @secs from user memory in sgx_ioc_enclave_create()
and now use ->size unverified? You're kidding, right?
> + struct sgx_epc_page *secs_epc;
> + unsigned long ssaframesize;
> + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
> + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
> + struct file *backing;
> + long ret;
> +
> + if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + ssaframesize = sgx_calc_ssaframesize(secs->miscselect, secs->xfrm);
So this is using more un-validated user input to do further calculations.
What can possibly go wrong?
I sure hope *I* am wrong and am missing something here.
If not, please, for the next version, audit all your user input and
validate it before using it. Srsly.
> + if (sgx_validate_secs(secs, ssaframesize)) {
> + pr_debug("invalid SECS\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + backing = shmem_file_setup("SGX backing", encl_size + (encl_size >> 5),
> + VM_NORESERVE);
> + if (IS_ERR(backing))
> + return PTR_ERR(backing);
> +
> + encl->backing = backing;
> +
> + secs_epc = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
> + if (IS_ERR(secs_epc)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(secs_epc);
> + goto err_out_backing;
> + }
> +
> + encl->secs.epc_page = secs_epc;
> +
> + pginfo.addr = 0;
> + pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)secs;
> + pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
> + pginfo.secs = 0;
> + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
> +
> + ret = __ecreate((void *)&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_addr(secs_epc));
> + if (ret) {
> + pr_debug("ECREATE returned %ld\n", ret);
> + goto err_out;
> + }
> +
> + if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_DEBUG)
> + atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags);
> +
> + encl->secs.encl = encl;
> + encl->secs_attributes = secs->attributes;
> + encl->allowed_attributes |= SGX_ATTR_ALLOWED_MASK;
> + encl->base = secs->base;
> + encl->size = secs->size;
> + encl->ssaframesize = secs->ssa_frame_size;
> +
> + /*
> + * Set SGX_ENCL_CREATED only after the enclave is fully prepped. This
> + * allows setting and checking enclave creation without having to take
> + * encl->lock.
> + */
> + atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags);
> +
> + return 0;
> +
> +err_out:
> + sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
> + encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
> +
> +err_out_backing:
> + fput(encl->backing);
> + encl->backing = NULL;
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * sgx_ioc_enclave_create - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE
> + * @filep: open file to /dev/sgx
That's
@encl: enclave pointer
or so.
> + * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_create instance
> + *
> + * Allocate kernel data structures for a new enclave and execute ECREATE after
> + * verifying the correctness of the provided SECS.
> + *
> + * Note, enforcement of restricted and disallowed attributes is deferred until
> + * sgx_ioc_enclave_init(), only the architectural correctness of the SECS is
> + * checked by sgx_ioc_enclave_create().
Well, I don't see that checking. Where is it?
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * 0 on success,
> + * -errno otherwise
> + */
> +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
> +{
> + struct sgx_enclave_create ecreate;
> + struct page *secs_page;
> + struct sgx_secs *secs;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&ecreate, arg, sizeof(ecreate)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + secs_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!secs_page)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + secs = kmap(secs_page);
> + if (copy_from_user(secs, (void __user *)ecreate.src, sizeof(*secs))) {
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + ret = sgx_encl_create(encl, secs);
> +
> +out:
> + kunmap(secs_page);
> + __free_page(secs_page);
> + return ret;
> +}
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-26 9:14 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-26 14:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-26 14:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-07-03 3:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2020-06-26 14:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 11:14:19AM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > +static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long encl_size = secs->size + PAGE_SIZE;
>
> Wait, you just copied @secs from user memory in sgx_ioc_enclave_create()
> and now use ->size unverified? You're kidding, right?
The size of the enclave is checked in sgx_validate_secs() before it is used
to configure the shmem backing.
> > + struct sgx_epc_page *secs_epc;
> > + unsigned long ssaframesize;
> > + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
> > + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
> > + struct file *backing;
> > + long ret;
> > +
> > + if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + ssaframesize = sgx_calc_ssaframesize(secs->miscselect, secs->xfrm);
>
> So this is using more un-validated user input to do further calculations.
> What can possibly go wrong?
ssaframesize is also validated below, and the computations on miscselect and
xfm in sgx_calc_ssaframesize() are bounded such that bad input won't send
the kernel into the weeds.
That being said, I agree that it would be safer to move sgx_calc_ssaframesize()
inside sgx_validate_secs() and only compute encl_size after the secs is
validated.
> I sure hope *I* am wrong and am missing something here.
>
> If not, please, for the next version, audit all your user input and
> validate it before using it. Srsly.
>
> > + if (sgx_validate_secs(secs, ssaframesize)) {
> > + pr_debug("invalid SECS\n");
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + backing = shmem_file_setup("SGX backing", encl_size + (encl_size >> 5),
> > + VM_NORESERVE);
> > + if (IS_ERR(backing))
> > + return PTR_ERR(backing);
> > +
> > + encl->backing = backing;
> > +
> > + secs_epc = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
> > + if (IS_ERR(secs_epc)) {
> > + ret = PTR_ERR(secs_epc);
> > + goto err_out_backing;
> > + }
> > +
> > + encl->secs.epc_page = secs_epc;
> > +
> > + pginfo.addr = 0;
> > + pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)secs;
> > + pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
> > + pginfo.secs = 0;
> > + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
> > +
> > + ret = __ecreate((void *)&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_addr(secs_epc));
> > + if (ret) {
> > + pr_debug("ECREATE returned %ld\n", ret);
> > + goto err_out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_DEBUG)
> > + atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags);
> > +
> > + encl->secs.encl = encl;
> > + encl->secs_attributes = secs->attributes;
> > + encl->allowed_attributes |= SGX_ATTR_ALLOWED_MASK;
> > + encl->base = secs->base;
> > + encl->size = secs->size;
> > + encl->ssaframesize = secs->ssa_frame_size;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Set SGX_ENCL_CREATED only after the enclave is fully prepped. This
> > + * allows setting and checking enclave creation without having to take
> > + * encl->lock.
> > + */
> > + atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags);
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > +err_out:
> > + sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
> > + encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
> > +
> > +err_out_backing:
> > + fput(encl->backing);
> > + encl->backing = NULL;
> > +
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * sgx_ioc_enclave_create - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE
> > + * @filep: open file to /dev/sgx
>
> That's
>
> @encl: enclave pointer
>
> or so.
>
> > + * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_create instance
> > + *
> > + * Allocate kernel data structures for a new enclave and execute ECREATE after
> > + * verifying the correctness of the provided SECS.
> > + *
> > + * Note, enforcement of restricted and disallowed attributes is deferred until
> > + * sgx_ioc_enclave_init(), only the architectural correctness of the SECS is
> > + * checked by sgx_ioc_enclave_create().
>
> Well, I don't see that checking. Where is it?
>
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * 0 on success,
> > + * -errno otherwise
> > + */
> > +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
> > +{
> > + struct sgx_enclave_create ecreate;
> > + struct page *secs_page;
> > + struct sgx_secs *secs;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + if (copy_from_user(&ecreate, arg, sizeof(ecreate)))
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > + secs_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!secs_page)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > + secs = kmap(secs_page);
> > + if (copy_from_user(secs, (void __user *)ecreate.src, sizeof(*secs))) {
> > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + ret = sgx_encl_create(encl, secs);
> > +
> > +out:
> > + kunmap(secs_page);
> > + __free_page(secs_page);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
>
> --
> Regards/Gruss,
> Boris.
>
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-26 14:16 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-06-26 14:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-07-03 23:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-26 14:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 07:16:27AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> That being said, I agree that it would be safer to move sgx_calc_ssaframesize()
> inside sgx_validate_secs() and only compute encl_size after the secs is
> validated.
Yap, that would be the right thing to do.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-26 14:20 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-07-03 23:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-07-03 23:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Sean Christopherson, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 04:20:19PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 07:16:27AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > That being said, I agree that it would be safer to move sgx_calc_ssaframesize()
> > inside sgx_validate_secs() and only compute encl_size after the secs is
> > validated.
>
Changed as
if (!secs->ssa_frame_size)
return -EINVAL;
if (sgx_calc_ssa_frame_size(secs->miscselect, secs->xfrm) >
secs->ssa_frame_size)
return -EINVAL;
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-26 9:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-26 14:16 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-07-03 3:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-07-03 3:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Sean Christopherson,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 11:14:19AM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
> > index 59472cd6a11d..35f713e3a267 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
> > @@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Code Seq# Include File Comments
> > <mailto:tlewis@mindspring.com>
> > 0xA3 90-9F linux/dtlk.h
> > 0xA4 00-1F uapi/linux/tee.h Generic TEE subsystem
> > +0xA4 00-1F uapi/asm/sgx.h Intel SGX subsystem (a legit conflict as TEE and SGX do not co-exist)
>
> Maybe add <mailto:linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org> ?
>
> > 0xAA 00-3F linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
> > 0xAB 00-1F linux/nbd.h
> > 0xAC 00-1F linux/raw.h
>
> ...
>
> > +static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long encl_size = secs->size + PAGE_SIZE;
>
> Wait, you just copied @secs from user memory in sgx_ioc_enclave_create()
> and now use ->size unverified? You're kidding, right?
The validation is done in sgx_validate_secs().
>
> > + struct sgx_epc_page *secs_epc;
> > + unsigned long ssaframesize;
> > + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
> > + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
> > + struct file *backing;
> > + long ret;
> > +
> > + if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + ssaframesize = sgx_calc_ssaframesize(secs->miscselect, secs->xfrm);
>
> So this is using more un-validated user input to do further calculations.
> What can possibly go wrong?
>
> I sure hope *I* am wrong and am missing something here.
>
> If not, please, for the next version, audit all your user input and
> validate it before using it. Srsly.
It works but is unclean. I'd guess reason for this is just that code has
evolved into this state over time.
I'd just move the call to sgx_calc_ssaframesize() inside
sgx_validate_secs().
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver Jarkko Sakkinen
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-26 9:14 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-26 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-07-04 0:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-26 21:26 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-27 17:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-07-02 3:59 ` Sean Christopherson
5 siblings, 2 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-26 15:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Sean Christopherson,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
...
This could use some commenting along the lines of:
"— If the enclave developer requires measurement of the page as a
proof for the content, use EEXTEND to add a measurement for 256 bytes of
the page. Repeat this operation until the entire page is measured."
At least this text from the SDM maps to the 256 bytes below. Otherwise
it is magic.
> +static int __sgx_encl_extend(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
> +{
> + int ret;
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
> + ret = __eextend(sgx_get_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page),
> + sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page) + (i * 0x100));
> + if (ret) {
> + if (encls_failed(ret))
> + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EEXTEND");
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
> + unsigned long offset, unsigned long length,
> + struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long flags)
> +{
> + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
> + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
> + int ret;
> +
> + encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, offset, secinfo->flags);
> + if (IS_ERR(encl_page))
> + return PTR_ERR(encl_page);
> +
> + epc_page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
> + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
> + kfree(encl_page);
> + return PTR_ERR(epc_page);
> + }
> +
> + if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) &
> + (SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED | SGX_ENCL_DEAD)) {
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto err_out_free;
> + }
You can do this first thing when you enter the function so that
you don't have to allocate needlessly in the error case, when
SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED | SGX_ENCL_DEAD is set.
> +
> + mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
> + mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
> +
> + /*
> + * Insert prior to EADD in case of OOM. EADD modifies MRENCLAVE, i.e.
> + * can't be gracefully unwound, while failure on EADD/EXTEND is limited
> + * to userspace errors (or kernel/hardware bugs).
> + */
> + ret = radix_tree_insert(&encl->page_tree, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc),
> + encl_page);
> + if (ret)
> + goto err_out_unlock;
> +
> + ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, secinfo,
> + src);
> + if (ret)
> + goto err_out;
> +
> + /*
> + * Complete the "add" before doing the "extend" so that the "add"
> + * isn't in a half-baked state in the extremely unlikely scenario the
> + * the enclave will be destroyed in response to EEXTEND failure.
> + */
> + encl_page->encl = encl;
> + encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
> + encl->secs_child_cnt++;
> +
> + if (flags & SGX_PAGE_MEASURE) {
> + ret = __sgx_encl_extend(encl, epc_page);
> + if (ret)
> + goto err_out;
> + }
> +
> + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
> + mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
> + return ret;
> +
> +err_out:
> + radix_tree_delete(&encl_page->encl->page_tree,
> + PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc));
> +
> +err_out_unlock:
> + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
> + mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
> +
> +err_out_free:
> + sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page);
> + kfree(encl_page);
> +
> + /*
> + * Destroy enclave on ENCLS failure as this means that EPC has been
> + * invalidated.
> + */
> + if (ret == -EIO) {
> + mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
> + sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
> + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
> + }
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
> + * @encl: pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer)
> + * @arg: a user pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_add_pages instance
> + *
> + * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally extend the
"uninitialized"?
Where is the test for SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED and erroring out otherwise?
I.e., what happens if you add pages to an initialized enclave?
> + * measurement with the contents of the page. The address range of pages must
> + * be contiguous.
Must? Who is enforcing this? I'm trying to find where...
> The SECINFO and measurement mask are applied to all pages.
> + *
> + * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because
> + * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in
> + * the measurement.
> + *
> + * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For each page
> + * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following
> + * heuristics:
> + *
> + * 1. A regular page: PROT_R, PROT_W and PROT_X match the SECINFO permissions.
> + * 2. A TCS page: PROT_R | PROT_W.
> + *
> + * mmap() is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum protection bits
> + * within the given address range.
> + *
> + * If ENCLS opcode fails, that effectively means that EPC has been invalidated.
> + * When this happens the enclave is destroyed and -EIO is returned to the
> + * caller.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * 0 on success,
> + * -EACCES if an executable source page is located in a noexec partition,
> + * -EIO if either ENCLS[EADD] or ENCLS[EEXTEND] fails
> + * -errno otherwise
> + */
> +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
> +{
> + struct sgx_enclave_add_pages addp;
> + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
> + unsigned long c;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
> + !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
> + return -EINVAL;
How many pages are allowed? Unlimited? I'm hoping some limits are
checked somewhere...
> +
> + if (addp.offset + addp.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)addp.secinfo,
> + sizeof(secinfo)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + for (c = 0 ; c < addp.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
> + if (signal_pending(current)) {
> + ret = -EINTR;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (need_resched())
> + cond_resched();
> +
> + ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp.src + c, addp.offset + c,
> + addp.length - c, &secinfo, addp.flags);
> + if (ret)
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + addp.count = c;
> +
> + if (copy_to_user(arg, &addp, sizeof(addp)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-26 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-07-04 0:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-26 21:26 ` Dave Hansen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-07-04 0:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Sean Christopherson,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 05:34:00PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>
> ...
>
> This could use some commenting along the lines of:
>
> "— If the enclave developer requires measurement of the page as a
> proof for the content, use EEXTEND to add a measurement for 256 bytes of
> the page. Repeat this operation until the entire page is measured."
>
> At least this text from the SDM maps to the 256 bytes below. Otherwise
> it is magic.
Copied with pride:
/*
* If the caller requires measurement of the page as a proof for the content,
* use EEXTEND to add a measurement for 256 bytes of the page. Repeat this
* operation until the entire page is measured."
*/
> > +static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
> > + unsigned long offset, unsigned long length,
> > + struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long flags)
> > +{
> > + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
> > + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, offset, secinfo->flags);
> > + if (IS_ERR(encl_page))
> > + return PTR_ERR(encl_page);
> > +
> > + epc_page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
> > + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
> > + kfree(encl_page);
> > + return PTR_ERR(epc_page);
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) &
> > + (SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED | SGX_ENCL_DEAD)) {
> > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > + goto err_out_free;
> > + }
>
> You can do this first thing when you enter the function so that
> you don't have to allocate needlessly in the error case, when
> SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED | SGX_ENCL_DEAD is set.
Updated version:
static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
unsigned long offset, unsigned long length,
struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long flags)
{
struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
int ret;
if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED)
return -EFAULT;
SGX_ENCL_DEAD check is unnecessary altogether as this flag cannot be
possibly be unset inside ioctl. 'sgx_release()' will set it which is
the release callback for the enclave file.
'sgx_ioctl()' also unnecessarily has this check I just noticed (and
removed).
> "uninitialized"?
>
> Where is the test for SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED and erroring out otherwise?
>
> I.e., what happens if you add pages to an initialized enclave?
Because of historical reasons it is in sgx_encl_add_page(). Then we
allowed ioctl's operate on enclave concurrently. Today we enforce
sequential operation on a single enclave with SGX_ENCL_IOCTL flag
because that is the only sane way to use the construction operations.
Therefore the check can be moved to sgx_ioc_encl_add_pages() if you
request so but first I have one remark to discuss.
I noticed that sometimes wrong state flags turn into -EINVAL and
sometimes into -EFAULT (like in the previous case). I'd suggest
that when the ioctl is blocked based encl->flags and only on that,
the ioctl would return -ENOIOCTLCMD in both cases, i.e. this
command is not available.
That would give much better aids for debugging user space code.
>
> > + * measurement with the contents of the page. The address range of pages must
> > + * be contiguous.
>
> Must? Who is enforcing this? I'm trying to find where...
Unfortunately I cannot recall what I meant when I wrote that. I removed
that sentence. I'm not sure what I meant exactly when I used 'contiguous'
here.
> > The SECINFO and measurement mask are applied to all pages.
> > + *
> > + * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because
> > + * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in
> > + * the measurement.
> > + *
> > + * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For each page
> > + * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following
> > + * heuristics:
> > + *
> > + * 1. A regular page: PROT_R, PROT_W and PROT_X match the SECINFO permissions.
> > + * 2. A TCS page: PROT_R | PROT_W.
> > + *
> > + * mmap() is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum protection bits
> > + * within the given address range.
> > + *
> > + * If ENCLS opcode fails, that effectively means that EPC has been invalidated.
> > + * When this happens the enclave is destroyed and -EIO is returned to the
> > + * caller.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * 0 on success,
> > + * -EACCES if an executable source page is located in a noexec partition,
> > + * -EIO if either ENCLS[EADD] or ENCLS[EEXTEND] fails
> > + * -errno otherwise
> > + */
> > +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
> > +{
> > + struct sgx_enclave_add_pages addp;
> > + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
> > + unsigned long c;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp)))
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > + if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
> > + !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)))
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > + if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
> > + return -EINVAL;
>
> How many pages are allowed? Unlimited? I'm hoping some limits are
> checked somewhere...
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE defines the address range, and thus sets the
limit on how many pages in total can be added to the enclave.
sgx_encl_size_max_64 contains the maximum size for the address range
and is initialized as follows:
cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
sgx_encl_size_max_64 = 1ULL << ((edx >> 8) & 0xFF);
[derived from sgx_drv_init()]
> > +
> > + if (addp.offset + addp.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)addp.secinfo,
> > + sizeof(secinfo)))
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > + if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + for (c = 0 ; c < addp.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
> > + if (signal_pending(current)) {
> > + ret = -EINTR;
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (need_resched())
> > + cond_resched();
> > +
> > + ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp.src + c, addp.offset + c,
> > + addp.length - c, &secinfo, addp.flags);
> > + if (ret)
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +
> > + addp.count = c;
If you referred with your previous question, how to limit the number of
pages that this ioctl can process in one run, it is already supported
in the API with 'addp.count'.
It'd be possible to add this if required:
addp.length = min(addp.length, SGX_ENCLAVE_IOC_ADD_PAGES_MAX_LENGTH));
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-26 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-07-04 0:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-10-26 21:26 ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-27 1:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-27 10:05 ` Borislav Petkov
1 sibling, 2 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2020-10-26 21:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov, Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Sean Christopherson,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, puiterwijk,
rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On 6/26/20 8:34 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>> + if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp)))
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
>> + !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)))
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> + if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
>> + return -EINVAL;
> How many pages are allowed? Unlimited? I'm hoping some limits are
> checked somewhere...
What were you concerned about here? Was it how long the syscall could
take, or that one user could exhaust all the enclave memory in one call?
Some later versions of this patch have a 1MB limit per to reduce how
long each SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES call spends in the kernel. But, I'm
not _sure_ that's what you were intending.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-10-26 21:26 ` Dave Hansen
@ 2020-10-27 1:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-27 10:05 ` Borislav Petkov
1 sibling, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-10-27 1:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dave Hansen
Cc: Borislav Petkov, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Sean Christopherson, Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko,
asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 02:26:13PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 6/26/20 8:34 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> >> + if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
> >> + return -EINVAL;
> >> +
> >> + if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp)))
> >> + return -EFAULT;
> >> +
> >> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
> >> + !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))
> >> + return -EINVAL;
> >> +
> >> + if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)))
> >> + return -EFAULT;
> >> +
> >> + if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
> >> + return -EINVAL;
> > How many pages are allowed? Unlimited? I'm hoping some limits are
> > checked somewhere...
>
> What were you concerned about here? Was it how long the syscall could
> take, or that one user could exhaust all the enclave memory in one call?
>
> Some later versions of this patch have a 1MB limit per to reduce how
> long each SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES call spends in the kernel. But, I'm
> not _sure_ that's what you were intending.
The loop does check for pending signals, i.e. it is possible to
interrupt it.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-10-26 21:26 ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-27 1:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-10-27 10:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-10-27 15:20 ` Dave Hansen
1 sibling, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-10-27 10:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dave Hansen
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Sean Christopherson, Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko,
asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 02:26:13PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> What were you concerned about here? Was it how long the syscall could
> take, or that one user could exhaust all the enclave memory in one call?
More the latter. And generally, to have a sanity-check on all requests
coming from luserspace.
> Some later versions of this patch have a 1MB limit per to reduce how
> long each SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES call spends in the kernel. But, I'm
> not _sure_ that's what you were intending.
Yeah, that was not my main goal - rather to sanity-check user input and
impose a sane limit.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-10-27 10:05 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-10-27 15:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-27 15:37 ` Borislav Petkov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2020-10-27 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Sean Christopherson, Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko,
asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On 10/27/20 3:05 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 02:26:13PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> What were you concerned about here? Was it how long the syscall could
>> take, or that one user could exhaust all the enclave memory in one call?
> More the latter. And generally, to have a sanity-check on all requests
> coming from luserspace.
I can't think of a *lot* of spots where we have sanity checks like this
for memory. We have cgroups and the overcommit limits. But, in
general, folks can allocate as much memory as they want until
allocations start to fail.
Should SGX be any different?
