From: serue@us.ibm.com
To: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>,
James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>,
David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>,
Gerrit Huizenga <gerrit@us.ibm.com>
Subject: [patch 1/12] lsm stacking v0.2: don't default to dummy_##hook
Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2005 14:48:06 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050630194806.GA23538@serge.austin.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050630194458.GA23439@serge.austin.ibm.com>
When stacking multiple LSMs, we do not want hooks which are undefined to
be substituted with the dummy_##hook.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
security.c | 12 ++++++------
1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/security.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc1.orig/security/security.c 2005-06-30 14:02:59.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/security.c 2005-06-30 14:03:54.000000000 -0500
@@ -81,15 +81,15 @@ int __init security_init(void)
*/
int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
{
+ if (security_ops != &dummy_security_ops)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+
if (verify(ops)) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s could not verify "
"security_operations structure.\n", __FUNCTION__);
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (security_ops != &dummy_security_ops)
- return -EAGAIN;
-
security_ops = ops;
return 0;
@@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ int unregister_security(struct security_
*/
int mod_reg_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
{
- if (verify(ops)) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "%s could not verify "
- "security operations.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+ if (!ops) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s received NULL security operations",
+ __FUNCTION__);
return -EINVAL;
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-06-30 19:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-06-30 19:44 [patch 0/12] lsm stacking v0.2: intro serue
2005-06-30 19:48 ` serue [this message]
2005-06-30 19:48 ` [patch 2/12] lsm stacking v0.2: replace void* security with hlist serue
2005-06-30 19:49 ` [patch 3/12] lsm stacking v0.2: introduce security_*_value API serue
2005-06-30 19:49 ` [patch 4/12] lsm stacking v0.2: stacker documentation serue
2005-06-30 19:50 ` [patch 5/12] lsm stacking v0.2: actual stacker module serue
2005-07-01 2:32 ` James Morris
2005-07-01 19:24 ` serge
2005-07-01 20:35 ` Greg KH
2005-07-03 0:24 ` serge
2005-07-03 18:25 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-03 18:53 ` James Morris
2005-07-03 19:09 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-03 20:44 ` [PATCH] securityfs Greg KH
2005-07-04 12:39 ` serge
2005-07-04 15:53 ` serge
2005-07-05 6:07 ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 12:25 ` serge
2005-07-06 6:52 ` James Morris
2005-07-06 7:04 ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 12:29 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-06 15:35 ` James Morris
2005-07-06 16:06 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-06 16:16 ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 18:01 ` Chris Wright
2005-07-06 22:08 ` serue
2005-07-06 22:22 ` Greg KH
2005-07-06 23:32 ` serge
2005-07-07 17:30 ` serge
2005-07-07 17:48 ` Greg KH
2005-07-07 18:27 ` serue
2005-07-07 22:46 ` serge
2005-07-07 23:06 ` Greg KH
2005-07-07 23:12 ` serue
2005-07-08 20:44 ` serue
2005-07-08 20:49 ` Greg KH
2005-07-08 21:03 ` Chris Wright
2005-07-04 3:18 ` [patch 5/12] lsm stacking v0.2: actual stacker module Tony Jones
2005-07-04 11:51 ` serge
2005-07-04 19:37 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-04 20:06 ` serge
2005-07-04 20:41 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-05 18:17 ` serge
2005-07-08 21:43 ` serue
2005-07-08 22:12 ` serue
2005-07-11 14:40 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-11 17:51 ` serue
2005-07-11 19:03 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-07-13 16:39 ` serue
2005-07-13 18:27 ` serue
2005-06-30 19:51 ` [patch 6/12] lsm stacking v0.2: stackable capability lsm serue
2005-06-30 19:52 ` [patch 7/12] lsm stacking v0.2: selinux: update security structs serue
2005-06-30 19:53 ` [patch 8/12] lsm stacking v0.2: selinux: use security_*_value API serue
2005-06-30 19:53 ` [patch 9/12] lsm stacking v0.2: selinux: remove secondary support serue
2005-06-30 19:54 ` [patch 10/12] lsm stacking v0.2: hook completeness verification serue
2005-06-30 19:55 ` [patch 11/12] lsm stacking v0.2: /proc/$$/attr/ sharing serue
2005-06-30 19:55 ` [patch 12/12] lsm stacking v0.2: update seclvl for stacking serue
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