[ 00/44] 3.0.41-stable review

[ 00/44] 3.0.41-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.0.41 release.
There are 44 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed Aug 15 22:01:40 UTC 2012.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.0.41-rc1.gz
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
 MAINTAINERS                           |    2 +-
 Makefile                              |    4 +-
 arch/arm/configs/mxs_defconfig        |    1 -
 arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h     |    8 +-
 arch/arm/include/asm/mutex.h          |  119 +----------
 arch/arm/mm/tlb-v7.S                  |   12 ++
 arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c              |    6 +
 arch/ia64/include/asm/atomic.h        |    4 +-
 arch/ia64/kernel/irq_ia64.c           |    1 -
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c         |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/microcode_core.c      |   31 ++-
 drivers/char/mspec.c                  |    2 +-
 drivers/char/random.c                 |  374 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c           |    3 +
 drivers/firmware/pcdp.c               |    4 +-
 drivers/input/tablet/wacom_wac.c      |    2 +-
 drivers/mfd/ab3100-core.c             |    5 -
 drivers/mfd/ab3550-core.c             |    2 -
 drivers/mfd/ezx-pcap.c                |    2 +-
 drivers/mfd/wm831x-otp.c              |    8 +
 drivers/net/e1000e/82571.c            |    4 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/rt2x00/rt61pci.c |    3 +-
 drivers/rtc/rtc-wm831x.c              |   24 ++-
 drivers/usb/core/hub.c                |    9 +
 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c                     |    4 +-
 fs/nilfs2/super.c                     |    3 +
 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c                 |    1 +
 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.h                 |    2 +
 include/linux/irqdesc.h               |    1 -
 include/linux/mfd/ezx-pcap.h          |    1 +
 include/linux/random.h                |   19 +-
 include/trace/events/random.h         |  134 ++++++++++++
 kernel/irq/handle.c                   |    7 +-
 kernel/irq/manage.c                   |   17 --
 mm/hugetlb.c                          |   25 ++-
 mm/memory-failure.c                   |    6 +-
 mm/mmu_notifier.c                     |   45 ++--
 net/core/dev.c                        |    3 +
 net/core/rtnetlink.c                  |    1 +
 net/mac80211/mesh.c                   |    1 +
 net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c                |    4 +-
 net/wireless/core.c                   |    5 +
 net/wireless/core.h                   |    1 +
 net/wireless/util.c                   |    5 +-
 sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c        |    1 -
 45 files changed, 589 insertions(+), 329 deletions(-)

[ 01/44] [IA64] Redefine ATOMIC_INIT and ATOMIC64_INIT to drop the casts

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>

commit a119365586b0130dfea06457f584953e0ff6481d upstream.

The following build error occured during a ia64 build with
swap-over-NFS patches applied.

net/core/sock.c:274:36: error: initializer element is not constant
net/core/sock.c:274:36: error: (near initialization for 'memalloc_socks')
net/core/sock.c:274:36: error: initializer element is not constant

This is identical to a parisc build error. Fengguang Wu, Mel Gorman
and James Bottomley did all the legwork to track the root cause of
the problem. This fix and entire commit log is shamelessly copied
from them with one extra detail to change a dubious runtime use of
ATOMIC_INIT() to atomic_set() in drivers/char/mspec.c

Dave Anglin says:
> Here is the line in sock.i:
>
> struct static_key memalloc_socks = ((struct static_key) { .enabled =
> ((atomic_t) { (0) }) });

The above line contains two compound literals.  It also uses a designated
initializer to initialize the field enabled.  A compound literal is not a
constant expression.

The location of the above statement isn't fully clear, but if a compound
literal occurs outside the body of a function, the initializer list must
consist of constant expressions.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/ia64/include/asm/atomic.h |    4 ++--
 drivers/char/mspec.c           |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/atomic.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/atomic.h
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@
 #include <asm/system.h>
 
 
-#define ATOMIC_INIT(i)		((atomic_t) { (i) })
-#define ATOMIC64_INIT(i)	((atomic64_t) { (i) })
+#define ATOMIC_INIT(i)		{ (i) }
+#define ATOMIC64_INIT(i)	{ (i) }
 
 #define atomic_read(v)		(*(volatile int *)&(v)->counter)
 #define atomic64_read(v)	(*(volatile long *)&(v)->counter)
--- a/drivers/char/mspec.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mspec.c
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ mspec_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_
 	vdata->flags = flags;
 	vdata->type = type;
 	spin_lock_init(&vdata->lock);
-	vdata->refcnt = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
+	atomic_set(&vdata->refcnt, 1);
 	vma->vm_private_data = vdata;
 
 	vma->vm_flags |= (VM_IO | VM_RESERVED | VM_PFNMAP | VM_DONTEXPAND);

[ 02/44] SUNRPC: return negative value in case rpcbind client creation error

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>

commit caea33da898e4e14f0ba58173e3b7689981d2c0b upstream.

Without this patch kernel will panic on LockD start, because lockd_up() checks
lockd_up_net() result for negative value.
>From my pow it's better to return negative value from rpcbind routines instead
of replacing all such checks like in lockd_up().

Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static int rpcb_create_local_unix(void)
 	if (IS_ERR(clnt)) {
 		dprintk("RPC:       failed to create AF_LOCAL rpcbind "
 				"client (errno %ld).\n", PTR_ERR(clnt));
-		result = -PTR_ERR(clnt);
+		result = PTR_ERR(clnt);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static int rpcb_create_local_net(void)
 	if (IS_ERR(clnt)) {
 		dprintk("RPC:       failed to create local rpcbind "
 				"client (errno %ld).\n", PTR_ERR(clnt));
-		result = -PTR_ERR(clnt);
+		result = PTR_ERR(clnt);
 		goto out;
 	}
 

[ 03/44] nilfs2: fix deadlock issue between chcp and thaw ioctls

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>

commit 572d8b3945a31bee7c40d21556803e4807fd9141 upstream.

An fs-thaw ioctl causes deadlock with a chcp or mkcp -s command:

 chcp            D ffff88013870f3d0     0  1325   1324 0x00000004
 ...
 Call Trace:
   nilfs_transaction_begin+0x11c/0x1a0 [nilfs2]
   wake_up_bit+0x20/0x20
   copy_from_user+0x18/0x30 [nilfs2]
   nilfs_ioctl_change_cpmode+0x7d/0xcf [nilfs2]
   nilfs_ioctl+0x252/0x61a [nilfs2]
   do_page_fault+0x311/0x34c
   get_unmapped_area+0x132/0x14e
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x44b/0x490
   __set_task_blocked+0x5a/0x61
   vm_mmap_pgoff+0x76/0x87
   __set_current_blocked+0x30/0x4a
   sys_ioctl+0x4b/0x6f
   system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
 thaw            D ffff88013870d890     0  1352   1351 0x00000004
 ...
 Call Trace:
   rwsem_down_failed_common+0xdb/0x10f
   call_rwsem_down_write_failed+0x13/0x20
   down_write+0x25/0x27
   thaw_super+0x13/0x9e
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x1f5/0x490
   vm_mmap_pgoff+0x76/0x87
   sys_ioctl+0x4b/0x6f
   filp_close+0x64/0x6c
   system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

where the thaw ioctl deadlocked at thaw_super() when called while chcp was
waiting at nilfs_transaction_begin() called from
nilfs_ioctl_change_cpmode().  This deadlock is 100% reproducible.

This is because nilfs_ioctl_change_cpmode() first locks sb->s_umount in
read mode and then waits for unfreezing in nilfs_transaction_begin(),
whereas thaw_super() locks sb->s_umount in write mode.  The locking of
sb->s_umount here was intended to make snapshot mounts and the downgrade
of snapshots to checkpoints exclusive.

This fixes the deadlock issue by replacing the sb->s_umount usage in
nilfs_ioctl_change_cpmode() with a dedicated mutex which protects snapshot
mounts.

Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: Fernando Luis Vazquez Cao <fernando@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c     |    4 ++--
 fs/nilfs2/super.c     |    3 +++
 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c |    1 +
 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.h |    2 ++
 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_change_cpmode(str
 	if (copy_from_user(&cpmode, argp, sizeof(cpmode)))
 		goto out;
 
-	down_read(&inode->i_sb->s_umount);
+	mutex_lock(&nilfs->ns_snapshot_mount_mutex);
 
 	nilfs_transaction_begin(inode->i_sb, &ti, 0);
 	ret = nilfs_cpfile_change_cpmode(
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_change_cpmode(str
 	else
 		nilfs_transaction_commit(inode->i_sb); /* never fails */
 
-	up_read(&inode->i_sb->s_umount);
+	mutex_unlock(&nilfs->ns_snapshot_mount_mutex);
 out:
 	mnt_drop_write(filp->f_path.mnt);
 	return ret;
--- a/fs/nilfs2/super.c
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/super.c
@@ -951,6 +951,8 @@ static int nilfs_attach_snapshot(struct
 	struct nilfs_root *root;
 	int ret;
 
+	mutex_lock(&nilfs->ns_snapshot_mount_mutex);
+
 	down_read(&nilfs->ns_segctor_sem);
 	ret = nilfs_cpfile_is_snapshot(nilfs->ns_cpfile, cno);
 	up_read(&nilfs->ns_segctor_sem);
@@ -975,6 +977,7 @@ static int nilfs_attach_snapshot(struct
 	ret = nilfs_get_root_dentry(s, root, root_dentry);
 	nilfs_put_root(root);
  out:
+	mutex_unlock(&nilfs->ns_snapshot_mount_mutex);
 	return ret;
 }
 
--- a/fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ struct the_nilfs *alloc_nilfs(struct blo
 	nilfs->ns_bdev = bdev;
 	atomic_set(&nilfs->ns_ndirtyblks, 0);
 	init_rwsem(&nilfs->ns_sem);
+	mutex_init(&nilfs->ns_snapshot_mount_mutex);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nilfs->ns_dirty_files);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nilfs->ns_gc_inodes);
 	spin_lock_init(&nilfs->ns_inode_lock);
--- a/fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.h
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.h
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ enum {
  * @ns_flags: flags
  * @ns_bdev: block device
  * @ns_sem: semaphore for shared states
+ * @ns_snapshot_mount_mutex: mutex to protect snapshot mounts
  * @ns_sbh: buffer heads of on-disk super blocks
  * @ns_sbp: pointers to super block data
  * @ns_sbwtime: previous write time of super block
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ struct the_nilfs {
 
 	struct block_device    *ns_bdev;
 	struct rw_semaphore	ns_sem;
+	struct mutex		ns_snapshot_mount_mutex;
 
 	/*
 	 * used for

[ 04/44] pcdp: use early_ioremap/early_iounmap to access pcdp table

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Greg Pearson <greg.pearson@hp.com>

commit 6c4088ac3a4d82779903433bcd5f048c58fb1aca upstream.

efi_setup_pcdp_console() is called during boot to parse the HCDP/PCDP
EFI system table and setup an early console for printk output.  The
routine uses ioremap/iounmap to setup access to the HCDP/PCDP table
information.

The call to ioremap is happening early in the boot process which leads
to a panic on x86_64 systems:

    panic+0x01ca
    do_exit+0x043c
    oops_end+0x00a7
    no_context+0x0119
    __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x0138
    bad_area_nosemaphore+0x000e
    do_page_fault+0x0321
    page_fault+0x0020
    reserve_memtype+0x02a1
    __ioremap_caller+0x0123
    ioremap_nocache+0x0012
    efi_setup_pcdp_console+0x002b
    setup_arch+0x03a9
    start_kernel+0x00d4
    x86_64_start_reservations+0x012c
    x86_64_start_kernel+0x00fe

This replaces the calls to ioremap/iounmap in efi_setup_pcdp_console()
with calls to early_ioremap/early_iounmap which can be called during
early boot.

This patch was tested on an x86_64 prototype system which uses the
HCDP/PCDP table for early console setup.

Signed-off-by: Greg Pearson <greg.pearson@hp.com>
Acked-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/firmware/pcdp.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/firmware/pcdp.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/pcdp.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *cmdline)
 	if (efi.hcdp == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	pcdp = ioremap(efi.hcdp, 4096);
+	pcdp = early_ioremap(efi.hcdp, 4096);
 	printk(KERN_INFO "PCDP: v%d at 0x%lx\n", pcdp->rev, efi.hcdp);
 
 	if (strstr(cmdline, "console=hcdp")) {
@@ -131,6 +131,6 @@ efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *cmdline)
 	}
 
 out:
-	iounmap(pcdp);
+	early_iounmap(pcdp, 4096);
 	return rc;
 }

[ 05/44] mm: fix wrong argument of migrate_huge_pages() in soft_offline_huge_page()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Joonsoo Kim <js1304@gmail.com>

commit dc32f63453f56d07a1073a697dcd843dd3098c09 upstream.

Commit a6bc32b89922 ("mm: compaction: introduce sync-light migration for
use by compaction") changed the declaration of migrate_pages() and
migrate_huge_pages().

But it missed changing the argument of migrate_huge_pages() in
soft_offline_huge_page().  In this case, we should call
migrate_huge_pages() with MIGRATE_SYNC.

Additionally, there is a mismatch between type the of argument and the
function declaration for migrate_pages().

Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <js1304@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 mm/memory-failure.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/mm/memory-failure.c
+++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -1334,8 +1334,8 @@ static int soft_offline_huge_page(struct
 	/* Keep page count to indicate a given hugepage is isolated. */
 
 	list_add(&hpage->lru, &pagelist);
-	ret = migrate_huge_pages(&pagelist, new_page, MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL, 0,
-				true);
+	ret = migrate_huge_pages(&pagelist, new_page, MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL, false,
+				MIGRATE_SYNC);
 	if (ret) {
 		struct page *page1, *page2;
 		list_for_each_entry_safe(page1, page2, &pagelist, lru)
@@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@ int soft_offline_page(struct page *page,
 					    page_is_file_cache(page));
 		list_add(&page->lru, &pagelist);
 		ret = migrate_pages(&pagelist, new_page, MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL,
-							0, MIGRATE_SYNC);
+							false, MIGRATE_SYNC);
 		if (ret) {
 			putback_lru_pages(&pagelist);
 			pr_info("soft offline: %#lx: migration failed %d, type %lx\n",

[ 06/44] ARM: 7467/1: mutex: use generic xchg-based implementation for ARMv6+

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

commit a76d7bd96d65fa5119adba97e1b58d95f2e78829 upstream.

The open-coded mutex implementation for ARMv6+ cores suffers from a
severe lack of barriers, so in the uncontended case we don't actually
protect any accesses performed during the critical section.

Furthermore, the code is largely a duplication of the ARMv6+ atomic_dec
code but optimised to remove a branch instruction, as the mutex fastpath
was previously inlined. Now that this is executed out-of-line, we can
reuse the atomic access code for the locking (in fact, we use the xchg
code as this produces shorter critical sections).

This patch uses the generic xchg based implementation for mutexes on
ARMv6+, which introduces barriers to the lock/unlock operations and also
has the benefit of removing a fair amount of inline assembly code.

Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Shan Kang <kangshan0910@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/mutex.h |  119 +------------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/mutex.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/mutex.h
@@ -7,121 +7,10 @@
  */
 #ifndef _ASM_MUTEX_H
 #define _ASM_MUTEX_H
-
-#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 6
-/* On pre-ARMv6 hardware the swp based implementation is the most efficient. */
-# include <asm-generic/mutex-xchg.h>
-#else
-
 /*
- * Attempting to lock a mutex on ARMv6+ can be done with a bastardized
- * atomic decrement (it is not a reliable atomic decrement but it satisfies
- * the defined semantics for our purpose, while being smaller and faster
- * than a real atomic decrement or atomic swap.  The idea is to attempt
- * decrementing the lock value only once.  If once decremented it isn't zero,
- * or if its store-back fails due to a dispute on the exclusive store, we
- * simply bail out immediately through the slow path where the lock will be
- * reattempted until it succeeds.
+ * On pre-ARMv6 hardware this results in a swp-based implementation,
+ * which is the most efficient. For ARMv6+, we emit a pair of exclusive
+ * accesses instead.
  */
-static inline void
-__mutex_fastpath_lock(atomic_t *count, void (*fail_fn)(atomic_t *))
-{
-	int __ex_flag, __res;
-
-	__asm__ (
-
-		"ldrex	%0, [%2]	\n\t"
-		"sub	%0, %0, #1	\n\t"
-		"strex	%1, %0, [%2]	"
-
-		: "=&r" (__res), "=&r" (__ex_flag)
-		: "r" (&(count)->counter)
-		: "cc","memory" );
-
-	__res |= __ex_flag;
-	if (unlikely(__res != 0))
-		fail_fn(count);
-}
-
-static inline int
-__mutex_fastpath_lock_retval(atomic_t *count, int (*fail_fn)(atomic_t *))
-{
-	int __ex_flag, __res;
-
-	__asm__ (
-
-		"ldrex	%0, [%2]	\n\t"
-		"sub	%0, %0, #1	\n\t"
-		"strex	%1, %0, [%2]	"
-
-		: "=&r" (__res), "=&r" (__ex_flag)
-		: "r" (&(count)->counter)
-		: "cc","memory" );
-
-	__res |= __ex_flag;
-	if (unlikely(__res != 0))
-		__res = fail_fn(count);
-	return __res;
-}
-
-/*
- * Same trick is used for the unlock fast path. However the original value,
- * rather than the result, is used to test for success in order to have
- * better generated assembly.
- */
-static inline void
-__mutex_fastpath_unlock(atomic_t *count, void (*fail_fn)(atomic_t *))
-{
-	int __ex_flag, __res, __orig;
-
-	__asm__ (
-
-		"ldrex	%0, [%3]	\n\t"
-		"add	%1, %0, #1	\n\t"
-		"strex	%2, %1, [%3]	"
-
-		: "=&r" (__orig), "=&r" (__res), "=&r" (__ex_flag)
-		: "r" (&(count)->counter)
-		: "cc","memory" );
-
-	__orig |= __ex_flag;
-	if (unlikely(__orig != 0))
-		fail_fn(count);
-}
-
-/*
- * If the unlock was done on a contended lock, or if the unlock simply fails
- * then the mutex remains locked.
- */
-#define __mutex_slowpath_needs_to_unlock()	1
-
-/*
- * For __mutex_fastpath_trylock we use another construct which could be
- * described as a "single value cmpxchg".
- *
- * This provides the needed trylock semantics like cmpxchg would, but it is
- * lighter and less generic than a true cmpxchg implementation.
- */
-static inline int
-__mutex_fastpath_trylock(atomic_t *count, int (*fail_fn)(atomic_t *))
-{
-	int __ex_flag, __res, __orig;
-
-	__asm__ (
-
-		"1: ldrex	%0, [%3]	\n\t"
-		"subs		%1, %0, #1	\n\t"
-		"strexeq	%2, %1, [%3]	\n\t"
-		"movlt		%0, #0		\n\t"
-		"cmpeq		%2, #0		\n\t"
-		"bgt		1b		"
-
-		: "=&r" (__orig), "=&r" (__res), "=&r" (__ex_flag)
-		: "r" (&count->counter)
-		: "cc", "memory" );
-
-	return __orig;
-}
-
-#endif
+#include <asm-generic/mutex-xchg.h>
 #endif

[ 07/44] ARM: 7477/1: vfp: Always save VFP state in vfp_pm_suspend on UP

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>

commit 24b35521b8ddf088531258f06f681bb7b227bf47 upstream.

vfp_pm_suspend should save the VFP state in suspend after
any lazy context switch.  If it only saves when the VFP is enabled,
the state can get lost when, on a UP system:
  Thread 1 uses the VFP
  Context switch occurs to thread 2, VFP is disabled but the
     VFP context is not saved
  Thread 2 initiates suspend
  vfp_pm_suspend is called with the VFP disabled, and the unsaved
     VFP context of Thread 1 in the registers

Modify vfp_pm_suspend to save the VFP context whenever
vfp_current_hw_state is not NULL.

Includes a fix from Ido Yariv <ido@wizery.com>, who pointed out that on
SMP systems, the state pointer can be pointing to a freed task struct if
a task exited on another cpu, fixed by using #ifndef CONFIG_SMP in the
new if clause.

Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Cc: Barry Song <bs14@csr.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Ido Yariv <ido@wizery.com>
Cc: Daniel Drake <dsd@laptop.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
+++ b/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
@@ -412,6 +412,12 @@ static int vfp_pm_suspend(void)
 
 		/* disable, just in case */
 		fmxr(FPEXC, fmrx(FPEXC) & ~FPEXC_EN);
+	} else if (vfp_current_hw_state[ti->cpu]) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
+		fmxr(FPEXC, fpexc | FPEXC_EN);
+		vfp_save_state(vfp_current_hw_state[ti->cpu], fpexc);
+		fmxr(FPEXC, fpexc);
+#endif
 	}
 
 	/* clear any information we had about last context state */

[ 08/44] ARM: 7478/1: errata: extend workaround for erratum #720789

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

commit 5a783cbc48367cfc7b65afc75430953dfe60098f upstream.

Commit cdf357f1 ("ARM: 6299/1: errata: TLBIASIDIS and TLBIMVAIS
operations can broadcast a faulty ASID") replaced by-ASID TLB flushing
operations with all-ASID variants to workaround A9 erratum #720789.

This patch extends the workaround to include the tlb_range operations,
which were overlooked by the original patch.

Tested-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/mm/tlb-v7.S |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v7.S
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v7.S
@@ -38,11 +38,19 @@ ENTRY(v7wbi_flush_user_tlb_range)
 	dsb
 	mov	r0, r0, lsr #PAGE_SHIFT		@ align address
 	mov	r1, r1, lsr #PAGE_SHIFT
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_ERRATA_720789
+	mov	r3, #0
+#else
 	asid	r3, r3				@ mask ASID
+#endif
 	orr	r0, r3, r0, lsl #PAGE_SHIFT	@ Create initial MVA
 	mov	r1, r1, lsl #PAGE_SHIFT
 1:
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_ERRATA_720789
+	ALT_SMP(mcr	p15, 0, r0, c8, c3, 3)	@ TLB invalidate U MVA all ASID (shareable)
+#else
 	ALT_SMP(mcr	p15, 0, r0, c8, c3, 1)	@ TLB invalidate U MVA (shareable)
+#endif
 	ALT_UP(mcr	p15, 0, r0, c8, c7, 1)	@ TLB invalidate U MVA
 
 	add	r0, r0, #PAGE_SZ
@@ -70,7 +78,11 @@ ENTRY(v7wbi_flush_kern_tlb_range)
 	mov	r0, r0, lsl #PAGE_SHIFT
 	mov	r1, r1, lsl #PAGE_SHIFT
 1:
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_ERRATA_720789
+	ALT_SMP(mcr	p15, 0, r0, c8, c3, 3)	@ TLB invalidate U MVA all ASID (shareable)
+#else
 	ALT_SMP(mcr	p15, 0, r0, c8, c3, 1)	@ TLB invalidate U MVA (shareable)
+#endif
 	ALT_UP(mcr	p15, 0, r0, c8, c7, 1)	@ TLB invalidate U MVA
 	add	r0, r0, #PAGE_SZ
 	cmp	r0, r1

[ 09/44] ARM: 7479/1: mm: avoid NULL dereference when flushing gate_vma with VIVT caches

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

commit b74253f78400f9a4b42da84bb1de7540b88ce7c4 upstream.

The vivt_flush_cache_{range,page} functions check that the mm_struct
of the VMA being flushed has been active on the current CPU before
performing the cache maintenance.

The gate_vma has a NULL mm_struct pointer and, as such, will cause a
kernel fault if we try to flush it with the above operations. This
happens during ELF core dumps, which include the gate_vma as it may be
useful for debugging purposes.

This patch adds checks to the VIVT cache flushing functions so that VMAs
with a NULL mm_struct are flushed unconditionally (the vectors page may
be dirty if we use it to store the current TLS pointer).

Reported-by: Gilles Chanteperdrix <gilles.chanteperdrix@xenomai.org>
Tested-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -215,7 +215,9 @@ static inline void vivt_flush_cache_mm(s
 static inline void
 vivt_flush_cache_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
 {
-	if (cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), mm_cpumask(vma->vm_mm)))
+	struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
+
+	if (!mm || cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), mm_cpumask(mm)))
 		__cpuc_flush_user_range(start & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_ALIGN(end),
 					vma->vm_flags);
 }
@@ -223,7 +225,9 @@ vivt_flush_cache_range(struct vm_area_st
 static inline void
 vivt_flush_cache_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long user_addr, unsigned long pfn)
 {
-	if (cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), mm_cpumask(vma->vm_mm))) {
+	struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
+
+	if (!mm || cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), mm_cpumask(mm))) {
 		unsigned long addr = user_addr & PAGE_MASK;
 		__cpuc_flush_user_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE, vma->vm_flags);
 	}

[ 10/44] ALSA: hda - remove quirk for Dell Vostro 1015

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Henningsson <david.henningsson@canonical.com>

commit e9fc83cb2e5877801a255a37ddbc5be996ea8046 upstream.

This computer is confirmed working with model=auto on kernel 3.2.
Also, parsing fails with hda-emu with the current model.

Signed-off-by: David Henningsson <david.henningsson@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c
@@ -3089,7 +3089,6 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk cxt506
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x02d8, "Dell Vostro", CXT5066_DELL_VOSTRO),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x02f5, "Dell Vostro 320", CXT5066_IDEAPAD),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x0401, "Dell Vostro 1014", CXT5066_DELL_VOSTRO),
-	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x0402, "Dell Vostro", CXT5066_DELL_VOSTRO),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x0408, "Dell Inspiron One 19T", CXT5066_IDEAPAD),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x050f, "Dell Inspiron", CXT5066_IDEAPAD),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x0510, "Dell Vostro", CXT5066_IDEAPAD),

[ 11/44] mm: mmu_notifier: fix freed page still mapped in secondary MMU

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

commit 3ad3d901bbcfb15a5e4690e55350db0899095a68 upstream.

mmu_notifier_release() is called when the process is exiting.  It will
delete all the mmu notifiers.  But at this time the page belonging to the
process is still present in page tables and is present on the LRU list, so
this race will happen:

      CPU 0                 CPU 1
mmu_notifier_release:    try_to_unmap:
   hlist_del_init_rcu(&mn->hlist);
                            ptep_clear_flush_notify:
                                  mmu nofifler not found
                            free page  !!!!!!
                            /*
                             * At the point, the page has been
                             * freed, but it is still mapped in
                             * the secondary MMU.
                             */

  mn->ops->release(mn, mm);

Then the box is not stable and sometimes we can get this bug:

[  738.075923] BUG: Bad page state in process migrate-perf  pfn:03bec
[  738.075931] page:ffffea00000efb00 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x8076
[  738.075936] page flags: 0x20000000000014(referenced|dirty)

The same issue is present in mmu_notifier_unregister().

We can call ->release before deleting the notifier to ensure the page has
been unmapped from the secondary MMU before it is freed.

Signed-off-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 mm/mmu_notifier.c |   45 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

--- a/mm/mmu_notifier.c
+++ b/mm/mmu_notifier.c
@@ -33,6 +33,24 @@
 void __mmu_notifier_release(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	struct mmu_notifier *mn;
+	struct hlist_node *n;
+
+	/*
+	 * RCU here will block mmu_notifier_unregister until
+	 * ->release returns.
+	 */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(mn, n, &mm->mmu_notifier_mm->list, hlist)
+		/*
+		 * if ->release runs before mmu_notifier_unregister it
+		 * must be handled as it's the only way for the driver
+		 * to flush all existing sptes and stop the driver
+		 * from establishing any more sptes before all the
+		 * pages in the mm are freed.
+		 */
+		if (mn->ops->release)
+			mn->ops->release(mn, mm);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	spin_lock(&mm->mmu_notifier_mm->lock);
 	while (unlikely(!hlist_empty(&mm->mmu_notifier_mm->list))) {
@@ -46,23 +64,6 @@ void __mmu_notifier_release(struct mm_st
 		 * mmu_notifier_unregister to return.
 		 */
 		hlist_del_init_rcu(&mn->hlist);
-		/*
-		 * RCU here will block mmu_notifier_unregister until
-		 * ->release returns.
-		 */
-		rcu_read_lock();
-		spin_unlock(&mm->mmu_notifier_mm->lock);
-		/*
-		 * if ->release runs before mmu_notifier_unregister it
-		 * must be handled as it's the only way for the driver
-		 * to flush all existing sptes and stop the driver
-		 * from establishing any more sptes before all the
-		 * pages in the mm are freed.
-		 */
-		if (mn->ops->release)
-			mn->ops->release(mn, mm);
-		rcu_read_unlock();
-		spin_lock(&mm->mmu_notifier_mm->lock);
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&mm->mmu_notifier_mm->lock);
 
@@ -284,16 +285,13 @@ void mmu_notifier_unregister(struct mmu_
 {
 	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&mm->mm_count) <= 0);
 
-	spin_lock(&mm->mmu_notifier_mm->lock);
 	if (!hlist_unhashed(&mn->hlist)) {
-		hlist_del_rcu(&mn->hlist);
-
 		/*
 		 * RCU here will force exit_mmap to wait ->release to finish
 		 * before freeing the pages.
 		 */
 		rcu_read_lock();
-		spin_unlock(&mm->mmu_notifier_mm->lock);
+
 		/*
 		 * exit_mmap will block in mmu_notifier_release to
 		 * guarantee ->release is called before freeing the
@@ -302,8 +300,11 @@ void mmu_notifier_unregister(struct mmu_
 		if (mn->ops->release)
 			mn->ops->release(mn, mm);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
-	} else
+
+		spin_lock(&mm->mmu_notifier_mm->lock);
+		hlist_del_rcu(&mn->hlist);
 		spin_unlock(&mm->mmu_notifier_mm->lock);
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Wait any running method to finish, of course including

[ 12/44] mac80211: cancel mesh path timer

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

commit dd4c9260e7f23f2e951cbfb2726e468c6d30306c upstream.

The mesh path timer needs to be canceled when
leaving the mesh as otherwise it could fire
after the interface has been removed already.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/mac80211/mesh.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/mac80211/mesh.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mesh.c
@@ -490,6 +490,7 @@ void ieee80211_stop_mesh(struct ieee8021
 
 	del_timer_sync(&sdata->u.mesh.housekeeping_timer);
 	del_timer_sync(&sdata->u.mesh.mesh_path_root_timer);
+	del_timer_sync(&sdata->u.mesh.mesh_path_timer);
 	/*
 	 * If the timer fired while we waited for it, it will have
 	 * requeued the work. Now the work will be running again

[ 13/44] x86, nops: Missing break resulting in incorrect selection on Intel

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>

commit d6250a3f12edb3a86db9598ffeca3de8b4a219e9 upstream.