If we had a sanity check that said, "you can only allocate 1/2 of
enclave memory", wouldn't that just make somebody mad because they want
one big enclave?
Or, do you just want a sanity check to see if, up front, the user is
asking for more enclave memory than there is on the *whole* system?
That's also sane, but it doesn't take overcommit into account. That's
why, for instance, we have vm.overcommit_ratio for normal memory.
BTW, I think we all agree that a cgroup controller for enclave memory is
going to be needed eventually.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-10-27 15:20 ` Dave Hansen
@ 2020-10-27 15:37 ` Borislav Petkov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-10-27 15:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dave Hansen
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Sean Christopherson, Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko,
asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 08:20:00AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> I can't think of a *lot* of spots where we have sanity checks like this
> for memory. We have cgroups and the overcommit limits. But, in
> general, folks can allocate as much memory as they want until
> allocations start to fail.
>
> Should SGX be any different?
>
> If we had a sanity check that said, "you can only allocate 1/2 of
> enclave memory", wouldn't that just make somebody mad because they want
> one big enclave?
>
> Or, do you just want a sanity check to see if, up front, the user is
> asking for more enclave memory than there is on the *whole* system?
> That's also sane, but it doesn't take overcommit into account. That's
> why, for instance, we have vm.overcommit_ratio for normal memory.
Yeah, you're making sense and there's really no need for SGX to be any
different. Especially since users are already familiar the "policy" of
failing allocations when too much memory requested. :-)
> BTW, I think we all agree that a cgroup controller for enclave memory is
> going to be needed eventually.
Right.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver Jarkko Sakkinen
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-26 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-27 17:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-29 15:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-04 1:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-02 3:59 ` Sean Christopherson
5 siblings, 2 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-27 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Sean Christopherson,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> +static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
> + void *token)
> +{
> + u64 mrsigner[4];
> + int ret;
> + int i;
> + int j;
> +
> + /* Check that the required attributes have been authorized. */
> + if (encl->secs_attributes & ~encl->allowed_attributes)
> + return -EACCES;
> +
> + ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
> +
> + if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) {
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto err_out;
> + }
That test should be the first thing this function or its caller does.
> + for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) {
> + for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) {
Ew, what's that double-loop for?
It tries to init an enclave a bunch of times. Why does it need to init
more than once?
> + ret = sgx_einit(sigstruct, token, encl->secs.epc_page,
> + mrsigner);
> + if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
> + continue;
> + else
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
> + break;
> +
> + msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME);
> +
> + if (signal_pending(current)) {
> + ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
> + goto err_out;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) {
> + if (encls_failed(ret))
> + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT");
> +
> + sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + } else if (ret) {
> + pr_debug("EINIT returned %d\n", ret);
> + ret = -EPERM;
> + } else {
> + atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags);
> + }
> +
> +err_out:
> + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * sgx_ioc_enclave_init - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
> + *
> + * @filep: open file to /dev/sgx
@encl: pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer)
> + * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_init instance
> + *
> + * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The
> + * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match
> + * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * 0 on success,
> + * SGX error code on EINIT failure,
> + * -errno otherwise
> + */
> +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
> +{
> + struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct;
> + struct sgx_enclave_init einit;
> + struct page *initp_page;
> + void *token;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
Might just as well check the other flags: doing EINIT on an already
initialized enclave - SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED - is perhaps a nono or
similarly on a SGX_ENCL_DEAD enclave.
And you could do similar sanity checks in the other ioctl functions.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-27 17:43 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-29 15:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-29 15:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-07-04 1:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-04 1:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 2 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2020-06-29 15:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Sat, Jun 27, 2020 at 07:43:35PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > +static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
> > + void *token)
> > +{
> > + u64 mrsigner[4];
> > + int ret;
> > + int i;
> > + int j;
> > +
> > + /* Check that the required attributes have been authorized. */
> > + if (encl->secs_attributes & ~encl->allowed_attributes)
> > + return -EACCES;
> > +
> > + ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return ret;
> > +
> > + mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
> > +
> > + if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) {
> > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > + goto err_out;
> > + }
>
> That test should be the first thing this function or its caller does.
Hmm, I was going to say that SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can't be checked until
encl->lock is held, but that's not true for this path as mutual exclusion
is provided by the SGX_ENCL_IOCTL flag. So yeah, this can be checked at
the same time as SGX_ENCL_CREATED in sgx_ioc_enclave_init().
> > + for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) {
> > + for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) {
>
> Ew, what's that double-loop for?
>
> It tries to init an enclave a bunch of times. Why does it need to init
> more than once?
ENCLS[EINIT] is interruptible because it has such a high latency, e.g. 50k+
cycles on success. If an IRQ/NMI/SMI becomes pending, EINIT may fail with
SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT so that the event can be serviced.
The idea behind the double loop is to try EINIT in a tight loop, then back
off and sleep for a while before retrying that tight inner loop.
> > + ret = sgx_einit(sigstruct, token, encl->secs.epc_page,
> > + mrsigner);
> > + if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
> > + continue;
> > + else
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
> > + break;
> > +
> > + msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME);
> > +
> > + if (signal_pending(current)) {
> > + ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
> > + goto err_out;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) {
> > + if (encls_failed(ret))
> > + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT");
> > +
> > + sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
> > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > + } else if (ret) {
> > + pr_debug("EINIT returned %d\n", ret);
> > + ret = -EPERM;
> > + } else {
> > + atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags);
> > + }
> > +
> > +err_out:
> > + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * sgx_ioc_enclave_init - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
> > + *
> > + * @filep: open file to /dev/sgx
>
> @encl: pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer)
>
> > + * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_init instance
> > + *
> > + * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The
> > + * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match
> > + * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * 0 on success,
> > + * SGX error code on EINIT failure,
> > + * -errno otherwise
> > + */
> > +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
> > +{
> > + struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct;
> > + struct sgx_enclave_init einit;
> > + struct page *initp_page;
> > + void *token;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
>
> Might just as well check the other flags: doing EINIT on an already
> initialized enclave - SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED - is perhaps a nono or
> similarly on a SGX_ENCL_DEAD enclave.
>
> And you could do similar sanity checks in the other ioctl functions.
Ya, as above, SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can be checked here.
SGX_ENCL_DEAD is actually already checked in in the top level sgx_ioctl(),
i.e. the check in sgx_encl_add_page() can technically be flat out dropped.
I say "technically" because I'm a bit torn over SGX_ENCL_DEAD; encl->lock
must be held to SGX_ENCL_DEAD (the page fault and reclaim flows rely on
this), but as it stands today only ioctl() paths (guarded by SGX_ENCL_IOCTL)
and sgx_release() (makes the ioctls() unreachable) set SGX_ENCL_DEAD.
So it's safe to check SGX_ENCL_DEAD from ioctl() context without holding
encl->lock, at least in the current code base, but it feels weird/sketchy.
In the end I don't think I have a strong opinion. Removing the technically
unnecessary DEAD check in sgx_encl_add_page() is the simplest change, so it
may make sense to do that and nothing more for initial upstreaming. Long
term, I fully expect we'll add paths that set SGX_ENCL_DEAD outside of
ioctl() context, e.g. to handle EPC OOM, but it wouldn't be a bad thing to
have a standalone commit in a future series to add DEAD checks (under
encl->lock) in the ADD and INIT flows.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-29 15:27 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-06-29 15:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-07-04 1:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-29 15:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 08:27:19AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Hmm, I was going to say that SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can't be checked until
> encl->lock is held, but that's not true for this path as mutual exclusion
> is provided by the SGX_ENCL_IOCTL flag. So yeah, this can be checked at
> the same time as SGX_ENCL_CREATED in sgx_ioc_enclave_init().
Right, so my point is to have state checks for flags which make sense in
all ioctl entry points, in order to catch a misuse early. But we're on
the same page.
> ENCLS[EINIT] is interruptible because it has such a high latency, e.g. 50k+
> cycles on success. If an IRQ/NMI/SMI becomes pending, EINIT may fail with
> SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT so that the event can be serviced.
>
> The idea behind the double loop is to try EINIT in a tight loop, then back
> off and sleep for a while before retrying that tight inner loop.
That gist of that kinda wants to be in a comment over that double-loop for
future on-lookers.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-29 15:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-29 15:37 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-07-04 1:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-07 1:38 ` Sean Christopherson
1 sibling, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-07-04 1:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Borislav Petkov, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 08:27:19AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Sat, Jun 27, 2020 at 07:43:35PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > +static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
> > > + void *token)
> > > +{
> > > + u64 mrsigner[4];
> > > + int ret;
> > > + int i;
> > > + int j;
> > > +
> > > + /* Check that the required attributes have been authorized. */
> > > + if (encl->secs_attributes & ~encl->allowed_attributes)
> > > + return -EACCES;
> > > +
> > > + ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner);
> > > + if (ret)
> > > + return ret;
> > > +
> > > + mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
> > > +
> > > + if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) {
> > > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > > + goto err_out;
> > > + }
> >
> > That test should be the first thing this function or its caller does.
>
> Hmm, I was going to say that SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can't be checked until
> encl->lock is held, but that's not true for this path as mutual exclusion
> is provided by the SGX_ENCL_IOCTL flag. So yeah, this can be checked at
> the same time as SGX_ENCL_CREATED in sgx_ioc_enclave_init().
>
> > > + for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) {
> > > + for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) {
> >
> > Ew, what's that double-loop for?
> >
> > It tries to init an enclave a bunch of times. Why does it need to init
> > more than once?
>
> ENCLS[EINIT] is interruptible because it has such a high latency, e.g. 50k+
> cycles on success. If an IRQ/NMI/SMI becomes pending, EINIT may fail with
> SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT so that the event can be serviced.
>
> The idea behind the double loop is to try EINIT in a tight loop, then back
> off and sleep for a while before retrying that tight inner loop.
>
> > > + ret = sgx_einit(sigstruct, token, encl->secs.epc_page,
> > > + mrsigner);
> > > + if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
> > > + continue;
> > > + else
> > > + break;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
> > > + break;
> > > +
> > > + msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME);
> > > +
> > > + if (signal_pending(current)) {
> > > + ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
> > > + goto err_out;
> > > + }
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) {
> > > + if (encls_failed(ret))
> > > + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT");
> > > +
> > > + sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
> > > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > > + } else if (ret) {
> > > + pr_debug("EINIT returned %d\n", ret);
> > > + ret = -EPERM;
> > > + } else {
> > > + atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags);
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > +err_out:
> > > + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
> > > + return ret;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +/**
> > > + * sgx_ioc_enclave_init - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
> > > + *
> > > + * @filep: open file to /dev/sgx
> >
> > @encl: pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer)
> >
> > > + * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_init instance
> > > + *
> > > + * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The
> > > + * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match
> > > + * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct.
> > > + *
> > > + * Return:
> > > + * 0 on success,
> > > + * SGX error code on EINIT failure,
> > > + * -errno otherwise
> > > + */
> > > +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
> > > +{
> > > + struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct;
> > > + struct sgx_enclave_init einit;
> > > + struct page *initp_page;
> > > + void *token;
> > > + int ret;
> > > +
> > > + if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
> >
> > Might just as well check the other flags: doing EINIT on an already
> > initialized enclave - SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED - is perhaps a nono or
> > similarly on a SGX_ENCL_DEAD enclave.
> >
> > And you could do similar sanity checks in the other ioctl functions.
>
> Ya, as above, SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can be checked here.
>
> SGX_ENCL_DEAD is actually already checked in in the top level sgx_ioctl(),
> i.e. the check in sgx_encl_add_page() can technically be flat out dropped.
>
> I say "technically" because I'm a bit torn over SGX_ENCL_DEAD; encl->lock
> must be held to SGX_ENCL_DEAD (the page fault and reclaim flows rely on
> this), but as it stands today only ioctl() paths (guarded by SGX_ENCL_IOCTL)
> and sgx_release() (makes the ioctls() unreachable) set SGX_ENCL_DEAD.
>
> So it's safe to check SGX_ENCL_DEAD from ioctl() context without holding
> encl->lock, at least in the current code base, but it feels weird/sketchy.
>
> In the end I don't think I have a strong opinion. Removing the technically
> unnecessary DEAD check in sgx_encl_add_page() is the simplest change, so it
> may make sense to do that and nothing more for initial upstreaming. Long
> term, I fully expect we'll add paths that set SGX_ENCL_DEAD outside of
> ioctl() context, e.g. to handle EPC OOM, but it wouldn't be a bad thing to
> have a standalone commit in a future series to add DEAD checks (under
> encl->lock) in the ADD and INIT flows.
AFAIK nonne of th ioctl's should not need SGX_ENCL_DEAD check.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-07-04 1:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-07-07 1:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-07 3:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2020-07-07 1:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: Borislav Petkov, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Sat, Jul 04, 2020 at 04:43:49AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 08:27:19AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Sat, Jun 27, 2020 at 07:43:35PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > > And you could do similar sanity checks in the other ioctl functions.
> >
> > Ya, as above, SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can be checked here.
> >
> > SGX_ENCL_DEAD is actually already checked in in the top level sgx_ioctl(),
> > i.e. the check in sgx_encl_add_page() can technically be flat out dropped.
> >
> > I say "technically" because I'm a bit torn over SGX_ENCL_DEAD; encl->lock
> > must be held to SGX_ENCL_DEAD (the page fault and reclaim flows rely on
> > this), but as it stands today only ioctl() paths (guarded by SGX_ENCL_IOCTL)
> > and sgx_release() (makes the ioctls() unreachable) set SGX_ENCL_DEAD.
> >
> > So it's safe to check SGX_ENCL_DEAD from ioctl() context without holding
> > encl->lock, at least in the current code base, but it feels weird/sketchy.
> >
> > In the end I don't think I have a strong opinion. Removing the technically
> > unnecessary DEAD check in sgx_encl_add_page() is the simplest change, so it
> > may make sense to do that and nothing more for initial upstreaming. Long
> > term, I fully expect we'll add paths that set SGX_ENCL_DEAD outside of
> > ioctl() context, e.g. to handle EPC OOM, but it wouldn't be a bad thing to
> > have a standalone commit in a future series to add DEAD checks (under
> > encl->lock) in the ADD and INIT flows.
>
> AFAIK nonne of th ioctl's should not need SGX_ENCL_DEAD check.
I can't tell if the double negative was intended, but I took a peek at your
current master and see that you removed the SGX_ENCL_DEAD check in
sgx_ioctl(). That check needs to stay, e.g. if EEXTEND fails we absolutely
need to prevent any further operations on the enclave.
The above was calling out that additional checks on SGX_ENCL_DEAD after
acquiring encl->lock are not necessary because SGX_ENCL_DEAD can only be
set when the ioctls() are no longer reachable or from within an ioctl(),
which provides exclusivity via SGX_ENCL_IOCTL.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-07-07 1:38 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-07-07 3:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-07-07 3:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Borislav Petkov, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang,
Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Mon, Jul 06, 2020 at 06:38:47PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 04, 2020 at 04:43:49AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 08:27:19AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > On Sat, Jun 27, 2020 at 07:43:35PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > > > And you could do similar sanity checks in the other ioctl functions.
> > >
> > > Ya, as above, SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can be checked here.
> > >
> > > SGX_ENCL_DEAD is actually already checked in in the top level sgx_ioctl(),
> > > i.e. the check in sgx_encl_add_page() can technically be flat out dropped.
> > >
> > > I say "technically" because I'm a bit torn over SGX_ENCL_DEAD; encl->lock
> > > must be held to SGX_ENCL_DEAD (the page fault and reclaim flows rely on
> > > this), but as it stands today only ioctl() paths (guarded by SGX_ENCL_IOCTL)
> > > and sgx_release() (makes the ioctls() unreachable) set SGX_ENCL_DEAD.
> > >
> > > So it's safe to check SGX_ENCL_DEAD from ioctl() context without holding
> > > encl->lock, at least in the current code base, but it feels weird/sketchy.
> > >
> > > In the end I don't think I have a strong opinion. Removing the technically
> > > unnecessary DEAD check in sgx_encl_add_page() is the simplest change, so it
> > > may make sense to do that and nothing more for initial upstreaming. Long
> > > term, I fully expect we'll add paths that set SGX_ENCL_DEAD outside of
> > > ioctl() context, e.g. to handle EPC OOM, but it wouldn't be a bad thing to
> > > have a standalone commit in a future series to add DEAD checks (under
> > > encl->lock) in the ADD and INIT flows.
> >
> > AFAIK nonne of th ioctl's should not need SGX_ENCL_DEAD check.
>
> I can't tell if the double negative was intended, but I took a peek at your
> current master and see that you removed the SGX_ENCL_DEAD check in
> sgx_ioctl(). That check needs to stay, e.g. if EEXTEND fails we absolutely
> need to prevent any further operations on the enclave.
>
> The above was calling out that additional checks on SGX_ENCL_DEAD after
> acquiring encl->lock are not necessary because SGX_ENCL_DEAD can only be
> set when the ioctls() are no longer reachable or from within an ioctl(),
> which provides exclusivity via SGX_ENCL_IOCTL.
Got it.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-27 17:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-29 15:27 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-07-04 1:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-07-04 1:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Sean Christopherson,
Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Sat, Jun 27, 2020 at 07:43:35PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > +static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
> > + void *token)
> > +{
> > + u64 mrsigner[4];
> > + int ret;
> > + int i;
> > + int j;
> > +
> > + /* Check that the required attributes have been authorized. */
> > + if (encl->secs_attributes & ~encl->allowed_attributes)
> > + return -EACCES;
> > +
> > + ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return ret;
> > +
> > + mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
> > +
> > + if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) {
> > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > + goto err_out;
> > + }
>
> That test should be the first thing this function or its caller does.
Fixed.
>
> > + for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) {
> > + for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) {
>
> Ew, what's that double-loop for?
>
> It tries to init an enclave a bunch of times. Why does it need to init
> more than once?
From SDM:
"Periodically, EINIT polls for certain asynchronous events. If such an
event is detected, it completes with failure code (ZF=1 and RAX =
SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT), and RIP is incremented to point to the next
instruction. These events includes external interrupts, non-maskable
interrupts, system-management interrupts, machine checks, INIT signals,
and the VMX-preemption timer. EINIT does not fail if the pending event
is inhibited (e.g., external interrupts could be inhibited due to
blocking by MOV SS blocking or by STI)."
Not exactly sure though why this must be polled inside the kernel though.
>
> > + ret = sgx_einit(sigstruct, token, encl->secs.epc_page,
> > + mrsigner);
> > + if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
> > + continue;
> > + else
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
> > + break;
> > +
> > + msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME);
> > +
> > + if (signal_pending(current)) {
> > + ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
> > + goto err_out;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) {
> > + if (encls_failed(ret))
> > + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT");
> > +
> > + sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
> > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > + } else if (ret) {
> > + pr_debug("EINIT returned %d\n", ret);
> > + ret = -EPERM;
> > + } else {
> > + atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags);
> > + }
> > +
> > +err_out:
> > + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * sgx_ioc_enclave_init - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
> > + *
> > + * @filep: open file to /dev/sgx
>
> @encl: pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer)
>
> > + * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_init instance
> > + *
> > + * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The
> > + * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match
> > + * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * 0 on success,
> > + * SGX error code on EINIT failure,
> > + * -errno otherwise
> > + */
> > +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
> > +{
> > + struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct;
> > + struct sgx_enclave_init einit;
> > + struct page *initp_page;
> > + void *token;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
>
> Might just as well check the other flags: doing EINIT on an already
> initialized enclave - SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED - is perhaps a nono or
> similarly on a SGX_ENCL_DEAD enclave.
>
> And you could do similar sanity checks in the other ioctl functions.
Agreed (see my earlier response, let's continue this discussion there).
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver Jarkko Sakkinen
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-27 17:43 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-07-02 3:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-04 3:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
5 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2020-07-02 3:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Suresh Siddha, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, puiterwijk,
rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> +static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
> + unsigned long ssaframesize)
> +{
> + if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
> + secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
> + secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
> + if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + } else if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
> + return -EINVAL;
These should be >=, not >, the SDM uses one of those fancy ≥ ligatures.
Internal versions use more obvious pseudocode, e.g.:
if ((DS:TMP_SECS.ATTRIBUTES.MODE64BIT = 1) AND
(DS:TMP_SECS.SIZE AND (~((1 << CPUID.18.0:EDX[15:8]) – 1)))
{
#GP(0);
}
> +
> + if (!(secs->xfrm & XFEATURE_MASK_FP) ||
> + !(secs->xfrm & XFEATURE_MASK_SSE) ||
> + (((secs->xfrm >> XFEATURE_BNDREGS) & 1) !=
> + ((secs->xfrm >> XFEATURE_BNDCSR) & 1)))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (!secs->ssa_frame_size || ssaframesize > secs->ssa_frame_size)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (memchr_inv(secs->reserved1, 0, sizeof(secs->reserved1)) ||
> + memchr_inv(secs->reserved2, 0, sizeof(secs->reserved2)) ||
> + memchr_inv(secs->reserved3, 0, sizeof(secs->reserved3)) ||
> + memchr_inv(secs->reserved4, 0, sizeof(secs->reserved4)))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-07-02 3:59 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-07-04 3:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-02 3:06 ` Haitao Huang
0 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-07-04 3:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Haitao Huang, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Suresh Siddha, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, puiterwijk,
rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Wed, Jul 01, 2020 at 08:59:02PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > +static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
> > + unsigned long ssaframesize)
> > +{
> > + if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
> > + secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
> > + secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
> > + if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + } else if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
> > + return -EINVAL;
>
> These should be >=, not >, the SDM uses one of those fancy ≥ ligatures.
>
> Internal versions use more obvious pseudocode, e.g.:
>
> if ((DS:TMP_SECS.ATTRIBUTES.MODE64BIT = 1) AND
> (DS:TMP_SECS.SIZE AND (~((1 << CPUID.18.0:EDX[15:8]) – 1)))
> {
> #GP(0);
Updated as:
static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs)
{
u64 max_size = (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) ?
sgx_encl_size_max_64 : sgx_encl_size_max_32;
if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
return -EINVAL;
if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
return -EINVAL;
if (secs->size >= max_size)
return -EINVAL;
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-07-04 3:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-09-02 3:06 ` Haitao Huang
2020-09-02 16:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-04 12:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 2 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Haitao Huang @ 2020-09-02 3:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson, Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum,
Seth Moore, Suresh Siddha, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Fri, 03 Jul 2020 22:31:10 -0500, Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 01, 2020 at 08:59:02PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>> > +static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
>> > + unsigned long ssaframesize)
>> > +{
>> > + if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>> > +
>> > + if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>> > +
>> > + if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
>> > + secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
>> > + secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>> > +
>> > + if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
>> > + if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>> > + } else if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>>
>> These should be >=, not >, the SDM uses one of those fancy ≥ ligatures.
