From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>,
keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
serge.hallyn@canonical.com, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com, djm@mindrot.org,
segoon@openwall.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, jmorris@namei.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com, penberg@cs.helsinki.fi,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo@elte.hu,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com,
borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de,
dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org,
mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: [PATCH v3 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe
Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2012 08:17:29 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0e2f0f54e19bff53a3739ecfddb4ffa9a6dbde4d.1327858005.git.luto@amacapital.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1327858005.git.luto@amacapital.net>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1327858005.git.luto@amacapital.net>
Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs. If no_new_privs,
then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot.
Because chroot is an easy way to break out of chroot jail, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
is still required if the caller is already chrooted.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
---
fs/open.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 77becc0..2e2887a 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -418,10 +418,39 @@ out:
return error;
}
+static bool is_chrooted(struct fs_struct *fs)
+{
+ bool ret;
+
+ /*
+ * This is equivalent to checking whether "/.." is the same
+ * directory as "/", where the ".." part ignores the current
+ * root. This logic is the same as follow_dotdot except that we
+ * ignore fs->root and we don't need to follow the final
+ * mountpoint we end up on.
+ */
+ struct path path = fs->root;
+ path_get(&path);
+ while (true) {
+ if (path.dentry != path.mnt->mnt_root) {
+ ret = true; /* .. moves up within a vfsmount. */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!follow_up(&path)) {
+ ret = false; /* We've hit the real root. */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ path_put(&path);
+ return ret;
+}
+
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename)
{
struct path path;
int error;
+ struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
error = user_path_dir(filename, &path);
if (error)
@@ -432,13 +461,26 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename)
goto dput_and_out;
error = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
+ /*
+ * Chroot is dangerous unless no_new_privs is set, and we also
+ * don't want to allow unprivileged users to break out of chroot
+ * jail with another chroot call.
+ *
+ * We therefore allow chroot under one of two circumstances:
+ * a) no_new_privs (so setuid and similar programs can't be
+ * exploited), fs not shared (to avoid bypassing no_new_privs),
+ * and not already chrooted (so there's no chroot jail to break
+ * out of)
+ * b) CAP_SYS_CHROOT
+ */
+ if (!(current->no_new_privs && fs->users == 1 && !is_chrooted(fs)) &&
+ !capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
goto dput_and_out;
error = security_path_chroot(&path);
if (error)
goto dput_and_out;
- set_fs_root(current->fs, &path);
+ set_fs_root(fs, &path);
error = 0;
dput_and_out:
path_put(&path);
--
1.7.7.6
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-01-30 16:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-01-30 16:17 [PATCH v3 0/4] PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, unshare, and chroot Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 16:17 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Andy Lutomirski
2012-02-01 18:14 ` Kees Cook
2012-01-30 16:17 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] Fix apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 16:17 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] Allow unprivileged CLONE_NEWUTS and CLONE_NEWIPC with no_new_privs Andy Lutomirski
2012-02-01 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-01 20:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 16:17 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2012-01-30 21:58 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe Colin Walters
2012-01-30 22:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:41 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 22:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 23:10 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 23:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 23:55 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-31 0:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:18 ` Steven Rostedt
2012-01-30 22:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:38 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-30 22:48 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 22:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-02-09 9:35 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
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