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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	<iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 17:38:07 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160822223807.29880.69294.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160822223529.29880.50884.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

Since DMA addresses will effectively look like 48-bit addresses when the
memory encryption mask is set, SWIOTLB is needed if the DMA mask of the
device performing the DMA does not support 48-bits. SWIOTLB will be
initialized to create un-encrypted bounce buffers for use by these devices.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h |    5 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    6 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c          |   11 ++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c        |    2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c      |    8 +++--
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   22 ++++++++++++
 include/linux/swiotlb.h            |    1 +
 init/main.c                        |   13 +++++++
 lib/swiotlb.c                      |   64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 9 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
index 4446162..c9cdcae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/swiotlb.h>
 #include <linux/dma-contiguous.h>
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ISA
 # define ISA_DMA_BIT_MASK DMA_BIT_MASK(24)
@@ -69,12 +70,12 @@ static inline bool dma_capable(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t addr, size_t size)
 
 static inline dma_addr_t phys_to_dma(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t paddr)
 {
-	return paddr;
+	return paddr | sme_me_mask;
 }
 
 static inline phys_addr_t dma_to_phys(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t daddr)
 {
-	return daddr;
+	return daddr & ~sme_me_mask;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_DMA_REMAP */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 5616ed1..384fdfb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -33,6 +33,12 @@ void __init sme_early_mem_dec(resource_size_t paddr,
 
 void __init sme_early_init(void);
 
+/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
+void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
+
+unsigned long swiotlb_get_me_mask(void);
+void swiotlb_set_mem_dec(void *vaddr, unsigned long size);
+
 #define __sme_pa(x)		(__pa((x)) | sme_me_mask)
 #define __sme_pa_nodebug(x)	(__pa_nodebug((x)) | sme_me_mask)
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
index d30c377..0ce28df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
@@ -92,9 +92,12 @@ again:
 	/* CMA can be used only in the context which permits sleeping */
 	if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flag)) {
 		page = dma_alloc_from_contiguous(dev, count, get_order(size));
-		if (page && page_to_phys(page) + size > dma_mask) {
-			dma_release_from_contiguous(dev, page, count);
-			page = NULL;
+		if (page) {
+			addr = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page));
+			if (addr + size > dma_mask) {
+				dma_release_from_contiguous(dev, page, count);
+				page = NULL;
+			}
 		}
 	}
 	/* fallback */
@@ -103,7 +106,7 @@ again:
 	if (!page)
 		return NULL;
 
-	addr = page_to_phys(page);
+	addr = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page));
 	if (addr + size > dma_mask) {
 		__free_pages(page, get_order(size));
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c
index 00e71ce..922c10d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static dma_addr_t nommu_map_page(struct device *dev, struct page *page,
 				 enum dma_data_direction dir,
 				 unsigned long attrs)
 {
-	dma_addr_t bus = page_to_phys(page) + offset;
+	dma_addr_t bus = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page)) + offset;
 	WARN_ON(size == 0);
 	if (!check_addr("map_single", dev, bus, size))
 		return DMA_ERROR_CODE;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
index b47edb8..34a9e524 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 #include <asm/dma.h>
 #include <asm/xen/swiotlb-xen.h>
 #include <asm/iommu_table.h>
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
+
 int swiotlb __read_mostly;
 
 void *x86_swiotlb_alloc_coherent(struct device *hwdev, size_t size,
@@ -64,13 +66,15 @@ static struct dma_map_ops swiotlb_dma_ops = {
  * pci_swiotlb_detect_override - set swiotlb to 1 if necessary
  *
  * This returns non-zero if we are forced to use swiotlb (by the boot
- * option).
+ * option). If memory encryption is enabled then swiotlb will be set
+ * to 1 so that bounce buffers are allocated and used for devices that
+ * do not support the addressing range required for the encryption mask.
  */
 int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_override(void)
 {
 	int use_swiotlb = swiotlb | swiotlb_force;
 
-	if (swiotlb_force)
+	if (swiotlb_force || sme_me_mask)
 		swiotlb = 1;
 
 	return use_swiotlb;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index b0f39c5..6b2e8bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
 
 #include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@@ -172,3 +174,23 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++)
 		protection_map[i] = __pgprot(pgprot_val(protection_map[i]) | sme_me_mask);
 }
+
+/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
+void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
+{
+	if (!sme_me_mask)
+		return;
+
+	/* Make SWIOTLB use an unencrypted DMA area */
+	swiotlb_clear_encryption();
+}
+
+unsigned long swiotlb_get_me_mask(void)
+{
+	return sme_me_mask;
+}
+
+void swiotlb_set_mem_dec(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+	sme_set_mem_dec(vaddr, size);
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/swiotlb.h b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
index 5f81f8a..5c909fc 100644
--- a/include/linux/swiotlb.h
+++ b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs, int verbose);
 extern unsigned long swiotlb_nr_tbl(void);
 unsigned long swiotlb_size_or_default(void);
 extern int swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs);
+extern void __init swiotlb_clear_encryption(void);
 
 /*
  * Enumeration for sync targets
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index a8a58e2..82c7cd9 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -458,6 +458,10 @@ void __init __weak thread_stack_cache_init(void)
 }
 #endif
 
+void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void)
+{
+}
+
 /*
  * Set up kernel memory allocators
  */
@@ -598,6 +602,15 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
 	 */
 	locking_selftest();
 
+	/*
+	 * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
+	 * operations that might use the swiotlb bounce buffers.
+	 * This call will mark the bounce buffers as un-encrypted so
+	 * that the usage of them will not cause "plain-text" data
+	 * to be decrypted when accessed.
+	 */
+	mem_encrypt_init();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
 	if (initrd_start && !initrd_below_start_ok &&
 	    page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)initrd_start)) < min_low_pfn) {
diff --git a/lib/swiotlb.c b/lib/swiotlb.c
index 22e13a0..15d5741 100644
--- a/lib/swiotlb.c
+++ b/lib/swiotlb.c
@@ -131,6 +131,26 @@ unsigned long swiotlb_size_or_default(void)
 	return size ? size : (IO_TLB_DEFAULT_SIZE);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Support for memory encryption. If memory encryption is supported, then an
+ * override to these functions will be provided.
+ */
+unsigned long __weak swiotlb_get_me_mask(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void __weak swiotlb_set_mem_dec(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+}
+
+/* For swiotlb, clear memory encryption mask from dma addresses */
+static dma_addr_t swiotlb_phys_to_dma(struct device *hwdev,
+				      phys_addr_t address)
+{
+	return phys_to_dma(hwdev, address) & ~swiotlb_get_me_mask();
+}
+
 /* Note that this doesn't work with highmem page */
 static dma_addr_t swiotlb_virt_to_bus(struct device *hwdev,
 				      volatile void *address)
@@ -159,6 +179,30 @@ void swiotlb_print_info(void)
 	       bytes >> 20, vstart, vend - 1);
 }
 
+/*
+ * If memory encryption is active, the DMA address for an encrypted page may
+ * be beyond the range of the device. If bounce buffers are required be sure
+ * that they are not on an encrypted page. This should be called before the
+ * iotlb area is used.
+ */
+void __init swiotlb_clear_encryption(void)
+{
+	void *vaddr;
+	unsigned long bytes;
+
+	if (no_iotlb_memory || !io_tlb_start || late_alloc)
+		return;
+
+	vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_start);
+	bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_nslabs << IO_TLB_SHIFT);
+	swiotlb_set_mem_dec(vaddr, bytes);
+	memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
+
+	vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
+	bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_overflow);
+	swiotlb_set_mem_dec(vaddr, bytes);
+}
+
 int __init swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs, int verbose)
 {
 	void *v_overflow_buffer;
@@ -294,6 +338,8 @@ swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs)
 	io_tlb_start = virt_to_phys(tlb);
 	io_tlb_end = io_tlb_start + bytes;
 
+	/* Keep TLB in unencrypted memory if memory encryption is active */
+	swiotlb_set_mem_dec(tlb, bytes);
 	memset(tlb, 0, bytes);
 
 	/*
@@ -304,6 +350,8 @@ swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs)
 	if (!v_overflow_buffer)
 		goto cleanup2;
 
+	/* Keep overflow in unencrypted memory if memory encryption is active */
+	swiotlb_set_mem_dec(v_overflow_buffer, io_tlb_overflow);
 	io_tlb_overflow_buffer = virt_to_phys(v_overflow_buffer);
 
 	/*
@@ -541,7 +589,7 @@ static phys_addr_t
 map_single(struct device *hwdev, phys_addr_t phys, size_t size,
 	   enum dma_data_direction dir)
 {
-	dma_addr_t start_dma_addr = phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_start);
+	dma_addr_t start_dma_addr = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_start);
 
 	return swiotlb_tbl_map_single(hwdev, start_dma_addr, phys, size, dir);
 }
@@ -659,7 +707,7 @@ swiotlb_alloc_coherent(struct device *hwdev, size_t size,
 			goto err_warn;
 
 		ret = phys_to_virt(paddr);
-		dev_addr = phys_to_dma(hwdev, paddr);
+		dev_addr = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, paddr);
 
 		/* Confirm address can be DMA'd by device */
 		if (dev_addr + size - 1 > dma_mask) {
@@ -758,15 +806,15 @@ dma_addr_t swiotlb_map_page(struct device *dev, struct page *page,
 	map = map_single(dev, phys, size, dir);
 	if (map == SWIOTLB_MAP_ERROR) {
 		swiotlb_full(dev, size, dir, 1);
-		return phys_to_dma(dev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
+		return swiotlb_phys_to_dma(dev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
 	}
 
-	dev_addr = phys_to_dma(dev, map);
+	dev_addr = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(dev, map);
 
 	/* Ensure that the address returned is DMA'ble */
 	if (!dma_capable(dev, dev_addr, size)) {
 		swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single(dev, map, size, dir);
-		return phys_to_dma(dev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
+		return swiotlb_phys_to_dma(dev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
 	}
 
 	return dev_addr;
@@ -901,7 +949,7 @@ swiotlb_map_sg_attrs(struct device *hwdev, struct scatterlist *sgl, int nelems,
 				sg_dma_len(sgl) = 0;
 				return 0;
 			}
-			sg->dma_address = phys_to_dma(hwdev, map);
+			sg->dma_address = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, map);
 		} else
 			sg->dma_address = dev_addr;
 		sg_dma_len(sg) = sg->length;
@@ -985,7 +1033,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(swiotlb_sync_sg_for_device);
 int
 swiotlb_dma_mapping_error(struct device *hwdev, dma_addr_t dma_addr)
 {
-	return (dma_addr == phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer));
+	return (dma_addr == swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer));
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(swiotlb_dma_mapping_error);
 
@@ -998,6 +1046,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(swiotlb_dma_mapping_error);
 int
 swiotlb_dma_supported(struct device *hwdev, u64 mask)
 {
-	return phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_end - 1) <= mask;
+	return swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_end - 1) <= mask;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(swiotlb_dma_supported);

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-08-22 22:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-22 22:35 [RFC PATCH v2 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02  8:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25  3:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 11:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25 13:04   ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-30 13:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-30 14:57       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 14:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:07     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 18:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:11     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05  8:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:16     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05 15:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06  9:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:30     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-08 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 13:43             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/20] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06 16:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 15:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:11         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 16:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:35       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:55   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 14:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15  9:57       ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15 16:52         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:41     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2016-09-12 10:58   ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 11:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:45     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 16:57         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16  7:08           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 12:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 17:08         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16  7:11           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 17:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:31     ` Tom Lendacky

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