>>
>> Internal versions use more obvious pseudocode, e.g.:
>>
>> if ((DS:TMP_SECS.ATTRIBUTES.MODE64BIT = 1) AND
>> (DS:TMP_SECS.SIZE AND (~((1 << CPUID.18.0:EDX[15:8]) – 1)))
>> {
>> #GP(0);
>
> Updated as:
>
> static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs)
> {
> u64 max_size = (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) ?
> sgx_encl_size_max_64 : sgx_encl_size_max_32;
>
> if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
> secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
> secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> if (secs->size >= max_size)
> return -EINVAL;
>
This should be > not >=. Issue raised and fixed by Fábio Silva for ported
patches for OOT SGX support:
https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives/pull/123
I tested and verified with Intel arch, the comparison indeed should be >.
Thanks
Haitao
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-09-02 3:06 ` Haitao Huang
@ 2020-09-02 16:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-02 18:40 ` Haitao Huang
2020-09-04 12:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2020-09-02 16:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Haitao Huang
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Suresh Siddha, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn,
kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx,
yaozhangx
On Tue, Sep 01, 2020 at 10:06:32PM -0500, Haitao Huang wrote:
> On Fri, 03 Jul 2020 22:31:10 -0500, Jarkko Sakkinen
> <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> > On Wed, Jul 01, 2020 at 08:59:02PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > +static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
> > > > + unsigned long ssaframesize)
> > > > +{
> > > > + if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
> > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > +
> > > > + if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
> > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > +
> > > > + if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
> > > > + secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
> > > > + secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
> > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > +
> > > > + if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
> > > > + if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
> > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > + } else if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
> > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > > These should be >=, not >, the SDM uses one of those fancy ≥ ligatures.
> > >
> > > Internal versions use more obvious pseudocode, e.g.:
> > >
> > > if ((DS:TMP_SECS.ATTRIBUTES.MODE64BIT = 1) AND
> > > (DS:TMP_SECS.SIZE AND (~((1 << CPUID.18.0:EDX[15:8]) – 1)))
> > > {
> > > #GP(0);
> >
> > Updated as:
> >
> > static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs)
> > {
> > u64 max_size = (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) ?
> > sgx_encl_size_max_64 : sgx_encl_size_max_32;
> >
> > if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
> > secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
> > secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > if (secs->size >= max_size)
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
>
> This should be > not >=. Issue raised and fixed by Fábio Silva for ported
> patches for OOT SGX support:
> https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives/pull/123
>
> I tested and verified with Intel arch, the comparison indeed should be >.
And this is a confirmed SDM bug, correct?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-09-02 16:10 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-09-02 18:40 ` Haitao Huang
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Haitao Huang @ 2020-09-02 18:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Suresh Siddha, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn,
kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx,
yaozhangx
On Wed, 02 Sep 2020 11:10:12 -0500, Sean Christopherson
<sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 01, 2020 at 10:06:32PM -0500, Haitao Huang wrote:
>> On Fri, 03 Jul 2020 22:31:10 -0500, Jarkko Sakkinen
>> <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> > On Wed, Jul 01, 2020 at 08:59:02PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> > > On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>> > > > +static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
>> > > > + unsigned long ssaframesize)
>> > > > +{
>> > > > + if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
>> > > > + return -EINVAL;
>> > > > +
>> > > > + if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
>> > > > + return -EINVAL;
>> > > > +
>> > > > + if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
>> > > > + secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
>> > > > + secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
>> > > > + return -EINVAL;
>> > > > +
>> > > > + if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
>> > > > + if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
>> > > > + return -EINVAL;
>> > > > + } else if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
>> > > > + return -EINVAL;
>> > >
>> > > These should be >=, not >, the SDM uses one of those fancy ≥
>> ligatures.
>> > >
>> > > Internal versions use more obvious pseudocode, e.g.:
>> > >
>> > > if ((DS:TMP_SECS.ATTRIBUTES.MODE64BIT = 1) AND
>> > > (DS:TMP_SECS.SIZE AND (~((1 << CPUID.18.0:EDX[15:8]) – 1)))
>> > > {
>> > > #GP(0);
>> >
>> > Updated as:
>> >
>> > static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs)
>> > {
>> > u64 max_size = (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) ?
>> > sgx_encl_size_max_64 : sgx_encl_size_max_32;
>> >
>> > if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
>> > return -EINVAL;
>> >
>> > if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
>> > return -EINVAL;
>> >
>> > if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
>> > secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
>> > secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
>> > return -EINVAL;
>> >
>> > if (secs->size >= max_size)
>> > return -EINVAL;
>> >
>>
>> This should be > not >=. Issue raised and fixed by Fábio Silva for
>> ported
>> patches for OOT SGX support:
>> https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives/pull/123
>>
>> I tested and verified with Intel arch, the comparison indeed should be
>> >.
>
> And this is a confirmed SDM bug, correct?
yes, the pseudo code for ECREATE is inaccurate and inconsistent with the
CPUID spec. The latter is correct.
Haitao
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
2020-09-02 3:06 ` Haitao Huang
2020-09-02 16:10 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-09-04 12:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-09-04 12:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Haitao Huang
Cc: Sean Christopherson, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Chunyang Hui, Jordan Hand,
Nathaniel McCallum, Seth Moore, Suresh Siddha, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn,
kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx,
yaozhangx
On Tue, Sep 01, 2020 at 10:06:32PM -0500, Haitao Huang wrote:
> On Fri, 03 Jul 2020 22:31:10 -0500, Jarkko Sakkinen
> <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> > On Wed, Jul 01, 2020 at 08:59:02PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > +static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
> > > > + unsigned long ssaframesize)
> > > > +{
> > > > + if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
> > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > +
> > > > + if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
> > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > +
> > > > + if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
> > > > + secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
> > > > + secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
> > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > +
> > > > + if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
> > > > + if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
> > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > + } else if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
> > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > > These should be >=, not >, the SDM uses one of those fancy ≥ ligatures.
> > >
> > > Internal versions use more obvious pseudocode, e.g.:
> > >
> > > if ((DS:TMP_SECS.ATTRIBUTES.MODE64BIT = 1) AND
> > > (DS:TMP_SECS.SIZE AND (~((1 << CPUID.18.0:EDX[15:8]) – 1)))
> > > {
> > > #GP(0);
> >
> > Updated as:
> >
> > static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs)
> > {
> > u64 max_size = (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) ?
> > sgx_encl_size_max_64 : sgx_encl_size_max_32;
> >
> > if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
> > secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
> > secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > if (secs->size >= max_size)
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
>
> This should be > not >=. Issue raised and fixed by Fábio Silva for ported
> patches for OOT SGX support:
> https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives/pull/123
>
> I tested and verified with Intel arch, the comparison indeed should be >.
>
> Thanks
> Haitao
Thans a lot!
I added this changelog entry to the v37 log:
* Fixed off-by-one error in a size calculation:
https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives/commit/e44cc238becf584cc079aef40b557c6af9a03f38
Given the Boris' earlier feedback I xref every changelog
entry in v37 changelog. Then it is also less time consuming
to spot if something is missing.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-29 16:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 13/21] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Jarkko Sakkinen
` (8 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Jarkko Sakkinen, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Andy Lutomirski, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek,
bp, cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish,
dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy,
ludloff, nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes,
sean.j.christopherson, tglx, yaozhangx
Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other
enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning
Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key
of a QE, e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel
signed PCE is used.
To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be
only allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted
parties can certify QE's.
Obviously the attestation service should know the public key of the used
PCE and that way detect illegit attestation, but whitelisting the legit
users still adds an additional layer of defence.
Add new device file called /dev/sgx/provision. The sole purpose of this
file is to provide file descriptors that act as privilege tokens to allow
to build enclaves with ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY set. A new ioctl called
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE is used to assign this token to an enclave.
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 11 ++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 14 ++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 74 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
index 5edb08ab8fd0..57d0d30c79b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages)
#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT \
_IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x02, struct sgx_enclave_init)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE \
+ _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x03, struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute)
/**
* struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -63,4 +65,13 @@ struct sgx_enclave_init {
__u64 sigstruct;
};
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute - parameter structure for the
+ * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE ioctl
+ * @attribute_fd: file handle of the attribute file in the securityfs
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute {
+ __u64 attribute_fd;
+};
+
#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
index b4aa7b9f8376..d90114cec1c3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
@@ -150,6 +150,13 @@ static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = {
.fops = &sgx_encl_fops,
};
+static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_provision = {
+ .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+ .name = "provision",
+ .nodename = "sgx/provision",
+ .fops = &sgx_provision_fops,
+};
+
int __init sgx_drv_init(void)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
@@ -190,5 +197,12 @@ int __init sgx_drv_init(void)
return ret;
}
+ ret = misc_register(&sgx_dev_provision);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("Creating /dev/sgx/provision failed with %d.\n", ret);
+ misc_deregister(&sgx_dev_enclave);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
index e4063923115b..72747d01c046 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ extern u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask;
extern u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask;
extern u32 sgx_xsave_size_tbl[64];
+extern const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops;
+
long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
int sgx_drv_init(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
index 420d13fc03da..721096f1d5ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -669,6 +669,50 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
return ret;
}
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_set_attribute - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE
+ * @filep: open file to /dev/sgx
+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute instance
+ *
+ * Mark the enclave as being allowed to access a restricted attribute bit.
+ * The requested attribute is specified via the attribute_fd field in the
+ * provided struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute. The attribute_fd must be a
+ * handle to an SGX attribute file, e.g. "/dev/sgx/provision".
+ *
+ * Failure to explicitly request access to a restricted attribute will cause
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init() to fail. Currently, the only restricted attribute
+ * is access to the PROVISION_KEY.
+ *
+ * Note, access to the EINITTOKEN_KEY is disallowed entirely.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -errno otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_set_attribute(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute params;
+ struct file *attribute_file;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, arg, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ attribute_file = fget(params.attribute_fd);
+ if (!attribute_file)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (attribute_file->f_op != &sgx_provision_fops) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ encl->allowed_attributes |= SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY;
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ fput(attribute_file);
+ return ret;
+}
long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
@@ -694,6 +738,9 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT:
ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_init(encl, (void __user *)arg);
break;
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_set_attribute(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
default:
ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
break;
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-29 16:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-29 22:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-03 2:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 2 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-29 16:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Andy Lutomirski, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, sean.j.christopherson, tglx,
yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:34AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other
> enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning
> Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key
> of a QE, e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel
What's a QE?
I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.
> signed PCE is used.
>
> To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be
> only allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted
> parties can certify QE's.
>
> Obviously the attestation service should know the public key of the used
> PCE and that way detect illegit attestation, but whitelisting the legit
> users still adds an additional layer of defence.
>
> Add new device file called /dev/sgx/provision. The sole purpose of this
> file is to provide file descriptors that act as privilege tokens to allow
> to build enclaves with ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY set. A new ioctl called
> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE is used to assign this token to an enclave.
So I'm sure I'm missing something here: what controls which
enclave can open /dev/sgx/provision and thus pass the FD to
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE?
And in general, how does that whole flow look like: what calls
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE when?
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation
2020-06-29 16:02 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-29 22:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-30 8:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-07-03 2:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-03 2:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 2 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2020-06-29 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Andy Lutomirski, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 06:02:42PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:34AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other
> > enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning
> > Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key
> > of a QE, e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel
>
> What's a QE?
>
> I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.
Quoting Enclave.
> > signed PCE is used.
> >
> > To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be
> > only allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted
> > parties can certify QE's.
> >
> > Obviously the attestation service should know the public key of the used
> > PCE and that way detect illegit attestation, but whitelisting the legit
> > users still adds an additional layer of defence.
> >
> > Add new device file called /dev/sgx/provision. The sole purpose of this
> > file is to provide file descriptors that act as privilege tokens to allow
> > to build enclaves with ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY set. A new ioctl called
> > SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE is used to assign this token to an enclave.
>
> So I'm sure I'm missing something here: what controls which
> enclave can open /dev/sgx/provision and thus pass the FD to
> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE?
/dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is that the admin
will configure the system to grant only specific enclaves access to the
PROVISION_KEY.
> And in general, how does that whole flow look like: what calls
> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE when?
The basic gist is that the host process of an enclave that needs/wants access
to the PROVISION_KEY will invoke SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE when building
the enclave. Any enclave can request access to PROVISION_KEY, but practically
speaking only the PCE and QE (or their non-Intel equivalents) actually need
access to the key. KVM (future series) will also respect /dev/sgx/provision,
i.e. require a similar ioctl() to expose the PROVISION_KEY to a guest.
E.g. for my own personal testing, I never do anything attestation related, so
none of the enclaves I run request PROVISION_KEY, but I do expose it to VMs to
test the KVM paths.
In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no additional kernel
infrastructure to help userspace make per-enclave decisions. There have been
more than a few proposals on how to extend the kernel to help provide better
granularity, e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff
to post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough down
various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a corner.
If you want super gory details, Intel's whitepaper on attestation in cloud
environments is a good starting point[*], but I don't recommended doing much
more than skimming unless you really like attestation stuff or are
masochistic, which IMO amount to the same thing :-)
[*] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/dcap-1.0/docs/SGX_ECDSA_QuoteGenReference_DCAP_API_Linux_1.0.pdf
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation
2020-06-29 22:04 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-06-30 8:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-30 14:20 ` Sean Christopherson
` (2 more replies)
2020-07-03 2:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 3 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-30 8:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Andy Lutomirski, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 03:04:00PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.
>
> Quoting Enclave.
Yah, pls add it somewhere.
> /dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is that the admin
> will configure the system to grant only specific enclaves access to the
> PROVISION_KEY.
Uuh, I don't like "the expectation is" - the reality happens to turn
differently, more often than not.
> In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no additional kernel
> infrastructure to help userspace make per-enclave decisions. There have been
> more than a few proposals on how to extend the kernel to help provide better
> granularity, e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff
> to post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough down
> various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a corner.
So this all sounds to me like we should not upstream /dev/sgx/provision
now but delay it until the infrastructure for that has been made more
concrete. We can always add it then. Changing it after the fact -
if we have to and for whatever reason - would be a lot harder for a
user-visible interface which someone has started using already.
So I'd leave that out from the initial patchset.
> If you want super gory details, Intel's whitepaper on attestation in cloud
> environments is a good starting point[*], but I don't recommended doing much
> more than skimming unless you really like attestation stuff or are
> masochistic, which IMO amount to the same thing :-)
No thanks. :)
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation
2020-06-30 8:49 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-30 14:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-30 17:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-02 20:47 ` Dr. Greg
2020-07-03 2:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2020-06-30 14:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Andy Lutomirski, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 10:49:56AM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 03:04:00PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > /dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is that the admin
> > will configure the system to grant only specific enclaves access to the
> > PROVISION_KEY.
>
> Uuh, I don't like "the expectation is" - the reality happens to turn
> differently, more often than not.
Would it help if I worded it as "only root should ever be able to run an
enclave with access to PROVISION_KEY"? We obviously can't control what
admins actually do, hence my wording of it as the expected behavior.
> > In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no additional kernel
> > infrastructure to help userspace make per-enclave decisions. There have been
> > more than a few proposals on how to extend the kernel to help provide better
> > granularity, e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff
> > to post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough down
> > various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a corner.
>
> So this all sounds to me like we should not upstream /dev/sgx/provision
> now but delay it until the infrastructure for that has been made more
> concrete. We can always add it then. Changing it after the fact -
> if we have to and for whatever reason - would be a lot harder for a
> user-visible interface which someone has started using already.
The userspace and attestation infrastructure is very concrete, i.e. the
need for userspace to be able to access PROVISION_KEY is there, as is the
desire to be able to restrict access to PROVISION_KEY, e.g. I believe Andy
Lutomirski originally requested the ability to restrict access.
The additional infrastructure for per-enclave decisions is somewhat
orthogonal to the PROVISION_KEY, e.g. they won't necessarily be employed
by everyone running enclaves, and environments that do have per-enclave
policies would still likely want the extra layer of restriction for
PROVISION_KEY. I only brought the additional policy crud to call out that
we've done enough path-finding on additional restrictions to have strong
confidence that adding /dev/sgx/provision won't prevent us from adding more
fine grained control in the future.
> So I'd leave that out from the initial patchset.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation
2020-06-30 14:20 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-06-30 17:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2020-06-30 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Borislav Petkov, Jarkko Sakkinen, X86 ML, linux-sgx, LKML,
LSM List, Jethro Beekman, Andy Lutomirski, Andrew Morton,
Andy Shevchenko, asapek, Xing, Cedric, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, Dave Hansen, Huang, Haitao,
Josh Triplett, Huang, Kai, Svahn, Kai, kmoy, Christian Ludloff,
Neil Horman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, David Rientjes,
Thomas Gleixner, yaozhangx
On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 7:20 AM Sean Christopherson
<sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 10:49:56AM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 03:04:00PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > /dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is that the admin
> > > will configure the system to grant only specific enclaves access to the
> > > PROVISION_KEY.
> >
> > Uuh, I don't like "the expectation is" - the reality happens to turn
> > differently, more often than not.
>
> Would it help if I worded it as "only root should ever be able to run an
> enclave with access to PROVISION_KEY"? We obviously can't control what
> admins actually do, hence my wording of it as the expected behavior.
>
> > > In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no additional kernel
> > > infrastructure to help userspace make per-enclave decisions. There have been
> > > more than a few proposals on how to extend the kernel to help provide better
> > > granularity, e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff
> > > to post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough down
> > > various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a corner.
> >
> > So this all sounds to me like we should not upstream /dev/sgx/provision
> > now but delay it until the infrastructure for that has been made more
> > concrete. We can always add it then. Changing it after the fact -
> > if we have to and for whatever reason - would be a lot harder for a
> > user-visible interface which someone has started using already.
>
> The userspace and attestation infrastructure is very concrete, i.e. the
> need for userspace to be able to access PROVISION_KEY is there, as is the
> desire to be able to restrict access to PROVISION_KEY, e.g. I believe Andy
> Lutomirski originally requested the ability to restrict access.
>
> The additional infrastructure for per-enclave decisions is somewhat
> orthogonal to the PROVISION_KEY, e.g. they won't necessarily be employed
> by everyone running enclaves, and environments that do have per-enclave
> policies would still likely want the extra layer of restriction for
> PROVISION_KEY. I only brought the additional policy crud to call out that
> we've done enough path-finding on additional restrictions to have strong
> confidence that adding /dev/sgx/provision won't prevent us from adding more
> fine grained control in the future.
I agree.
I anticipate that most of the nasty fine-grained stuff will end up in
userspace down the road. Systems can be configured such that
provisioning is done as root, or systems can end up with fancy SELinux
rules or daemons that pass around fds or whatever, but all of this can
be done with the kernel code in this patchset.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation
2020-06-30 8:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-30 14:20 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-07-02 20:47 ` Dr. Greg
2020-07-03 2:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Dr. Greg @ 2020-07-02 20:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Sean Christopherson, Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx,
linux-kernel, linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman,
Andy Lutomirski, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
Good afternoon, I hope the week is progressing productively to an end
for everyone.
I think it was almost two months ago now that Thomas Gleixner
indicated that security and privacy issues that we were raising with
respect to this driver, with what we believe is legitimate domain
expertise, threatened the upstreaming of the driver. I think the case
can be made that those claims were somewhat specious given a fast
forward to today and the continued uncertainty regarding the
architecture of this driver.
So I will take that risk once again in order to provide some context
for this thread.
On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 10:49:56AM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 03:04:00PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.
> >
> > Quoting Enclave.
> Yah, pls add it somewhere.
For the benefit of everyone not deeply involved with this and perhaps
something that Jarkko can cut and paste if he desires.
The Quoting Enclave (QE) is the trusted endpoint that is responsible
for signing the report of an enclave's initialized status on a
platform.
In Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) based attestation, the QE is the
custodian of one of the private EPID group keys that is provisioned to
the platform by the Intel Attestation Service (IAS). The quoting
enclave generates a signature over the attesting enclave's report
structure using that key. The IAS uses its public copy of the group
key to verify that the signature is from a trusted endpoint running on
a member of the group.
The EPID provisioning process 'trusts' that the platform, to which the
private group key is being delegated to, is a known Intel platform by
virtue of the fact that the Platform Certification Enclave (PCE) is
able to generate an identifier that could only be generated by having
access to a specific symmetric encryption key. A key that is
available only to enclaves that have been initialized with the
PROVISION_KEY attribute bit.
The QE encrypts the private group key using a signer specific
(MRSIGNER) symmetric encryption key that only the QE can generate
while in a trusted initialization state. That provides a mechanisum
for persisting this chain of trust outside the context of execution of
the QE.
Things are slightly different from a mechanistic perspective when the
Data Center Attestation Protocol (DCAP) is being used, but
conceptually the same. In that attestation variant, the QE carries
the PROVISION_KEY attribute so that it can certify that the report
signature, generated with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) rather then EPID, is from a known platform.
> > /dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is
> > that the admin will configure the system to grant only specific
> > enclaves access to the PROVISION_KEY.
> Uuh, I don't like "the expectation is" - the reality happens to turn
> differently, more often than not.
Indeed, which is why we have consistently maintained that the platform
owner should be allowed to use cryptographic access controls over
which enclaves can possess the PROVISION_KEY attribute.
Given the security threat on a platform that is capable of supporting
Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM), the ability to initialize an
enclave is also a legitimate candidate for cryptographic access
control.
We can bikeshed the significance of these issues all day, but for the
record, access to the PROVISION_KEY allows platforms to be absolutely
and precisely fingerprinted for their entire lifespan.
Initialized enclaves on an EDMM capable platform have the ability to
execute arbitrary code, over which the kernel security infrastructure
has no visibility into or control over.
There is little doubt that EDMM will be a mainstay of the Confidential
Computing Initiative (CCI), which is the target of this driver. A
review of the archives will indicate that RedHat/IBM has already
confirmed that their candidate for this infrastructure (Enarx)
requires EDMM.
