Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2]

[Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>]

On Mon, 2007-12-10 at 21:08 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> 
> > Otherwise, only other issue I have with this interface is it won't
> > generalize to dealing with nfsd, where we want to set the acting context
> > to a context we obtain from or determine based upon the client.
> 
> Are you speaking of security_kernel_act_as() and security_create_files_as()
> specifically?  Or the task_struct::act_as override pointer in general?

security_kernel_act_as()

> I don't really know how nfsd wants to obtain and set its LSM context, so it's
> a bit difficult for me to make something that works for nfsd as well as
> cachefiles.

It would get a context from the client or from a local configuration
that would map security-unaware clients to a default context, and then
want to assume that context for the particular operation.  No transition
involved.

> > Why can't cachefilesd just push a context into the kernel and pass that
> > into the hook as the acting context,
> 
> How does cachefilesd come up with such a context?  Grab it from
> /etc/cachefilesd.conf?

>From a config file whose pathname would be provided by libselinux (ala
the way in which dbusd imports contexts), or directly as a context
returned by a libselinux function.  Has to be done that way so that it
can be set differently for different policy types (strict, targeted,
mls).

Naturally, cachefiles (the kernel module) would invoke a security hook
to check whether the daemon is allowed to set the specified context.

> I use to do that, but someone objected...  Possibly Karl MacMillan.

Yes, but I think I disagreed then too.

> > and then nfsd can do likewise using the context provided by the client or
> > obtained locally from exports for ordinary clients?  Avoids the transition
> > SID computation altogether within the kernel and makes this more generic.
> 
> I seem to remember that I was told that it should be done this way, possibly
> by Karl MacMillan, but I don't remember exactly.
> 
> Now it's configured by cachefilesd.te:
> 
> 	type_transition cachefilesd_t kernel_t : process cachefiles_kernel_t;

It doesn't fit with how other users of security_kernel_act_as() will
likely want to work (they will want to just set the context to a
specified value, whether one obtained from the client or from some local
source), nor with how type transitions normally work (exec, with the
program type as the second type field).  I think it will just cause
confusion and subtle breakage.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency