From: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
To: serue@us.ibm.com
Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>, James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>,
David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>,
Gerrit Huizenga <gerrit@us.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 5/12] lsm stacking v0.2: actual stacker module
Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2005 10:40:28 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1121092828.12334.94.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050630195043.GE23538@serge.austin.ibm.com>
On Thu, 2005-06-30 at 14:50 -0500, serue@us.ibm.com wrote:
> Adds the actual stacker LSM.
<snip>
> +static int stacker_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size)
> +{
> + RETURN_ERROR_IF_ANY_ERROR(inode_getsecurity,inode_getsecurity(inode,name,buffer,size));
> +}
> +
> +static int stacker_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
> +{
> + RETURN_ERROR_IF_ANY_ERROR(inode_setsecurity,inode_setsecurity(inode,name,value,size,flags));
> +}
> +
> +static int stacker_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
> +{
> + RETURN_ERROR_IF_ANY_ERROR(inode_listsecurity,inode_listsecurity(inode,buffer, buffer_size));
> +}
These hooks pose a similar problem for stacking as with the
[gs]etprocattr hooks, although [gs]etsecurity have the benefit of
already taking a distinguishing name suffix (the part after the
security. prefix). Note also that inode_getsecurity returns the number
of bytes used/required on success.
The proposed inode_init_security hook will likewise have an issue for
stacking.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-07-11 14:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-06-30 19:44 [patch 0/12] lsm stacking v0.2: intro serue
2005-06-30 19:48 ` [patch 1/12] lsm stacking v0.2: don't default to dummy_##hook serue
2005-06-30 19:48 ` [patch 2/12] lsm stacking v0.2: replace void* security with hlist serue
2005-06-30 19:49 ` [patch 3/12] lsm stacking v0.2: introduce security_*_value API serue
2005-06-30 19:49 ` [patch 4/12] lsm stacking v0.2: stacker documentation serue
2005-06-30 19:50 ` [patch 5/12] lsm stacking v0.2: actual stacker module serue
2005-07-01 2:32 ` James Morris
2005-07-01 19:24 ` serge
2005-07-01 20:35 ` Greg KH
2005-07-03 0:24 ` serge
2005-07-03 18:25 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-03 18:53 ` James Morris
2005-07-03 19:09 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-03 20:44 ` [PATCH] securityfs Greg KH
2005-07-04 12:39 ` serge
2005-07-04 15:53 ` serge
2005-07-05 6:07 ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 12:25 ` serge
2005-07-06 6:52 ` James Morris
2005-07-06 7:04 ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 12:29 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-06 15:35 ` James Morris
2005-07-06 16:06 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-06 16:16 ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 18:01 ` Chris Wright
2005-07-06 22:08 ` serue
2005-07-06 22:22 ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 23:32 ` serge
2005-07-07 17:30 ` serge
2005-07-07 17:48 ` Greg KH
2005-07-07 18:27 ` serue
2005-07-07 22:46 ` serge
2005-07-07 23:06 ` Greg KH
2005-07-07 23:12 ` serue
2005-07-08 20:44 ` serue
2005-07-08 20:49 ` Greg KH
2005-07-08 21:03 ` Chris Wright
2005-07-04 3:18 ` [patch 5/12] lsm stacking v0.2: actual stacker module Tony Jones
2005-07-04 11:51 ` serge
2005-07-04 19:37 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-04 20:06 ` serge
2005-07-04 20:41 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-05 18:17 ` serge
2005-07-08 21:43 ` serue
2005-07-08 22:12 ` serue
2005-07-11 14:40 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2005-07-11 17:51 ` serue
2005-07-11 19:03 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-13 16:39 ` serue
2005-07-13 18:27 ` serue
2005-06-30 19:51 ` [patch 6/12] lsm stacking v0.2: stackable capability lsm serue
2005-06-30 19:52 ` [patch 7/12] lsm stacking v0.2: selinux: update security structs serue
2005-06-30 19:53 ` [patch 8/12] lsm stacking v0.2: selinux: use security_*_value API serue
2005-06-30 19:53 ` [patch 9/12] lsm stacking v0.2: selinux: remove secondary support serue
2005-06-30 19:54 ` [patch 10/12] lsm stacking v0.2: hook completeness verification serue
2005-06-30 19:55 ` [patch 11/12] lsm stacking v0.2: /proc/$$/attr/ sharing serue
2005-06-30 19:55 ` [patch 12/12] lsm stacking v0.2: update seclvl for stacking serue
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