To refresh everyone further, the last version of the SFLC patches that
we proposed, allows a platform owner to run the driver in a default
mode, which uses the proposed DAC controls over all of this or to opt
for stronger cryptographic controls. The approach that we took has
virtually no impact on the architecture and footprint of the driver.
> > In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no
> > additional kernel infrastructure to help userspace make
> > per-enclave decisions. There have been more than a few proposals
> > on how to extend the kernel to help provide better granularity,
> > e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff to
> > post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough
> > down various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a
> > corner.
> So this all sounds to me like we should not upstream
> /dev/sgx/provision now but delay it until the infrastructure for
> that has been made more concrete. We can always add it
> then. Changing it after the fact - if we have to and for whatever
> reason - would be a lot harder for a user-visible interface which
> someone has started using already.
>
> So I'd leave that out from the initial patchset.
Without access to the PROVISION_KEY attribute, the two standard
mechanisms for attestation will not function, the technology is
arguably useless for its intended purposes without attestation.
Once again, I will leave it to community bike shedding as to whether
or not Linux wants the ability to support unfettered deterministic
platform fingerprinting that can be conducted for the physical
lifespan of the platform.
Once again, for the record, our approach affords compatibility with
the now 6+ year old out-of-tree user interface, without requiring its
use. I would argue that the continually voiced concerns about
'painting ourselves into a corner', with respect to access
authorization, is significantly less of a problem with our approach
rather then without it.
> > If you want super gory details, Intel's whitepaper on attestation
> > in cloud environments is a good starting point[*], but I don't
> > recommended doing much more than skimming unless you really like
> > attestation stuff or are masochistic, which IMO amount to the same
> > thing :-)
> No thanks. :)
Interesting reflections and perhaps worthy of some introspection by
the Linux development community.
I will concede that there are a lot of musty corners that need to be
explored in order to understand how all of this works and the
security/privacy issues involved. I certainly wouldn't wish
exploration on those corners on anyone.
I think everyone will concede that my ideas and suggestions on these
issues have been deemed to be unpopular, if not without merit. They
do, however, come from the perspective of someone who directed a
complete and independent implementation of all of this infrastructure.
A process which has left me with no uncertainty whatsoever with
respect to the issues involved in all of this.
> Regards/Gruss,
> Boris.
Best wishes for a pleasant and productive weekend to everyone.
Dr. Greg
As always,
Dr. Greg Wettstein, Ph.D, Worker Autonomously self-defensive
Enjellic Systems Development, LLC IOT platforms and edge devices.
4206 N. 19th Ave.
Fargo, ND 58102
PH: 701-281-1686 EMAIL: greg@enjellic.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"I suppose that could happen but he wouldn't know a Galois Field
if it kicked him in the nuts."
-- Anonymous mathematician
Resurrection.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation
2020-06-30 8:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-30 14:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-02 20:47 ` Dr. Greg
@ 2020-07-03 2:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-07-03 2:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Sean Christopherson, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Andy Lutomirski, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 10:49:56AM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 03:04:00PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.
> >
> > Quoting Enclave.
>
> Yah, pls add it somewhere.
>
> > /dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is that the admin
> > will configure the system to grant only specific enclaves access to the
> > PROVISION_KEY.
>
> Uuh, I don't like "the expectation is" - the reality happens to turn
> differently, more often than not.
>
> > In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no additional kernel
> > infrastructure to help userspace make per-enclave decisions. There have been
> > more than a few proposals on how to extend the kernel to help provide better
> > granularity, e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff
> > to post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough down
> > various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a corner.
>
> So this all sounds to me like we should not upstream /dev/sgx/provision
> now but delay it until the infrastructure for that has been made more
> concrete. We can always add it then. Changing it after the fact -
> if we have to and for whatever reason - would be a lot harder for a
> user-visible interface which someone has started using already.
>
> So I'd leave that out from the initial patchset.
I'm trying to understand what is meant by "more concrete". Attestation
is needed for most enclave applications.
If this patch is dropped, should we also allow PROVISION_KEY attribute
to all enclaves? Dropping this patch and keeping that check in the
driver patch is not very coherent behaviour.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation
2020-06-29 22:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-30 8:49 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-07-03 2:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-07-03 2:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Borislav Petkov, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, Jethro Beekman, Andy Lutomirski, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 03:04:00PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 06:02:42PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:34AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other
> > > enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning
> > > Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key
> > > of a QE, e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel
> >
> > What's a QE?
> >
> > I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.
>
> Quoting Enclave.
>
> > > signed PCE is used.
> > >
> > > To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be
> > > only allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted
> > > parties can certify QE's.
> > >
> > > Obviously the attestation service should know the public key of the used
> > > PCE and that way detect illegit attestation, but whitelisting the legit
> > > users still adds an additional layer of defence.
> > >
> > > Add new device file called /dev/sgx/provision. The sole purpose of this
> > > file is to provide file descriptors that act as privilege tokens to allow
> > > to build enclaves with ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY set. A new ioctl called
> > > SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE is used to assign this token to an enclave.
> >
> > So I'm sure I'm missing something here: what controls which
> > enclave can open /dev/sgx/provision and thus pass the FD to
> > SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE?
>
> /dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is that the admin
> will configure the system to grant only specific enclaves access to the
> PROVISION_KEY.
>
> > And in general, how does that whole flow look like: what calls
> > SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE when?
>
> The basic gist is that the host process of an enclave that needs/wants access
> to the PROVISION_KEY will invoke SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE when building
> the enclave. Any enclave can request access to PROVISION_KEY, but practically
> speaking only the PCE and QE (or their non-Intel equivalents) actually need
> access to the key. KVM (future series) will also respect /dev/sgx/provision,
> i.e. require a similar ioctl() to expose the PROVISION_KEY to a guest.
>
> E.g. for my own personal testing, I never do anything attestation related, so
> none of the enclaves I run request PROVISION_KEY, but I do expose it to VMs to
> test the KVM paths.
>
> In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no additional kernel
> infrastructure to help userspace make per-enclave decisions. There have been
> more than a few proposals on how to extend the kernel to help provide better
> granularity, e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff
> to post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough down
> various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a corner.
>
> If you want super gory details, Intel's whitepaper on attestation in cloud
> environments is a good starting point[*], but I don't recommended doing much
> more than skimming unless you really like attestation stuff or are
> masochistic, which IMO amount to the same thing :-)
>
> [*] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/dcap-1.0/docs/SGX_ECDSA_QuoteGenReference_DCAP_API_Linux_1.0.pdf
Section 3 in [*] is what describes the infrastructure. DCAP is only a
component in the whole attestation infrastructure.
[*] https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/f1/b8/intel-sgx-support-for-third-party-attestation.pdf
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation
2020-06-29 16:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-29 22:04 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-07-03 2:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-03 2:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-07-03 2:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Andy Lutomirski, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, sean.j.christopherson, tglx,
yaozhangx
On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 06:02:42PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:34AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other
> > enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning
> > Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key
> > of a QE, e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel
>
> What's a QE?
>
> I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.
Quoting Enclave.
>
> > signed PCE is used.
> >
> > To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be
> > only allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted
> > parties can certify QE's.
> >
> > Obviously the attestation service should know the public key of the used
> > PCE and that way detect illegit attestation, but whitelisting the legit
> > users still adds an additional layer of defence.
> >
> > Add new device file called /dev/sgx/provision. The sole purpose of this
> > file is to provide file descriptors that act as privilege tokens to allow
> > to build enclaves with ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY set. A new ioctl called
> > SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE is used to assign this token to an enclave.
>
> So I'm sure I'm missing something here: what controls which
> enclave can open /dev/sgx/provision and thus pass the FD to
> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE?
>
> And in general, how does that whole flow look like: what calls
> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE when?
I've documented it in the Remote Attestation section:
https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/linux-sgx/blob/master/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation
2020-07-03 2:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-07-03 2:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-07-03 2:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
Jethro Beekman, Andy Lutomirski, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, sean.j.christopherson, tglx,
yaozhangx
On Fri, Jul 03, 2020 at 05:32:28AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 06:02:42PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:34AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other
> > > enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning
> > > Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key
> > > of a QE, e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel
> >
> > What's a QE?
> >
> > I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.
>
> Quoting Enclave.
Thanks for spotting this. I updated my GIT-tree accordingly.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 13/21] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 14/21] x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
` (7 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Jarkko Sakkinen, linux-mm, Jethro Beekman,
Jordan Hand, Nathaniel McCallum, Chunyang Hui, Seth Moore,
Sean Christopherson, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
There is a limited amount of EPC available. Therefore, some of it must be
copied to the regular memory, and only subset kept in the SGX reserved
memory. While kernel cannot directly access enclave memory, SGX provides a
set of ENCLS leaf functions to perform reclaiming.
This commits implements a page reclaimer by using these leaf functions. It
picks the victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the
system. The thread ksgxswapd reclaims pages on the event when the number of
free EPC pages goes below SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES up until it reaches
SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES.
sgx_alloc_epc_page() can optionally directly reclaim pages with @reclaim
set true. A caller must also supply owner for each page so that the
reclaimer can access the associated enclaves. This is needed for locking,
as most of the ENCLS leafs cannot be executed concurrently for an enclave.
The owner is also needed for accessing SECS, which is required to be
resident when its child pages are being reclaimed.
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Tested-by: Jordan Hand <jorhand@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Chunyang Hui <sanqian.hcy@antfin.com>
Tested-by: Seth Moore <sethmo@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 340 +++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 41 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 76 ++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 465 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 9 +
6 files changed, 925 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
index d90114cec1c3..997a7f4117c5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static int sgx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
atomic_set(&encl->flags, 0);
kref_init(&encl->refcount);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&encl->va_pages);
INIT_RADIX_TREE(&encl->page_tree, GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_init(&encl->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&encl->mm_list);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
index 939b2faa185a..525bed526041 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
@@ -12,9 +12,84 @@
#include "encls.h"
#include "sgx.h"
+static int __sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page,
+ struct sgx_epc_page *secs_page)
+{
+ unsigned long va_offset = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET(encl_page);
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl;
+ struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
+ struct sgx_backing b;
+ pgoff_t page_index;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (secs_page)
+ page_index = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_INDEX(encl_page);
+ else
+ page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl->size);
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_get_backing(encl, page_index, &b);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ pginfo.addr = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(encl_page);
+ pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(b.contents);
+ pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(b.pcmd) +
+ b.pcmd_offset;
+
+ if (secs_page)
+ pginfo.secs = (u64)sgx_get_epc_addr(secs_page);
+ else
+ pginfo.secs = 0;
+
+ ret = __eldu(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page),
+ sgx_get_epc_addr(encl_page->va_page->epc_page) +
+ va_offset);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (encls_failed(ret))
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "ELDU");
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)(pginfo.metadata - b.pcmd_offset));
+ kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)pginfo.contents);
+
+ sgx_encl_put_backing(&b, false);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
+ struct sgx_epc_page *secs_page)
+{
+ unsigned long va_offset = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET(encl_page);
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ int ret;
+
+ epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, false);
+ if (IS_ERR(epc_page))
+ return epc_page;
+
+ ret = __sgx_encl_eldu(encl_page, epc_page, secs_page);
+ if (ret) {
+ sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+
+ sgx_free_va_slot(encl_page->va_page, va_offset);
+ list_move(&encl_page->va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
+ encl_page->desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK;
+ encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
+
+ return epc_page;
+}
+
static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
unsigned long addr)
{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
unsigned int flags;
@@ -34,10 +109,27 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
/* Page is already resident in the EPC. */
- if (entry->epc_page)
+ if (entry->epc_page) {
+ if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_RECLAIMED)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
+
return entry;
+ }
+
+ if (!(encl->secs.epc_page)) {
+ epc_page = sgx_encl_eldu(&encl->secs, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(epc_page))
+ return ERR_CAST(epc_page);
+ }
+
+ epc_page = sgx_encl_eldu(entry, encl->secs.epc_page);
+ if (IS_ERR(epc_page))
+ return ERR_CAST(epc_page);
- return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+ encl->secs_child_cnt++;
+ sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page);
+
+ return entry;
}
static void sgx_mmu_notifier_release(struct mmu_notifier *mn,
@@ -135,6 +227,9 @@ int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm)
spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock);
list_add_rcu(&encl_mm->list, &encl->mm_list);
+ /* Pairs with smp_rmb() in sgx_reclaimer_block(). */
+ smp_wmb();
+ encl->mm_list_version++;
spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock);
return 0;
@@ -182,6 +277,8 @@ static unsigned int sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
goto out;
}
+ sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(vma->vm_mm, entry);
+
out:
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
return ret;
@@ -281,6 +378,7 @@ int sgx_encl_find(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
*/
void sgx_encl_destroy(struct sgx_encl *encl)
{
+ struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
struct radix_tree_iter iter;
void **slot;
@@ -291,6 +389,13 @@ void sgx_encl_destroy(struct sgx_encl *encl)
entry = *slot;
if (entry->epc_page) {
+ /*
+ * The page and its radix tree entry cannot be freed
+ * if the page is being held by the reclaimer.
+ */
+ if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page))
+ continue;
+
sgx_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page);
encl->secs_child_cnt--;
entry->epc_page = NULL;
@@ -305,6 +410,19 @@ void sgx_encl_destroy(struct sgx_encl *encl)
sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
}
+
+ /*
+ * The reclaimer is responsible for checking SGX_ENCL_DEAD before doing
+ * EWB, thus it's safe to free VA pages even if the reclaimer holds a
+ * reference to the enclave.
+ */
+ while (!list_empty(&encl->va_pages)) {
+ va_page = list_first_entry(&encl->va_pages, struct sgx_va_page,
+ list);
+ list_del(&va_page->list);
+ sgx_free_epc_page(va_page->epc_page);
+ kfree(va_page);
+ }
}
/**
@@ -333,3 +451,221 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)
kfree(encl);
}
+
+static struct page *sgx_encl_get_backing_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ pgoff_t index)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = encl->backing->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
+ gfp_t gfpmask = mapping_gfp_mask(mapping);
+
+ return shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp(mapping, index, gfpmask);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_get_backing() - Pin the backing storage
+ * @encl: an enclave
+ * @page_index: enclave page index
+ * @backing: data for accessing backing storage for the page
+ *
+ * Pin the backing storage pages for storing the encrypted contents and Paging
+ * Crypto MetaData (PCMD) of an enclave page.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * -errno otherwise.
+ */
+int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
+ struct sgx_backing *backing)
+{
+ pgoff_t pcmd_index = PFN_DOWN(encl->size) + 1 + (page_index >> 5);
+ struct page *contents;
+ struct page *pcmd;
+
+ contents = sgx_encl_get_backing_page(encl, page_index);
+ if (IS_ERR(contents))
+ return PTR_ERR(contents);
+
+ pcmd = sgx_encl_get_backing_page(encl, pcmd_index);
+ if (IS_ERR(pcmd)) {
+ put_page(contents);
+ return PTR_ERR(pcmd);
+ }
+
+ backing->page_index = page_index;
+ backing->contents = contents;
+ backing->pcmd = pcmd;
+ backing->pcmd_offset =
+ (page_index & (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd) - 1)) *
+ sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_put_backing() - Unpin the backing storage
+ * @backing: data for accessing backing storage for the page
+ * @do_write: mark pages dirty
+ */
+void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write)
+{
+ if (do_write) {
+ set_page_dirty(backing->pcmd);
+ set_page_dirty(backing->contents);
+ }
+
+ put_page(backing->pcmd);
+ put_page(backing->contents);
+}
+
+static int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young_cb(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
+ void *data)
+{
+ pte_t pte;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = pte_young(*ptep);
+ if (ret) {
+ pte = pte_mkold(*ptep);
+ set_pte_at((struct mm_struct *)data, addr, ptep, pte);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young() - Test and reset the accessed bit
+ * @mm: mm_struct that is checked
+ * @page: enclave page to be tested for recent access
+ *
+ * Checks the Access (A) bit from the PTE corresponding to the enclave page and
+ * clears it.
+ *
+ * Return: 1 if the page has been recently accessed and 0 if not.
+ */
+int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm,
+ struct sgx_encl_page *page)
+{
+ unsigned long addr = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(page);
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_find(mm, addr, &vma);
+ if (ret)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (encl != vma->vm_private_data)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = apply_to_page_range(vma->vm_mm, addr, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young_cb, vma->vm_mm);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_reserve_page() - Reserve an enclave page
+ * @encl: an enclave
+ * @addr: a page address
+ *
+ * Load an enclave page and lock the enclave so that the page can be used by
+ * EDBG* and EMOD*.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * an enclave page on success
+ * -EFAULT if the load fails
+ */
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long addr)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+
+ for ( ; ; ) {
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
+ if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY)
+ break;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ }
+
+ if (IS_ERR(entry))
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ return entry;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_alloc_va_page() - Allocate a Version Array (VA) page
+ *
+ * Allocate a free EPC page and convert it to a Version Array (VA) page.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * a VA page,
+ * -errno otherwise
+ */
+struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ int ret;
+
+ epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(NULL, true);
+ if (IS_ERR(epc_page))
+ return ERR_CAST(epc_page);
+
+ ret = __epa(sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page));
+ if (ret) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "EPA returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret);
+ sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+ }
+
+ return epc_page;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_alloc_va_slot - allocate a VA slot
+ * @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance
+ *
+ * Allocates a slot from a &struct sgx_va_page instance.
+ *
+ * Return: offset of the slot inside the VA page
+ */
+unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
+{
+ int slot = find_first_zero_bit(va_page->slots, SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT);
+
+ if (slot < SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT)
+ set_bit(slot, va_page->slots);
+
+ return slot << 3;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_free_va_slot - free a VA slot
+ * @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance
+ * @offset: offset of the slot inside the VA page
+ *
+ * Frees a slot from a &struct sgx_va_page instance.
+ */
+void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset)
+{
+ clear_bit(offset >> 3, va_page->slots);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_va_page_full - is the VA page full?
+ * @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance
+ *
+ * Return: true if all slots have been taken
+ */
+bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
+{
+ int slot = find_first_zero_bit(va_page->slots, SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT);
+
+ return slot == SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
index 1d1bc5d590ee..f0f72e591244 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
/**
* enum sgx_encl_page_desc - defines bits for an enclave page's descriptor
+ * %SGX_ENCL_PAGE_RECLAIMED: The page is in the process of being
+ * reclaimed.
+ * %SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK: Holds the offset in the Version Array
+ * (VA) page for a swapped page.
* %SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR_MASK: Holds the virtual address of the page.
*
* The page address for SECS is zero and is used by the subsystem to recognize
@@ -26,16 +30,23 @@
*/
enum sgx_encl_page_desc {
/* Bits 11:3 are available when the page is not swapped. */
+ SGX_ENCL_PAGE_RECLAIMED = BIT(3),
+ SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK = GENMASK_ULL(11, 3),
SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR_MASK = PAGE_MASK,
};
#define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(page) \
((page)->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR_MASK)
+#define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET(page) \
+ ((page)->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK)
+#define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_INDEX(page) \
+ PFN_DOWN((page)->desc - (page)->encl->base)
struct sgx_encl_page {
unsigned long desc;
unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits;
struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
struct sgx_encl *encl;
};
@@ -63,17 +74,27 @@ struct sgx_encl {
struct mutex lock;
struct list_head mm_list;
spinlock_t mm_lock;
+ unsigned long mm_list_version;
struct file *backing;
struct kref refcount;
struct srcu_struct srcu;
unsigned long base;
unsigned long size;
unsigned long ssaframesize;
+ struct list_head va_pages;
struct radix_tree_root page_tree;
struct sgx_encl_page secs;
cpumask_t cpumask;
};
+#define SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT 512
+
+struct sgx_va_page {
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ DECLARE_BITMAP(slots, SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT);
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
extern const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops;
int sgx_encl_find(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
@@ -84,4 +105,24 @@ int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm);
int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start,
unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_prot_bits);
+struct sgx_backing {
+ pgoff_t page_index;
+ struct page *contents;
+ struct page *pcmd;
+ unsigned long pcmd_offset;
+};
+
+int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
+ struct sgx_backing *backing);
+void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write);
+int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm,
+ struct sgx_encl_page *page);
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long addr);
+
+struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void);
+unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
+void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset);
+bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
+
#endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
index 721096f1d5ba..9227ba94e090 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -19,6 +19,43 @@
/* A per-cpu cache for the last known values of IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHx MSRs. */
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64 [4], sgx_lepubkeyhash_cache);
+static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+ struct sgx_va_page *va_page = NULL;
+ void *err;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT !=
+ (SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK >> 3) + 1);
+
+ if (!(encl->page_cnt % SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT)) {
+ va_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*va_page), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!va_page)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ va_page->epc_page = sgx_alloc_va_page();
+ if (IS_ERR(va_page->epc_page)) {
+ err = ERR_CAST(va_page->epc_page);
+ kfree(va_page);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->page_cnt % SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT);
+ }
+ encl->page_cnt++;
+ return va_page;
+}
+
+static void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
+{
+ encl->page_cnt--;
+
+ if (va_page) {
+ sgx_free_epc_page(va_page->epc_page);
+ list_del(&va_page->list);
+ kfree(va_page);
+ }
+}
+
static u32 sgx_calc_ssaframesize(u32 miscselect, u64 xfrm)
{
u32 size_max = PAGE_SIZE;
@@ -114,6 +151,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
{
unsigned long encl_size = secs->size + PAGE_SIZE;
struct sgx_epc_page *secs_epc;
+ struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
unsigned long ssaframesize;
struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
@@ -123,20 +161,29 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED)
return -EINVAL;
+ va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl);
+ if (IS_ERR(va_page))
+ return PTR_ERR(va_page);
+ else if (va_page)
+ list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
+
ssaframesize = sgx_calc_ssaframesize(secs->miscselect, secs->xfrm);
if (sgx_validate_secs(secs, ssaframesize)) {
pr_debug("invalid SECS\n");
- return -EINVAL;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_out_shrink;
}
backing = shmem_file_setup("SGX backing", encl_size + (encl_size >> 5),
VM_NORESERVE);
- if (IS_ERR(backing))
- return PTR_ERR(backing);
+ if (IS_ERR(backing)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(backing);
+ goto err_out_shrink;
+ }
encl->backing = backing;
- secs_epc = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
+ secs_epc = sgx_alloc_epc_page(&encl->secs, true);
if (IS_ERR(secs_epc)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(secs_epc);
goto err_out_backing;
@@ -183,6 +230,9 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
fput(encl->backing);
encl->backing = NULL;
+err_out_shrink:
+ sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page);
+
return ret;
}
@@ -319,13 +369,14 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
{
struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
int ret;
encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, offset, secinfo->flags);
if (IS_ERR(encl_page))
return PTR_ERR(encl_page);
- epc_page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
+ epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, true);
if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
kfree(encl_page);
return PTR_ERR(epc_page);
@@ -337,9 +388,22 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
goto err_out_free;
}
+ va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl);
+ if (IS_ERR(va_page)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(va_page);
+ goto err_out_free;
+ }
+
mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+ /*
+ * Adding to encl->va_pages must be done under encl->lock. Ditto for
+ * deleting (via sgx_encl_shrink()) in the error path.