The Intel case falls through into the generic case which then changes
the values.  For cases like the P6 it doesn't do the right thing so
this seems to be a screwup.

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-lww2uirad4skzjlmrm0vru8o@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ void __init arch_init_ideal_nops(void)
 			ideal_nops = intel_nops;
 #endif
 		}
-
+		break;
 	default:
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 		ideal_nops = k8_nops;

[ 14/44] random: Add support for architectural random hooks

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>

commit 63d77173266c1791f1553e9e8ccea65dc87c4485 upstream.

Add support for architecture-specific hooks into the kernel-directed
random number generator interfaces.  This patchset does not use the
architecture random number generator interfaces for the
userspace-directed interfaces (/dev/random and /dev/urandom), thus
eliminating the need to distinguish between them based on a pool
pointer.

Changes in version 3:
- Moved the hooks from extract_entropy() to get_random_bytes().
- Changes the hooks to inlines.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c  |   23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
 include/linux/random.h |   13 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -932,7 +932,21 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(stru
  */
 void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
-	extract_entropy(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes, 0, 0);
+	char *p = buf;
+
+	while (nbytes) {
+		unsigned long v;
+		int chunk = min(nbytes, (int)sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
+			break;
+
+		memcpy(buf, &v, chunk);
+		p += chunk;
+		nbytes -= chunk;
+	}
+
+	extract_entropy(&nonblocking_pool, p, nbytes, 0, 0);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 
@@ -1318,9 +1332,14 @@ late_initcall(random_int_secret_init);
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash);
 unsigned int get_random_int(void)
 {
-	__u32 *hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
+	__u32 *hash;
 	unsigned int ret;
 
+	if (arch_get_random_int(&ret))
+		return ret;
+
+	hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
+
 	hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + get_cycles();
 	md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret);
 	ret = hash[0];
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -91,6 +91,19 @@ static inline void prandom32_seed(struct
 	state->s3 = __seed(i, 15);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
+# include <asm/archrandom.h>
+#else
+static inline int arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __KERNEL___ */
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */

[ 15/44] fix typo/thinko in get_random_bytes()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>

commit bd29e568a4cb6465f6e5ec7c1c1f3ae7d99cbec1 upstream.

If there is an architecture-specific random number generator we use it
to acquire randomness one "long" at a time.  We should put these random
words into consecutive words in the result buffer - not just overwrite
the first word again and again.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nby
 		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
 			break;
 
-		memcpy(buf, &v, chunk);
+		memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
 		p += chunk;
 		nbytes -= chunk;
 	}

[ 16/44] random: Use arch_get_random_int instead of cycle counter if avail

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit cf833d0b9937874b50ef2867c4e8badfd64948ce upstream.

We still don't use rdrand in /dev/random, which just seems stupid. We
accept the *cycle*counter* as a random input, but we don't accept
rdrand? That's just broken.

Sure, people can do things in user space (write to /dev/random, use
rdrand in addition to /dev/random themselves etc etc), but that
*still* seems to be a particularly stupid reason for saying "we
shouldn't bother to try to do better in /dev/random".

And even if somebody really doesn't trust rdrand as a source of random
bytes, it seems singularly stupid to trust the cycle counter *more*.

So I'd suggest the attached patch. I'm not going to even bother
arguing that we should add more bits to the entropy estimate, because
that's not the point - I don't care if /dev/random fills up slowly or
not, I think it's just stupid to not use the bits we can get from
rdrand and mix them into the strong randomness pool.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFwn59N1=m651QAyTy-1gO1noGbK18zwKDwvwqnravA84A@mail.gmail.com
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -624,8 +624,8 @@ static struct timer_rand_state input_tim
 static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
 {
 	struct {
-		cycles_t cycles;
 		long jiffies;
+		unsigned cycles;
 		unsigned num;
 	} sample;
 	long delta, delta2, delta3;
@@ -637,7 +637,11 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct
 		goto out;
 
 	sample.jiffies = jiffies;
-	sample.cycles = get_cycles();
+
+	/* Use arch random value, fall back to cycles */
+	if (!arch_get_random_int(&sample.cycles))
+		sample.cycles = get_cycles();
+
 	sample.num = num;
 	mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &sample, sizeof(sample));
 

[ 17/44] random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit 3e88bdff1c65145f7ba297ccec69c774afe4c785 upstream.

If there is an architecture-specific random number generator (such as
RDRAND for Intel architectures), use it to initialize /dev/random's
entropy stores.  Even in the worst case, if RDRAND is something like
AES(NSA_KEY, counter++), it won't hurt, and it will definitely help
against any other adversaries.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -965,6 +965,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
  */
 static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
 {
+	int i;
 	ktime_t now;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
@@ -974,6 +975,11 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy
 
 	now = ktime_get_real();
 	mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
+	for (i = r->poolinfo->poolwords; i; i--) {
+		if (!arch_get_random_long(&flags))
+			break;
+		mix_pool_bytes(r, &flags, sizeof(flags));
+	}
 	mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
 }
 

[ 18/44] random: Adjust the number of loops when initializing

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>

commit 2dac8e54f988ab58525505d7ef982493374433c3 upstream.

When we are initializing using arch_get_random_long() we only need to
loop enough times to touch all the bytes in the buffer; using
poolwords for that does twice the number of operations necessary on a
64-bit machine, since in the random number generator code "word" means
32 bits.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy
 
 	now = ktime_get_real();
 	mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
-	for (i = r->poolinfo->poolwords; i; i--) {
+	for (i = r->poolinfo->POOLBYTES; i > 0; i -= sizeof flags) {
 		if (!arch_get_random_long(&flags))
 			break;
 		mix_pool_bytes(r, &flags, sizeof(flags));

[ 19/44] drivers/char/random.c: fix boot id uniqueness race

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>

commit 44e4360fa3384850d65dd36fb4e6e5f2f112709b upstream.

/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id can be read concurrently by userspace
processes.  If two (or more) user-space processes concurrently read
boot_id when sysctl_bootid is not yet assigned, a race can occur making
boot_id differ between the reads.  Because the whole point of the boot id
is to be unique across a kernel execution, fix this by protecting this
operation with a spinlock.

Given that this operation is not frequently used, hitting the spinlock
on each call should not be an issue.

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c |   11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1260,10 +1260,15 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table
 	uuid = table->data;
 	if (!uuid) {
 		uuid = tmp_uuid;
-		uuid[8] = 0;
-	}
-	if (uuid[8] == 0)
 		generate_random_uuid(uuid);
+	} else {
+		static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bootid_spinlock);
+
+		spin_lock(&bootid_spinlock);
+		if (!uuid[8])
+			generate_random_uuid(uuid);
+		spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock);
+	}
 
 	sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
 

[ 20/44] random: make add_interrupt_randomness() do something sane

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit 775f4b297b780601e61787b766f306ed3e1d23eb upstream.

We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various
reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the
CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy
from a somewhat externally controllable source.

This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition
to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first.
During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu
pool.  Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is
initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool.  This
assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as
possible.

(Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by
tytso.)

Tested-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Nadia Heninger <nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu>
Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric <zakir@umich.edu>
Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman <jhalderm@umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c     |  103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 drivers/mfd/ab3100-core.c |    2 
 include/linux/random.h    |    2 
 kernel/irq/handle.c       |    7 +--
 4 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -127,19 +127,15 @@
  *
  * 	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
  *                                unsigned int value);
- * 	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
+ *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
  * 	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
  *
  * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as
  * the event type information from the hardware.
  *
- * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the inter-interrupt timing as random
- * inputs to the entropy pool.  Note that not all interrupts are good
- * sources of randomness!  For example, the timer interrupts is not a
- * good choice, because the periodicity of the interrupts is too
- * regular, and hence predictable to an attacker.  Network Interface
- * Controller interrupts are a better measure, since the timing of the
- * NIC interrupts are more unpredictable.
+ * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
+ * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
+ * as inputs, it feeds the randomness roughly once a second.
  *
  * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
  * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
@@ -248,6 +244,7 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/cryptohash.h>
 #include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_HARDIRQS
 # include <linux/irq.h>
@@ -256,6 +253,7 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/irq.h>
+#include <asm/irq_regs.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 
 /*
@@ -421,7 +419,9 @@ struct entropy_store {
 	spinlock_t lock;
 	unsigned add_ptr;
 	int entropy_count;
+	int entropy_total;
 	int input_rotate;
+	unsigned int initialized:1;
 	__u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
 };
 
@@ -454,6 +454,10 @@ static struct entropy_store nonblocking_
 	.pool = nonblocking_pool_data
 };
 
+static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
+	0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
+	0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
+
 /*
  * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool".  It does not
  * update the entropy estimate.  The caller should call
@@ -467,9 +471,6 @@ static struct entropy_store nonblocking_
 static void mix_pool_bytes_extract(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
 				   int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
 {
-	static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
-		0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
-		0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
 	unsigned long i, j, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
 	int input_rotate;
 	int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
@@ -528,6 +529,36 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entrop
        mix_pool_bytes_extract(r, in, bytes, NULL);
 }
 
+struct fast_pool {
+	__u32		pool[4];
+	unsigned long	last;
+	unsigned short	count;
+	unsigned char	rotate;
+	unsigned char	last_timer_intr;
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness
+ * collector.  It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any
+ * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller.
+ */
+static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f, const void *in, int nbytes)
+{
+	const char	*bytes = in;
+	__u32		w;
+	unsigned	i = f->count;
+	unsigned	input_rotate = f->rotate;
+
+	while (nbytes--) {
+		w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate & 31) ^ f->pool[i & 3] ^
+			f->pool[(i + 1) & 3];
+		f->pool[i & 3] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
+		input_rotate += (i++ & 3) ? 7 : 14;
+	}
+	f->count = i;
+	f->rotate = input_rotate;
+}
+
 /*
  * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy
  */
@@ -551,6 +582,12 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct e
 		entropy_count = r->poolinfo->POOLBITS;
 	r->entropy_count = entropy_count;
 
+	if (!r->initialized && nbits > 0) {
+		r->entropy_total += nbits;
+		if (r->entropy_total > 128)
+			r->initialized = 1;
+	}
+
 	/* should we wake readers? */
 	if (r == &input_pool && entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh) {
 		wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
@@ -700,17 +737,48 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int t
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
 
-void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness);
+
+void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
 {
-	struct timer_rand_state *state;
+	struct entropy_store	*r;
+	struct fast_pool	*fast_pool = &__get_cpu_var(irq_randomness);
+	struct pt_regs		*regs = get_irq_regs();
+	unsigned long		now = jiffies;
+	__u32			input[4], cycles = get_cycles();
+
+	input[0] = cycles ^ jiffies;
+	input[1] = irq;
+	if (regs) {
+		__u64 ip = instruction_pointer(regs);
+		input[2] = ip;
+		input[3] = ip >> 32;
+	}
 
-	state = get_timer_rand_state(irq);
+	fast_mix(fast_pool, input, sizeof(input));
 
-	if (state == NULL)
+	if ((fast_pool->count & 1023) &&
+	    !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
 		return;
 
-	DEBUG_ENT("irq event %d\n", irq);
-	add_timer_randomness(state, 0x100 + irq);
+	fast_pool->last = now;
+
+	r = nonblocking_pool.initialized ? &input_pool : &nonblocking_pool;
+	mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
+	/*
+	 * If we don't have a valid cycle counter, and we see
+	 * back-to-back timer interrupts, then skip giving credit for
+	 * any entropy.
+	 */
+	if (cycles == 0) {
+		if (irq_flags & __IRQF_TIMER) {
+			if (fast_pool->last_timer_intr)
+				return;
+			fast_pool->last_timer_intr = 1;
+		} else
+			fast_pool->last_timer_intr = 0;
+	}
+	credit_entropy_bits(r, 1);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
@@ -971,6 +1039,7 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
 	r->entropy_count = 0;
+	r->entropy_total = 0;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
 
 	now = ktime_get_real();
--- a/drivers/mfd/ab3100-core.c
+++ b/drivers/mfd/ab3100-core.c
@@ -408,8 +408,6 @@ static irqreturn_t ab3100_irq_handler(in
 	u32 fatevent;
 	int err;
 
-	add_interrupt_randomness(irq);
-
 	err = ab3100_get_register_page_interruptible(ab3100, AB3100_EVENTA1,
 				       event_regs, 3);
 	if (err)
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ extern void rand_initialize_irq(int irq)
 
 extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
 				 unsigned int value);
-extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
+extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
 
 extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16]);
--- a/kernel/irq/handle.c
+++ b/kernel/irq/handle.c
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ irqreturn_t
 handle_irq_event_percpu(struct irq_desc *desc, struct irqaction *action)
 {
 	irqreturn_t retval = IRQ_NONE;
-	unsigned int random = 0, irq = desc->irq_data.irq;
+	unsigned int flags = 0, irq = desc->irq_data.irq;
 
 	do {
 		irqreturn_t res;
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ handle_irq_event_percpu(struct irq_desc
 
 			/* Fall through to add to randomness */
 		case IRQ_HANDLED:
-			random |= action->flags;
+			flags |= action->flags;
 			break;
 
 		default:
@@ -156,8 +156,7 @@ handle_irq_event_percpu(struct irq_desc
 		action = action->next;
 	} while (action);
 
-	if (random & IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM)
-		add_interrupt_randomness(irq);
+	add_interrupt_randomness(irq, flags);
 
 	if (!noirqdebug)
 		note_interrupt(irq, desc, retval);

[ 21/44] random: use lockless techniques in the interrupt path

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit 902c098a3663de3fa18639efbb71b6080f0bcd3c upstream.

The real-time Linux folks don't like add_interrupt_randomness() taking
a spinlock since it is called in the low-level interrupt routine.
This also allows us to reduce the overhead in the fast path, for the
random driver, which is the interrupt collection path.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c |   78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -418,9 +418,9 @@ struct entropy_store {
 	/* read-write data: */
 	spinlock_t lock;
 	unsigned add_ptr;
+	unsigned input_rotate;
 	int entropy_count;
 	int entropy_total;
-	int input_rotate;
 	unsigned int initialized:1;
 	__u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
 };
@@ -468,26 +468,24 @@ static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
  * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
  * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
  */
-static void mix_pool_bytes_extract(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
-				   int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
+static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+			     int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
 {
 	unsigned long i, j, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
 	int input_rotate;
 	int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
 	const char *bytes = in;
 	__u32 w;
-	unsigned long flags;
 
-	/* Taps are constant, so we can load them without holding r->lock.  */
 	tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
 	tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2;
 	tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3;
 	tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
 	tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
-	input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
-	i = r->add_ptr;
+	smp_rmb();
+	input_rotate = ACCESS_ONCE(r->input_rotate);
+	i = ACCESS_ONCE(r->add_ptr);
 
 	/* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */
 	while (nbytes--) {
@@ -514,19 +512,23 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes_extract(struc
 		input_rotate += i ? 7 : 14;
 	}
 
-	r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
-	r->add_ptr = i;
+	ACCESS_ONCE(r->input_rotate) = input_rotate;
+	ACCESS_ONCE(r->add_ptr) = i;
+	smp_wmb();
 
 	if (out)
 		for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
 			((__u32 *)out)[j] = r->pool[(i - j) & wordmask];
-
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
 }
 
-static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, int bytes)
+static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+			     int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
 {
-       mix_pool_bytes_extract(r, in, bytes, NULL);
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+	__mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes, out);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
 }
 
 struct fast_pool {
@@ -564,23 +566,22 @@ static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f
  */
 static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
 {
-	unsigned long flags;
-	int entropy_count;
+	int entropy_count, orig;
 
 	if (!nbits)
 		return;
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
-
 	DEBUG_ENT("added %d entropy credits to %s\n", nbits, r->name);
-	entropy_count = r->entropy_count;
+retry:
+	entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
 	entropy_count += nbits;
 	if (entropy_count < 0) {
 		DEBUG_ENT("negative entropy/overflow\n");
 		entropy_count = 0;
 	} else if (entropy_count > r->poolinfo->POOLBITS)
 		entropy_count = r->poolinfo->POOLBITS;
-	r->entropy_count = entropy_count;
+	if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
+		goto retry;
 
 	if (!r->initialized && nbits > 0) {
 		r->entropy_total += nbits;
@@ -593,7 +594,6 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct e
 		wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
 		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
 	}
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
 }
 
 /*********************************************************************
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct
 		sample.cycles = get_cycles();
 
 	sample.num = num;
-	mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &sample, sizeof(sample));
+	mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &sample, sizeof(sample), NULL);
 
 	/*
 	 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
@@ -764,7 +764,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, i
 	fast_pool->last = now;
 
 	r = nonblocking_pool.initialized ? &input_pool : &nonblocking_pool;
-	mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
+	__mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool), NULL);
 	/*
 	 * If we don't have a valid cycle counter, and we see
 	 * back-to-back timer interrupts, then skip giving credit for
@@ -829,7 +829,7 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct e
 
 		bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
 					random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8, rsvd);
-		mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);
+		mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes, NULL);
 		credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
 	}
 }
@@ -890,9 +890,11 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_s
 	int i;
 	__u32 hash[5], workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
 	__u8 extract[64];
+	unsigned long flags;
 
 	/* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */
 	sha_init(hash);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
 	for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16)
 		sha_transform(hash, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace);
 
@@ -905,7 +907,8 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_s
 	 * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the
 	 * hash.
 	 */
-	mix_pool_bytes_extract(r, hash, sizeof(hash), extract);
+	__mix_pool_bytes(r, hash, sizeof(hash), extract);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
 
 	/*
 	 * To avoid duplicates, we atomically extract a portion of the
@@ -928,11 +931,10 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_s
 }
 
 static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
-			       size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved)
+				 size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved)
 {
 	ssize_t ret = 0, i;
 	__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
-	unsigned long flags;
 
 	xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
 	nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved);
@@ -941,6 +943,8 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct en
 		extract_buf(r, tmp);
 
 		if (fips_enabled) {
+			unsigned long flags;
+
 			spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
 			if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE))
 				panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n");
@@ -1034,22 +1038,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
 {
 	int i;
-	ktime_t now;
-	unsigned long flags;
+	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
+	unsigned long rv;
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
 	r->entropy_count = 0;
 	r->entropy_total = 0;
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-
-	now = ktime_get_real();
-	mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
-	for (i = r->poolinfo->POOLBYTES; i > 0; i -= sizeof flags) {
-		if (!arch_get_random_long(&flags))
+	mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now), NULL);
+	for (i = r->poolinfo->POOLBYTES; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
+		if (!arch_get_random_long(&rv))
 			break;
-		mix_pool_bytes(r, &flags, sizeof(flags));
+		mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv), NULL);
 	}
-	mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+	mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())), NULL);
 }
 
 static int rand_initialize(void)
@@ -1186,7 +1186,7 @@ write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, cons
 		count -= bytes;
 		p += bytes;
 
-		mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes);
+		mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes, NULL);
 		cond_resched();
 	}
 

[ 22/44] random: create add_device_randomness() interface

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit a2080a67abe9e314f9e9c2cc3a4a176e8a8f8793 upstream.

Add a new interface, add_device_randomness() for adding data to the
random pool that is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly
even per boot).  This would be things like MAC addresses or serial
numbers, or the read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual
entropy to the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values
for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little
entropy available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).

[ Modified by tytso to mix in a timestamp, since there may be some
  variability caused by the time needed to detect/configure the hardware
  in question. ]

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c  |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/random.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -125,11 +125,20 @@
  * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
  * from the devices are:
  *
+ *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
  * 	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
  *                                unsigned int value);
  *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
  * 	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
  *
+ * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that
+ * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
+ * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
+ * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the
+ * pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
+ * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
+ * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
+ *
  * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as
  * the event type information from the hardware.
  *
@@ -646,6 +655,25 @@ static void set_timer_rand_state(unsigne
 }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input and nonblocking
+ * pools to help initialize them to unique values.
+ *
+ * None of this adds any entropy, it is meant to avoid the
+ * problem of the nonblocking pool having similar initial state
+ * across largely identical devices.
+ */
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
+{
+	unsigned long time = get_cycles() ^ jiffies;
+
+	mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size, NULL);
+	mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time), NULL);
+	mix_pool_bytes(&nonblocking_pool, buf, size, NULL);
+	mix_pool_bytes(&nonblocking_pool, &time, sizeof(time), NULL);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
+
 static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state;
 
 /*
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct rnd_state {
 
 extern void rand_initialize_irq(int irq);
 
+extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
 extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
 				 unsigned int value);
 extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);

[ 23/44] usb: feed USB device information to the /dev/random driver

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit b04b3156a20d395a7faa8eed98698d1e17a36000 upstream.

Send the USB device's serial, product, and manufacturer strings to the
/dev/random driver to help seed its pools.

Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/core/hub.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/freezer.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
@@ -1902,6 +1903,14 @@ int usb_new_device(struct usb_device *ud
 	/* Tell the world! */
 	announce_device(udev);
 
+	if (udev->serial)
+		add_device_randomness(udev->serial, strlen(udev->serial));
+	if (udev->product)
+		add_device_randomness(udev->product, strlen(udev->product));
+	if (udev->manufacturer)
+		add_device_randomness(udev->manufacturer,
+				      strlen(udev->manufacturer));
+
 	device_enable_async_suspend(&udev->dev);
 	/* Register the device.  The device driver is responsible
 	 * for configuring the device and invoking the add-device

[ 24/44] net: feed /dev/random with the MAC address when registering a device

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit 7bf2357524408b97fec58344caf7397f8140c3fd upstream.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/core/dev.c       |    3 +++
 net/core/rtnetlink.c |    1 +
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -1163,6 +1163,7 @@ static int __dev_open(struct net_device
 		net_dmaengine_get();
 		dev_set_rx_mode(dev);
 		dev_activate(dev);
+		add_device_randomness(dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
 	}
 
 	return ret;
@@ -4730,6 +4731,7 @@ int dev_set_mac_address(struct net_devic
 	err = ops->ndo_set_mac_address(dev, sa);
 	if (!err)
 		call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_CHANGEADDR, dev);
+	add_device_randomness(dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
 	return err;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dev_set_mac_address);
@@ -5507,6 +5509,7 @@ int register_netdevice(struct net_device
 	dev_init_scheduler(dev);
 	dev_hold(dev);
 	list_netdevice(dev);
+	add_device_randomness(dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
 
 	/* Notify protocols, that a new device appeared. */
 	ret = call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_REGISTER, dev);
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -1304,6 +1304,7 @@ static int do_setlink(struct net_device
 			goto errout;
 		send_addr_notify = 1;
 		modified = 1;
+		add_device_randomness(dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
 	}
 
 	if (tb[IFLA_MTU]) {

[ 25/44] random: use the arch-specific rng in xfer_secondary_pool

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit e6d4947b12e8ad947add1032dd754803c6004824 upstream.

If the CPU supports a hardware random number generator, use it in
xfer_secondary_pool(), where it will significantly improve things and
where we can afford it.

Also, remove the use of the arch-specific rng in
add_timer_randomness(), since the call is significantly slower than
get_cycles(), and we're much better off using it in
xfer_secondary_pool() anyway.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c |   25 ++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@
 #include <linux/cryptohash.h>
 #include <linux/fips.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/kmemcheck.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_HARDIRQS
 # include <linux/irq.h>
@@ -702,11 +703,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct
 		goto out;
 
 	sample.jiffies = jiffies;
-
-	/* Use arch random value, fall back to cycles */
-	if (!arch_get_random_int(&sample.cycles))
-		sample.cycles = get_cycles();
-
+	sample.cycles = get_cycles();
 	sample.num = num;
 	mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &sample, sizeof(sample), NULL);
 
@@ -838,7 +835,11 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct en
  */
 static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
 {
-	__u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
+	union {
+		__u32	tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
+		long	hwrand[4];
+	} u;
+	int	i;
 
 	if (r->pull && r->entropy_count < nbytes * 8 &&
 	    r->entropy_count < r->poolinfo->POOLBITS) {
@@ -849,17 +850,23 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct e
 		/* pull at least as many as BYTES as wakeup BITS */
 		bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8);
 		/* but never more than the buffer size */
-		bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp));
+		bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(u.tmp));
 
 		DEBUG_ENT("going to reseed %s with %d bits "
 			  "(%d of %d requested)\n",
 			  r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, r->entropy_count);
 
-		bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
+		bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, u.tmp, bytes,
 					random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8, rsvd);
-		mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes, NULL);
+		mix_pool_bytes(r, u.tmp, bytes, NULL);
 		credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
 	}
+	kmemcheck_mark_initialized(&u.hwrand, sizeof(u.hwrand));
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		if (arch_get_random_long(&u.hwrand[i]))
+			break;
+	if (i)
+		mix_pool_bytes(r, &u.hwrand, sizeof(u.hwrand), 0);
 }
 
 /*

[ 26/44] random: add new get_random_bytes_arch() function

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit c2557a303ab6712bb6e09447df828c557c710ac9 upstream.

Create a new function, get_random_bytes_arch() which will use the
architecture-specific hardware random number generator if it is
present.  Change get_random_bytes() to not use the HW RNG, even if it
is avaiable.

The reason for this is that the hw random number generator is fast (if
it is present), but it requires that we trust the hardware
manufacturer to have not put in a back door.  (For example, an
increasing counter encrypted by an AES key known to the NSA.)

It's unlikely that Intel (for example) was paid off by the US
Government to do this, but it's impossible for them to prove otherwise
  --- especially since Bull Mountain is documented to use AES as a
whitener.  Hence, the output of an evil, trojan-horse version of
RDRAND is statistically indistinguishable from an RDRAND implemented
to the specifications claimed by Intel.  Short of using a tunnelling
electronic microscope to reverse engineer an Ivy Bridge chip and
disassembling and analyzing the CPU microcode, there's no way for us
to tell for sure.

Since users of get_random_bytes() in the Linux kernel need to be able
to support hardware systems where the HW RNG is not present, most
time-sensitive users of this interface have already created their own
cryptographic RNG interface which uses get_random_bytes() as a seed.
So it's much better to use the HW RNG to improve the existing random
number generator, by mixing in any entropy returned by the HW RNG into
/dev/random's entropy pool, but to always _use_ /dev/random's entropy
pool.

This way we get almost of the benefits of the HW RNG without any
potential liabilities.  The only benefits we forgo is the
speed/performance enhancements --- and generic kernel code can't
depend on depend on get_random_bytes() having the speed of a HW RNG
anyway.

For those places that really want access to the arch-specific HW RNG,
if it is available, we provide get_random_bytes_arch().

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c  |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
 include/linux/random.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1038,11 +1038,28 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(stru
 
 /*
  * This function is the exported kernel interface.  It returns some
- * number of good random numbers, suitable for seeding TCP sequence
- * numbers, etc.
+ * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
+ * TCP sequence numbers, etc.  It does not use the hw random number
+ * generator, if available; use get_random_bytes_arch() for that.
  */
 void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
+	extract_entropy(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes, 0, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
+
+/*
+ * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
+ * number generator if it is available.  The arch-specific hw RNG will
+ * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it
+ * is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as
+ * opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a
+ * key known by the NSA).  So it's useful if we need the speed, but
+ * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to
+ * have put in a back door.
+ */
+void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
+{
 	char *p = buf;
 
 	while (nbytes) {
@@ -1057,9 +1074,11 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nby
 		nbytes -= chunk;
 	}
 
-	extract_entropy(&nonblocking_pool, p, nbytes, 0, 0);
+	if (nbytes)
+		extract_entropy(&nonblocking_pool, p, nbytes, 0, 0);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
+
 
 /*
  * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ extern void add_input_randomness(unsigne
 extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
 
 extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
 void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16]);
 
 #ifndef MODULE

[ 27/44] random: add tracepoints for easier debugging and verification

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit 00ce1db1a634746040ace24c09a4e3a7949a3145 upstream.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c         |   26 ++++++--
 include/trace/events/random.h |  134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -266,6 +266,9 @@
 #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/random.h>
+
 /*
  * Configuration information
  */
@@ -478,8 +481,8 @@ static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
  * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
  * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
  */
-static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
-			     int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
+static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+			    int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
 {
 	unsigned long i, j, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
 	int input_rotate;
@@ -531,13 +534,21 @@ static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entr
 			((__u32 *)out)[j] = r->pool[(i - j) & wordmask];
 }
 
-static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
 			     int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
 {
+	trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes, out);
+}
+
+static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+			   int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
+{
 	unsigned long flags;
 
+	trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
-	__mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes, out);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes, out);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
 }
 
@@ -585,6 +596,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct e
 retry:
 	entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
 	entropy_count += nbits;
+
 	if (entropy_count < 0) {
 		DEBUG_ENT("negative entropy/overflow\n");
 		entropy_count = 0;
@@ -599,6 +611,9 @@ retry:
 			r->initialized = 1;
 	}
 
+	trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits, entropy_count,
+				  r->entropy_total, _RET_IP_);
+
 	/* should we wake readers? */
 	if (r == &input_pool && entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh) {
 		wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
@@ -971,6 +986,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct en
 	ssize_t ret = 0, i;
 	__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
 
+	trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, r->entropy_count, _RET_IP_);
 	xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
 	nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved);
 
@@ -1005,6 +1021,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(stru
 	ssize_t ret = 0, i;
 	__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
 
+	trace_extract_entropy_user(r->name, nbytes, r->entropy_count, _RET_IP_);
 	xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
 	nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0);
 
@@ -1062,6 +1079,7 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, in
 {
 	char *p = buf;
 
+	trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
 	while (nbytes) {
 		unsigned long v;
 		int chunk = min(nbytes, (int)sizeof(unsigned long));
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/trace/events/random.h
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
+#define TRACE_SYSTEM random
+
+#if !defined(_TRACE_RANDOM_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
+#define _TRACE_RANDOM_H
+
+#include <linux/writeback.h>
+#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+
+DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes,
+	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+
+	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
+		__field(	  int,	bytes			)
+		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
+		__entry->bytes		= bytes;
+		__entry->IP		= IP;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("%s pool: bytes %d caller %pF",
+		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
+);
+
+DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes,
+	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+
+	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
+);
+
+DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock,
+	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+
+	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
+	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bits, int entropy_count,
+		 int entropy_total, unsigned long IP),
+
+	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bits, entropy_count, entropy_total, IP),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
+		__field(	  int,	bits			)
+		__field(	  int,	entropy_count		)
+		__field(	  int,	entropy_total		)
+		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
+		__entry->bits		= bits;
+		__entry->entropy_count	= entropy_count;
+		__entry->entropy_total	= entropy_total;
+		__entry->IP		= IP;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("%s pool: bits %d entropy_count %d entropy_total %d "
+		  "caller %pF", __entry->pool_name, __entry->bits,
+		  __entry->entropy_count, __entry->entropy_total,
+		  (void *)__entry->IP)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(get_random_bytes,
+	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
+
+	TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	  int,	nbytes			)
+		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->nbytes		= nbytes;
+		__entry->IP		= IP;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("nbytes %d caller %pF", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
+);
+
+DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
+	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
+		 unsigned long IP),
+
+	TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
+		__field(	  int,	nbytes			)
+		__field(	  int,	entropy_count		)
+		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
+		__entry->nbytes		= nbytes;
+		__entry->entropy_count	= entropy_count;
+		__entry->IP		= IP;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("%s pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pF",
+		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count,
+		  (void *)__entry->IP)
+);
+
+
+DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy,
+	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
+		 unsigned long IP),
+
+	TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
+);
+
+DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy_user,
+	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
+		 unsigned long IP),
+
+	TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
+);
+
+
+
+#endif /* _TRACE_RANDOM_H */
+
+/* This part must be outside protection */
+#include <trace/define_trace.h>

[ 28/44] MAINTAINERS: Theodore Tso is taking over the random driver

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit 330e0a01d54c2b8606c56816f99af6ebc58ec92c upstream.

Matt Mackall stepped down as the /dev/random driver maintainer last
year, so Theodore Ts'o is taking back the /dev/random driver.

Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 MAINTAINERS |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -5247,7 +5247,7 @@ F:	Documentation/blockdev/ramdisk.txt
 F:	drivers/block/brd.c
 
 RANDOM NUMBER DRIVER
-M:	Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
+M:	Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
 S:	Maintained
 F:	drivers/char/random.c
 

[ 29/44] rtc: wm831x: Feed the write counter into device_add_randomness()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Brown <broonie@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>

commit 9dccf55f4cb011a7552a8a2749a580662f5ed8ed upstream.

The tamper evident features of the RTC include the "write counter" which
is a pseudo-random number regenerated whenever we set the RTC. Since this
value is unpredictable it should provide some useful seeding to the random
number generator.

Only do this on boot since the goal is to seed the pool rather than add
useful entropy.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/rtc/rtc-wm831x.c |   24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/rtc/rtc-wm831x.c
+++ b/drivers/rtc/rtc-wm831x.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/mfd/wm831x/core.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
-
+#include <linux/random.h>
 
 /*
  * R16416 (0x4020) - RTC Write Counter
@@ -96,6 +96,26 @@ struct wm831x_rtc {
 	unsigned int alarm_enabled:1;
 };
 
+static void wm831x_rtc_add_randomness(struct wm831x *wm831x)
+{
+	int ret;
+	u16 reg;
+
+	/*
+	 * The write counter contains a pseudo-random number which is
+	 * regenerated every time we set the RTC so it should be a
+	 * useful per-system source of entropy.
+	 */
+	ret = wm831x_reg_read(wm831x, WM831X_RTC_WRITE_COUNTER);
+	if (ret >= 0) {
+		reg = ret;
+		add_device_randomness(&reg, sizeof(reg));
+	} else {
+		dev_warn(wm831x->dev, "Failed to read RTC write counter: %d\n",
+			 ret);
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * Read current time and date in RTC
  */
@@ -449,6 +469,8 @@ static int wm831x_rtc_probe(struct platf
 			alm_irq, ret);
 	}
 
+	wm831x_rtc_add_randomness(wm831x);
+
 	return 0;
 
 err:

[ 30/44] mfd: wm831x: Feed the device UUID into device_add_randomness()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Brown <broonie@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>

commit 27130f0cc3ab97560384da437e4621fc4e94f21c upstream.

wm831x devices contain a unique ID value. Feed this into the newly added
device_add_randomness() to add some per device seed data to the pool.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mfd/wm831x-otp.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/mfd/wm831x-otp.c
+++ b/drivers/mfd/wm831x-otp.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/bcd.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/mfd/core.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 
 #include <linux/mfd/wm831x/core.h>
 #include <linux/mfd/wm831x/otp.h>
@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(unique_id, 0444, wm83
 
 int wm831x_otp_init(struct wm831x *wm831x)
 {
+	char uuid[WM831X_UNIQUE_ID_LEN];
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = device_create_file(wm831x->dev, &dev_attr_unique_id);
@@ -73,6 +75,12 @@ int wm831x_otp_init(struct wm831x *wm831
 		dev_err(wm831x->dev, "Unique ID attribute not created: %d\n",
 			ret);
 
+	ret = wm831x_unique_id_read(wm831x, uuid);
+	if (ret == 0)
+		add_device_randomness(uuid, sizeof(uuid));
+	else
+		dev_err(wm831x->dev, "Failed to read UUID: %d\n", ret);
+
 	return ret;
 }
 

[ 31/44] random: remove rand_initialize_irq()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit c5857ccf293968348e5eb4ebedc68074de3dcda6 upstream.

With the new interrupt sampling system, we are no longer using the
timer_rand_state structure in the irq descriptor, so we can stop
initializing it now.

[ Merged in fixes from Sedat to find some last missing references to
  rand_initialize_irq() ]

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/ia64/kernel/irq_ia64.c |    1 
 drivers/char/random.c       |   55 --------------------------------------------
 drivers/mfd/ab3100-core.c   |    3 --
 drivers/mfd/ab3550-core.c   |    2 -
 include/linux/irqdesc.h     |    1 
 include/linux/random.h      |    2 -
 kernel/irq/manage.c         |   17 -------------
 7 files changed, 81 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/irq_ia64.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/irq_ia64.c
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
 #include <linux/ioport.h>
 #include <linux/kernel_stat.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
-#include <linux/random.h>	/* for rand_initialize_irq() */
 #include <linux/signal.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/threads.h>
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -634,43 +634,6 @@ struct timer_rand_state {
 	unsigned dont_count_entropy:1;
 };
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_GENERIC_HARDIRQS
-
-static struct timer_rand_state *irq_timer_state[NR_IRQS];
-
-static struct timer_rand_state *get_timer_rand_state(unsigned int irq)
-{
-	return irq_timer_state[irq];
-}
-
-static void set_timer_rand_state(unsigned int irq,
-				 struct timer_rand_state *state)
-{
-	irq_timer_state[irq] = state;
-}
-
-#else
-
-static struct timer_rand_state *get_timer_rand_state(unsigned int irq)
-{
-	struct irq_desc *desc;
-
-	desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
-
-	return desc->timer_rand_state;
-}
-
-static void set_timer_rand_state(unsigned int irq,
-				 struct timer_rand_state *state)
-{
-	struct irq_desc *desc;
-
-	desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
-
-	desc->timer_rand_state = state;
-}
-#endif
-
 /*
  * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input and nonblocking
  * pools to help initialize them to unique values.
@@ -1133,24 +1096,6 @@ static int rand_initialize(void)
 }
 module_init(rand_initialize);
 
-void rand_initialize_irq(int irq)
-{
-	struct timer_rand_state *state;
-
-	state = get_timer_rand_state(irq);
-
-	if (state)
-		return;
-
-	/*
-	 * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
-	 * source.
-	 */
-	state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (state)
-		set_timer_rand_state(irq, state);
-}
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
 void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
 {
--- a/drivers/mfd/ab3100-core.c
+++ b/drivers/mfd/ab3100-core.c
@@ -936,9 +936,6 @@ static int __devinit ab3100_probe(struct
 
 	err = request_threaded_irq(client->irq, NULL, ab3100_irq_handler,
 				IRQF_ONESHOT, "ab3100-core", ab3100);
-	/* This real unpredictable IRQ is of course sampled for entropy */
-	rand_initialize_irq(client->irq);
-
 	if (err)
 		goto exit_no_irq;
 
--- a/drivers/mfd/ab3550-core.c
+++ b/drivers/mfd/ab3550-core.c
@@ -1309,8 +1309,6 @@ static int __init ab3550_probe(struct i2
 
 	err = request_threaded_irq(client->irq, NULL, ab3550_irq_handler,
 		IRQF_ONESHOT, "ab3550-core", ab);
-	/* This real unpredictable IRQ is of course sampled for entropy */
-	rand_initialize_irq(client->irq);
 
 	if (err)
 		goto exit_no_irq;
--- a/include/linux/irqdesc.h
+++ b/include/linux/irqdesc.h
@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ struct timer_rand_state;
  */
 struct irq_desc {
 	struct irq_data		irq_data;
-	struct timer_rand_state *timer_rand_state;
 	unsigned int __percpu	*kstat_irqs;
 	irq_flow_handler_t	handle_irq;
 #ifdef CONFIG_IRQ_PREFLOW_FASTEOI
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -48,8 +48,6 @@ struct rnd_state {
 
 #ifdef __KERNEL__
 
-extern void rand_initialize_irq(int irq);
-
 extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
 extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
 				 unsigned int value);
--- a/kernel/irq/manage.c
+++ b/kernel/irq/manage.c
@@ -886,22 +886,6 @@ __setup_irq(unsigned int irq, struct irq
 
 	if (desc->irq_data.chip == &no_irq_chip)
 		return -ENOSYS;
-	/*
-	 * Some drivers like serial.c use request_irq() heavily,
-	 * so we have to be careful not to interfere with a
-	 * running system.
-	 */
-	if (new->flags & IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM) {
-		/*
-		 * This function might sleep, we want to call it first,
-		 * outside of the atomic block.
-		 * Yes, this might clear the entropy pool if the wrong
-		 * driver is attempted to be loaded, without actually
-		 * installing a new handler, but is this really a problem,
-		 * only the sysadmin is able to do this.
-		 */
-		rand_initialize_irq(irq);
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Check whether the interrupt nests into another interrupt
@@ -1325,7 +1309,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_irq);
  *	Flags:
  *
  *	IRQF_SHARED		Interrupt is shared
- *	IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM	The interrupt can be used for entropy
  *	IRQF_TRIGGER_*		Specify active edge(s) or level
  *
  */

[ 32/44] random: Add comment to random_initialize()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>

commit cbc96b7594b5691d61eba2db8b2ea723645be9ca upstream.

Many platforms have per-machine instance data (serial numbers,
asset tags, etc.) squirreled away in areas that are accessed
during early system bringup. Mixing this data into the random
pools has a very high value in providing better random data,
so we should allow (and even encourage) architecture code to
call add_device_randomness() from the setup_arch() paths.

However, this limits our options for internal structure of
the random driver since random_initialize() is not called
until long after setup_arch().

Add a big fat comment to rand_initialize() spelling out
this requirement.

Suggested-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1087,6 +1087,16 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy
 	mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())), NULL);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Note that setup_arch() may call add_device_randomness()
+ * long before we get here. This allows seeding of the pools
+ * with some platform dependent data very early in the boot
+ * process. But it limits our options here. We must use
+ * statically allocated structures that already have all
+ * initializations complete at compile time. We should also
+ * take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data
+ * we were given.
+ */
 static int rand_initialize(void)
 {
 	init_std_data(&input_pool);

[ 33/44] dmi: Feed DMI table to /dev/random driver

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>

commit d114a33387472555188f142ed8e98acdb8181c6d upstream.

Send the entire DMI (SMBIOS) table to the /dev/random driver to
help seed its pools.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/dmi.h>
 #include <linux/efi.h>
 #include <linux/bootmem.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 #include <asm/dmi.h>
 
 /*
@@ -111,6 +112,8 @@ static int __init dmi_walk_early(void (*
 
 	dmi_table(buf, dmi_len, dmi_num, decode, NULL);
 
+	add_device_randomness(buf, dmi_len);
+
 	dmi_iounmap(buf, dmi_len);
 	return 0;
 }

[ 34/44] random: mix in architectural randomness in extract_buf()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>

commit d2e7c96af1e54b507ae2a6a7dd2baf588417a7e5 upstream.

Mix in any architectural randomness in extract_buf() instead of
xfer_secondary_buf().  This allows us to mix in more architectural
randomness, and it also makes xfer_secondary_buf() faster, moving a
tiny bit of additional CPU overhead to process which is extracting the
randomness.

[ Commit description modified by tytso to remove an extended
  advertisement for the RDRAND instruction. ]

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: DJ Johnston <dj.johnston@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c |   56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -277,6 +277,8 @@
 #define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512
 #define EXTRACT_SIZE 10
 
+#define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long))
+
 /*
  * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on
  * /dev/random.  Should be enough to do a significant reseed.
@@ -813,11 +815,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct en
  */
 static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
 {
-	union {
-		__u32	tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
-		long	hwrand[4];
-	} u;
-	int	i;
+	__u32	tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
 
 	if (r->pull && r->entropy_count < nbytes * 8 &&
 	    r->entropy_count < r->poolinfo->POOLBITS) {
@@ -828,23 +826,17 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct e
 		/* pull at least as many as BYTES as wakeup BITS */
 		bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8);
 		/* but never more than the buffer size */
-		bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(u.tmp));
+		bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp));
 
 		DEBUG_ENT("going to reseed %s with %d bits "
 			  "(%d of %d requested)\n",
 			  r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, r->entropy_count);
 
-		bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, u.tmp, bytes,
+		bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
 					random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8, rsvd);
-		mix_pool_bytes(r, u.tmp, bytes, NULL);
+		mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes, NULL);
 		credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
 	}
-	kmemcheck_mark_initialized(&u.hwrand, sizeof(u.hwrand));
-	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
-		if (arch_get_random_long(&u.hwrand[i]))
-			break;
-	if (i)
-		mix_pool_bytes(r, &u.hwrand, sizeof(u.hwrand), 0);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -901,15 +893,19 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_sto
 static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
 {
 	int i;
-	__u32 hash[5], workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
+	union {
+		__u32 w[5];
+		unsigned long l[LONGS(EXTRACT_SIZE)];
+	} hash;
+	__u32 workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
 	__u8 extract[64];
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	/* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */
-	sha_init(hash);
+	sha_init(hash.w);
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
 	for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16)
-		sha_transform(hash, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace);
+		sha_transform(hash.w, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace);
 
 	/*
 	 * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking
@@ -920,14 +916,14 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_s
 	 * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the
 	 * hash.
 	 */
-	__mix_pool_bytes(r, hash, sizeof(hash), extract);
+	__mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w), extract);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
 
 	/*
 	 * To avoid duplicates, we atomically extract a portion of the
 	 * pool while mixing, and hash one final time.
 	 */
-	sha_transform(hash, extract, workspace);
+	sha_transform(hash.w, extract, workspace);
 	memset(extract, 0, sizeof(extract));
 	memset(workspace, 0, sizeof(workspace));
 
@@ -936,11 +932,23 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_s
 	 * pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back
 	 * twice as much data as we output.
 	 */
-	hash[0] ^= hash[3];
-	hash[1] ^= hash[4];
-	hash[2] ^= rol32(hash[2], 16);
-	memcpy(out, hash, EXTRACT_SIZE);
-	memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+	hash.w[0] ^= hash.w[3];
+	hash.w[1] ^= hash.w[4];
+	hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we have a architectural hardware random number
+	 * generator, mix that in, too.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < LONGS(EXTRACT_SIZE); i++) {
+		unsigned long v;
+		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
+			break;
+		hash.l[i] ^= v;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(out, &hash, EXTRACT_SIZE);
+	memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
 }
 
 static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,

[ 35/44] x86, microcode: microcode_core.c simple_strtoul cleanup

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuah Khan <shuahkhan@gmail.com>

commit e826abd523913f63eb03b59746ffb16153c53dc4 upstream.

Change reload_for_cpu() in kernel/microcode_core.c to call kstrtoul()
instead of calling obsoleted simple_strtoul().

Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkhan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1336324264.2897.9.camel@lorien2
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@hmh.eng.br>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/microcode_core.c |    9 ++++-----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/microcode_core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/microcode_core.c
@@ -298,12 +298,11 @@ static ssize_t reload_store(struct sys_d
 {
 	unsigned long val;
 	int cpu = dev->id;
-	int ret = 0;
-	char *end;
+	ssize_t ret = 0;
 
-	val = simple_strtoul(buf, &end, 0);
-	if (end == buf)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	ret = kstrtoul(buf, 0, &val);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	if (val == 1) {
 		get_online_cpus();

[ 36/44] x86, microcode: Sanitize per-cpu microcode reloading interface

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>

commit c9fc3f778a6a215ace14ee556067c73982b6d40f upstream.

Microcode reloading in a per-core manner is a very bad idea for both
major x86 vendors. And the thing is, we have such interface with which
we can end up with different microcode versions applied on different
cores of an otherwise homogeneous wrt (family,model,stepping) system.

So turn off the possibility of doing that per core and allow it only
system-wide.

This is a minimal fix which we'd like to see in stable too thus the
more-or-less arbitrary decision to allow system-wide reloading only on
the BSP:

$ echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/microcode/reload
...

and disable the interface on the other cores:

$ echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu23/microcode/reload
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument

Also, allowing the reload only from one CPU (the BSP in
that case) doesn't allow the reload procedure to degenerate
into an O(n^2) deal when triggering reloads from all
/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpuX/microcode/reload sysfs nodes
simultaneously.

A more generic fix will follow.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>
Cc: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@hmh.eng.br>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1340280437-7718-2-git-send-email-bp@amd64.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/microcode_core.c |   26 +++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/microcode_core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/microcode_core.c
@@ -297,19 +297,31 @@ static ssize_t reload_store(struct sys_d
 			    const char *buf, size_t size)
 {
 	unsigned long val;
-	int cpu = dev->id;
-	ssize_t ret = 0;
+	int cpu;
+	ssize_t ret = 0, tmp_ret;
+
+	/* allow reload only from the BSP */
+	if (boot_cpu_data.cpu_index != dev->id)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	ret = kstrtoul(buf, 0, &val);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	if (val == 1) {
-		get_online_cpus();
-		if (cpu_online(cpu))
-			ret = reload_for_cpu(cpu);
-		put_online_cpus();
+	if (val != 1)
+		return size;
+
+	get_online_cpus();
+	for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+		tmp_ret = reload_for_cpu(cpu);
+		if (tmp_ret != 0)
+			pr_warn("Error reloading microcode on CPU %d\n", cpu);
+
+		/* save retval of the first encountered reload error */
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = tmp_ret;
 	}
+	put_online_cpus();
 
 	if (!ret)
 		ret = size;

[ 37/44] mm: hugetlbfs: close race during teardown of hugetlbfs shared page tables

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>

commit d833352a4338dc31295ed832a30c9ccff5c7a183 upstream.

If a process creates a large hugetlbfs mapping that is eligible for page
table sharing and forks heavily with children some of whom fault and
others which destroy the mapping then it is possible for page tables to
get corrupted.  Some teardowns of the mapping encounter a "bad pmd" and
output a message to the kernel log.  The final teardown will trigger a
BUG_ON in mm/filemap.c.

This was reproduced in 3.4 but is known to have existed for a long time
and goes back at least as far as 2.6.37.  It was probably was introduced
in 2.6.20 by [39dde65c: shared page table for hugetlb page].  The messages
look like this;

[  ..........] Lots of bad pmd messages followed by this
[  127.164256] mm/memory.c:391: bad pmd ffff880412e04fe8(80000003de4000e7).
[  127.164257] mm/memory.c:391: bad pmd ffff880412e04ff0(80000003de6000e7).
[  127.164258] mm/memory.c:391: bad pmd ffff880412e04ff8(80000003de0000e7).
[  127.186778] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  127.186781] kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:134!
[  127.186782] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  127.186783] CPU 7
[  127.186784] Modules linked in: af_packet cpufreq_conservative cpufreq_userspace cpufreq_powersave acpi_cpufreq mperf ext3 jbd dm_mod coretemp crc32c_intel usb_storage ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel i2c_i801 r8169 mii uas sr_mod cdrom sg iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support shpchp serio_raw cryptd aes_x86_64 e1000e pci_hotplug dcdbas aes_generic container microcode ext4 mbcache jbd2 crc16 sd_mod crc_t10dif i915 drm_kms_helper drm i2c_algo_bit ehci_hcd ahci libahci usbcore rtc_cmos usb_common button i2c_core intel_agp video intel_gtt fan processor thermal thermal_sys hwmon ata_generic pata_atiixp libata scsi_mod
[  127.186801]
[  127.186802] Pid: 9017, comm: hugetlbfs-test Not tainted 3.4.0-autobuild #53 Dell Inc. OptiPlex 990/06D7TR
[  127.186804] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810ed6ce>]  [<ffffffff810ed6ce>] __delete_from_page_cache+0x15e/0x160
[  127.186809] RSP: 0000:ffff8804144b5c08  EFLAGS: 00010002
[  127.186810] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffea000a5c9000 RCX: 00000000ffffffc0
[  127.186811] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000009 RDI: ffff88042dfdad00
[  127.186812] RBP: ffff8804144b5c18 R08: 0000000000000009 R09: 0000000000000003
[  127.186813] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000000000000002d R12: ffff880412ff83d8
[  127.186814] R13: ffff880412ff83d8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880412ff83d8
[  127.186815] FS:  00007fe18ed2c700(0000) GS:ffff88042dce0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  127.186816] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[  127.186817] CR2: 00007fe340000503 CR3: 0000000417a14000 CR4: 00000000000407e0
[  127.186818] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  127.186819] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  127.186820] Process hugetlbfs-test (pid: 9017, threadinfo ffff8804144b4000, task ffff880417f803c0)
[  127.186821] Stack:
[  127.186822]  ffffea000a5c9000 0000000000000000 ffff8804144b5c48 ffffffff810ed83b
[  127.186824]  ffff8804144b5c48 000000000000138a 0000000000001387 ffff8804144b5c98
[  127.186825]  ffff8804144b5d48 ffffffff811bc925 ffff8804144b5cb8 0000000000000000
[  127.186827] Call Trace:
[  127.186829]  [<ffffffff810ed83b>] delete_from_page_cache+0x3b/0x80
[  127.186832]  [<ffffffff811bc925>] truncate_hugepages+0x115/0x220
[  127.186834]  [<ffffffff811bca43>] hugetlbfs_evict_inode+0x13/0x30
[  127.186837]  [<ffffffff811655c7>] evict+0xa7/0x1b0
[  127.186839]  [<ffffffff811657a3>] iput_final+0xd3/0x1f0
[  127.186840]  [<ffffffff811658f9>] iput+0x39/0x50
[  127.186842]  [<ffffffff81162708>] d_kill+0xf8/0x130
[  127.186843]  [<ffffffff81162812>] dput+0xd2/0x1a0
[  127.186845]  [<ffffffff8114e2d0>] __fput+0x170/0x230
[  127.186848]  [<ffffffff81236e0e>] ? rb_erase+0xce/0x150
[  127.186849]  [<ffffffff8114e3ad>] fput+0x1d/0x30
[  127.186851]  [<ffffffff81117db7>] remove_vma+0x37/0x80
[  127.186853]  [<ffffffff81119182>] do_munmap+0x2d2/0x360
[  127.186855]  [<ffffffff811cc639>] sys_shmdt+0xc9/0x170
[  127.186857]  [<ffffffff81410a39>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  127.186858] Code: 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 43 08 48 8b 00 48 8b 40 28 8b b0 40 03 00 00 85 f6 0f 88 df fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 e7 cb 05 00 e9 d2 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 55 83 e2 fd 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 30 48 89 5d d8 4c 89 65 e0
[  127.186868] RIP  [<ffffffff810ed6ce>] __delete_from_page_cache+0x15e/0x160
[  127.186870]  RSP <ffff8804144b5c08>
[  127.186871] ---[ end trace 7cbac5d1db69f426 ]---

The bug is a race and not always easy to reproduce.  To reproduce it I was
doing the following on a single socket I7-based machine with 16G of RAM.

$ hugeadm --pool-pages-max DEFAULT:13G
$ echo $((18*1048576*1024)) > /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
$ echo $((18*1048576*1024)) > /proc/sys/kernel/shmall
$ for i in `seq 1 9000`; do ./hugetlbfs-test; done

On my particular machine, it usually triggers within 10 minutes but
enabling debug options can change the timing such that it never hits.
Once the bug is triggered, the machine is in trouble and needs to be
rebooted.  The machine will respond but processes accessing proc like "ps
aux" will hang due to the BUG_ON.  shutdown will also hang and needs a
hard reset or a sysrq-b.

The basic problem is a race between page table sharing and teardown.  For
the most part page table sharing depends on i_mmap_mutex.  In some cases,
it is also taking the mm->page_table_lock for the PTE updates but with
shared page tables, it is the i_mmap_mutex that is more important.

Unfortunately it appears to be also insufficient. Consider the following
situation

Process A					Process B
---------					---------
hugetlb_fault					shmdt
  						LockWrite(mmap_sem)
    						  do_munmap
						    unmap_region
						      unmap_vmas
						        unmap_single_vma
						          unmap_hugepage_range
      						            Lock(i_mmap_mutex)
							    Lock(mm->page_table_lock)
							    huge_pmd_unshare/unmap tables <--- (1)
							    Unlock(mm->page_table_lock)
      						            Unlock(i_mmap_mutex)
  huge_pte_alloc				      ...
    Lock(i_mmap_mutex)				      ...
    vma_prio_walk, find svma, spte		      ...
    Lock(mm->page_table_lock)			      ...
    share spte					      ...
    Unlock(mm->page_table_lock)			      ...
    Unlock(i_mmap_mutex)			      ...
  hugetlb_no_page									  <--- (2)
						      free_pgtables
						        unlink_file_vma
							hugetlb_free_pgd_range
						    remove_vma_list

In this scenario, it is possible for Process A to share page tables with
Process B that is trying to tear them down.  The i_mmap_mutex on its own
does not prevent Process A walking Process B's page tables.  At (1) above,
the page tables are not shared yet so it unmaps the PMDs.  Process A sets
up page table sharing and at (2) faults a new entry.  Process B then trips
up on it in free_pgtables.

This patch fixes the problem by adding a new function
__unmap_hugepage_range_final that is only called when the VMA is about to
be destroyed.  This function clears VM_MAYSHARE during
unmap_hugepage_range() under the i_mmap_mutex.  This makes the VMA
ineligible for sharing and avoids the race.  Superficially this looks like
it would then be vunerable to truncate and madvise issues but hugetlbfs
has its own truncate handlers so does not use unmap_mapping_range() and
does not support madvise(DONTNEED).

This should be treated as a -stable candidate if it is merged.

Test program is as follows. The test case was mostly written by Michal
Hocko with a few minor changes to reproduce this bug.

==== CUT HERE ====

static size_t huge_page_size = (2UL << 20);
static size_t nr_huge_page_A = 512;
static size_t nr_huge_page_B = 5632;

unsigned int get_random(unsigned int max)
{
	struct timeval tv;

	gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
	srandom(tv.tv_usec);
	return random() % max;
}

static void play(void *addr, size_t size)
{
	unsigned char *start = addr,
		      *end = start + size,
		      *a;
	start += get_random(size/2);

	/* we could itterate on huge pages but let's give it more time. */
	for (a = start; a < end; a += 4096)
		*a = 0;
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	key_t key = IPC_PRIVATE;
	size_t sizeA = nr_huge_page_A * huge_page_size;
	size_t sizeB = nr_huge_page_B * huge_page_size;
	int shmidA, shmidB;
	void *addrA = NULL, *addrB = NULL;
	int nr_children = 300, n = 0;

	if ((shmidA = shmget(key, sizeA, IPC_CREAT|SHM_HUGETLB|0660)) == -1) {
		perror("shmget:");
		return 1;
	}

	if ((addrA = shmat(shmidA, addrA, SHM_R|SHM_W)) == (void *)-1UL) {
		perror("shmat");
		return 1;
	}
	if ((shmidB = shmget(key, sizeB, IPC_CREAT|SHM_HUGETLB|0660)) == -1) {
		perror("shmget:");
		return 1;
	}

	if ((addrB = shmat(shmidB, addrB, SHM_R|SHM_W)) == (void *)-1UL) {
		perror("shmat");
		return 1;
	}

fork_child:
	switch(fork()) {
		case 0:
			switch (n%3) {
			case 0:
				play(addrA, sizeA);
				break;
			case 1:
				play(addrB, sizeB);
				break;
			case 2:
				break;
			}
			break;
		case -1:
			perror("fork:");
			break;
		default:
			if (++n < nr_children)
				goto fork_child;
			play(addrA, sizeA);
			break;
	}
	shmdt(addrA);
	shmdt(addrB);
	do {
		wait(NULL);
	} while (--n > 0);
	shmctl(shmidA, IPC_RMID, NULL);
	shmctl(shmidB, IPC_RMID, NULL);
	return 0;
}

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: name the declaration's args, fix CONFIG_HUGETLBFS=n build]
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 mm/hugetlb.c |   25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/mm/hugetlb.c
+++ b/mm/hugetlb.c
@@ -2301,6 +2301,22 @@ void unmap_hugepage_range(struct vm_area
 {
 	mutex_lock(&vma->vm_file->f_mapping->i_mmap_mutex);
 	__unmap_hugepage_range(vma, start, end, ref_page);
+	/*
+	 * Clear this flag so that x86's huge_pmd_share page_table_shareable
+	 * test will fail on a vma being torn down, and not grab a page table
+	 * on its way out.  We're lucky that the flag has such an appropriate
+	 * name, and can in fact be safely cleared here. We could clear it
+	 * before the __unmap_hugepage_range above, but all that's necessary
+	 * is to clear it before releasing the i_mmap_mutex below.
+	 *
+	 * This works because in the contexts this is called, the VMA is
+	 * going to be destroyed. It is not vunerable to madvise(DONTNEED)
+	 * because madvise is not supported on hugetlbfs. The same applies
+	 * for direct IO. unmap_hugepage_range() is only being called just
+	 * before free_pgtables() so clearing VM_MAYSHARE will not cause
+	 * surprises later.
+	 */
+	vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYSHARE;
 	mutex_unlock(&vma->vm_file->f_mapping->i_mmap_mutex);
 }
 
@@ -2853,9 +2869,14 @@ void hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm
 		}
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
-	mutex_unlock(&vma->vm_file->f_mapping->i_mmap_mutex);
-
+	/*
+	 * Must flush TLB before releasing i_mmap_mutex: x86's huge_pmd_unshare
+	 * may have cleared our pud entry and done put_page on the page table:
+	 * once we release i_mmap_mutex, another task can do the final put_page
+	 * and that page table be reused and filled with junk.
+	 */
 	flush_tlb_range(vma, start, end);
+	mutex_unlock(&vma->vm_file->f_mapping->i_mmap_mutex);
 }
 
 int hugetlb_reserve_pages(struct inode *inode,

[ 38/44] ARM: mxs: Remove MMAP_MIN_ADDR setting from mxs_defconfig

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>

commit 3bed491c8d28329e34f8a31e3fe64d03f3a350f1 upstream.

The CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR was set to 65536 in mxs_defconfig,
this caused severe breakage of userland applications since the upper
limit for ARM is 32768. By default CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR is
set to 4096 and can also be changed via /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
if needed.

Quoting Russell King [1]:

"4096 is also fine for ARM too. There's not much point in having
defconfigs change it - that would just be pure noise in the config
files."

the CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR can be removed from the defconfig
altogether.

This problem was introduced by commit cde7c41 (ARM: configs: add
defconfig for mach-mxs).

[1] http://marc.info/?l=linux-arm-kernel&m=134401593807820&w=2

Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Wolfgang Denk <wd@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/configs/mxs_defconfig |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/arm/configs/mxs_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/configs/mxs_defconfig
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ CONFIG_NO_HZ=y
 CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS=y
 CONFIG_PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY=y
 CONFIG_AEABI=y
-CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536
 CONFIG_AUTO_ZRELADDR=y
 CONFIG_FPE_NWFPE=y
 CONFIG_NET=y

[ 39/44] ARM: pxa: remove irq_to_gpio from ezx-pcap driver

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

commit 59ee93a528b94ef4e81a08db252b0326feff171f upstream.

The irq_to_gpio function was removed from the pxa platform
in linux-3.2, and this driver has been broken since.

There is actually no in-tree user of this driver that adds
this platform device, but the driver can and does get enabled
on some platforms.

Without this patch, building ezx_defconfig results in:

drivers/mfd/ezx-pcap.c: In function 'pcap_isr_work':
drivers/mfd/ezx-pcap.c:205:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'irq_to_gpio' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Haojian Zhuang <haojian.zhuang@gmail.com>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Ribeiro <drwyrm@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mfd/ezx-pcap.c       |    2 +-
 include/linux/mfd/ezx-pcap.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/mfd/ezx-pcap.c
+++ b/drivers/mfd/ezx-pcap.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static void pcap_isr_work(struct work_st
 		}
 		local_irq_enable();
 		ezx_pcap_write(pcap, PCAP_REG_MSR, pcap->msr);
-	} while (gpio_get_value(irq_to_gpio(pcap->spi->irq)));
+	} while (gpio_get_value(pdata->gpio));
 }
 
 static void pcap_irq_handler(unsigned int irq, struct irq_desc *desc)
--- a/include/linux/mfd/ezx-pcap.h
+++ b/include/linux/mfd/ezx-pcap.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ struct pcap_subdev {
 struct pcap_platform_data {
 	unsigned int irq_base;
 	unsigned int config;
+	int gpio;
 	void (*init) (void *);	/* board specific init */
 	int num_subdevs;
 	struct pcap_subdev *subdevs;

[ 40/44] cfg80211: process pending events when unregistering net device

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Drake <dsd@laptop.org>

commit 1f6fc43e621167492ed4b7f3b4269c584c3d6ccc upstream.

libertas currently calls cfg80211_disconnected() when it is being
brought down. This causes an event to be allocated, but since the
wdev is already removed from the rdev by the time that the event
processing work executes, the event is never processed or freed.
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/95666

Fix this leak, and other possible situations, by processing the event
queue when a device is being unregistered. Thanks to Johannes Berg for
the suggestion.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Drake <dsd@laptop.org>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/wireless/core.c |    5 +++++
 net/wireless/core.h |    1 +
 net/wireless/util.c |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/wireless/core.c
+++ b/net/wireless/core.c
@@ -959,6 +959,11 @@ static int cfg80211_netdev_notifier_call
 		 */
 		synchronize_rcu();
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&wdev->list);
+		/*
+		 * Ensure that all events have been processed and
+		 * freed.
+		 */
+		cfg80211_process_wdev_events(wdev);
 		break;
 	case NETDEV_PRE_UP:
 		if (!(wdev->wiphy->interface_modes & BIT(wdev->iftype)))
--- a/net/wireless/core.h
+++ b/net/wireless/core.h
@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ int cfg80211_change_iface(struct cfg8021
 			  struct net_device *dev, enum nl80211_iftype ntype,
 			  u32 *flags, struct vif_params *params);
 void cfg80211_process_rdev_events(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev);
+void cfg80211_process_wdev_events(struct wireless_dev *wdev);
 
 int cfg80211_can_change_interface(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
 				  struct wireless_dev *wdev,
--- a/net/wireless/util.c
+++ b/net/wireless/util.c
@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ void cfg80211_upload_connect_keys(struct
 	wdev->connect_keys = NULL;
 }
 
-static void cfg80211_process_wdev_events(struct wireless_dev *wdev)
+void cfg80211_process_wdev_events(struct wireless_dev *wdev)
 {
 	struct cfg80211_event *ev;
 	unsigned long flags;

[ 41/44] cfg80211: fix interface combinations check for ADHOC(IBSS)

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------


From: Liang Li <liang.li@windriver.com>

partial of commit 8e8b41f9d8c8e63fc92f899ace8da91a490ac573 upstream.

As part of commit 463454b5dbd8 ("cfg80211: fix interface
combinations check"), this extra check was introduced:

       if ((all_iftypes & used_iftypes) != used_iftypes)
               goto cont;

However, most wireless NIC drivers did not advertise ADHOC in
wiphy.iface_combinations[i].limits[] and hence we'll get -EBUSY
when we bring up a ADHOC wlan with commands similar to:

 # iwconfig wlan0 mode ad-hoc && ifconfig wlan0 up

In commit 8e8b41f9d8c8e ("cfg80211: enforce lack of interface
combinations"), the change below fixes the issue:

       if (total == 1)
               return 0;

But it also introduces other dependencies for stable. For example,
a full cherry pick of 8e8b41f9d8c8e would introduce additional
regressions unless we also start cherry picking driver specific
fixes like the following:

  9b4760e  ath5k: add possible wiphy interface combinations
  1ae2fc2  mac80211_hwsim: advertise interface combinations
  20c8e8d  ath9k: add possible wiphy interface combinations

And the purpose of the 'if (total == 1)' is to cover the specific
use case (IBSS, adhoc) that was mentioned above. So we just pick
the specific part out from 8e8b41f9d8c8e here.

Doing so gives stable kernels a way to fix the change introduced
by 463454b5dbd8, without having to make cherry picks specific to
various NIC drivers.

Signed-off-by: Liang Li <liang.li@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/wireless/util.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/net/wireless/util.c
+++ b/net/wireless/util.c
@@ -975,6 +975,9 @@ int cfg80211_can_change_interface(struct
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&rdev->devlist_mtx);
 
+	if (total == 1)
+		return 0;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < rdev->wiphy.n_iface_combinations; i++) {
 		const struct ieee80211_iface_combination *c;
 		struct ieee80211_iface_limit *limits;

[ 42/44] e1000e: NIC goes up and immediately goes down

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tushar Dave <tushar.n.dave@intel.com>

commit b7ec70be01a87f2c85df3ae11046e74f9b67e323 upstream.

Found that commit d478eb44 was a bad commit.
If the link partner is transmitting codeword (even if NULL codeword),
then the RXCW.C bit will be set so check for RXCW.CW is unnecessary.
Ref: RH BZ 840642

Reported-by: Fabio Futigami <ffutigam@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tushar Dave <tushar.n.dave@intel.com>
CC: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Aaron Brown <aaron.f.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter P Waskiewicz Jr <peter.p.waskiewicz.jr@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/e1000e/82571.c |    4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/e1000e/82571.c
+++ b/drivers/net/e1000e/82571.c
@@ -1602,10 +1602,8 @@ static s32 e1000_check_for_serdes_link_8
 			 * auto-negotiation in the TXCW register and disable
 			 * forced link in the Device Control register in an
 			 * attempt to auto-negotiate with our link partner.
-			 * If the partner code word is null, stop forcing
-			 * and restart auto negotiation.
 			 */
-			if ((rxcw & E1000_RXCW_C) || !(rxcw & E1000_RXCW_CW))  {
+			if (rxcw & E1000_RXCW_C) {
 				/* Enable autoneg, and unforce link up */
 				ew32(TXCW, mac->txcw);
 				ew32(CTRL, (ctrl & ~E1000_CTRL_SLU));

[ 43/44] Input: wacom - Bamboo One 1024 pressure fix

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chris Bagwell <chris@cnpbagwell.com>

commit 6dc463511d4a690f01a9248df3b384db717e0b1c upstream.

Bamboo One's with ID of 0x6a and 0x6b were added with correct
indication of 1024 pressure levels but the Graphire packet routine
was only looking at 9 bits.  Increased to 10 bits.

This bug caused these devices to roll over to zero pressure at half
way mark.

The other devices using this routine only support 256 or 512 range
and look to fix unused bits at zero.

Signed-off-by: Chris Bagwell <chris@cnpbagwell.com>
Reported-by: Tushant Mirchandani <tushantin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ping Cheng <pingc@wacom.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/input/tablet/wacom_wac.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/input/tablet/wacom_wac.c
+++ b/drivers/input/tablet/wacom_wac.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static int wacom_graphire_irq(struct wac
 		input_report_abs(input, ABS_X, le16_to_cpup((__le16 *)&data[2]));
 		input_report_abs(input, ABS_Y, le16_to_cpup((__le16 *)&data[4]));
 		if (wacom->tool[0] != BTN_TOOL_MOUSE) {
-			input_report_abs(input, ABS_PRESSURE, data[6] | ((data[7] & 0x01) << 8));
+			input_report_abs(input, ABS_PRESSURE, data[6] | ((data[7] & 0x03) << 8));
 			input_report_key(input, BTN_TOUCH, data[1] & 0x01);
 			input_report_key(input, BTN_STYLUS, data[1] & 0x02);
 			input_report_key(input, BTN_STYLUS2, data[1] & 0x04);

[ 44/44] rt61pci: fix NULL pointer dereference in config_lna_gain

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>

commit deee0214def5d8a32b8112f11d9c2b1696e9c0cb upstream.

We can not pass NULL libconf->conf->channel to rt61pci_config() as it
is dereferenced unconditionally in rt61pci_config_lna_gain() subroutine.

Resolves:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=44361

Reported-and-tested-by: <dolohow@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/wireless/rt2x00/rt61pci.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/rt2x00/rt61pci.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/rt2x00/rt61pci.c
@@ -2254,8 +2254,7 @@ static void rt61pci_txdone(struct rt2x00
 
 static void rt61pci_wakeup(struct rt2x00_dev *rt2x00dev)
 {
-	struct ieee80211_conf conf = { .flags = 0 };
-	struct rt2x00lib_conf libconf = { .conf = &conf };
+	struct rt2x00lib_conf libconf = { .conf = &rt2x00dev->hw->conf };
 
 	rt61pci_config(rt2x00dev, &libconf, IEEE80211_CONF_CHANGE_PS);
 }

Re: [ 10/44] ALSA: hda - remove quirk for Dell Vostro 1015

[David Henningsson]

On 08/14/2012 12:02 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>
> 3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

As my previous email states, I still object to this patch being applied 
to 3.0 (it is for 3.2+). Repeating that text now:

This patch will not work on 3.0 because there is no model=auto fallback, 
so please remove it from 3.0-stable-queue.

In the original patch [1], the cc to stable was written as this:

Cc: stable@kernel.org (3.2+)

Is there a better way to specify what kernels it should and should not 
be applied to, as it doesn't seem to have worked in this case?

[1] 
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/tiwai/sound.git;a=commit;h=e9fc83cb2e5877801a255a37ddbc5be996ea8046

-- 
David Henningsson, Canonical Ltd.
https://launchpad.net/~diwic

Re: [ 10/44] ALSA: hda - remove quirk for Dell Vostro 1015

[Takashi Iwai]

At Tue, 14 Aug 2012 07:17:43 +0200,
David Henningsson wrote:
> 
> On 08/14/2012 12:02 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> >
> > 3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> 
> As my previous email states, I still object to this patch being applied 
> to 3.0 (it is for 3.2+). Repeating that text now:
> 
> This patch will not work on 3.0 because there is no model=auto fallback, 
> so please remove it from 3.0-stable-queue.

Right, Greg, could you remove this patch from the 3.0 queue?
This will cause a regression on 3.0.


thanks,

Takashi

> 
> In the original patch [1], the cc to stable was written as this:
> 
> Cc: stable@kernel.org (3.2+)
> 
> Is there a better way to specify what kernels it should and should not 
> be applied to, as it doesn't seem to have worked in this case?
> 
> [1] 
> http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/tiwai/sound.git;a=commit;h=e9fc83cb2e5877801a255a37ddbc5be996ea8046
> 
> -- 
> David Henningsson, Canonical Ltd.
> https://launchpad.net/~diwic
> 

Re: [ 07/44] ARM: 7477/1: vfp: Always save VFP state in vfp_pm_suspend on UP

[Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski]

On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 03:02:14PM -0700, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> 
[...]
> --- a/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
> @@ -412,6 +412,12 @@ static int vfp_pm_suspend(void)
>  
>  		/* disable, just in case */
>  		fmxr(FPEXC, fmrx(FPEXC) & ~FPEXC_EN);
> +	} else if (vfp_current_hw_state[ti->cpu]) {
> +#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
> +		fmxr(FPEXC, fpexc | FPEXC_EN);
> +		vfp_save_state(vfp_current_hw_state[ti->cpu], fpexc);
> +		fmxr(FPEXC, fpexc);
> +#endif

This fails to build on 3.0:

linux-stable/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c: In function 'vfp_pm_suspend':
linux-stable/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c:415:13: error: 'vfp_current_hw_state' undeclared (first use in this function)
linux-stable/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c:415:13: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
make[3]: *** [arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.o] Error 1

In 3.0, vfp_current_hw_state was still named last_VFP_context, so I
think just renaming should be enough to fix this.

>  	}
>  
>  	/* clear any information we had about last context state */
> 

-- 
[]'s
Herton

Re: [ 36/44] x86, microcode: Sanitize per-cpu microcode reloading interface

[Henrique de Moraes Holschuh]

I believe the patch bellow, which was required on 3.2, will also be
necessary.

From: Kevin Winchester <kjwinchester@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] x86: Simplify code by removing a !SMP #ifdefs from 'struct
 cpuinfo_x86'

commit 141168c36cdee3ff23d9c7700b0edc47cb65479f and
commit 3f806e50981825fa56a7f1938f24c0680816be45 upstream.

Several fields in struct cpuinfo_x86 were not defined for the
!SMP case, likely to save space.  However, those fields still
have some meaning for UP, and keeping them allows some #ifdef
removal from other files.  The additional size of the UP kernel
from this change is not significant enough to worry about
keeping up the distinction:

	   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
	4737168	 506459	 972040	6215667	 5ed7f3	vmlinux.o.before
	4737444	 506459	 972040	6215943	 5ed907	vmlinux.o.after

for a difference of 276 bytes for an example UP config.

If someone wants those 276 bytes back badly then it should
be implemented in a cleaner way.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Winchester <kjwinchester@gmail.com>
Cc: Steffen Persvold <sp@numascale.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324428742-12498-1-git-send-email-kjwinchester@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h     |    2 --
 arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c             |    8 ++------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c            |    2 --
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c         |    5 -----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c          |    2 --
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c     |    2 --
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c |    5 +----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c           |    4 +---
 drivers/edac/sb_edac.c               |    2 --
 drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c             |    7 +++----
 10 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index bb3ee36..f7c89e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -99,7 +99,6 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 {
 	u16			apicid;
 	u16			initial_apicid;
 	u16			x86_clflush_size;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	/* number of cores as seen by the OS: */
 	u16			booted_cores;
 	/* Physical processor id: */
@@ -110,7 +109,6 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 {
 	u8			compute_unit_id;
 	/* Index into per_cpu list: */
 	u16			cpu_index;
-#endif
 	u32			microcode;
 } __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES)));
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c
index bae1efe..be16854 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c
@@ -154,16 +154,14 @@ int amd_get_subcaches(int cpu)
 {
 	struct pci_dev *link = node_to_amd_nb(amd_get_nb_id(cpu))->link;
 	unsigned int mask;
-	int cuid = 0;
+	int cuid;
 
 	if (!amd_nb_has_feature(AMD_NB_L3_PARTITIONING))
 		return 0;
 
 	pci_read_config_dword(link, 0x1d4, &mask);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	cuid = cpu_data(cpu).compute_unit_id;
-#endif
 	return (mask >> (4 * cuid)) & 0xf;
 }
 
@@ -172,7 +170,7 @@ int amd_set_subcaches(int cpu, int mask)
 	static unsigned int reset, ban;
 	struct amd_northbridge *nb = node_to_amd_nb(amd_get_nb_id(cpu));
 	unsigned int reg;
-	int cuid = 0;
+	int cuid;
 
 	if (!amd_nb_has_feature(AMD_NB_L3_PARTITIONING) || mask > 0xf)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -190,9 +188,7 @@ int amd_set_subcaches(int cpu, int mask)
 		pci_write_config_dword(nb->misc, 0x1b8, reg & ~0x180000);
 	}
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	cuid = cpu_data(cpu).compute_unit_id;
-#endif
 	mask <<= 4 * cuid;
 	mask |= (0xf ^ (1 << cuid)) << 26;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 3524e1f..ff8557e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -148,7 +148,6 @@ static void __cpuinit init_amd_k6(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 static void __cpuinit amd_k7_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	/* calling is from identify_secondary_cpu() ? */
 	if (!c->cpu_index)
 		return;
@@ -192,7 +191,6 @@ static void __cpuinit amd_k7_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 valid_k7:
 	;
-#endif
 }
 
 static void __cpuinit init_amd_k7(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index aa003b1..ca93cc7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -676,9 +676,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (this_cpu->c_early_init)
 		this_cpu->c_early_init(c);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	c->cpu_index = 0;
-#endif
 	filter_cpuid_features(c, false);
 
 	setup_smep(c);
@@ -764,10 +762,7 @@ static void __cpuinit generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		c->apicid = c->initial_apicid;
 # endif
 #endif
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_HT
 		c->phys_proc_id = c->initial_apicid;
-#endif
 	}
 
 	setup_smep(c);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index 5231312..3e6ff6c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -181,7 +181,6 @@ static void __cpuinit trap_init_f00f_bug(void)
 
 static void __cpuinit intel_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	/* calling is from identify_secondary_cpu() ? */
 	if (!c->cpu_index)
 		return;
@@ -198,7 +197,6 @@ static void __cpuinit intel_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "WARNING: SMP operation may be unreliable"
 				    "with B stepping processors.\n");
 	}
-#endif
 }
 
 static void __cpuinit intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
index b0f1271..3b67877 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -119,9 +119,7 @@ void mce_setup(struct mce *m)
 	m->time = get_seconds();
 	m->cpuvendor = boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor;
 	m->cpuid = cpuid_eax(1);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	m->socketid = cpu_data(m->extcpu).phys_proc_id;
-#endif
 	m->apicid = cpu_data(m->extcpu).initial_apicid;
 	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP, m->mcgcap);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c
index 445a61c..d4444be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c
@@ -65,11 +65,9 @@ struct threshold_bank {
 };
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct threshold_bank * [NR_BANKS], threshold_banks);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 static unsigned char shared_bank[NR_BANKS] = {
 	0, 0, 0, 0, 1
 };
-#endif
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned char, bank_map);	/* see which banks are on */
 
@@ -227,10 +225,9 @@ void mce_amd_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 			if (!block)
 				per_cpu(bank_map, cpu) |= (1 << bank);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+
 			if (shared_bank[bank] && c->cpu_core_id)
 				break;
-#endif
 
 			memset(&b, 0, sizeof(b));
 			b.cpu			= cpu;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c
index 14b2314..8022c66 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c
@@ -64,12 +64,10 @@ static void show_cpuinfo_misc(struct seq_file *m, struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
 	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = v;
-	unsigned int cpu = 0;
+	unsigned int cpu;
 	int i;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	cpu = c->cpu_index;
-#endif
 	seq_printf(m, "processor\t: %u\n"
 		   "vendor_id\t: %s\n"
 		   "cpu family\t: %d\n"
diff --git a/drivers/edac/sb_edac.c b/drivers/edac/sb_edac.c
index 18a1293..0db57b5 100644
--- a/drivers/edac/sb_edac.c
+++ b/drivers/edac/sb_edac.c
@@ -1609,11 +1609,9 @@ static int sbridge_mce_check_error(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,
 		mce->cpuvendor, mce->cpuid, mce->time,
 		mce->socketid, mce->apicid);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	/* Only handle if it is the right mc controller */
 	if (cpu_data(mce->cpu).phys_proc_id != pvt->sbridge_dev->mc)
 		return NOTIFY_DONE;
-#endif
 
 	smp_rmb();
 	if ((pvt->mce_out + 1) % MCE_LOG_LEN == pvt->mce_in) {
diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c b/drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c
index 0790c98..19b4412 100644
--- a/drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c
@@ -57,16 +57,15 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(tjmax, "TjMax value in degrees Celsius");
 #define TOTAL_ATTRS		(MAX_CORE_ATTRS + 1)
 #define MAX_CORE_DATA		(NUM_REAL_CORES + BASE_SYSFS_ATTR_NO)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 #define TO_PHYS_ID(cpu)		cpu_data(cpu).phys_proc_id
 #define TO_CORE_ID(cpu)		cpu_data(cpu).cpu_core_id
+#define TO_ATTR_NO(cpu)		(TO_CORE_ID(cpu) + BASE_SYSFS_ATTR_NO)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 #define for_each_sibling(i, cpu)	for_each_cpu(i, cpu_sibling_mask(cpu))
 #else
-#define TO_PHYS_ID(cpu)		(cpu)
-#define TO_CORE_ID(cpu)		(cpu)
 #define for_each_sibling(i, cpu)	for (i = 0; false; )
 #endif
-#define TO_ATTR_NO(cpu)		(TO_CORE_ID(cpu) + BASE_SYSFS_ATTR_NO)
 
 /*
  * Per-Core Temperature Data
-- 
1.7.10


-- 
  "One disk to rule them all, One disk to find them. One disk to bring
  them all and in the darkness grind them. In the Land of Redmond
  where the shadows lie." -- The Silicon Valley Tarot
  Henrique Holschuh

Re: [ 06/44] ARM: 7467/1: mutex: use generic xchg-based implementation for ARMv6+

[Ben Hutchings]

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On Mon, 2012-08-13 at 15:02 -0700, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> 
> 3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> 
> ------------------
> 
> From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
> 
> commit a76d7bd96d65fa5119adba97e1b58d95f2e78829 upstream.
> 
> The open-coded mutex implementation for ARMv6+ cores suffers from a
> severe lack of barriers, so in the uncontended case we don't actually
> protect any accesses performed during the critical section.
> 
> Furthermore, the code is largely a duplication of the ARMv6+ atomic_dec
> code but optimised to remove a branch instruction, as the mutex fastpath
> was previously inlined. Now that this is executed out-of-line, we can
> reuse the atomic access code for the locking (in fact, we use the xchg
> code as this produces shorter critical sections).
> 
> This patch uses the generic xchg based implementation for mutexes on
> ARMv6+, which introduces barriers to the lock/unlock operations and also
> has the benefit of removing a fair amount of inline assembly code.
[...]

This should be deferred, same as in 3.4.y and 3.5.y.

Ben.

-- 
Ben Hutchings
I say we take off; nuke the site from orbit.  It's the only way to be sure.

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Re: [ 10/44] ALSA: hda - remove quirk for Dell Vostro 1015

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:17:43AM +0200, David Henningsson wrote:
> On 08/14/2012 12:02 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> >From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> >
> >3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> 
> As my previous email states, I still object to this patch being
> applied to 3.0 (it is for 3.2+). Repeating that text now:
> 
> This patch will not work on 3.0 because there is no model=auto
> fallback, so please remove it from 3.0-stable-queue.
> 
> In the original patch [1], the cc to stable was written as this:
> 
> Cc: stable@kernel.org (3.2+)
> 
> Is there a better way to specify what kernels it should and should
> not be applied to, as it doesn't seem to have worked in this case?
> 
> [1] http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/tiwai/sound.git;a=commit;h=e9fc83cb2e5877801a255a37ddbc5be996ea8046

No, that's my fault, sorry, I missed that marking and shouldn't have
applied it there.  I'll go remove it right now from the queue.

greg k-h

Re: [ 07/44] ARM: 7477/1: vfp: Always save VFP state in vfp_pm_suspend on UP

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 05:01:11PM -0300, Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 03:02:14PM -0700, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> > 
> [...]
> > --- a/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
> > @@ -412,6 +412,12 @@ static int vfp_pm_suspend(void)
> >  
> >  		/* disable, just in case */
> >  		fmxr(FPEXC, fmrx(FPEXC) & ~FPEXC_EN);
> > +	} else if (vfp_current_hw_state[ti->cpu]) {
> > +#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
> > +		fmxr(FPEXC, fpexc | FPEXC_EN);
> > +		vfp_save_state(vfp_current_hw_state[ti->cpu], fpexc);
> > +		fmxr(FPEXC, fpexc);
> > +#endif
> 
> This fails to build on 3.0:
> 
> linux-stable/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c: In function 'vfp_pm_suspend':
> linux-stable/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c:415:13: error: 'vfp_current_hw_state' undeclared (first use in this function)
> linux-stable/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c:415:13: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
> make[3]: *** [arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.o] Error 1
> 
> In 3.0, vfp_current_hw_state was still named last_VFP_context, so I
> think just renaming should be enough to fix this.

I'll remove the patch as it probably just shouldn't be there, right?  If
you think it should be in 3.0-stable, can you please send me a fixed up
patch that you have tested that it at least builds properly?

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [ 36/44] x86, microcode: Sanitize per-cpu microcode reloading interface

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 09:26:54PM -0300, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> I believe the patch bellow, which was required on 3.2, will also be
> necessary.

Will it be necessary to apply this before this patch goes in the series,
or after it?

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [ 07/44] ARM: 7477/1: vfp: Always save VFP state in vfp_pm_suspend on UP

[Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski]

On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 07:05:41AM -0700, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 05:01:11PM -0300, Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 03:02:14PM -0700, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> > > 
> > [...]
> > > --- a/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
> > > +++ b/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
> > > @@ -412,6 +412,12 @@ static int vfp_pm_suspend(void)
> > >  
> > >  		/* disable, just in case */
> > >  		fmxr(FPEXC, fmrx(FPEXC) & ~FPEXC_EN);
> > > +	} else if (vfp_current_hw_state[ti->cpu]) {
> > > +#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
> > > +		fmxr(FPEXC, fpexc | FPEXC_EN);
> > > +		vfp_save_state(vfp_current_hw_state[ti->cpu], fpexc);
> > > +		fmxr(FPEXC, fpexc);
> > > +#endif
> > 
> > This fails to build on 3.0:
> > 
> > linux-stable/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c: In function 'vfp_pm_suspend':
> > linux-stable/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c:415:13: error: 'vfp_current_hw_state' undeclared (first use in this function)
> > linux-stable/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c:415:13: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
> > make[3]: *** [arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.o] Error 1
> > 
> > In 3.0, vfp_current_hw_state was still named last_VFP_context, so I
> > think just renaming should be enough to fix this.
> 
> I'll remove the patch as it probably just shouldn't be there, right?  If
> you think it should be in 3.0-stable, can you please send me a fixed up
> patch that you have tested that it at least builds properly?

I'm not intimate with this ARM code, so I think someone else in Cc can
answer better, I just saw it doesn't build with 3.0. If the same problem
affects 3.0, then the change should be backported renaming
vfp_current_hw_state to last_VFP_context. It seems the same code was
there with vfp_current_hw_state still named as last_VFP_context, so
looks like 3.0 would be affected as well.

Also I noted that because the same naming, 3.0 didn't got commit
a84b895a2348f0dbff31b71ddf954f70a6cde368 ("ARM: 7476/1: vfp: only clear
vfp state for current cpu in vfp_pm_suspend") as the patch would fail to
apply on 3.0 code base, while 3.4.9 and 3.5.2 have it.

I assume someone who did these commits or know it/are affected can take
a look and if needed backport them to 3.0?

> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

-- 
[]'s
Herton

Re: [ 36/44] x86, microcode: Sanitize per-cpu microcode reloading interface

[Henrique de Moraes Holschuh]

On Wed, 15 Aug 2012, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 09:26:54PM -0300, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> > I believe the patch bellow, which was required on 3.2, will also be
> > necessary.
> 
> Will it be necessary to apply this before this patch goes in the series,
> or after it?

Applying after fixes a build error.  Applying before might avoid the build
error altogether (error happens when #undef CONFIG_SMP), AFAIK.

-- 
  "One disk to rule them all, One disk to find them. One disk to bring
  them all and in the darkness grind them. In the Land of Redmond
  where the shadows lie." -- The Silicon Valley Tarot
  Henrique Holschuh

Re: [ 36/44] x86, microcode: Sanitize per-cpu microcode reloading interface

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 01:30:46PM -0300, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 09:26:54PM -0300, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> > > I believe the patch bellow, which was required on 3.2, will also be
> > > necessary.
> > 
> > Will it be necessary to apply this before this patch goes in the series,
> > or after it?
> 
> Applying after fixes a build error.  Applying before might avoid the build
> error altogether (error happens when #undef CONFIG_SMP), AFAIK.

Ok, it doesn't apply directly, but looks easy enough to fix up by hand,
I'll go work on that right now...

greg k-h