From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: yu-cheng.yu@intel.com,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
hjl.tools@gmail.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
keescook@chromiun.org, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
ravi.v.shankar@intel.com, vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 12/24] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW
Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2018 18:23:47 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez2gHOD9hH4+0wek5vUOv9upj79XWoug2SXjdwfXWoQqxw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <079a55f2-4654-4adf-a6ef-6e480b594a2f@linux.intel.com>
On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 6:09 PM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> On 08/30/2018 08:49 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
> >> @@ -1203,7 +1203,28 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm,
> >> static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
> >> unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
> >> {
> >> + pte_t pte;
> >> +
> >> clear_bit(_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)&ptep->pte);
> >> + pte = *ptep;
> >> +
> >> + /*
> >> + * Some processors can start a write, but ending up seeing
> >> + * a read-only PTE by the time they get to the Dirty bit.
> >> + * In this case, they will set the Dirty bit, leaving a
> >> + * read-only, Dirty PTE which looks like a Shadow Stack PTE.
> >> + *
> >> + * However, this behavior has been improved and will not occur
> >> + * on processors supporting Shadow Stacks. Without this
> >> + * guarantee, a transition to a non-present PTE and flush the
> >> + * TLB would be needed.
> >> + *
> >> + * When change a writable PTE to read-only and if the PTE has
> >> + * _PAGE_DIRTY_HW set, we move that bit to _PAGE_DIRTY_SW so
> >> + * that the PTE is not a valid Shadow Stack PTE.
> >> + */
> >> + pte = pte_move_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
> >> + set_pte_at(mm, addr, ptep, pte);
> >> }
> > I don't understand why it's okay that you first atomically clear the
> > RW bit, then atomically switch from DIRTY_HW to DIRTY_SW. Doesn't that
> > mean that between the two atomic writes, another core can incorrectly
> > see a shadow stack?
>
> Good point.
>
> This could result in a spurious shadow-stack fault, or allow a
> shadow-stack write to the page in the transient state.
>
> But, the shadow-stack permissions are more restrictive than what could
> be in the TLB at this point, so I don't think there's a real security
> implication here.
How about this:
Three threads (A, B, C) run with the same CR3.
1. a dirty+writable PTE is placed directly in front of B's shadow stack.
(this can happen, right? or is there a guard page?)
2. C's TLB caches the dirty+writable PTE.
3. A performs some syscall that triggers ptep_set_wrprotect().
4. A's syscall calls clear_bit().
5. B's TLB caches the transient shadow stack.
[now C has write access to B's transiently-extended shadow stack]
6. B recurses into the transiently-extended shadow stack
7. C overwrites the transiently-extended shadow stack area.
8. B returns through the transiently-extended shadow stack, giving
the attacker instruction pointer control in B.
9. A's syscall broadcasts a TLB flush.
Sure, it's not exactly an easy race and probably requires at least
some black timing magic to exploit, if it's exploitable at all - but
still. This seems suboptimal.
> The only trouble is handling the spurious shadow-stack fault. The
> alternative is to go !Present for a bit, which we would probably just
> handle fine in the existing page fault code.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-30 16:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-30 14:38 [RFC PATCH v3 00/24] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/24] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/24] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 20:39 ` Pavel Machek
2018-08-30 22:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 21:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-03 2:56 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/24] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 15:01 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-31 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/24] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/24] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/24] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/24] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/24] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 15:49 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 16:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 16:08 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 16:23 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2018-08-30 17:19 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 17:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 17:33 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 17:54 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 17:59 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 20:44 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 20:52 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 21:01 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 21:47 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-31 9:53 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-08-31 14:33 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 14:47 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 15:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 15:58 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 16:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-14 20:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 20:46 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-14 21:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 21:33 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 1:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-30 17:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-30 18:55 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 17:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-31 17:52 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 19:59 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-08-30 20:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 16:29 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/24] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/24] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/24] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/24] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/24] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/24] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 16:10 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/24] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 15:39 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 15:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-30 16:22 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 22:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-09-14 20:46 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/24] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 21/24] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 22/24] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 23/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 24/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-02 8:13 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/24] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Balbir Singh
2018-09-04 14:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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