+ */
+ if (va_page)
+ list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
+
/*
* Insert prior to EADD in case of OOM. EADD modifies MRENCLAVE, i.e.
* can't be gracefully unwound, while failure on EADD/EXTEND is limited
@@ -370,6 +434,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
goto err_out;
}
+ sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(encl_page->epc_page);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
return ret;
@@ -379,6 +444,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc));
err_out_unlock:
+ sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
index 506cb0756147..3594d37d545f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
@@ -16,6 +16,378 @@
struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS];
static int sgx_nr_epc_sections;
static struct task_struct *ksgxswapd_tsk;
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(ksgxswapd_waitq);
+static LIST_HEAD(sgx_active_page_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sgx_active_page_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * sgx_mark_page_reclaimable() - Mark a page as reclaimable
+ * @page: EPC page
+ *
+ * Mark a page as reclaimable and add it to the active page list. Pages
+ * are automatically removed from the active list when freed.
+ */
+void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
+{
+ spin_lock(&sgx_active_page_list_lock);
+ page->desc |= SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMABLE;
+ list_add_tail(&page->list, &sgx_active_page_list);
+ spin_unlock(&sgx_active_page_list_lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable() - Remove a page from the reclaim list
+ * @page: EPC page
+ *
+ * Clear the reclaimable flag and remove the page from the active page list.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * -EBUSY if the page is in the process of being reclaimed
+ */
+int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
+{
+ /*
+ * Remove the page from the active list if necessary. If the page
+ * is actively being reclaimed, i.e. RECLAIMABLE is set but the
+ * page isn't on the active list, return -EBUSY as we can't free
+ * the page at this time since it is "owned" by the reclaimer.
+ */
+ spin_lock(&sgx_active_page_list_lock);
+ if (page->desc & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMABLE) {
+ if (list_empty(&page->list)) {
+ spin_unlock(&sgx_active_page_list_lock);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+ list_del(&page->list);
+ page->desc &= ~SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMABLE;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&sgx_active_page_list_lock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool sgx_reclaimer_age(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *page = epc_page->owner;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl;
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
+ bool ret = true;
+ int idx;
+
+ idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) {
+ if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm))
+ continue;
+
+ mmap_read_lock(encl_mm->mm);
+ ret = !sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(encl_mm->mm, page);
+ mmap_read_unlock(encl_mm->mm);
+
+ mmput_async(encl_mm->mm);
+
+ if (!ret || (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_DEAD))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
+
+ if (!ret && !(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_DEAD))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void sgx_reclaimer_block(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *page = epc_page->owner;
+ unsigned long addr = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(page);
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl;
+ unsigned long mm_list_version;
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ int idx, ret;
+
+ do {
+ mm_list_version = encl->mm_list_version;
+
+ /* Pairs with smp_rmb() in sgx_encl_mm_add(). */
+ smp_rmb();
+
+ idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) {
+ if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm))
+ continue;
+
+ mmap_read_lock(encl_mm->mm);
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_find(encl_mm->mm, addr, &vma);
+ if (!ret && encl == vma->vm_private_data)
+ zap_vma_ptes(vma, addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ mmap_read_unlock(encl_mm->mm);
+
+ mmput_async(encl_mm->mm);
+ }
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
+ } while (unlikely(encl->mm_list_version != mm_list_version));
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_DEAD)) {
+ ret = __eblock(sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page));
+ if (encls_failed(ret))
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EBLOCK");
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+}
+
+static int __sgx_encl_ewb(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, void *va_slot,
+ struct sgx_backing *backing)
+{
+ struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
+ int ret;
+
+ pginfo.addr = 0;
+ pginfo.secs = 0;
+
+ pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(backing->contents);
+ pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(backing->pcmd) +
+ backing->pcmd_offset;
+
+ ret = __ewb(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page), va_slot);
+
+ kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)(pginfo.metadata -
+ backing->pcmd_offset));
+ kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)pginfo.contents);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info)
+{
+}
+
+static const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+ cpumask_t *cpumask = &encl->cpumask;
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
+ int idx;
+
+ /*
+ * Can race with sgx_encl_mm_add(), but ETRACK has already been
+ * executed, which means that the CPUs running in the new mm will enter
+ * into the enclave with a fresh epoch.
+ */
+ cpumask_clear(cpumask);
+
+ idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) {
+ if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm))
+ continue;
+
+ cpumask_or(cpumask, cpumask, mm_cpumask(encl_mm->mm));
+
+ mmput_async(encl_mm->mm);
+ }
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
+
+ return cpumask;
+}
+
+static void sgx_encl_ewb(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page,
+ struct sgx_backing *backing)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page = epc_page->owner;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl;
+ struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
+ unsigned int va_offset;
+ void *va_slot;
+ int ret;
+
+ encl_page->desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_RECLAIMED;
+
+ va_page = list_first_entry(&encl->va_pages, struct sgx_va_page,
+ list);
+ va_offset = sgx_alloc_va_slot(va_page);
+ va_slot = sgx_get_epc_addr(va_page->epc_page) + va_offset;
+ if (sgx_va_page_full(va_page))
+ list_move_tail(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
+
+ ret = __sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, va_slot, backing);
+ if (ret == SGX_NOT_TRACKED) {
+ ret = __etrack(sgx_get_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page));
+ if (ret) {
+ if (encls_failed(ret))
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "ETRACK");
+ }
+
+ ret = __sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, va_slot, backing);
+ if (ret == SGX_NOT_TRACKED) {
+ /*
+ * Slow path, send IPIs to kick cpus out of the
+ * enclave. Note, it's imperative that the cpu
+ * mask is generated *after* ETRACK, else we'll
+ * miss cpus that entered the enclave between
+ * generating the mask and incrementing epoch.
+ */
+ on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(encl),
+ sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1);
+ ret = __sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, va_slot, backing);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret) {
+ if (encls_failed(ret))
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EWB");
+
+ sgx_free_va_slot(va_page, va_offset);
+ } else {
+ encl_page->desc |= va_offset;
+ encl_page->va_page = va_page;
+ }
+}
+
+static void sgx_reclaimer_write(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page,
+ struct sgx_backing *backing)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page = epc_page->owner;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl;
+ struct sgx_backing secs_backing;
+ int ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_DEAD) {
+ ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page));
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EREMOVE");
+ } else {
+ sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, backing);
+ }
+
+ encl_page->epc_page = NULL;
+ encl->secs_child_cnt--;
+
+ if (!encl->secs_child_cnt) {
+ if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_DEAD) {
+ sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
+ encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
+ } else if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) {
+ ret = sgx_encl_get_backing(encl, PFN_DOWN(encl->size),
+ &secs_backing);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ sgx_encl_ewb(encl->secs.epc_page, &secs_backing);
+
+ sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
+ encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
+
+ sgx_encl_put_backing(&secs_backing, true);
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Take a fixed number of pages from the head of the active page pool and
+ * reclaim them to the enclave's private shmem files. Skip the pages, which have
+ * been accessed since the last scan. Move those pages to the tail of active
+ * page pool so that the pages get scanned in LRU like fashion.
+ */
+static void sgx_reclaim_pages(void)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *chunk[SGX_NR_TO_SCAN];
+ struct sgx_backing backing[SGX_NR_TO_SCAN];
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section;
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ int cnt = 0;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ spin_lock(&sgx_active_page_list_lock);
+ for (i = 0; i < SGX_NR_TO_SCAN; i++) {
+ if (list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list))
+ break;
+
+ epc_page = list_first_entry(&sgx_active_page_list,
+ struct sgx_epc_page, list);
+ list_del_init(&epc_page->list);
+ encl_page = epc_page->owner;
+
+ if (kref_get_unless_zero(&encl_page->encl->refcount) != 0)
+ chunk[cnt++] = epc_page;
+ else
+ /* The owner is freeing the page. No need to add the
+ * page back to the list of reclaimable pages.
+ */
+ epc_page->desc &= ~SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMABLE;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&sgx_active_page_list_lock);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+ epc_page = chunk[i];
+ encl_page = epc_page->owner;
+
+ if (!sgx_reclaimer_age(epc_page))
+ goto skip;
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_get_backing(encl_page->encl,
+ SGX_ENCL_PAGE_INDEX(encl_page),
+ &backing[i]);
+ if (ret)
+ goto skip;
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl_page->encl->lock);
+ encl_page->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_RECLAIMED;
+ mutex_unlock(&encl_page->encl->lock);
+ continue;
+
+skip:
+ spin_lock(&sgx_active_page_list_lock);
+ list_add_tail(&epc_page->list, &sgx_active_page_list);
+ spin_unlock(&sgx_active_page_list_lock);
+
+ kref_put(&encl_page->encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
+
+ chunk[i] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+ epc_page = chunk[i];
+ if (epc_page)
+ sgx_reclaimer_block(epc_page);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+ epc_page = chunk[i];
+ if (!epc_page)
+ continue;
+
+ encl_page = epc_page->owner;
+ sgx_reclaimer_write(epc_page, &backing[i]);
+ sgx_encl_put_backing(&backing[i], true);
+
+ kref_put(&encl_page->encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
+ epc_page->desc &= ~SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMABLE;
+
+ section = sgx_get_epc_section(epc_page);
+ spin_lock(§ion->lock);
+ list_add_tail(&epc_page->list, §ion->page_list);
+ section->free_cnt++;
+ spin_unlock(§ion->lock);
+ }
+}
+
static void sgx_sanitize_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section)
{
@@ -44,6 +416,23 @@ static void sgx_sanitize_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section)
}
}
+static unsigned long sgx_nr_free_pages(void)
+{
+ unsigned long cnt = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++)
+ cnt += sgx_epc_sections[i].free_cnt;
+
+ return cnt;
+}
+
+static bool sgx_should_reclaim(unsigned long watermark)
+{
+ return sgx_nr_free_pages() < watermark &&
+ !list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list);
+}
+
static int ksgxswapd(void *p)
{
int i;
@@ -69,6 +458,20 @@ static int ksgxswapd(void *p)
WARN(1, "EPC section %d has unsanitized pages.\n", i);
}
+ while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
+ if (try_to_freeze())
+ continue;
+
+ wait_event_freezable(ksgxswapd_waitq,
+ kthread_should_stop() ||
+ sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES));
+
+ if (sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES))
+ sgx_reclaim_pages();
+
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+
return 0;
}
@@ -94,6 +497,8 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section(struct sgx_epc_sec
page = list_first_entry(§ion->page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list);
list_del_init(&page->list);
+ section->free_cnt--;
+
return page;
}
@@ -126,6 +531,57 @@ struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
+/**
+ * sgx_alloc_epc_page() - Allocate an EPC page
+ * @owner: the owner of the EPC page
+ * @reclaim: reclaim pages if necessary
+ *
+ * Iterate through EPC sections and borrow a free EPC page to the caller. When a
+ * page is no longer needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page(). If
+ * @reclaim is set to true, directly reclaim pages when we are out of pages. No
+ * mm's can be locked when @reclaim is set to true.
+ *
+ * Finally, wake up ksgxswapd when the number of pages goes below the watermark
+ * before returning back to the caller.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * an EPC page,
+ * -errno on error
+ */
+struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *entry;
+
+ for ( ; ; ) {
+ entry = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
+ if (!IS_ERR(entry)) {
+ entry->owner = owner;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list))
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ if (!reclaim) {
+ entry = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ entry = ERR_PTR(-ERESTARTSYS);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ sgx_reclaim_pages();
+ schedule();
+ }
+
+ if (sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES))
+ wake_up(&ksgxswapd_waitq);
+
+ return entry;
+}
+
/**
* sgx_free_epc_page() - Free an EPC page
* @page: an EPC page
@@ -137,12 +593,20 @@ void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
struct sgx_epc_section *section = sgx_get_epc_section(page);
int ret;
+ /*
+ * Don't take sgx_active_page_list_lock when asserting the page isn't
+ * reclaimable, missing a WARN in the very rare case is preferable to
+ * unnecessarily taking a global lock in the common case.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(page->desc & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMABLE);
+
ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_addr(page));
if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret))
return;
spin_lock(§ion->lock);
list_add_tail(&page->list, §ion->page_list);
+ section->free_cnt++;
spin_unlock(§ion->lock);
}
@@ -193,6 +657,7 @@ static bool __init sgx_setup_epc_section(u64 addr, u64 size,
list_add_tail(&page->list, §ion->unsanitized_page_list);
}
+ section->free_cnt = nr_pages;
return true;
err_out:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
index aae6bfb3bc8a..f2fb7e362226 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
struct sgx_epc_page {
unsigned long desc;
+ struct sgx_encl_page *owner;
struct list_head list;
};
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ struct sgx_epc_page {
struct sgx_epc_section {
unsigned long pa;
void *va;
+ unsigned long free_cnt;
struct list_head page_list;
struct list_head unsanitized_page_list;
spinlock_t lock;
@@ -34,6 +36,10 @@ struct sgx_epc_section {
#define SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK GENMASK(7, 0)
#define SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS (SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK + 1)
+#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMABLE BIT(8)
+#define SGX_NR_TO_SCAN 16
+#define SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES 32
+#define SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES 64
extern struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS];
@@ -50,7 +56,10 @@ static inline void *sgx_get_epc_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
return section->va + (page->desc & PAGE_MASK) - section->pa;
}
+void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
+int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void);
+struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim);
void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 14/21] x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 13/21] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
` (6 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Jarkko Sakkinen, Jethro Beekman, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, sean.j.christopherson, tglx, yaozhangx
Add VMA callbacks for ptrace() that can be used with debug enclaves.
With debug enclaves data can be read and write the memory word at a time
by using ENCLS(EDBGRD) and ENCLS(EDBGWR) leaf instructions.
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 87 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
index 525bed526041..d1edadfa3fc6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
@@ -334,10 +334,97 @@ static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0));
}
+static int sgx_edbgrd(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *page,
+ unsigned long addr, void *data)
+{
+ unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+ int ret;
+
+
+ ret = __edbgrd(sgx_get_epc_addr(page->epc_page) + offset, data);
+ if (ret)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_edbgwr(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *page,
+ unsigned long addr, void *data)
+{
+ unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = __edbgwr(sgx_get_epc_addr(page->epc_page) + offset, data);
+ if (ret)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
+ void *buf, int len, int write)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry = NULL;
+ char data[sizeof(unsigned long)];
+ unsigned long align;
+ unsigned int flags;
+ int offset;
+ int cnt;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ /* If process was forked, VMA is still there but vm_private_data is set
+ * to NULL.
+ */
+ if (!encl)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ flags = atomic_read(&encl->flags);
+
+ if (!(flags & SGX_ENCL_DEBUG) || !(flags & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) ||
+ (flags & SGX_ENCL_DEAD))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += cnt) {
+ entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(entry);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ align = ALIGN_DOWN(addr + i, sizeof(unsigned long));
+ offset = (addr + i) & (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1);
+ cnt = sizeof(unsigned long) - offset;
+ cnt = min(cnt, len - i);
+
+ ret = sgx_edbgrd(encl, entry, align, data);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (write) {
+ memcpy(data + offset, buf + i, cnt);
+ ret = sgx_edbgwr(encl, entry, align, data);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ memcpy(buf + i, data + offset, cnt);
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret < 0 ? ret : i;
+}
+
const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = {
.open = sgx_vma_open,
.fault = sgx_vma_fault,
.may_mprotect = sgx_vma_mprotect,
+ .access = sgx_vma_access,
};
/**
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 14/21] x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-29 17:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 16/21] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Jarkko Sakkinen
` (5 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, Andy Lutomirski,
Jethro Beekman, Jarkko Sakkinen, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek,
bp, cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish,
dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy,
ludloff, luto, nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx,
yaozhangx
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
The basic concept and implementation is very similar to the kernel's
exception fixup mechanism. The key differences are that the kernel
handler is hardcoded and the fixup entry addresses are relative to
the overall table as opposed to individual entries.
Hardcoding the kernel handler avoids the need to figure out how to
get userspace code to point at a kernel function. Given that the
expected usage is to propagate information to userspace, dumping all
fault information into registers is likely the desired behavior for
the vast majority of yet-to-be-created functions. Use registers
DI, SI and DX to communicate fault information, which follows Linux's
ABI for register consumption and hopefully avoids conflict with
hardware features that might leverage the fixup capabilities, e.g.
register usage for SGX instructions was at least partially designed
with calling conventions in mind.
Making fixup addresses relative to the overall table allows the table
to be stripped from the final vDSO image (it's a kernel construct)
without complicating the offset logic, e.g. entry-relative addressing
would also need to account for the table's location relative to the
image.
Regarding stripping the table, modify vdso2c to extract the table from
the raw, a.k.a. unstripped, data and dump it as a standalone byte array
in the resulting .c file. The original base of the table, its length
and a pointer to the byte array are captured in struct vdso_image.
Alternatively, the table could be dumped directly into the struct,
but because the number of entries can vary per image, that would
require either hardcoding a max sized table into the struct definition
or defining the table as a flexible length array. The flexible length
array approach has zero benefits, e.g. the base/size are still needed,
and prevents reusing the extraction code, while hardcoding the max size
adds ongoing maintenance just to avoid exporting the explicit size.
The immediate use case is for Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX).
SGX introduces a new CPL3-only "enclave" mode that runs as a sort of
black box shared object that is hosted by an untrusted "normal" CPl3
process.
Entering an enclave can only be done through SGX-specific instructions,
EENTER and ERESUME, and is a non-trivial process. Because of the
complexity of transitioning to/from an enclave, the vast majority of
enclaves are expected to utilize a library to handle the actual
transitions. This is roughly analogous to how e.g. libc implementations
are used by most applications.
Another crucial characteristic of SGX enclaves is that they can generate
exceptions as part of their normal (at least as "normal" as SGX can be)
operation that need to be handled *in* the enclave and/or are unique
to SGX.
And because they are essentially fancy shared objects, a process can
host any number of enclaves, each of which can execute multiple threads
simultaneously.
Putting everything together, userspace enclaves will utilize a library
that must be prepared to handle any and (almost) all exceptions any time
at least one thread may be executing in an enclave. Leveraging signals
to handle the enclave exceptions is unpleasant, to put it mildly, e.g.
the SGX library must constantly (un)register its signal handler based
on whether or not at least one thread is executing in an enclave, and
filter and forward exceptions that aren't related to its enclaves. This
becomes particularly nasty when using multiple levels of libraries that
register signal handlers, e.g. running an enclave via cgo inside of the
Go runtime.
Enabling exception fixup in vDSO allows the kernel to provide a vDSO
function that wraps the low-level transitions to/from the enclave, i.e.
the EENTER and ERESUME instructions. The vDSO function can intercept
exceptions that would otherwise generate a signal and return the fault
information directly to its caller, thus avoiding the need to juggle
signal handlers.
Note that unlike the kernel's _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE implementation, the
'C' version of _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE doesn't use a pre-compiled
assembly macro. Duplicating four lines of code is simpler than adding
the necessary infrastructure to generate pre-compiled assembly and the
intended benefit of massaging GCC's inlining algorithm is unlikely to
realized in the vDSO any time soon, if ever.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 6 ++--
arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h | 29 ++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S | 9 ++++-
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h | 5 +++
6 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
index 04e65f0698f6..ebe82b7aecda 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o
vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o
# files to link into kernel
-obj-y += vma.o
+obj-y += vma.o extable.o
KASAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y
UBSAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y
KCSAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y
@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ $(obj)/%-x32.o: $(obj)/%.o FORCE
targets += vdsox32.lds $(vobjx32s-y)
-$(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S
-$(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg FORCE
+$(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S --remove-section __ex_table
+$(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg
$(call if_changed,objcopy)
$(obj)/vdsox32.so.dbg: $(obj)/vdsox32.lds $(vobjx32s) FORCE
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..afcf5b65beef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <asm/current.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/vdso.h>
+
+struct vdso_exception_table_entry {
+ int insn, fixup;
+};
+
+bool fixup_vdso_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+ unsigned long error_code, unsigned long fault_addr)
+{
+ const struct vdso_image *image = current->mm->context.vdso_image;
+ const struct vdso_exception_table_entry *extable;
+ unsigned int nr_entries, i;
+ unsigned long base;
+
+ /*
+ * Do not attempt to fixup #DB or #BP. It's impossible to identify
+ * whether or not a #DB/#BP originated from within an SGX enclave and
+ * SGX enclaves are currently the only use case for vDSO fixup.
+ */
+ if (trapnr == X86_TRAP_DB || trapnr == X86_TRAP_BP)
+ return false;
+
+ if (!current->mm->context.vdso)
+ return false;
+
+ base = (unsigned long)current->mm->context.vdso + image->extable_base;
+ nr_entries = image->extable_len / (sizeof(*extable));
+ extable = image->extable;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_entries; i++) {
+ if (regs->ip == base + extable[i].insn) {
+ regs->ip = base + extable[i].fixup;
+ regs->di = trapnr;
+ regs->si = error_code;
+ regs->dx = fault_addr;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..aafdac396948
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __VDSO_EXTABLE_H
+#define __VDSO_EXTABLE_H
+
+/*
+ * Inject exception fixup for vDSO code. Unlike normal exception fixup,
+ * vDSO uses a dedicated handler the addresses are relative to the overall
+ * exception table, not each individual entry.
+ */
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to) \
+ ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from to
+
+.macro ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from:req to:req
+ .pushsection __ex_table, "a"
+ .long (\from) - __ex_table
+ .long (\to) - __ex_table
+ .popsection
+.endm
+#else
+#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to) \
+ ".pushsection __ex_table, \"a\"\n" \
+ ".long (" #from ") - __ex_table\n" \
+ ".long (" #to ") - __ex_table\n" \
+ ".popsection\n"
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __VDSO_EXTABLE_H */
+
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S
index 4d152933547d..dc8da7695859 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S
@@ -75,11 +75,18 @@ SECTIONS
* stuff that isn't used at runtime in between.
