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From: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com,
	coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com,
	djm@mindrot.org, segoon@openwall.com, rostedt@goodmis.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com,
	penberg@cs.helsinki.fi, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo@elte.hu,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com,
	borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
	ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de,
	dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org,
	mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe
Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2012 14:26:05 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1326741967.3467.8.camel@lenny> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c4c1a0e710a50e48221aa28d2b60b486ab686369.1326673414.git.luto@amacapital.net>

On Sun, 2012-01-15 at 16:37 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

> Because chroot is an easy way to break out of chroot jail, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> is still required if the caller is already chrooted.

This part is pretty gross.  It means it won't work for stuff like
containers (systemd-nspawn etc.) and furthermore I have plans that
involve running OS trees inside a chroot, and this would obviously not
work for that.

Incidentally I ended up putting my setuid program here:
http://git.gnome.org/browse/linux-user-chroot/

Now unfortunately, even if we say that a new setuid program is the way
to gain these privileges, you still can't nest it, because all of these
things are predicated on disabling setuid programs.  But it would at
least not fail initially if your process was inside a chroot.







  parent reply	other threads:[~2012-01-16 19:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-01-16  0:37 [PATCH v2 0/4] PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, unshare, and chroot Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16  0:37 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 17:33   ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-16 20:15     ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16  0:37 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] Fix apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16  0:37 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] Allow unprivileged CLONE_NEWUTS and CLONE_NEWIPC with no_new_privs Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16  0:37 ` [PATCH 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16  0:45   ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-16  1:08     ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 19:26   ` Colin Walters [this message]
2012-01-16 20:18     ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-17 10:14     ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-16 20:06   ` Al Viro
2012-01-16 20:15     ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 20:26       ` Al Viro
2012-01-17 16:23   ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-17 16:31     ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16  1:04 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, unshare, and chroot Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 20:49 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-16 21:25   ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 21:47     ` Colin Walters
2012-01-16 21:57       ` Andy Lutomirski

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