From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, luto@kernel.org,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@parisplace.org, jethro@fortanix.com,
dave.hansen@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
nhorman@redhat.com, pmccallum@redhat.com, serge.ayoun@intel.com,
shay.katz-zamir@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com,
andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com,
bp@alien8.de, josh@joshtriplett.org, kai.huang@intel.com,
rientjes@google.com, william.c.roberts@intel.com,
philip.b.tricca@intel.com
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Call new LSM hooks from SGX subsystem
Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2019 00:03:06 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cf7cef1172943c78611001cc06e043654a973023.1560131039.git.cedric.xing@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1560131039.git.cedric.xing@intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1560131039.git.cedric.xing@intel.com>
There are three places LSM hooks are called from within the SGX subsystem.
The first place is to invoke security_file_mprotect() in sgx_mmap() to validate
requested protection. Given the architecture of SGX subsystem, all enclaves
look like file mappings of /dev/sgx/enclave device file, meaning the existing
security_mmap_file() invoked inside vm_mmap_pgoff() cannot provide any
meaningful information to LSM. Based on the idea that mmap(prot) is equivalent
to mmap(PROT_NONE) followed by mprotect(prot), security_file_mprotect() shall
be queried with more specific enclave/page information.
Secondly, security_enclave_load() is invoked upon loading of every enclave
page.
Lastly, security_enclave_init() is invoked before initializing (EINIT) every
enclave.
Signed-off-by: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c | 12 ++++-
2 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
index b186fb7b48d5..a3f22a6f6d2b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include "driver.h"
struct sgx_add_page_req {
@@ -575,6 +576,42 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr,
return ret;
}
+static int sgx_encl_prepare_page(struct file *filp, unsigned long dst,
+ unsigned long src, void *buf)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ unsigned long prot;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (dst & ~PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, dst);
+ if (vma && dst >= vma->vm_start)
+ prot = vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
+ else
+ prot = 0;
+
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, src);
+ if (!vma || src < vma->vm_start || src + PAGE_SIZE > vma->vm_end)
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!rc && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC))
+ rc = -EACCES;
+
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = security_enclave_load(filp, dst, PAGE_SIZE, prot, vma);
+
+ if (!rc && copy_from_user(buf, (void __user *)src, PAGE_SIZE))
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
/**
* sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE
*
@@ -613,10 +650,9 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
data = kmap(data_page);
- if (copy_from_user((void *)data, (void __user *)addp->src, PAGE_SIZE)) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
+ ret = sgx_encl_prepare_page(filep, addp->addr, addp->src, data);
+ if (ret)
goto out;
- }
ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp->addr, data, &secinfo, addp->mrmask);
if (ret)
@@ -718,6 +754,29 @@ static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
return ret;
}
+static int sgx_encl_prepare_sigstruct(struct file *filp, unsigned long src,
+ struct sgx_sigstruct *ss)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, src);
+ if (!vma || src < vma->vm_start || src + sizeof(*ss) > vma->vm_end)
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!rc && copy_from_user(ss, (void __user *)src, sizeof(*ss)))
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = security_enclave_init(filp, ss, vma);
+
+ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
/**
* sgx_ioc_enclave_init - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
*
@@ -753,12 +812,9 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
((unsigned long)sigstruct + PAGE_SIZE / 2);
memset(einittoken, 0, sizeof(*einittoken));
- if (copy_from_user(sigstruct, (void __user *)initp->sigstruct,
- sizeof(*sigstruct))) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
+ ret = sgx_encl_prepare_sigstruct(filep, initp->sigstruct, sigstruct);
+ if (ret)
goto out;
- }
-
ret = sgx_encl_init(encl, sigstruct, einittoken);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c
index 58ba6153070b..c634df440c16 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c
@@ -63,14 +63,22 @@ static long sgx_compat_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
+ unsigned long prot;
+ int rc;
vma->vm_ops = &sgx_vm_ops;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_PFNMAP | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP | VM_IO;
vma->vm_private_data = encl;
- kref_get(&encl->refcount);
+ prot = vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
+ vma->vm_flags &= ~prot;
+ rc = security_file_mprotect(vma, prot, prot);
+ if (!rc) {
+ vma->vm_flags |= prot;
+ kref_get(&encl->refcount);
+ }
- return 0;
+ return rc;
}
static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file,
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-10 7:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-06 2:11 [RFC PATCH v2 0/5] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Sean Christopherson
2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 15:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-10 15:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 17:47 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-10 19:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 22:06 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 15:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-10 16:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 17:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-10 18:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-12 19:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-10 18:29 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-10 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-10 22:28 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-12 0:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-12 14:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-12 18:20 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 16:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-10 16:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-11 17:21 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-07 19:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-10 16:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 16:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson
2019-06-07 21:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-10 16:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 16:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks Cedric Xing
2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Add " Cedric Xing
2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux Cedric Xing
2019-06-11 13:40 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-11 22:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-12 9:32 ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-12 14:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-13 7:25 ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-12 19:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-12 22:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-13 0:10 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-13 1:02 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-13 17:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-13 23:03 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-13 23:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-14 0:31 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-14 0:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-14 15:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-16 22:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 16:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 17:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18 15:40 ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-14 17:16 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-14 17:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-14 17:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-14 20:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-16 22:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-14 23:19 ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-11 22:55 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-13 18:00 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-13 19:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-13 21:09 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-13 21:02 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-14 0:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 7:03 ` Cedric Xing [this message]
2019-06-10 17:36 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
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