*/
- .text : { *(.text*) } :text =0x90909090,
+ .text : {
+ *(.text*)
+ *(.fixup)
+ } :text =0x90909090,
+
+
.altinstructions : { *(.altinstructions) } :text
.altinstr_replacement : { *(.altinstr_replacement) } :text
+ __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) } :text
+
/DISCARD/ : {
*(.discard)
*(.discard.*)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
index 6f46e11ce539..1c7cfac7e64a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
@@ -5,6 +5,41 @@
* are built for 32-bit userspace.
*/
+static void BITSFUNC(copy)(FILE *outfile, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (i % 10 == 0)
+ fprintf(outfile, "\n\t");
+ fprintf(outfile, "0x%02X, ", (int)(data)[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Extract a section from the input data into a standalone blob. Used to
+ * capture kernel-only data that needs to persist indefinitely, e.g. the
+ * exception fixup tables, but only in the kernel, i.e. the section can
+ * be stripped from the final vDSO image.
+ */
+static void BITSFUNC(extract)(const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
+ FILE *outfile, ELF(Shdr) *sec, const char *name)
+{
+ unsigned long offset;
+ size_t len;
+
+ offset = (unsigned long)GET_LE(&sec->sh_offset);
+ len = (size_t)GET_LE(&sec->sh_size);
+
+ if (offset + len > data_len)
+ fail("section to extract overruns input data");
+
+ fprintf(outfile, "static const unsigned char %s[%lu] = {", name, len);
+ BITSFUNC(copy)(outfile, data + offset, len);
+ fprintf(outfile, "\n};\n\n");
+}
+
static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len,
void *stripped_addr, size_t stripped_len,
FILE *outfile, const char *image_name)
@@ -15,7 +50,7 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len,
ELF(Ehdr) *hdr = (ELF(Ehdr) *)raw_addr;
unsigned long i, syms_nr;
ELF(Shdr) *symtab_hdr = NULL, *strtab_hdr, *secstrings_hdr,
- *alt_sec = NULL;
+ *alt_sec = NULL, *extable_sec = NULL;
ELF(Dyn) *dyn = 0, *dyn_end = 0;
const char *secstrings;
INT_BITS syms[NSYMS] = {};
@@ -77,6 +112,8 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len,
if (!strcmp(secstrings + GET_LE(&sh->sh_name),
".altinstructions"))
alt_sec = sh;
+ if (!strcmp(secstrings + GET_LE(&sh->sh_name), "__ex_table"))
+ extable_sec = sh;
}
if (!symtab_hdr)
@@ -155,6 +192,9 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len,
(int)((unsigned char *)stripped_addr)[i]);
}
fprintf(outfile, "\n};\n\n");
+ if (extable_sec)
+ BITSFUNC(extract)(raw_addr, raw_len, outfile,
+ extable_sec, "extable");
fprintf(outfile, "const struct vdso_image %s = {\n", image_name);
fprintf(outfile, "\t.data = raw_data,\n");
@@ -165,6 +205,14 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len,
fprintf(outfile, "\t.alt_len = %lu,\n",
(unsigned long)GET_LE(&alt_sec->sh_size));
}
+ if (extable_sec) {
+ fprintf(outfile, "\t.extable_base = %lu,\n",
+ (unsigned long)GET_LE(&extable_sec->sh_offset));
+ fprintf(outfile, "\t.extable_len = %lu,\n",
+ (unsigned long)GET_LE(&extable_sec->sh_size));
+ fprintf(outfile, "\t.extable = extable,\n");
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < NSYMS; i++) {
if (required_syms[i].export && syms[i])
fprintf(outfile, "\t.sym_%s = %" PRIi64 ",\n",
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h
index bbcdc7b8f963..b5d23470f56b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ struct vdso_image {
unsigned long size; /* Always a multiple of PAGE_SIZE */
unsigned long alt, alt_len;
+ unsigned long extable_base, extable_len;
+ const void *extable;
long sym_vvar_start; /* Negative offset to the vvar area */
@@ -45,6 +47,9 @@ extern void __init init_vdso_image(const struct vdso_image *image);
extern int map_vdso_once(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr);
+extern bool fixup_vdso_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+ unsigned long error_code,
+ unsigned long fault_addr);
#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_VDSO_H */
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-29 17:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-30 6:00 ` Sean Christopherson
0 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-29 17:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson,
Andy Lutomirski, Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:37AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
...
> intended benefit of massaging GCC's inlining algorithm is unlikely to
> realized in the vDSO any time soon, if ever.
That is a very good explanation and I would prefer if it would be in a
sgx-specific README or so instead of it getting lost in git...
> +bool fixup_vdso_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
> + unsigned long error_code, unsigned long fault_addr)
> +{
> + const struct vdso_image *image = current->mm->context.vdso_image;
> + const struct vdso_exception_table_entry *extable;
> + unsigned int nr_entries, i;
> + unsigned long base;
> +
> + /*
> + * Do not attempt to fixup #DB or #BP. It's impossible to identify
> + * whether or not a #DB/#BP originated from within an SGX enclave and
> + * SGX enclaves are currently the only use case for vDSO fixup.
> + */
So this is all fine and dandy but nowhere do I see the code doing:
if (am_I_an_sgx_enclave(tsk))
fixup_vdso_exception()
because that vDSO exception fixup, albeit it looking kinda generic, is
SGX-only for now. So it should be designed to run only for SGX enclaves
for now.
Also, is there any particular reason for fixup_vdso_exception() to be in
arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c instead of in arch/x86/mm/extable.c?
I mean, it gets called by traps.c so it looks like normal kernel code to
me or am I missing some vdso magic?
And built only when CONFIG_INTEL_SGX is enabled.
And so on...
...
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..aafdac396948
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef __VDSO_EXTABLE_H
> +#define __VDSO_EXTABLE_H
> +
> +/*
> + * Inject exception fixup for vDSO code. Unlike normal exception fixup,
> + * vDSO uses a dedicated handler the addresses are relative to the overall
> + * exception table, not each individual entry.
> + */
> +#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
> +#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to) \
> + ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from to
> +
> +.macro ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from:req to:req
> + .pushsection __ex_table, "a"
> + .long (\from) - __ex_table
> + .long (\to) - __ex_table
> + .popsection
> +.endm
> +#else
> +#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to) \
> + ".pushsection __ex_table, \"a\"\n" \
> + ".long (" #from ") - __ex_table\n" \
> + ".long (" #to ") - __ex_table\n" \
> + ".popsection\n"
> +#endif
> +
> +#endif /* __VDSO_EXTABLE_H */
> +
.git/rebase-apply/patch:122: new blank line at EOF.
+
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions
2020-06-29 17:10 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-30 6:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-30 8:41 ` Borislav Petkov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 93+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2020-06-30 6:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Andy Lutomirski,
Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 07:10:22PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:37AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> ...
> > intended benefit of massaging GCC's inlining algorithm is unlikely to
> > realized in the vDSO any time soon, if ever.
>
> That is a very good explanation and I would prefer if it would be in a
> sgx-specific README or so instead of it getting lost in git...
>
> > +bool fixup_vdso_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
> > + unsigned long error_code, unsigned long fault_addr)
> > +{
> > + const struct vdso_image *image = current->mm->context.vdso_image;
> > + const struct vdso_exception_table_entry *extable;
> > + unsigned int nr_entries, i;
> > + unsigned long base;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Do not attempt to fixup #DB or #BP. It's impossible to identify
> > + * whether or not a #DB/#BP originated from within an SGX enclave and
> > + * SGX enclaves are currently the only use case for vDSO fixup.
> > + */
>
> So this is all fine and dandy but nowhere do I see the code doing:
>
> if (am_I_an_sgx_enclave(tsk))
> fixup_vdso_exception()
>
> because that vDSO exception fixup, albeit it looking kinda generic, is
> SGX-only for now. So it should be designed to run only for SGX enclaves
> for now.
That's not really feasible as there is no readily available identifier for
an SGX task. The only indication that a relevant task is an SGX task is if
it has mmap()'d /dev/sgx/enclave, and hooking that would be heinous. And
adding flag just to tag the task as SGX seems wasteful.
Even if we could easily condition the vDSO fixup on SGX tasks, I don't think
that'd be a good ABI for the SGX vDSO code. The intended contract is that
fixup will happen simply by virtue of the code at the related IP taking a
fault (in userspace). E.g. the vDSO function should get the fixup even if
userspace screws up mmap() and invokes __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() without
being tagged an SGX task.
> Also, is there any particular reason for fixup_vdso_exception() to be in
> arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c instead of in arch/x86/mm/extable.c?
>
> I mean, it gets called by traps.c so it looks like normal kernel code to
> me or am I missing some vdso magic?
No hard dependency, it's normal kernel code. My reasoning for dropping it
in .../vdso was largely to co-locate it with vdso/extable.h due to the
dependency on the format of 'struct vdso_exception_table_entry'. And I
put extable.h in .../vdso because it contains macros that are only for use
in actual vDSO code.
> And built only when CONFIG_INTEL_SGX is enabled.
Ya, shouldn't be a problem to stub it out for SGX=n.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions
2020-06-30 6:00 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-06-30 8:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-30 14:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-30 16:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
0 siblings, 2 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2020-06-30 8:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Andy Lutomirski,
Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 11:00:55PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> E.g. the vDSO function should get the fixup even if userspace screws
> up mmap() and invokes __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() without being tagged
> an SGX task.
I sincerely hope you don't mean this seriously.
Please add a member to task_struct which denotes that a task is an
sgx task, test that member where needed and forget real quickly about
running *any* *fixup* for unrelated tasks.
> No hard dependency, it's normal kernel code. My reasoning for dropping it
> in .../vdso was largely to co-locate it with vdso/extable.h due to the
> dependency on the format of 'struct vdso_exception_table_entry'.
A struct which you defined instead of simply using struct
exception_table_entry even if it has a handler member which would remain
unused?
Let's not put code in vdso/ if it doesn't really belong there pls.
> Ya, shouldn't be a problem to stub it out for SGX=n.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions
2020-06-30 8:41 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2020-06-30 14:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-30 16:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
1 sibling, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2020-06-30 14:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, x86, linux-sgx, linux-kernel, Andy Lutomirski,
Jethro Beekman, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing,
chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang,
josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman,
npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 10:41:28AM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 11:00:55PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > E.g. the vDSO function should get the fixup even if userspace screws
> > up mmap() and invokes __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() without being tagged
> > an SGX task.
>
> I sincerely hope you don't mean this seriously.
>
> Please add a member to task_struct which denotes that a task is an
> sgx task, test that member where needed and forget real quickly about
> running *any* *fixup* for unrelated tasks.
But IMO they're not unrelated if they end up in __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave().
Getting to the point where __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() actually attempts
ENCLU (the single fixup entry) requires a very deliberate attempt to run an
enclave. Not to mention the fixup doesn't squash the fault, it simply
morphs what would be a signal into a synchronous error.
And I don't see how to sanely track this in task_struct. As stated before,
the only foolproof way to identify an SGX task is by tracking whether it
has a VMA backed by /dev/sgx/enclave, i.e. the flag would probably need to
reside in mm_struct. Keying off opening /dev/sgx/enclave isn't viable as
enclaves can be handed off via SCM_RIGHTS or fork().
Putting a flag in mm_struct is doable, but it would need to be sticky to
keep things sane, e.g. clearing the flag on unmapping the enclave would
require refcounting VMAs and hooking vm_ops->close. The refcounting is
painful (we had it for several years) and ->close prevents merging VMAs,
which IMO is far worse than unconditionally morphing fault-based signals
that originate in __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave(). And assuming we don't do the
whole ->close thing, we'd end up with MADV_DONTFORK -> fork() having
divergent behavior for mm_structs without /dev/sgx/enclave VMAs, i.e. the
child of MADV_DONTFORK -> fork() case would not be tagged SGX (unless we
intentionally do the "wrong" thing and propagate the flag), whereas the
munmap() case would result in a SGX-tagged mm_struct with no
/dev/sgx/enclave VMAs.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions
2020-06-30 8:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-30 14:55 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-06-30 16:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-30 17:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-02 12:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
1 sibling, 2 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2020-06-30 16:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Sean Christopherson, Jarkko Sakkinen, X86 ML, linux-sgx, LKML,
Jethro Beekman, Andrew Morton, Andy Shevchenko, asapek, Xing,
Cedric, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, Dave Hansen, Huang,
Haitao, Josh Triplett, Huang, Kai, Svahn, Kai, kmoy,
Christian Ludloff, Andrew Lutomirski, Neil Horman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, David Rientjes, Thomas Gleixner, yaozhangx
On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 1:41 AM Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 11:00:55PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > E.g. the vDSO function should get the fixup even if userspace screws
> > up mmap() and invokes __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() without being tagged
> > an SGX task.
>
> I sincerely hope you don't mean this seriously.
>
> Please add a member to task_struct which denotes that a task is an
> sgx task, test that member where needed and forget real quickly about
> running *any* *fixup* for unrelated tasks.
I don't see the problem. If you call this magic vDSO function and get
a fault, it gets handled. What's the failure mode?
>
> > No hard dependency, it's normal kernel code. My reasoning for dropping it
> > in .../vdso was largely to co-locate it with vdso/extable.h due to the
> > dependency on the format of 'struct vdso_exception_table_entry'.
>
> A struct which you defined instead of simply using struct
> exception_table_entry even if it has a handler member which would remain
> unused?
Don't forget the cross-arch issue. We need that structure to have
constant layout so that the -m32 build from the vDSO has the same
layout as in the kernel.
So my only actual objection to the patch is that there should probably
be a comment above the structure reminding people that it needs to
have the same layout on 32-bit, x32, and x86_64. So maybe the entries
should be s32 instead of int, although this doesn't really matter.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions
2020-06-30 16:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2020-06-30 17:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-02 12:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
1 sibling, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2020-06-30 17:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Borislav Petkov, Jarkko Sakkinen, X86 ML, linux-sgx, LKML,
Jethro Beekman, Andrew Morton, Andy Shevchenko, asapek, Xing,
Cedric, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, Dave Hansen, Huang,
Haitao, Josh Triplett, Huang, Kai, Svahn, Kai, kmoy,
Christian Ludloff, Andrew Lutomirski, Neil Horman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, David Rientjes, Thomas Gleixner, yaozhangx
On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 09:48:22AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 1:41 AM Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 11:00:55PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > E.g. the vDSO function should get the fixup even if userspace screws
> > > up mmap() and invokes __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() without being tagged
> > > an SGX task.
> >
> > I sincerely hope you don't mean this seriously.
> >
> > Please add a member to task_struct which denotes that a task is an
> > sgx task, test that member where needed and forget real quickly about
> > running *any* *fixup* for unrelated tasks.
>
> I don't see the problem. If you call this magic vDSO function and get
> a fault, it gets handled. What's the failure mode?
>
> >
> > > No hard dependency, it's normal kernel code. My reasoning for dropping it
> > > in .../vdso was largely to co-locate it with vdso/extable.h due to the
> > > dependency on the format of 'struct vdso_exception_table_entry'.
> >
> > A struct which you defined instead of simply using struct
> > exception_table_entry even if it has a handler member which would remain
> > unused?
>
> Don't forget the cross-arch issue. We need that structure to have
> constant layout so that the -m32 build from the vDSO has the same
> layout as in the kernel.
>
> So my only actual objection to the patch is that there should probably
> be a comment above the structure reminding people that it needs to
> have the same layout on 32-bit, x32, and x86_64. So maybe the entries
> should be s32 instead of int, although this doesn't really matter.
I highly doubt my past self thought about the cross-arch issue. The main
reason I created 'struct vdso_exception_table_entry' is that interpretation
of the fields is different. For the kernel, the fields contain offsets
that are relative to the address of the field itself, i.e. of the fixup
itself. For vDSO, the offsets are relative to the base of the vDSO.
Reusing exception_table_entry felt like it would be all kinds of confusing.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions
2020-06-30 16:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-30 17:23 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2020-07-02 12:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
1 sibling, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2020-07-02 12:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski, Borislav Petkov
Cc: Sean Christopherson, Jarkko Sakkinen, X86 ML, linux-sgx, LKML,
Jethro Beekman, Andrew Morton, Andy Shevchenko, asapek, Xing,
Cedric, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, Dave Hansen, Huang,
Haitao, Josh Triplett, Huang, Kai, Svahn, Kai, kmoy,
Christian Ludloff, Andrew Lutomirski, Neil Horman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, David Rientjes, yaozhangx
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> writes:
> On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 1:41 AM Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 11:00:55PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> > E.g. the vDSO function should get the fixup even if userspace screws
>> > up mmap() and invokes __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() without being tagged
>> > an SGX task.
>>
>> I sincerely hope you don't mean this seriously.
>>
>> Please add a member to task_struct which denotes that a task is an
>> sgx task, test that member where needed and forget real quickly about
>> running *any* *fixup* for unrelated tasks.
>
> I don't see the problem. If you call this magic vDSO function and get
> a fault, it gets handled. What's the failure mode?
Handled by some definition of handled. If a random user space tasks ends
up in that function then it will not die as it would otherwise, but I
don't see a real issue with that either.
Thanks,
tglx
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 16/21] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 17/21] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling Jarkko Sakkinen
` (4 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, Jethro Beekman,
Jarkko Sakkinen, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Add helper function to sanitize error code to prepare for vDSO exception
fixup, which will expose the error code to userspace and runs before
set_signal_archinfo(), i.e. suppresses the signal when fixup is successful.
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 25d48aae36c1..966af17523fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -556,6 +556,18 @@ pgtable_bad(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
oops_end(flags, regs, sig);
}
+static void sanitize_error_code(unsigned long address,
+ unsigned long *error_code)
+{
+ /*
+ * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page
+ * table layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to
+ * kernel addresses are always protection faults.
+ */
+ if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
+ *error_code |= X86_PF_PROT;
+}
+
static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address,
unsigned long error_code)
{
@@ -612,6 +624,8 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
* faulting through the emulate_vsyscall() logic.
*/
if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) {
+ sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
+
set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
/* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */
@@ -760,13 +774,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
if (is_errata100(regs, address))
return;
- /*
- * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page table
- * layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to kernel addresses
- * are always protection faults.
- */
- if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
- error_code |= X86_PF_PROT;
+ sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
if (likely(show_unhandled_signals))
show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk);
@@ -885,6 +893,8 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
if (is_prefetch(regs, error_code, address))
return;
+ sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
+
set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 17/21] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 16/21] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 18/21] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call Jarkko Sakkinen
` (3 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, Andy Lutomirski,
Jethro Beekman, Jarkko Sakkinen, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek,
bp, cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish,
dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy,
ludloff, luto, nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx,
yaozhangx
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
vDSO functions can now leverage an exception fixup mechanism similar to
kernel exception fixup. For vDSO exception fixup, the initial user is
Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), which will wrap the low-level
transitions to/from the enclave, i.e. EENTER and ERESUME instructions,
in a vDSO function and leverage fixup to intercept exceptions that would
otherwise generate a signal. This allows the vDSO wrapper to return the
fault information directly to its caller, obviating the need for SGX
applications and libraries to juggle signal handlers.
Attempt to fixup vDSO exceptions immediately prior to populating and
sending signal information. Except for the delivery mechanism, an
exception in a vDSO function should be treated like any other exception
in userspace, e.g. any fault that is successfully handled by the kernel
should not be directly visible to userspace.
Although it's debatable whether or not all exceptions are of interest to
enclaves, defer to the vDSO fixup to decide whether to do fixup or
generate a signal. Future users of vDSO fixup, if there ever are any,
will undoubtedly have different requirements than SGX enclaves, e.g. the
fixup vs. signal logic can be made function specific if/when necessary.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 8 ++++++++
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index af75109485c2..d283a216e503 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
#include <asm/umip.h>
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/insn-eval.h>
+#include <asm/vdso.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
@@ -118,6 +119,9 @@ do_trap_no_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, int trapnr, const char *str,
tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
tsk->thread.trap_nr = trapnr;
die(str, regs, error_code);
+ } else {
+ if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, trapnr, error_code, 0))
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -543,6 +547,9 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection)
tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_GP;
+ if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_GP, error_code, 0))
+ return;
+
show_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV, "", desc, regs, error_code);
force_sig(SIGSEGV);
goto exit;
@@ -824,9 +831,12 @@ static void handle_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long dr6, bool user)
#endif
if (notify_die(DIE_DEBUG, "debug", regs, (long)&dr6, 0,
- SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP) {
- return;
- }
+ SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (user_mode(regs) &&
+ fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_DB, 0, 0))
+ goto out;
/* It's safe to allow irq's after DR6 has been saved */
cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
@@ -968,6 +978,9 @@ static void math_error(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
if (!si_code)
goto exit;
+ if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, trapnr, 0, 0))
+ return;
+
force_sig_fault(SIGFPE, si_code,
(void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs));
exit:
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 966af17523fb..6e51ec08564f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h> /* exception stack */
#include <asm/pgtable_areas.h> /* VMALLOC_START, ... */
#include <asm/kvm_para.h> /* kvm_handle_async_pf */
+#include <asm/vdso.h> /* fixup_vdso_exception() */
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <asm/trace/exceptions.h>
@@ -776,6 +777,10 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
+ if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF, error_code,
+ address))
+ return;
+
if (likely(show_unhandled_signals))
show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk);
@@ -895,6 +900,9 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
+ if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF, error_code, address))
+ return;
+
set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 18/21] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 17/21] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 19/21] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
` (2 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Sean Christopherson, Andy Lutomirski,
Jethro Beekman, Cedric Xing, Jarkko Sakkinen, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp, chenalexchen, conradparker,
cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn,
kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes,
tglx, yaozhangx
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
An SGX runtime must be aware of the exceptions, which happen inside an
enclave. Introduce a vDSO call that wraps EENTER/ERESUME cycle and returns
the CPU exception back to the caller exactly when it happens.
Kernel fixups the exception information to RDI, RSI and RDX. The SGX call
vDSO handler fills this information to the user provided buffer or
alternatively trigger user provided callback at the time of the exception.
