From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com,
djm@mindrot.org, segoon@openwall.com, rostedt@goodmis.org,
jmorris@namei.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com,
penberg@cs.helsinki.fi, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo@elte.hu,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com,
borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de,
dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org,
mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe
Date: Sun, 15 Jan 2012 16:37:21 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c4c1a0e710a50e48221aa28d2b60b486ab686369.1326673414.git.luto@amacapital.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1326673414.git.luto@amacapital.net>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1326673414.git.luto@amacapital.net>
Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs. If no_new_privs,
then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot.
Because chroot is an easy way to break out of chroot jail, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
is still required if the caller is already chrooted.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
---
fs/open.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
1 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index f711921..80ca7e2 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -422,6 +422,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename)
{
struct path path;
int error;
+ struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
+ bool is_chrooted;
error = user_path_dir(filename, &path);
if (error)
@@ -432,13 +434,23 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename)
goto dput_and_out;
error = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
+ /*
+ * Chroot is dangerous unless no_new_privs is set. But we also
+ * don't want to allow unprivileged users to break out of chroot
+ * jail with another chroot call, so we require either CAP_SYS_CHROOT
+ * unless we're not chrooted already and we have no_new_privs.
+ */
+ is_chrooted = (fs->root.mnt->mnt_mountpoint !=
+ fs->root.mnt->mnt_parent->mnt_root ||
+ fs->root.dentry != fs->root.mnt->mnt_root);
+ if (!(current->no_new_privs && !is_chrooted) &&
+ !capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
goto dput_and_out;
error = security_path_chroot(&path);
if (error)
goto dput_and_out;
- set_fs_root(current->fs, &path);
+ set_fs_root(fs, &path);
error = 0;
dput_and_out:
path_put(&path);
--
1.7.7.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-01-16 0:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-01-16 0:37 [PATCH v2 0/4] PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, unshare, and chroot Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 0:37 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 17:33 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-16 20:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 0:37 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] Fix apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 0:37 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] Allow unprivileged CLONE_NEWUTS and CLONE_NEWIPC with no_new_privs Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 0:37 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2012-01-16 0:45 ` [PATCH 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe Linus Torvalds
2012-01-16 1:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 19:26 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-16 20:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-17 10:14 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-16 20:06 ` Al Viro
2012-01-16 20:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 20:26 ` Al Viro
2012-01-17 16:23 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-01-17 16:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 1:04 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, unshare, and chroot Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 20:49 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-16 21:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-16 21:47 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-16 21:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
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