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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 17:27:16 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <152346403637.4030.15247096217928429102.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <152346387861.4030.4408662483445703127.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

Disallow opening of debugfs files that might be used to muck around when
the kernel is locked down as various drivers give raw access to hardware
through debugfs.  Given the effort of auditing all 2000 or so files and
manually fixing each one as necessary, I've chosen to apply a heuristic
instead.  The following changes are made:

 (1) chmod and chown are disallowed on debugfs objects (though the root dir
     can be modified by mount and remount, but I'm not worried about that).

 (2) When the kernel is locked down, only files with the following criteria
     are permitted to be opened:

	- The file must have mode 00444
	- The file must not have ioctl methods
	- The file must not have mmap

 (3) When the kernel is locked down, files may only be opened for reading.

Normal device interaction should be done through configfs, sysfs or a
miscdev, not debugfs.

Note that this makes it unnecessary to specifically lock down show_dsts(),
show_devs() and show_call() in the asus-wmi driver.

I would actually prefer to lock down all files by default and have the
the files unlocked by the creator.  This is tricky to manage correctly,
though, as there are 19 creation functions and ~1600 call sites (some of
them in loops scanning tables).

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
cc: acpi4asus-user@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---

 fs/debugfs/file.c  |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/debugfs/inode.c |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/debugfs/file.c b/fs/debugfs/file.c
index 1f99678ff5d3..51cb894c21f2 100644
--- a/fs/debugfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/debugfs/file.c
@@ -136,6 +136,25 @@ void debugfs_file_put(struct dentry *dentry)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(debugfs_file_put);
 
+/*
+ * Only permit access to world-readable files when the kernel is locked down.
+ * We also need to exclude any file that has ways to write or alter it as root
+ * can bypass the permissions check.
+ */
+static bool debugfs_is_locked_down(struct inode *inode,
+				   struct file *filp,
+				   const struct file_operations *real_fops)
+{
+	if ((inode->i_mode & 07777) == 0444 &&
+	    !(filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) &&
+	    !real_fops->unlocked_ioctl &&
+	    !real_fops->compat_ioctl &&
+	    !real_fops->mmap)
+		return false;
+
+	return kernel_is_locked_down("debugfs");
+}
+
 static int open_proxy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry = F_DENTRY(filp);
@@ -147,6 +166,11 @@ static int open_proxy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 		return r == -EIO ? -ENOENT : r;
 
 	real_fops = debugfs_real_fops(filp);
+
+	r = -EPERM;
+	if (debugfs_is_locked_down(inode, filp, real_fops))
+		goto out;
+
 	real_fops = fops_get(real_fops);
 	if (!real_fops) {
 		/* Huh? Module did not clean up after itself at exit? */
@@ -272,6 +296,10 @@ static int full_proxy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 		return r == -EIO ? -ENOENT : r;
 
 	real_fops = debugfs_real_fops(filp);
+	r = -EPERM;
+	if (debugfs_is_locked_down(inode, filp, real_fops))
+		goto out;
+
 	real_fops = fops_get(real_fops);
 	if (!real_fops) {
 		/* Huh? Module did not cleanup after itself at exit? */
diff --git a/fs/debugfs/inode.c b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
index 13b01351dd1c..4daec17b8215 100644
--- a/fs/debugfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
@@ -32,6 +32,31 @@ static struct vfsmount *debugfs_mount;
 static int debugfs_mount_count;
 static bool debugfs_registered;
 
+/*
+ * Don't allow access attributes to be changed whilst the kernel is locked down
+ * so that we can use the file mode as part of a heuristic to determine whether
+ * to lock down individual files.
+ */
+static int debugfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia)
+{
+	if ((ia->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) &&
+	    kernel_is_locked_down("debugfs"))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return simple_setattr(dentry, ia);
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations debugfs_file_inode_operations = {
+	.setattr	= debugfs_setattr,
+};
+static const struct inode_operations debugfs_dir_inode_operations = {
+	.lookup		= simple_lookup,
+	.setattr	= debugfs_setattr,
+};
+static const struct inode_operations debugfs_symlink_inode_operations = {
+	.get_link	= simple_get_link,
+	.setattr	= debugfs_setattr,
+};
+
 static struct inode *debugfs_get_inode(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = new_inode(sb);
@@ -356,6 +381,7 @@ static struct dentry *__debugfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
 	inode->i_mode = mode;
 	inode->i_private = data;
 
+	inode->i_op = &debugfs_file_inode_operations;
 	inode->i_fop = proxy_fops;
 	dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)((unsigned long)real_fops |
 				DEBUGFS_FSDATA_IS_REAL_FOPS_BIT);
@@ -513,7 +539,7 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
 		return failed_creating(dentry);
 
 	inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
-	inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
+	inode->i_op = &debugfs_dir_inode_operations;
 	inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
 
 	/* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
@@ -608,7 +634,7 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_symlink(const char *name, struct dentry *parent,
 		return failed_creating(dentry);
 	}
 	inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO;
-	inode->i_op = &simple_symlink_inode_operations;
+	inode->i_op = &debugfs_symlink_inode_operations;
 	inode->i_link = link;
 	d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
 	return end_creating(dentry);


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-04-11 16:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-11 16:24 [PATCH 00/24] security: Add kernel lockdown David Howells
2018-04-11 16:24 ` [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2018-04-11 16:44   ` Jann Horn
2018-04-11 17:37   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-04-11 18:50     ` Miguel Ojeda
2018-04-11 19:56       ` Greg KH
2018-04-11 17:49   ` David Howells
2018-04-11 18:09   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-11 18:35     ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-11 21:05     ` Jordan Glover
2018-04-11 22:38       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-12 13:09         ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-12 16:52           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-12  2:57   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-11 16:24 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown David Howells
2018-04-11 17:05   ` Jann Horn
2018-04-13 20:22   ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-11 16:24 ` [PATCH 03/24] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 06/24] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " David Howells
2018-04-11 19:00   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-11 20:09     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-04-12 11:38       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-04-11 20:05   ` David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 07/24] hibernate: Disable when " David Howells
2018-04-13 20:22   ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-19 14:38   ` David Howells
2018-04-22 14:34     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-26  7:26     ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-26  7:34       ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2018-04-26  8:20       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-23  8:46         ` joeyli
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 08/24] uswsusp: " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 09/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 10/24] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 11/24] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 12/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 13/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 14/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 15/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 16/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 17/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 18/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells
2018-04-11 17:22   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 19/24] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 20/24] Lock down /proc/kcore David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 21/24] Lock down kprobes David Howells
2018-04-11 16:27 ` [PATCH 22/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-04-11 16:27 ` [PATCH 23/24] Lock down perf David Howells
2018-04-11 16:27 ` David Howells [this message]
2018-04-11 17:26   ` [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down Randy Dunlap
2018-04-11 18:50   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-11 19:54   ` Greg KH
2018-04-11 20:08   ` David Howells
2018-04-11 20:09   ` David Howells
2018-04-11 20:33     ` Greg KH
2018-04-12  2:54       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-12  8:23         ` Greg KH
2018-04-12 14:19           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-13 20:22   ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-19 14:35   ` David Howells
2018-05-10 11:01     ` Pavel Machek

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