The calling convention is custom and does not follow System V x86-64 ABI.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 2 +
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S | 131 +++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h | 8 ++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 98 +++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 240 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
index ebe82b7aecda..f71ad5ebd0c4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ VDSO32-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) := y
vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o
vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o
vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o
+vobjs-$(VDSO64-y) += vsgx_enter_enclave.o
# files to link into kernel
obj-y += vma.o extable.o
@@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ $(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS
CFLAGS_REMOVE_vclock_gettime.o = -pg
CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso32/vclock_gettime.o = -pg
CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetcpu.o = -pg
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_vsgx_enter_enclave.o = -pg
#
# X32 processes use x32 vDSO to access 64bit kernel data.
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S
index 36b644e16272..4bf48462fca7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ VERSION {
__vdso_time;
clock_getres;
__vdso_clock_getres;
+ __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave;
local: *;
};
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..be7e467e1efb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/export.h>
+#include <asm/errno.h>
+#include <asm/enclu.h>
+
+#include "extable.h"
+
+#define EX_LEAF 0*8
+#define EX_TRAPNR 0*8+4
+#define EX_ERROR_CODE 0*8+6
+#define EX_ADDRESS 1*8
+
+.code64
+.section .text, "ax"
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave)
+ /* Prolog */
+ .cfi_startproc
+ push %rbp
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ .cfi_rel_offset %rbp, 0
+ mov %rsp, %rbp
+ .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
+ push %rbx
+ .cfi_rel_offset %rbx, -8
+
+ mov %ecx, %eax
+.Lenter_enclave:
+ /* EENTER <= leaf <= ERESUME */
+ cmp $EENTER, %eax
+ jb .Linvalid_leaf
+ cmp $ERESUME, %eax
+ ja .Linvalid_leaf
+
+ /* Load TCS and AEP */
+ mov 0x10(%rbp), %rbx
+ lea .Lasync_exit_pointer(%rip), %rcx
+
+ /* Single ENCLU serving as both EENTER and AEP (ERESUME) */
+.Lasync_exit_pointer:
+.Lenclu_eenter_eresume:
+ enclu
+
+ /* EEXIT jumps here unless the enclave is doing something fancy. */
+ xor %eax, %eax
+
+ /* Invoke userspace's exit handler if one was provided. */
+.Lhandle_exit:
+ cmp $0, 0x20(%rbp)
+ jne .Linvoke_userspace_handler
+
+.Lout:
+ pop %rbx
+ leave
+ .cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8
+ ret
+
+ /* The out-of-line code runs with the pre-leave stack frame. */
+ .cfi_def_cfa %rbp, 16
+
+.Linvalid_leaf:
+ mov $(-EINVAL), %eax
+ jmp .Lout
+
+.Lhandle_exception:
+ mov 0x18(%rbp), %rcx
+ test %rcx, %rcx
+ je .Lskip_exception_info
+
+ /* Fill optional exception info. */
+ mov %eax, EX_LEAF(%rcx)
+ mov %di, EX_TRAPNR(%rcx)
+ mov %si, EX_ERROR_CODE(%rcx)
+ mov %rdx, EX_ADDRESS(%rcx)
+.Lskip_exception_info:
+ mov $(-EFAULT), %eax
+ jmp .Lhandle_exit
+
+.Linvoke_userspace_handler:
+ /* Pass the untrusted RSP (at exit) to the callback via %rcx. */
+ mov %rsp, %rcx
+
+ /* Save the untrusted RSP offset in %rbx (non-volatile register). */
+ mov %rsp, %rbx
+ and $0xf, %rbx
+
+ /*
+ * Align stack per x86_64 ABI. Note, %rsp needs to be 16-byte aligned
+ * _after_ pushing the parameters on the stack, hence the bonus push.
+ */
+ and $-0x10, %rsp
+ push %rax
+
+ /* Push @e, the "return" value and @tcs as params to the callback. */
+ push 0x18(%rbp)
+ push %rax
+ push 0x10(%rbp)
+
+ /* Clear RFLAGS.DF per x86_64 ABI */
+ cld
+
+ /* Load the callback pointer to %rax and invoke it via retpoline. */
+ mov 0x20(%rbp), %rax
+ call .Lretpoline
+
+ /* Undo the post-exit %rsp adjustment. */
+ lea 0x20(%rsp, %rbx), %rsp
+
+ /*
+ * If the return from callback is zero or negative, return immediately,
+ * else re-execute ENCLU with the postive return value interpreted as
+ * the requested ENCLU leaf.
+ */
+ cmp $0, %eax
+ jle .Lout
+ jmp .Lenter_enclave
+
+.Lretpoline:
+ call 2f
+1: pause
+ lfence
+ jmp 1b
+2: mov %rax, (%rsp)
+ ret
+ .cfi_endproc
+
+_ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(.Lenclu_eenter_eresume, .Lhandle_exception)
+
+SYM_FUNC_END(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..06157b3e9ede
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H
+#define _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H
+
+#define EENTER 0x02
+#define ERESUME 0x03
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
index 57d0d30c79b3..3760e5d5dc0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
@@ -74,4 +74,102 @@ struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute {
__u64 attribute_fd;
};
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_exception - structure to report exceptions encountered in
+ * __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave()
+ *
+ * @leaf: ENCLU leaf from \%eax at time of exception
+ * @trapnr: exception trap number, a.k.a. fault vector
+ * @error_code: exception error code
+ * @address: exception address, e.g. CR2 on a #PF
+ * @reserved: reserved for future use
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_exception {
+ __u32 leaf;
+ __u16 trapnr;
+ __u16 error_code;
+ __u64 address;
+ __u64 reserved[2];
+};
+
+/**
+ * typedef sgx_enclave_exit_handler_t - Exit handler function accepted by
+ * __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave()
+ *
+ * @rdi: RDI at the time of enclave exit
+ * @rsi: RSI at the time of enclave exit
+ * @rdx: RDX at the time of enclave exit
+ * @ursp: RSP at the time of enclave exit (untrusted stack)
+ * @r8: R8 at the time of enclave exit
+ * @r9: R9 at the time of enclave exit
+ * @tcs: Thread Control Structure used to enter enclave
+ * @ret: 0 on success (EEXIT), -EFAULT on an exception
+ * @e: Pointer to struct sgx_enclave_exception (as provided by caller)
+ */
+typedef int (*sgx_enclave_exit_handler_t)(long rdi, long rsi, long rdx,
+ long ursp, long r8, long r9,
+ void *tcs, int ret,
+ struct sgx_enclave_exception *e);
+
+/**
+ * __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() - Enter an SGX enclave
+ * @rdi: Pass-through value for RDI
+ * @rsi: Pass-through value for RSI
+ * @rdx: Pass-through value for RDX
+ * @leaf: ENCLU leaf, must be EENTER or ERESUME
+ * @r8: Pass-through value for R8
+ * @r9: Pass-through value for R9
+ * @tcs: TCS, must be non-NULL
+ * @e: Optional struct sgx_enclave_exception instance
+ * @handler: Optional enclave exit handler
+ *
+ * NOTE: __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() does not ensure full compliance with the
+ * x86-64 ABI, e.g. doesn't explicitly clear EFLAGS.DF after EEXIT. Except for
+ * non-volatile general purpose registers, preserving/setting state in
+ * accordance with the x86-64 ABI is the responsibility of the enclave and its
+ * runtime, i.e. __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() cannot be called from C code
+ * without careful consideration by both the enclave and its runtime.
+ *
+ * All general purpose registers except RAX, RBX and RCX are passed as-is to
+ * the enclave. RAX, RBX and RCX are consumed by EENTER and ERESUME and are
+ * loaded with @leaf, asynchronous exit pointer, and @tcs respectively.
+ *
+ * RBP and the stack are used to anchor __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to the
+ * pre-enclave state, e.g. to retrieve @e and @handler after an enclave exit.
+ * All other registers are available for use by the enclave and its runtime,
+ * e.g. an enclave can push additional data onto the stack (and modify RSP) to
+ * pass information to the optional exit handler (see below).
+ *
+ * Most exceptions reported on ENCLU, including those that occur within the
+ * enclave, are fixed up and reported synchronously instead of being delivered
+ * via a standard signal. Debug Exceptions (#DB) and Breakpoints (#BP) are
+ * never fixed up and are always delivered via standard signals. On synchrously
+ * reported exceptions, -EFAULT is returned and details about the exception are
+ * recorded in @e, the optional sgx_enclave_exception struct.
+
+ * If an exit handler is provided, the handler will be invoked on synchronous
+ * exits from the enclave and for all synchronously reported exceptions. In
+ * latter case, @e is filled prior to invoking the handler.
+ *
+ * The exit handler's return value is interpreted as follows:
+ * >0: continue, restart __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() with @ret as @leaf
+ * 0: success, return @ret to the caller
+ * <0: error, return @ret to the caller
+ *
+ * The exit handler may transfer control, e.g. via longjmp() or C++ exception,
+ * without returning to __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave().
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * -EINVAL if ENCLU leaf is not allowed,
+ * -EFAULT if an exception occurs on ENCLU or within the enclave
+ * -errno for all other negative values returned by the userspace exit handler
+ */
+typedef int (*vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t)(unsigned long rdi, unsigned long rsi,
+ unsigned long rdx, unsigned int leaf,
+ unsigned long r8, unsigned long r9,
+ void *tcs,
+ struct sgx_enclave_exception *e,
+ sgx_enclave_exit_handler_t handler);
+
#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 19/21] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 18/21] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 20/21] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 21/21] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen
20 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Jarkko Sakkinen, linux-kselftest, akpm,
andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, sean.j.christopherson, tglx, yaozhangx
Add a selftest for SGX. It is a trivial test where a simple enclave
copies one 64-bit word of memory between two memory locations.
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile | 53 +++
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S | 54 +++
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h | 21 +
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c | 282 +++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 199 +++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h | 38 ++
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c | 395 ++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c | 20 +
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds | 40 ++
.../selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S | 89 ++++
12 files changed, 1194 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
index 1195bd85af38..ec7be6d5a10d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ TARGETS += user
TARGETS += vm
TARGETS += x86
TARGETS += zram
+TARGETS += sgx
#Please keep the TARGETS list alphabetically sorted
# Run "make quicktest=1 run_tests" or
# "make quicktest=1 kselftest" from top level Makefile
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fbaf0bda9a92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+test_sgx
+test_encl.elf
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..95e5c4df8014
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+top_srcdir = ../../../..
+
+include ../lib.mk
+
+.PHONY: all clean
+
+CAN_BUILD_X86_64 := $(shell ../x86/check_cc.sh $(CC) \
+ ../x86/trivial_64bit_program.c)
+
+ifndef OBJCOPY
+OBJCOPY := $(CROSS_COMPILE)objcopy
+endif
+
+INCLUDES := -I$(top_srcdir)/tools/include
+HOST_CFLAGS := -Wall -Werror -g $(INCLUDES) -fPIC -z noexecstack
+ENCL_CFLAGS := -Wall -Werror -static -nostdlib -nostartfiles -fPIC \
+ -fno-stack-protector -mrdrnd $(INCLUDES)
+
+TEST_CUSTOM_PROGS := $(OUTPUT)/test_sgx $(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf
+
+ifeq ($(CAN_BUILD_X86_64), 1)
+all: $(TEST_CUSTOM_PROGS)
+endif
+
+$(OUTPUT)/test_sgx: $(OUTPUT)/main.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/load.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/sigstruct.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/call.o
+ $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -o $@ $^ -lcrypto
+
+$(OUTPUT)/main.o: main.c
+ $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+$(OUTPUT)/load.o: load.c
+ $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+$(OUTPUT)/sigstruct.o: sigstruct.c
+ $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+$(OUTPUT)/call.o: call.S
+ $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+$(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf: test_encl.lds test_encl.c test_encl_bootstrap.S
+ $(CC) $(ENCL_CFLAGS) -T $^ -o $@
+
+EXTRA_CLEAN := \
+ $(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf \
+ $(OUTPUT)/load.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/call.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/main.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/sigstruct.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/test_sgx \
+ $(OUTPUT)/test_sgx.o \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..77131e83db42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */
+/**
+* Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+*/
+
+ .text
+
+ .macro ENCLU
+ .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7
+ .endm
+
+ .text
+
+ .global sgx_call_vdso
+sgx_call_vdso:
+ .cfi_startproc
+ push %r15
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ .cfi_rel_offset %r15, 0
+ push %r14
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ .cfi_rel_offset %r14, 0
+ push %r13
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ .cfi_rel_offset %r13, 0
+ push %r12
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ .cfi_rel_offset %r12, 0
+ push %rbx
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ .cfi_rel_offset %rbx, 0
+ push $0
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ push 0x48(%rsp)
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ push 0x48(%rsp)
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ push 0x48(%rsp)
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ call *eenter(%rip)
+ add $0x20, %rsp
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -0x20
+ pop %rbx
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
+ pop %r12
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
+ pop %r13
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
+ pop %r14
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
+ pop %r15
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
+ ret
+ .cfi_endproc
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..be8969922804
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef DEFINES_H
+#define DEFINES_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
+#define PAGE_MASK (~(PAGE_SIZE - 1))
+
+#define __aligned(x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x)))
+#define __packed __attribute__((packed))
+
+#include "../../../../arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h"
+#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h"
+#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h"
+
+#endif /* DEFINES_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..91407036541c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <elf.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "main.h"
+
+void encl_delete(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ if (encl->encl_base)
+ munmap((void *)encl->encl_base, encl->encl_size);
+
+ if (encl->bin)
+ munmap(encl->bin, encl->bin_size);
+
+ if (encl->fd)
+ close(encl->fd);
+
+ if (encl->segment_tbl)
+ free(encl->segment_tbl);
+
+ memset(encl, 0, sizeof(*encl));
+}
+
+static bool encl_map_bin(const char *path, struct encl *encl)
+{
+ struct stat sb;
+ void *bin;
+ int ret;
+ int fd;
+
+ fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ perror("open()");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ret = stat(path, &sb);
+ if (ret) {
+ perror("stat()");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ bin = mmap(NULL, sb.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
+ if (bin == MAP_FAILED) {
+ perror("mmap()");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ encl->bin = bin;
+ encl->bin_size = sb.st_size;
+
+ close(fd);
+ return true;
+
+err:
+ close(fd);
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool encl_ioc_create(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ struct sgx_secs *secs = &encl->secs;
+ struct sgx_enclave_create ioc;
+ int rc;
+
+ assert(encl->encl_base != 0);
+
+ memset(secs, 0, sizeof(*secs));
+ secs->ssa_frame_size = 1;
+ secs->attributes = SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT;
+ secs->xfrm = 3;
+ secs->base = encl->encl_base;
+ secs->size = encl->encl_size;
+
+ ioc.src = (unsigned long)secs;
+ rc = ioctl(encl->fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE, &ioc);
+ if (rc) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE failed: errno=%d\n",
+ errno);
+ munmap((void *)secs->base, encl->encl_size);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool encl_ioc_add_pages(struct encl *encl, struct encl_segment *seg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_add_pages ioc;
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ int rc;
+
+ memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+ secinfo.flags = seg->flags;
+
+ ioc.src = (uint64_t)encl->src + seg->offset;
+ ioc.offset = seg->offset;
+ ioc.length = seg->size;
+ ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+ ioc.flags = SGX_PAGE_MEASURE;
+
+ rc = ioctl(encl->fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES, &ioc);
+ if (rc) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES failed: errno=%d.\n",
+ errno);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (ioc.count != ioc.length) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "A segment not fully processed.\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl)
+{
+ Elf64_Phdr *phdr_tbl;
+ off_t src_offset;
+ Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr;
+ int i, j;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(encl, 0, sizeof(*encl));
+
+ ret = open("/dev/sgx/enclave", O_RDWR);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open /dev/sgx\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ encl->fd = ret;
+
+ if (!encl_map_bin(path, encl))
+ goto err;
+
+ ehdr = encl->bin;
+ phdr_tbl = encl->bin + ehdr->e_phoff;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) {
+ Elf64_Phdr *phdr = &phdr_tbl[i];
+
+ if (phdr->p_type == PT_LOAD)
+ encl->nr_segments++;
+ }
+
+ encl->segment_tbl = calloc(encl->nr_segments,
+ sizeof(struct encl_segment));
+ if (!encl->segment_tbl)
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) {
+ Elf64_Phdr *phdr = &phdr_tbl[i];
+ unsigned int flags = phdr->p_flags;
+ struct encl_segment *seg;
+
+ if (phdr->p_type != PT_LOAD)
+ continue;
+
+ seg = &encl->segment_tbl[j];
+
+ if (!!(flags & ~(PF_R | PF_W | PF_X))) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%d has invalid segment flags 0x%02x.\n", i,
+ phdr->p_flags);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (j == 0 && flags != (PF_R | PF_W)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "TCS has invalid segment flags 0x%02x.\n",
+ phdr->p_flags);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (j == 0) {
+ src_offset = (phdr->p_offset & PAGE_MASK) - src_offset;
+
+ seg->prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+ seg->flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS << 8;
+ } else {
+ seg->prot = (phdr->p_flags & PF_R) ? PROT_READ : 0;
+ seg->prot |= (phdr->p_flags & PF_W) ? PROT_WRITE : 0;
+ seg->prot |= (phdr->p_flags & PF_X) ? PROT_EXEC : 0;
+ seg->flags = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG << 8) | seg->prot;
+ }
+
+ seg->offset = (phdr->p_offset & PAGE_MASK) - src_offset;
+ seg->size = (phdr->p_filesz + PAGE_SIZE - 1) & PAGE_MASK;
+
+ printf("0x%016lx 0x%016lx 0x%02x\n", seg->offset, seg->size,
+ seg->prot);
+
+ j++;
+ }
+
+ assert(j == encl->nr_segments);
+
+ encl->src = encl->bin + src_offset;
+ encl->src_size = encl->segment_tbl[j - 1].offset +
+ encl->segment_tbl[j - 1].size;
+
+ for (encl->encl_size = 4096; encl->encl_size < encl->src_size; )
+ encl->encl_size <<= 1;
+
+ return true;
+
+err:
+ encl_delete(encl);
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool encl_map_area(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ size_t encl_size = encl->encl_size;
+ void *area;
+
+ area = mmap(NULL, encl_size * 2, PROT_NONE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+ if (area == MAP_FAILED) {
+ perror("mmap");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ encl->encl_base = ((uint64_t)area + encl_size - 1) & ~(encl_size - 1);
+
+ munmap(area, encl->encl_base - (uint64_t)area);
+ munmap((void *)(encl->encl_base + encl_size),
+ (uint64_t)area + encl_size - encl->encl_base);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool encl_build(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_init ioc;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!encl_map_area(encl))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!encl_ioc_create(encl))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Pages must be added before mapping VMAs because their permissions
+ * cap the VMA permissions.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+ if (!encl_ioc_add_pages(encl, seg))
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ioc.sigstruct = (uint64_t)&encl->sigstruct;
+ ret = ioctl(encl->fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT, &ioc);
+ if (ret) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT failed: errno=%d\n",
+ errno);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5394b2f6af8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+
+#include <elf.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "main.h"
+
+static const uint64_t MAGIC = 0x1122334455667788ULL;
+vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t eenter;
+
+struct vdso_symtab {
+ Elf64_Sym *elf_symtab;
+ const char *elf_symstrtab;
+ Elf64_Word *elf_hashtab;
+};
+
+static void *vdso_get_base_addr(char *envp[])
+{
+ Elf64_auxv_t *auxv;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; envp[i]; i++)
+ ;
+
+ auxv = (Elf64_auxv_t *)&envp[i + 1];
+
+ for (i = 0; auxv[i].a_type != AT_NULL; i++) {
+ if (auxv[i].a_type == AT_SYSINFO_EHDR)
+ return (void *)auxv[i].a_un.a_val;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static Elf64_Dyn *vdso_get_dyntab(void *addr)
+{
+ Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr = addr;
+ Elf64_Phdr *phdrtab = addr + ehdr->e_phoff;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++)
+ if (phdrtab[i].p_type == PT_DYNAMIC)
+ return addr + phdrtab[i].p_offset;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *vdso_get_dyn(void *addr, Elf64_Dyn *dyntab, Elf64_Sxword tag)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; dyntab[i].d_tag != DT_NULL; i++)
+ if (dyntab[i].d_tag == tag)
+ return addr + dyntab[i].d_un.d_ptr;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static bool vdso_get_symtab(void *addr, struct vdso_symtab *symtab)
+{
+ Elf64_Dyn *dyntab = vdso_get_dyntab(addr);
+
+ symtab->elf_symtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_SYMTAB);
+ if (!symtab->elf_symtab)
+ return false;
+
+ symtab->elf_symstrtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_STRTAB);
+ if (!symtab->elf_symstrtab)
+ return false;
+
+ symtab->elf_hashtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_HASH);
+ if (!symtab->elf_hashtab)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static unsigned long elf_sym_hash(const char *name)
+{
+ unsigned long h = 0, high;
+
+ while (*name) {
+ h = (h << 4) + *name++;
+ high = h & 0xf0000000;
+
+ if (high)
+ h ^= high >> 24;
+
+ h &= ~high;
+ }
+
+ return h;
+}
+
+static Elf64_Sym *vdso_symtab_get(struct vdso_symtab *symtab, const char *name)
+{
+ Elf64_Word bucketnum = symtab->elf_hashtab[0];
+ Elf64_Word *buckettab = &symtab->elf_hashtab[2];
+ Elf64_Word *chaintab = &symtab->elf_hashtab[2 + bucketnum];
+ Elf64_Sym *sym;
+ Elf64_Word i;
+
+ for (i = buckettab[elf_sym_hash(name) % bucketnum]; i != STN_UNDEF;
+ i = chaintab[i]) {
+ sym = &symtab->elf_symtab[i];
+ if (!strcmp(name, &symtab->elf_symstrtab[sym->st_name]))
+ return sym;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_exception exception;
+ struct vdso_symtab symtab;
+ Elf64_Sym *eenter_sym;
+ uint64_t result = 0;
+ struct encl encl;
+ unsigned int i;
+ void *addr;
+
+ if (!encl_load("test_encl.elf", &encl))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!encl_measure(&encl))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!encl_build(&encl))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * An enclave consumer only must do this.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < encl.nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &encl.segment_tbl[i];
+
+ addr = mmap((void *)encl.encl_base + seg->offset, seg->size,
+ seg->prot, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, encl.fd, 0);
+ if (addr == MAP_FAILED) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "mmap() failed, errno=%d.\n", errno);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ memset(&exception, 0, sizeof(exception));
+
+ addr = vdso_get_base_addr(envp);
+ if (!addr)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!vdso_get_symtab(addr, &symtab))
+ goto err;
+
+ eenter_sym = vdso_symtab_get(&symtab, "__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave");
+ if (!eenter_sym)
+ goto err;
+
+ eenter = addr + eenter_sym->st_value;
+
+ sgx_call_vdso((void *)&MAGIC, &result, 0, EENTER, NULL, NULL,
+ (void *)encl.encl_base, &exception, NULL);
+ if (result != MAGIC) {
+ printf("FAIL: sgx_call_vdso(), expected: 0x%lx, got: 0x%lx\n",
+ MAGIC, result);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Invoke the vDSO directly. */
+ result = 0;
+ eenter((unsigned long)&MAGIC, (unsigned long)&result, 0, EENTER, 0, 0,
+ (void *)encl.encl_base, &exception, NULL);
+ if (result != MAGIC) {
+ printf("FAIL: eenter(), expected: 0x%lx, got: 0x%lx\n",
+ MAGIC, result);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ printf("SUCCESS\n");
+ encl_delete(&encl);
+ exit(0);
+
+err:
+ encl_delete(&encl);
+ exit(1);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..999422cc7343
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef MAIN_H
+#define MAIN_H
+
+struct encl_segment {
+ off_t offset;
+ size_t size;
+ unsigned int prot;
+ unsigned int flags;
+};
+
+struct encl {
+ int fd;
+ void *bin;
+ off_t bin_size;
+ void *src;
+ size_t src_size;
+ size_t encl_size;
+ off_t encl_base;
+ unsigned int nr_segments;
+ struct encl_segment *segment_tbl;
+ struct sgx_secs secs;
+ struct sgx_sigstruct sigstruct;
+};
+
+void encl_delete(struct encl *ctx);
+bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl);
+bool encl_measure(struct encl *encl);
+bool encl_build(struct encl *encl);
+
+int sgx_call_vdso(void *rdi, void *rsi, long rdx, u32 leaf, void *r8, void *r9,
+ void *tcs, struct sgx_enclave_exception *ei, void *cb);
+
+#endif /* MAIN_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ceddad478672
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,395 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "main.h"
+
+struct q1q2_ctx {
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+ BIGNUM *m;
+ BIGNUM *s;
+ BIGNUM *q1;
+ BIGNUM *qr;
+ BIGNUM *q2;
+};
+
+static void free_q1q2_ctx(struct q1q2_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx->bn_ctx);
+ BN_free(ctx->m);
+ BN_free(ctx->s);
+ BN_free(ctx->q1);
+ BN_free(ctx->qr);
+ BN_free(ctx->q2);
+}
+
+static bool alloc_q1q2_ctx(const uint8_t *s, const uint8_t *m,
+ struct q1q2_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ ctx->s = BN_bin2bn(s, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, NULL);
+ ctx->m = BN_bin2bn(m, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, NULL);
+ ctx->q1 = BN_new();
+ ctx->qr = BN_new();
+ ctx->q2 = BN_new();
+
+ if (!ctx->bn_ctx || !ctx->s || !ctx->m || !ctx->q1 || !ctx->qr ||
+ !ctx->q2) {
+ free_q1q2_ctx(ctx);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool calc_q1q2(const uint8_t *s, const uint8_t *m, uint8_t *q1,
+ uint8_t *q2)
+{
+ struct q1q2_ctx ctx;
+
+ if (!alloc_q1q2_ctx(s, m, &ctx)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Not enough memory for Q1Q2 calculation\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_mul(ctx.q1, ctx.s, ctx.s, ctx.bn_ctx))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!BN_div(ctx.q1, ctx.qr, ctx.q1, ctx.m, ctx.bn_ctx))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (BN_num_bytes(ctx.q1) > SGX_MODULUS_SIZE) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Too large Q1 %d bytes\n",
+ BN_num_bytes(ctx.q1));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_mul(ctx.q2, ctx.s, ctx.qr, ctx.bn_ctx))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!BN_div(ctx.q2, NULL, ctx.q2, ctx.m, ctx.bn_ctx))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (BN_num_bytes(ctx.q2) > SGX_MODULUS_SIZE) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Too large Q2 %d bytes\n",
+ BN_num_bytes(ctx.q2));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ BN_bn2bin(ctx.q1, q1);
+ BN_bn2bin(ctx.q2, q2);
+
+ free_q1q2_ctx(&ctx);
+ return true;
+out:
+ free_q1q2_ctx(&ctx);
+ return false;
+}
+
+struct sgx_sigstruct_payload {
+ struct sgx_sigstruct_header header;
+ struct sgx_sigstruct_body body;
+};
+
+static bool check_crypto_errors(void)
+{
+ int err;
+ bool had_errors = false;
+ const char *filename;
+ int line;
+ char str[256];
+
+ for ( ; ; ) {
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ break;
+
+ had_errors = true;
+ err = ERR_get_error_line(&filename, &line);
+ ERR_error_string_n(err, str, sizeof(str));
+ fprintf(stderr, "crypto: %s: %s:%d\n", str, filename, line);
+ }
+
+ return had_errors;
+}
+
+static inline const BIGNUM *get_modulus(RSA *key)
+{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ return key->n;
+#else
+ const BIGNUM *n;
+
+ RSA_get0_key(key, &n, NULL, NULL);
+ return n;
+#endif
+}
+
+static RSA *gen_sign_key(void)
+{
+ BIGNUM *e;
+ RSA *key;
+ int ret;
+
+ e = BN_new();
+ key = RSA_new();
+
+ if (!e || !key)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = BN_set_word(e, RSA_3);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = RSA_generate_key_ex(key, 3072, e, NULL);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_free(e);
+
+ return key;
+
+err:
+ RSA_free(key);
+ BN_free(e);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void reverse_bytes(void *data, int length)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ int j = length - 1;
+ uint8_t temp;
+ uint8_t *ptr = data;
+
+ while (i < j) {
+ temp = ptr[i];
+ ptr[i] = ptr[j];
+ ptr[j] = temp;
+ i++;
+ j--;
+ }
+}
+
+enum mrtags {
+ MRECREATE = 0x0045544145524345,
+ MREADD = 0x0000000044444145,
+ MREEXTEND = 0x00444E4554584545,
+};
+
+static bool mrenclave_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data)
+{
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, 64)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "digest update failed\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool mrenclave_commit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *mrenclave)
+{
+ unsigned int size;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, (unsigned char *)mrenclave, &size)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "digest commit failed\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (size != 32) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "invalid digest size = %u\n", size);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+struct mrecreate {
+ uint64_t tag;
+ uint32_t ssaframesize;
+ uint64_t size;
+ uint8_t reserved[44];
+} __attribute__((__packed__));
+
+
+static bool mrenclave_ecreate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint64_t blob_size)
+{
+ struct mrecreate mrecreate;
+ uint64_t encl_size;
+
+ for (encl_size = 0x1000; encl_size < blob_size; )
+ encl_size <<= 1;
+
+ memset(&mrecreate, 0, sizeof(mrecreate));
+ mrecreate.tag = MRECREATE;
+ mrecreate.ssaframesize = 1;
+ mrecreate.size = encl_size;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL))
+ return false;
+
+ return mrenclave_update(ctx, &mrecreate);
+}
+
+struct mreadd {
+ uint64_t tag;
+ uint64_t offset;
+ uint64_t flags; /* SECINFO flags */
+ uint8_t reserved[40];
+} __attribute__((__packed__));
+
+static bool mrenclave_eadd(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint64_t offset, uint64_t flags)
+{
+ struct mreadd mreadd;
+
+ memset(&mreadd, 0, sizeof(mreadd));
+ mreadd.tag = MREADD;
+ mreadd.offset = offset;
+ mreadd.flags = flags;
+
+ return mrenclave_update(ctx, &mreadd);
+}
+
+struct mreextend {
+ uint64_t tag;
+ uint64_t offset;
+ uint8_t reserved[48];
+} __attribute__((__packed__));
+
+static bool mrenclave_eextend(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint64_t offset,
+ const uint8_t *data)
+{
+ struct mreextend mreextend;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 0x1000; i += 0x100) {
+ memset(&mreextend, 0, sizeof(mreextend));
+ mreextend.tag = MREEXTEND;
+ mreextend.offset = offset + i;
+
+ if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &mreextend))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0x00]))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0x40]))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0x80]))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0xC0]))
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool mrenclave_segment(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, struct encl *encl,
+ struct encl_segment *seg)
+{
+ uint64_t end = seg->offset + seg->size;
+ uint64_t offset;
+
+ for (offset = seg->offset; offset < end; offset += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ if (!mrenclave_eadd(ctx, offset, seg->flags))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!mrenclave_eextend(ctx, offset, encl->src + offset))
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool encl_measure(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ uint64_t header1[2] = {0x000000E100000006, 0x0000000000010000};
+ uint64_t header2[2] = {0x0000006000000101, 0x0000000100000060};
+ struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct = &encl->sigstruct;
+ struct sgx_sigstruct_payload payload;
+ uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int siglen;
+ RSA *key = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+ int i;
+
+ memset(sigstruct, 0, sizeof(*sigstruct));
+
+ sigstruct->header.header1[0] = header1[0];
+ sigstruct->header.header1[1] = header1[1];
+ sigstruct->header.header2[0] = header2[0];
+ sigstruct->header.header2[1] = header2[1];
+ sigstruct->exponent = 3;
+ sigstruct->body.attributes = SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT;
+ sigstruct->body.xfrm = 3;
+
+ /* sanity check */
+ if (check_crypto_errors())
+ goto err;
+
+ key = gen_sign_key();
+ if (!key)
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_bn2bin(get_modulus(key), sigstruct->modulus);
+
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!mrenclave_ecreate(ctx, encl->src_size))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+ if (!mrenclave_segment(ctx, encl, seg))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!mrenclave_commit(ctx, sigstruct->body.mrenclave))
+ goto err;
+
+ memcpy(&payload.header, &sigstruct->header, sizeof(sigstruct->header));
+ memcpy(&payload.body, &sigstruct->body, sizeof(sigstruct->body));
+
+ SHA256((unsigned char *)&payload, sizeof(payload), digest);
+
+ if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ sigstruct->signature, &siglen, key))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!calc_q1q2(sigstruct->signature, sigstruct->modulus, sigstruct->q1,
+ sigstruct->q2))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* BE -> LE */
+ reverse_bytes(sigstruct->signature, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE);
+ reverse_bytes(sigstruct->modulus, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE);
+ reverse_bytes(sigstruct->q1, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE);
+ reverse_bytes(sigstruct->q2, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+ RSA_free(key);
+ return true;
+
+err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+ RSA_free(key);
+ return false;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ede915399742
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+
+static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ ((char *)dest)[i] = ((char *)src)[i];
+
+ return dest;
+}
+
+void encl_body(void *rdi, void *rsi)
+{
+ memcpy(rsi, rdi, 8);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0fbbda7e665e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf64-x86-64)
+
+PHDRS
+{
+ tcs PT_LOAD;
+ text PT_LOAD;
+ data PT_LOAD;
+}
+
+SECTIONS
+{
+ . = 0;
+ .tcs : {
+ *(.tcs*)
+ } : tcs
+
+ . = ALIGN(4096);
+ .text : {
+ *(.text*)
+ *(.rodata*)
+ } : text
+
+ . = ALIGN(4096);
+ .data : {
+ *(.data*)
+ } : data
+
+ /DISCARD/ : {
+ *(.comment*)
+ *(.note*)
+ *(.debug*)
+ *(.eh_frame*)
+ }
+}
+
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.altinstructions), "ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves")
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.altinstr_replacement), "ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves")
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.discard.retpoline_safe), "RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves")
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.discard.nospec), "RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves")
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.got.plt), "Libcalls are not supported in enclaves")
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6836ea86126e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */
+/*
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+
+ .macro ENCLU
+ .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7
+ .endm
+
+ .section ".tcs", "aw"
+ .balign 4096
+
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # STATE (set by CPU)
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # FLAGS
+ .quad encl_ssa # OSSA
+ .fill 1, 4, 0 # CSSA (set by CPU)
+ .fill 1, 4, 1 # NSSA
+ .quad encl_entry # OENTRY
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # AEP (set by EENTER and ERESUME)
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # OFSBASE
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # OGSBASE
+ .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # FSLIMIT
+ .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # GSLIMIT
+ .fill 4024, 1, 0 # Reserved
+
+ # Identical to the previous TCS.
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # STATE (set by CPU)
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # FLAGS
+ .quad encl_ssa # OSSA
+ .fill 1, 4, 0 # CSSA (set by CPU)
+ .fill 1, 4, 1 # NSSA
+ .quad encl_entry # OENTRY
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # AEP (set by EENTER and ERESUME)
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # OFSBASE
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # OGSBASE
+ .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # FSLIMIT
+ .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # GSLIMIT
+ .fill 4024, 1, 0 # Reserved
+
+ .text
+
+encl_entry:
+ # RBX contains the base address for TCS, which is also the first address
+ # inside the enclave. By adding the value of le_stack_end to it, we get
+ # the absolute address for the stack.
+ lea (encl_stack)(%rbx), %rax
+ xchg %rsp, %rax
+ push %rax
+
+ push %rcx # push the address after EENTER
+ push %rbx # push the enclave base address
+
+ call encl_body
+
+ pop %rbx # pop the enclave base address
+
+ /* Clear volatile GPRs, except RAX (EEXIT leaf). */
+ xor %rcx, %rcx
+ xor %rdx, %rdx
+ xor %rdi, %rdi
+ xor %rsi, %rsi
+ xor %r8, %r8
+ xor %r9, %r9
+ xor %r10, %r10
+ xor %r11, %r11
+
+ # Reset status flags.
+ add %rdx, %rdx # OF = SF = AF = CF = 0; ZF = PF = 1
+
+ # Prepare EEXIT target by popping the address of the instruction after
+ # EENTER to RBX.
+ pop %rbx
+
+ # Restore the caller stack.
+ pop %rax
+ mov %rax, %rsp
+
+ # EEXIT
+ mov $4, %rax
+ enclu
+
+ .section ".data", "aw"
+
+encl_ssa:
+ .space 4096
+
+ .balign 4096
+ .space 8192
+encl_stack:
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 20/21] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 19/21] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 21/21] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen
20 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Jarkko Sakkinen, linux-doc, Randy Dunlap,
Sean Christopherson, akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, bp,
cedric.xing, chenalexchen, conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen,
haitao.huang, josh, kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto,
nhorman, npmccallum, puiterwijk, rientjes, tglx, yaozhangx
[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain; charset=y, Size: 9339 bytes --]
Document the Intel SGX kernel architecture. The fine-grained micro
architecture details can be looked up from Intel SDM Volume 3D.
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 198 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
index 265d9e9a093b..807290bf357c 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
@@ -30,3 +30,4 @@ x86-specific Documentation
usb-legacy-support
i386/index
x86_64/index
+ sgx
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst b/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..249843666963
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+============
+Architecture
+============
+
+*Software Guard eXtensions (SGX)* is a set of instructions that enable ring-3
+applications to set aside private regions of code and data. These regions are
+called enclaves. An enclave can be entered to a fixed set of entry points. Only
+a CPU running inside the enclave can access its code and data.
+
+The support can be determined by
+
+ ``grep sgx /proc/cpuinfo``
+
+Enclave Page Cache
+==================
+
+SGX utilizes an *Enclave Page Cache (EPC)* to store pages that are associated
+with an enclave. It is contained in a BIOS reserved region of physical memory.
+Unlike pages used for regular memory, pages can only be accessed outside the
+enclave for different purposes with the instructions **ENCLS**, **ENCLV** and
+**ENCLU**.
+
+Direct memory accesses to an enclave can be only done by a CPU executing inside
+the enclave. An enclave can be entered with **ENCLU[EENTER]** to a fixed set of
+entry points. However, a CPU executing inside the enclave can do outside memory
+accesses.
+
+Page Types
+----------
+
+**SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS)**
+ Enclave's address range, attributes and other global data are defined
+ by this structure.
+
+**Regular (REG)**
+ Regular EPC pages contain the code and data of an enclave.
+
+**Thread Control Structure (TCS)**
+ Thread Control Structure pages define the entry points to an enclave and
+ track the execution state of an enclave thread.
+
+**Version Array (VA)**
+ Version Array pages contain 512 slots, each of which can contain a version
+ number for a page evicted from the EPC.
+
+Enclave Page Cache Map
+----------------------
+
+The processor tracks EPC pages via the *Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)*. EPCM
+contains an entry for each EPC page, which describes the owning enclave, access
+rights and page type among the other things.
+
+The permissions from EPCM is consulted if and only if walking the kernel page
+tables succeeds. The total permissions are thus a conjunction between page table
+and EPCM permissions.
+
+For all intents and purposes the SGX architecture allows the processor to
+invalidate all EPCM entries at will, i.e. requires that software be prepared to
+handle an EPCM fault at any time. The contents of EPC are encrypted with an
+ephemeral key, which is lost on power transitions.
+
+EPC management
+==============
+
+EPC pages do not have ``struct page`` instances. They are IO memory from kernel
+perspective. The consequence is that they are always mapped as shared memory.
+Kernel defines ``/dev/sgx/enclave`` that can be mapped as ``MAP_SHARED`` to
+define the address range for an enclave.
+
+EPC Over-subscription
+=====================
+
+When the amount of free EPC pages goes below a low watermark the swapping thread
+starts reclaiming pages. The pages that do not have the **A** bit set are
+selected as victim pages.
+
+Launch Control
+==============
+
+SGX provides a launch control mechanism. After all enclave pages have been
+copied, kernel executes **ENCLS[EINIT]**, which initializes the enclave. Only
+after this the CPU can execute inside the enclave.
+
+This leaf function takes an RSA-3072 signature of the enclave measurement and an
+optional cryptographic token. Linux does not take advantage of launch tokens.
+The instruction checks that the signature is signed with the key defined in
+**IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH?** MSRs and the measurement is correct. If so, the
+enclave is allowed to be executed.
+
+MSRs can be configured by the BIOS to be either readable or writable. Linux
+supports only writable configuration in order to give full control to the kernel
+on launch control policy. Readable configuration requires the use of previously
+mentioned launch tokens.
+
+The current kernel implementation supports only writable MSRs. The launch is
+performed by setting the MSRs to the hash of the enclave signer's public key.
+The alternative would be to have *a launch enclave* that would be signed with
+the key set into MSRs, which would then generate launch tokens for other
+enclaves. This would only make sense with read-only MSRs, and thus the option
+has been discarded.
+
+Attestation
+===========
+
+Local Attestation
+-----------------
+
+In local attestation an enclave creates a **REPORT** data structure with
+**ENCLS[EREPORT]**, which describes the origin of an enclave. In particular, it
+contains a AES-CMAC of the enclave contents signed with a report key unique to
+each processor. All enclaves have access to this key.
+
+This mechanism can also be used in addition as a communication channel as the
+**REPORT** data structure includes a 64-byte field for variable information.
+
+Remote Attestation
+------------------
+
+Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other enclaves,
+generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning Certification Key.
+PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key of a QE, e.g. we get the
+chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel signed PCE is used.
+
+To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be only
+allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted parties can
+certify QE's.
+
+A device file called /dev/sgx/provision exists to provide file descriptors that
+act as privilege tokens for building provisioning enclaves. These can be
+associated with enclaves with the ioctl SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE.
+
+Encryption engines
+==================
+
+In order to conceal the enclave data while it is out of the CPU package,
+memory controller has to be extended with an encryption engine. MC can then
+route incoming requests coming from CPU cores running in enclave mode to the
+encryption engine.
+
+In CPUs prior to Icelake, Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) is used to
+encrypt pages leaving the CPU caches. MEE uses a n-ary Merkle tree with root in
+SRAM to maintain integrity of the encrypted data. This provides integrity and
+anti-replay protection but does not scale to large memory sizes because the time
+required to update the Merkle tree grows logarithmically in relation to the
+memory size.
+
+CPUs starting from Icelake use Total Memory Encryption (TME) in the place of
+MEE. TME throws away the Merkle tree, which means losing integrity and
+anti-replay protection but also enables variable size memory pools for EPC.
+Using this attack for benefit would require an interposer on the system bus.
+
+Backing storage
+===============
+
+Backing storage is shared and not accounted. It is implemented as a private
+shmem file. Providing a backing storage in some form from user space is not
+possible - accounting would go to invalid state as reclaimed pages would get
+accounted to the processes of which behalf the kernel happened to be acting on.
+
+Access control
+==============
+
+`mmap()` permissions are capped by the enclave permissions. A direct
+consequence of this is that all the pages for an address range must be added
+before `mmap()` can be applied. Effectively an enclave page with minimum
+permission in the address range sets the permission cap for the mapping
+operation.
+
+Usage Models
+============
+
+Shared Library
+--------------
+
+Sensitive data and the code that acts on it is partitioned from the application
+into a separate library. The library is then linked as a DSO which can be loaded
+into an enclave. The application can then make individual function calls into
+the enclave through special SGX instructions. A run-time within the enclave is
+configured to marshal function parameters into and out of the enclave and to
+call the correct library function.
+
+Application Container
+---------------------
+
+An application may be loaded into a container enclave which is specially
+configured with a library OS and run-time which permits the application to run.
+The enclave run-time and library OS work together to execute the application
+when a thread enters the enclave.
+
+References
+==========
+
+"Supporting Third Party Attestation for Intel® SGX with Intel® Data Center
+Attestation Primitives"
+ https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/f1/b8/intel-sgx-support-for-third-party-attestation.pdf
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v33 21/21] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS
2020-06-17 22:08 [PATCH v33 00/21] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-17 22:08 ` [PATCH v33 20/21] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2020-06-17 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
20 siblings, 0 replies; 93+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-06-17 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: x86, linux-sgx
Cc: linux-kernel, Jarkko Sakkinen, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov,
akpm, andriy.shevchenko, asapek, cedric.xing, chenalexchen,
conradparker, cyhanish, dave.hansen, haitao.huang, josh,
kai.huang, kai.svahn, kmoy, ludloff, luto, nhorman, npmccallum,
puiterwijk, rientjes, sean.j.christopherson, yaozhangx
Add the maintainer information for the SGX subsystem.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
MAINTAINERS | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 301330e02bca..1cbdaba79797 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -8968,6 +8968,17 @@ F: Documentation/x86/intel_txt.rst
F: arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
F: include/linux/tboot.h
+INTEL SGX
+M: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
+M: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
+L: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org
+S: Maintained
+Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/intel-sgx/list/
+T: git https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/linux-sgx.git
+F: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
+F: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/*
+K: \bSGX_
+
INTERCONNECT API
M: Georgi Djakov <georgi.djakov@linaro.org>
L: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 93+ messages in thread