From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com,
djm@mindrot.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
segoon@openwall.com, jmorris@namei.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com,
avi@redhat.com, penberg@cs.helsinki.fi, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
luto@mit.edu, mingo@elte.hu, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
khilman@ti.com, borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de,
dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org,
mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2012 11:38:44 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1326386324.7642.96.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120112161418.GA22360@redhat.com>
On Thu, 2012-01-12 at 17:14 +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> May be this needs something like LSM_UNSAFE_SECCOMP, or perhaps
> cap_bprm_set_creds() should take seccomp.mode == 2 into account, I dunno.
>
> OTOH, currently seccomp.mode == 1 doesn't allow to exec at all.
I've never used seccomp, so I admit I'm totally ignorant on this topic.
But looking at seccomp from the outside, the biggest advantage to this
would be the ability for normal processes to be able to limit tasks it
kicks off. If I want to run a task in a sandbox, I don't want to be root
to do so.
I guess a web browser doesn't perform an exec to run java programs. But
it would be nice if I could execute something from the command line that
I could run in a sand box.
What's the problem with making sure that the setuid isn't set before
doing an execv? Only fail when setuid (or some other magic) is enabled
on the file being exec'd.
Or is this a race where I can have a soft link pointing to a normal
file, run this, and have the link change to a setuid file at just the
right time that causes it to happen?
-- Steve
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-01-12 16:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 235+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-01-11 17:25 [RFC,PATCH 0/2] dynamic seccomp policies (using BPF filters) Will Drewry
2012-01-11 17:25 ` [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-01-12 8:53 ` Serge Hallyn
2012-01-12 16:54 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 14:50 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-12 16:55 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 15:43 ` Steven Rostedt
2012-01-12 16:14 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-12 16:38 ` Steven Rostedt [this message]
2012-01-12 16:47 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-12 17:08 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 17:30 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-12 17:40 ` Steven Rostedt
2012-01-12 17:44 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-12 17:56 ` Steven Rostedt
2012-01-12 23:27 ` Alan Cox
2012-01-12 23:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-12 22:18 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 23:00 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-12 16:14 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-12 16:27 ` Steven Rostedt
2012-01-12 16:51 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-12 17:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-12 17:17 ` Steven Rostedt
2012-01-12 18:18 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-12 18:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-12 18:44 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-12 19:08 ` Kyle Moffett
2012-01-12 23:05 ` Eric Paris
2012-01-12 23:33 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-12 19:40 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 19:42 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 19:46 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-12 20:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-12 16:59 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 17:22 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-12 17:35 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 17:57 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-12 18:03 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13 1:34 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-13 2:44 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-13 6:33 ` Chris Evans
2012-01-12 17:36 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-12 16:18 ` Alan Cox
2012-01-12 17:03 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 17:11 ` Alan Cox
2012-01-12 17:52 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13 1:31 ` James Morris
2012-01-12 16:22 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-12 17:10 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 17:23 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-12 17:51 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13 17:31 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-13 19:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13 23:10 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13 23:12 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13 23:30 ` Eric Paris
2012-01-15 3:40 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-16 1:40 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-16 6:49 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-16 20:12 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-17 6:46 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-17 17:37 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-18 4:06 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-18 4:38 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-17 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2012-01-17 20:42 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-17 21:09 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-18 4:47 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-16 18:37 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-16 20:15 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-17 16:45 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-17 16:56 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-17 17:01 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-17 17:05 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-17 17:45 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-18 0:56 ` Compat 32-bit syscall entry from 64-bit task!? [was: Re: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF] Indan Zupancic
2012-01-18 1:01 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-19 1:06 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-19 1:19 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-19 1:47 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-18 1:07 ` Roland McGrath
2012-01-18 1:47 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-18 1:48 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-18 1:50 ` Andi Kleen
2012-01-18 2:00 ` Steven Rostedt
2012-01-18 2:04 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-18 2:22 ` Andi Kleen
2012-01-18 2:25 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-18 4:22 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-18 5:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-18 6:25 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-18 13:12 ` Compat 32-bit syscall entry from 64-bit task!? Indan Zupancic
2012-01-18 19:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-18 19:36 ` Andi Kleen
2012-01-18 19:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-18 19:44 ` Andi Kleen
