From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
"Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 19/24] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction
Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2018 14:49:40 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1535752180.31230.4.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1535646146.26689.11.camel@intel.com>
On Thu, 2018-08-30 at 09:22 -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-08-30 at 08:55 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 8:39 AM, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 4:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.c
> > > om
> > > >
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > WRUSS is a new kernel-mode instruction but writes directly
> > > > to user shadow stack memory. This is used to construct
> > > > a return address on the shadow stack for the signal
> > > > handler.
> > > >
> > > > This instruction can fault if the user shadow stack is
> > > > invalid shadow stack memory. In that case, the kernel does
> > > > fixup.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> > > [...]
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > +static inline int write_user_shstk_64(unsigned long addr,
> > > > unsigned long val)
> > > > +{
> > > > + int err = 0;
> > > > +
> > > > + asm volatile("1: wrussq %1, (%0)\n"
> > > > + "2:\n"
> > > > + _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b,
> > > > ex_handler_wruss)
> > > > + :
> > > > + : "r" (addr), "r" (val));
> > > > +
> > > > + return err;
> > > > +}
> > > What's up with "err"? You set it to zero, and then you return
> > > it,
> > > but
> > > nothing can ever set it to non-zero, right?
> > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > +__visible bool ex_handler_wruss(const struct
> > > > exception_table_entry *fixup,
> > > > + struct pt_regs *regs, int
> > > > trapnr)
> > > > +{
> > > > + regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
> > > > + regs->ax = -1;
> > > > + return true;
> > > > +}
> > > And here you just write into regs->ax, but your "asm volatile"
> > > doesn't
> > > reserve that register. This looks wrong to me.
> > >
> > > I think you probably want to add something like an explicit
> > > `"+&a"(err)` output to the asm statements.
> > We require asm goto support these days. How about using
> > that? You
> > won't even need a special exception handler.
Maybe something like this? It looks simple now.
static inline int write_user_shstk_64(unsigned long addr, unsigned
long val)
{
asm_volatile_goto("wrussq %1, (%0)\n"
"jmp %l[ok]\n"
".section .fixup,\"ax\"n"
"jmp %l[fail]\n"
".previous\n"
:: "r" (addr), "r" (val)
:: ok, fail);
ok:
return 0;
fail:
return -1;
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-31 21:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-30 14:38 [RFC PATCH v3 00/24] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/24] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/24] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 20:39 ` Pavel Machek
2018-08-30 22:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 21:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-03 2:56 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/24] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 15:01 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-31 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/24] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/24] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/24] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/24] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/24] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 15:49 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 16:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 16:08 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 16:23 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 17:19 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 17:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 17:33 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 17:54 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 17:59 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 20:44 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 20:52 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 21:01 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 21:47 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-31 9:53 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-08-31 14:33 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 14:47 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 15:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 15:58 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 16:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-14 20:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 20:46 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-14 21:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 21:33 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 1:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-30 17:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-30 18:55 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 17:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-31 17:52 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 19:59 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-08-30 20:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 16:29 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/24] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/24] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/24] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/24] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/24] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/24] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 16:10 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/24] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 15:39 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 15:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-30 16:22 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-08-31 22:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-09-14 20:46 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/24] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 21/24] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 22/24] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 23/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 24/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-02 8:13 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/24] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Balbir Singh
2018-09-04 14:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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