2012-01-18 19:47 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-18 19:52 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-18 19:58 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-18 19:41 ` Martin Mares
2012-01-18 19:38 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-19 16:01 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-19 16:13 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-19 19:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-19 19:30 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-19 19:37 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-19 19:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-19 23:54 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-20 0:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-20 15:35 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-20 17:56 ` Roland McGrath
2012-01-20 19:45 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-18 20:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-18 20:55 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-01-18 21:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-18 21:04 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-01-18 21:21 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-01-18 21:51 ` Roland McGrath
2012-01-18 21:53 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-01-18 23:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-19 0:38 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-01-20 21:51 ` Denys Vlasenko
2012-01-20 22:40 ` Roland McGrath
2012-01-20 22:41 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-01-20 23:49 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-20 23:55 ` Roland McGrath
2012-01-20 23:58 ` hpanvin@gmail.com
2012-01-23 2:14 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-21 0:07 ` Denys Vlasenko
2012-01-21 0:10 ` Roland McGrath
2012-01-21 1:23 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-23 2:37 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-23 16:48 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-24 8:19 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-06 20:30 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-06 20:39 ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-06 20:42 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-01-18 21:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-18 21:30 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-01-18 21:42 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-18 21:47 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-01-19 1:45 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-19 2:16 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-06 8:32 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-06 17:02 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-07 1:52 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-09 0:19 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-09 4:20 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-09 4:29 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-09 6:03 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-09 14:47 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-09 16:00 ` H.J. Lu
2012-02-10 1:09 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-10 1:15 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-10 2:29 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-10 2:47 ` H. Peter Anvin
[not found] ` <cc95fcf4b1c28ee6f73e373d04593634.squirrel@webmail.greenhost.nl>
2012-02-10 15:53 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-10 22:42 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-10 22:56 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-12 12:07 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-25 19:36 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-25 20:20 ` Pedro Alves
2012-01-25 23:36 ` Denys Vlasenko
2012-01-25 23:32 ` Denys Vlasenko
2012-01-26 0:40 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-26 1:08 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-26 1:22 ` Denys Vlasenko
2012-01-26 6:34 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-26 10:31 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-26 10:40 ` Denys Vlasenko
2012-01-26 11:01 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-26 14:02 ` Denys Vlasenko
2012-01-26 11:19 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-26 11:20 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-26 11:47 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-26 14:05 ` Denys Vlasenko
2012-01-27 7:23 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-10 2:02 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-02-10 3:37 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-10 21:19 ` Denys Vlasenko
2012-01-26 1:09 ` Denys Vlasenko
2012-01-26 3:47 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-26 18:03 ` Denys Vlasenko
2017-03-08 23:41 ` Dmitry V. Levin
2017-03-09 4:39 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2017-03-14 2:57 ` Dmitry V. Levin
2012-01-26 5:57 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-26 0:59 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-26 1:21 ` Denys Vlasenko
2012-01-26 8:23 ` Pedro Alves
2012-01-26 8:53 ` Denys Vlasenko
2012-01-26 9:51 ` Pedro Alves
2012-01-26 18:44 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-02-10 2:51 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-18 15:04 ` Compat 32-bit syscall entry from 64-bit task!? [was: Re: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF] Eric Paris
2012-01-18 17:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-18 5:43 ` Chris Evans
2012-01-18 12:12 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-18 21:13 ` Chris Evans
2012-01-19 0:14 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-19 8:16 ` Chris Evans
2012-01-19 11:34 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-19 16:11 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-19 15:40 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-18 17:00 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-18 17:12 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-18 21:09 ` Chris Evans
2012-01-23 16:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-23 22:23 ` Chris Evans
2012-02-07 11:45 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-19 0:29 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-18 2:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-18 2:31 ` Andi Kleen
2012-01-18 2:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-18 14:06 ` Martin Mares
2012-01-18 18:24 ` Andi Kleen
2012-01-19 16:04 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-20 0:21 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-20 0:53 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-20 2:02 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-17 17:06 ` [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-01-17 19:35 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 17:02 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-16 20:28 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-11 17:25 ` [RFC,PATCH 2/2] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-01-11 20:03 ` Jonathan Corbet
2012-01-11 20:10 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-11 23:19 ` [PATCH v2 " Will Drewry
2012-01-12 0:29 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 18:16 ` Randy Dunlap
2012-01-12 17:23 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 17:34 ` Steven Rostedt
2012-01-12 13:13 ` [RFC,PATCH " Łukasz Sowa
2012-01-12 17:25 ` Will Drewry
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